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Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America
Why policymaking in the United States privileges the rich over the poor
Can a country be a democracy if its government only responds to the preferences of the rich? In an ideal democracy, all citizens should have equal influence on government policy--but as this book demonstrates, America's policymakers respond almost exclusively to the preferences of the economically advantaged. Affluence and Influence definitively explores how political inequality in the United States has evolved over the last several decades and how this growing disparity has been shaped by interest groups, parties, and elections.
With sharp analysis and an impressive range of data, Martin Gilens looks at thousands of proposed policy changes, and the degree of support for each among poor, middle-class, and affluent Americans. His findings are staggering: when preferences of low- or middle-income Americans diverge from those of the affluent, there is virtually no relationship between policy outcomes and the desires of less advantaged groups. In contrast, affluent Americans' preferences exhibit a substantial relationship with policy outcomes whether their preferences are shared by lower-income groups or not. Gilens shows that representational inequality is spread widely across different policy domains and time periods. Yet Gilens also shows that under specific circumstances the preferences of the middle class and, to a lesser extent, the poor, do seem to matter. In particular, impending elections--especially presidential elections--and an even partisan division in Congress mitigate representational inequality and boost responsiveness to the preferences of the broader public.
At a time when economic and political inequality in the United States only continues to rise, Affluence and Influence raises important questions about whether American democracy is truly responding to the needs of all its citizens.
Can a country be a democracy if its government only responds to the preferences of the rich? In an ideal democracy, all citizens should have equal influence on government policy--but as this book demonstrates, America's policymakers respond almost exclusively to the preferences of the economically advantaged. Affluence and Influence definitively explores how political inequality in the United States has evolved over the last several decades and how this growing disparity has been shaped by interest groups, parties, and elections.
With sharp analysis and an impressive range of data, Martin Gilens looks at thousands of proposed policy changes, and the degree of support for each among poor, middle-class, and affluent Americans. His findings are staggering: when preferences of low- or middle-income Americans diverge from those of the affluent, there is virtually no relationship between policy outcomes and the desires of less advantaged groups. In contrast, affluent Americans' preferences exhibit a substantial relationship with policy outcomes whether their preferences are shared by lower-income groups or not. Gilens shows that representational inequality is spread widely across different policy domains and time periods. Yet Gilens also shows that under specific circumstances the preferences of the middle class and, to a lesser extent, the poor, do seem to matter. In particular, impending elections--especially presidential elections--and an even partisan division in Congress mitigate representational inequality and boost responsiveness to the preferences of the broader public.
At a time when economic and political inequality in the United States only continues to rise, Affluence and Influence raises important questions about whether American democracy is truly responding to the needs of all its citizens.
352 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2010
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About the author
Martin Gilens
7 books22 followersMartin Gilens is Professor of Politics at Princeton University. His research examines representation, public opinion, and mass media, especially in relation to inequality and public policy.
Professor Gilens is the author of Affluence Influence Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (2012, Princeton University Press) and Why Americans Hate Welfare Race Media and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy (1999, University of Chicago Press), and has published on political inequality, mass media, race, gender, and welfare politics in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, The Journal of Politics, the British Journal of Political Science, Public Opinion Quarterly, and the Berkeley Journal of Sociology.
He holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California Berkeley, and taught at Yale University and UCLA before joining the faculty at Princeton. His research has been supported by the Russell Sage Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Institute for Advanced Study, and the Social Science Research Council.
Professor Gilens is the author of Affluence Influence Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (2012, Princeton University Press) and Why Americans Hate Welfare Race Media and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy (1999, University of Chicago Press), and has published on political inequality, mass media, race, gender, and welfare politics in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, The Journal of Politics, the British Journal of Political Science, Public Opinion Quarterly, and the Berkeley Journal of Sociology.
He holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California Berkeley, and taught at Yale University and UCLA before joining the faculty at Princeton. His research has been supported by the Russell Sage Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Institute for Advanced Study, and the Social Science Research Council.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
December 16, 2014
I chanced to come across this book while watching an interview with the author on TV. The subject matter and the interview were interesting and it made me want to read the book. Soon after starting to read it, I realized that it is actually aimed more at academics than lay readers like me. The book contains extensive use of Regression Analysis, concepts like Net Interest Group Alignment Index and measurement of many variables related to this subject. Though it is not an easy read, one can still look at the data, read the analysis and grasp the conclusions that the author arrives at. When I finished the book, I thought that the author has covered the gist of his arguments in the title itself, namely 'Economic Inequality and Political Power in America'.
Now, what is the book's thesis? In the author's own words, it is as follows:
"If you judge how much say people have--their influence over policy--by the match between their policy preferences and subsequent policy outcomes, then American citizens are vastly unequal in their influence over policymaking, and that inequality is growing. In most circumstances, affluent Americans exert substantial influence over the policies adopted by the federal government, and less well off Americans exert virtually none. Even when Democrats control Congress and the White House, the less well off are no more influential.
The one bright spot in this unhappy tale of unequal influence is that political competition increases the responsiveness of policymakers to the views of the public and generates policies that more equally reflect the preferences of all Americans. When elections are near and when control of the government is divided or uncertain, parties broaden their appeal, and influence becomes more equal. So the core elements of democratic government--electoral competition and partisan rivalry--force policymakers to take public preferences more fully into account."
In some ways, these pronouncements may seem obvious and one can ask why we need a Princeton Professor to validate something that most people feel instinctively to be true. But, there is much more to it in the book. Through a vast amount of data and analysis, the author reaches conclusions that run counter to our common-sensical understanding of issues apart from findings which are timely today in the context of increasing inequality in income levels between the top 20% and bottom 20% of income earners. It is an exhaustive study and is based on as many as 1779 public policy cases -- stemming from national surveys collected between 1961 and 2002. The methodology employed in the analysis of this data is too technical for me to understand fully or discuss critically and so I won't even venture into it. The ultimate inference of the findings are captured in the following stunning statement: ".. Modern state of U.S. "democracy" is best described as an amalgamation of competing economic elitist and organized business-based interests. Meanwhile, the overall impact of median voters has dropped to almost zero when considered as an independent public policy factor. The chief predictions of pure theories of majoritarian electoral democracy can be decisively rejected. Not only do ordinary citizens not have uniquely substantial power over policy decisions; they have little or no independent influence on policy at all".
One might think that the book is only about criticism and damning conclusions alone, but that would be wrong. The author deals with the question of what can be done to redress this imbalance and suggests the following measures for increasing responsiveness to public concerns : campaign finance reform, competition-enhancing reforms such as nonpartisan districting and nonpartisan get-out-the-vote drives, focussing on those policies that are supported by both the poor and the affluent alike such as, increases in the minimum wage, spending for education, means-tested job training and childcare, Social Security, and Medicare.
The book also has a humbling lesson for people like me who believe that the Democratic Party is a party of the less-privileged and the working class whereas the Republican Party is that of the well-to-do. The book finds that both parties tend to engage in policymaking that are immune to the preferences of the public. This is demonstrated well through a substantive look at the Lyndon Johnson administration in the 1960s and expressed through the following results:
a) The Democrats had a strong majority in both the House and the Senate during LBJ's time, but policymaking had little relationship to any income group's preferences.
b) Programs like the Great Society, War on Poverty, relaxation of immigration laws and increased government spending on welfare did not have much public support but the govt went ahead with them anyway.
The other lesson from the book is that low and middle income groups aren't necessarily at odds with many Republican positions. The author concedes that increases in minimum wage does correlate with Democrats being in power and reduction in Estate taxes with the Republicans. However, he cautions us with the caveat that Americans who are in the lower strata of income are in sync with Republicans when it comes to gay rights, estate tax repeal, income tax cuts or abortion or school prayer related issues. This group sees itself in sync with the Democrats mostly in certain economic and social welfare issues only. Even here, they were opposed to free-trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) whereas the affluent on the other hand, have supported Medicare and federal aid to education.
Overall, the author says that it is not an easy task to augment what he calls `representational equality'. However, electoral competition and partisan rivalry can force policymakers to take public preferences more into account. Since certain policies have wide support among Americans, including the 90th income percentile, focussing on these policies will automatically result in greater representational equality. Raising the minimum wage, more generous unemployment benefits, stricter corporate regulation (on the oil and gas industries in particular), and a more progressive tax regime are some of the policies which have such support.
Now, what is the book's thesis? In the author's own words, it is as follows:
"If you judge how much say people have--their influence over policy--by the match between their policy preferences and subsequent policy outcomes, then American citizens are vastly unequal in their influence over policymaking, and that inequality is growing. In most circumstances, affluent Americans exert substantial influence over the policies adopted by the federal government, and less well off Americans exert virtually none. Even when Democrats control Congress and the White House, the less well off are no more influential.
The one bright spot in this unhappy tale of unequal influence is that political competition increases the responsiveness of policymakers to the views of the public and generates policies that more equally reflect the preferences of all Americans. When elections are near and when control of the government is divided or uncertain, parties broaden their appeal, and influence becomes more equal. So the core elements of democratic government--electoral competition and partisan rivalry--force policymakers to take public preferences more fully into account."
In some ways, these pronouncements may seem obvious and one can ask why we need a Princeton Professor to validate something that most people feel instinctively to be true. But, there is much more to it in the book. Through a vast amount of data and analysis, the author reaches conclusions that run counter to our common-sensical understanding of issues apart from findings which are timely today in the context of increasing inequality in income levels between the top 20% and bottom 20% of income earners. It is an exhaustive study and is based on as many as 1779 public policy cases -- stemming from national surveys collected between 1961 and 2002. The methodology employed in the analysis of this data is too technical for me to understand fully or discuss critically and so I won't even venture into it. The ultimate inference of the findings are captured in the following stunning statement: ".. Modern state of U.S. "democracy" is best described as an amalgamation of competing economic elitist and organized business-based interests. Meanwhile, the overall impact of median voters has dropped to almost zero when considered as an independent public policy factor. The chief predictions of pure theories of majoritarian electoral democracy can be decisively rejected. Not only do ordinary citizens not have uniquely substantial power over policy decisions; they have little or no independent influence on policy at all".
One might think that the book is only about criticism and damning conclusions alone, but that would be wrong. The author deals with the question of what can be done to redress this imbalance and suggests the following measures for increasing responsiveness to public concerns : campaign finance reform, competition-enhancing reforms such as nonpartisan districting and nonpartisan get-out-the-vote drives, focussing on those policies that are supported by both the poor and the affluent alike such as, increases in the minimum wage, spending for education, means-tested job training and childcare, Social Security, and Medicare.
The book also has a humbling lesson for people like me who believe that the Democratic Party is a party of the less-privileged and the working class whereas the Republican Party is that of the well-to-do. The book finds that both parties tend to engage in policymaking that are immune to the preferences of the public. This is demonstrated well through a substantive look at the Lyndon Johnson administration in the 1960s and expressed through the following results:
a) The Democrats had a strong majority in both the House and the Senate during LBJ's time, but policymaking had little relationship to any income group's preferences.
b) Programs like the Great Society, War on Poverty, relaxation of immigration laws and increased government spending on welfare did not have much public support but the govt went ahead with them anyway.
The other lesson from the book is that low and middle income groups aren't necessarily at odds with many Republican positions. The author concedes that increases in minimum wage does correlate with Democrats being in power and reduction in Estate taxes with the Republicans. However, he cautions us with the caveat that Americans who are in the lower strata of income are in sync with Republicans when it comes to gay rights, estate tax repeal, income tax cuts or abortion or school prayer related issues. This group sees itself in sync with the Democrats mostly in certain economic and social welfare issues only. Even here, they were opposed to free-trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) whereas the affluent on the other hand, have supported Medicare and federal aid to education.
Overall, the author says that it is not an easy task to augment what he calls `representational equality'. However, electoral competition and partisan rivalry can force policymakers to take public preferences more into account. Since certain policies have wide support among Americans, including the 90th income percentile, focussing on these policies will automatically result in greater representational equality. Raising the minimum wage, more generous unemployment benefits, stricter corporate regulation (on the oil and gas industries in particular), and a more progressive tax regime are some of the policies which have such support.
October 27, 2024
Top tier book. The approach is good and it's not unnecessarily long. The later chapters involve too many subset analyses with lower power. However, since the dataset can and has been expanded, it is possible to replicate these analyses in the newly available data.
Read
December 30, 2024UPDATED REVIEW: Monday, December 30, 2024 (no rating)
According to political scientist Martin Gilens, when it comes to liberal or conservative policy, no matter whether the working class would benefit from the policy or not, the preferences of the working class make no difference to the proposal or enacting of the policy. Gilens' conclusion is identical to, though arrived at independently from, political scientist James Bartels' conclusion.
When faced with the same confounding factors to their data, Bartels and Gilens also arrive at the same explanations. One puzzle, for instance, is why a policy like the estate tax, which taxes the inherited wealth of the millionaire plus class, would continue to go unrepealed if such a tax is so unpopular among the wealthiest Americans. Add to this confusion the fact that a majority of working-class Americans actually support the estate tax's repeal, most Americans reporting that they think (incorrectly) that the estate tax is likely to harm their wealth.
Both Gilens and Bartels see this as an example of status-quo bias for Republican presidencies (too risky to mess with, so best leave it alone) and the repeal block on behalf of Democratic presidencies and congresses a matter of the party people behaving "like policy maximizers, pursuing their own policy agendas in apparent indifference to the preferences of the public."
Sometimes political party policy can inadvertently, or accidentally, work in favor of poor people and working-class people. Nevertheless, that doesn't discount the fact that in a proper democracy, the government would be responsive to the desires of its people. Gilens insists that though the United States bears the institutional features common to modern democracies, the fact that the country is only responsive to the top tier of wealth-holding Americans makes the U.S. not a democracy but a plutocracy.
ORIGINAL REVIEW: October 19, 2014 (three stars)
Martin Gilens's book Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America is a very important book that is not very fun to read. It is sort of an extended version of a paper that Gilens coauthored with Benjamin Page. Gilens and Page released a study titled "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Privilege" (available HERE), which created quite a controversy with its findings. The study's finding concluded that verifiably only the interests of American citizen's top 10% are accounted for in American politics, and the only way other American citizens get the policies they want is when the top 10% supports those policies as well. This book of Gilens' is essentially an elaboration of those research findings as well as others he and other people have conducted. That's the good news.
The bad news is that the book is not very fun to read because it's not really written for popular consumption--even though it's marketed that way. Gilens writes as if his audience is an academic audience, and he frequently refers to studies and debates that take place that I imagine the ordinary intelligent reader is going to have no idea about. The book could have been better written and not been so esoteric in the way it addresses the reader.
Even though it's no fun, I'm glad the book was written and think it will be a good resource.
According to political scientist Martin Gilens, when it comes to liberal or conservative policy, no matter whether the working class would benefit from the policy or not, the preferences of the working class make no difference to the proposal or enacting of the policy. Gilens' conclusion is identical to, though arrived at independently from, political scientist James Bartels' conclusion.
When faced with the same confounding factors to their data, Bartels and Gilens also arrive at the same explanations. One puzzle, for instance, is why a policy like the estate tax, which taxes the inherited wealth of the millionaire plus class, would continue to go unrepealed if such a tax is so unpopular among the wealthiest Americans. Add to this confusion the fact that a majority of working-class Americans actually support the estate tax's repeal, most Americans reporting that they think (incorrectly) that the estate tax is likely to harm their wealth.
Both Gilens and Bartels see this as an example of status-quo bias for Republican presidencies (too risky to mess with, so best leave it alone) and the repeal block on behalf of Democratic presidencies and congresses a matter of the party people behaving "like policy maximizers, pursuing their own policy agendas in apparent indifference to the preferences of the public."
Sometimes political party policy can inadvertently, or accidentally, work in favor of poor people and working-class people. Nevertheless, that doesn't discount the fact that in a proper democracy, the government would be responsive to the desires of its people. Gilens insists that though the United States bears the institutional features common to modern democracies, the fact that the country is only responsive to the top tier of wealth-holding Americans makes the U.S. not a democracy but a plutocracy.
ORIGINAL REVIEW: October 19, 2014 (three stars)
Martin Gilens's book Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America is a very important book that is not very fun to read. It is sort of an extended version of a paper that Gilens coauthored with Benjamin Page. Gilens and Page released a study titled "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Privilege" (available HERE), which created quite a controversy with its findings. The study's finding concluded that verifiably only the interests of American citizen's top 10% are accounted for in American politics, and the only way other American citizens get the policies they want is when the top 10% supports those policies as well. This book of Gilens' is essentially an elaboration of those research findings as well as others he and other people have conducted. That's the good news.
The bad news is that the book is not very fun to read because it's not really written for popular consumption--even though it's marketed that way. Gilens writes as if his audience is an academic audience, and he frequently refers to studies and debates that take place that I imagine the ordinary intelligent reader is going to have no idea about. The book could have been better written and not been so esoteric in the way it addresses the reader.
Even though it's no fun, I'm glad the book was written and think it will be a good resource.
June 25, 2014
The link between political inequality and income level in the US is a no-brainer: outsize power tends to accrue where economic elites move serious money. In his study Gilens does a fine job of presenting how this contemporary shift from democracy to plutocracy emerged here and now. Though it’s an accepted reality that affluence moves political change (more specifically, independent, large expenditures made by individuals and businesses move policy), it’s mind-blowing to digest the side-by-side data on political responsiveness among the income brackets in the last thirty or so years. It provokes thought on reconfiguring the policy surrounding this stuff: how can we revive pluralism and democratic representation? A satisfying read, especially in a discussion group/book club setting.
Read
March 7, 2014320.60973 G471 2012
August 22, 2018
- Winner of the 2016 AAPOR Book Award, American Association for Public Opinion Research
- Winner of the 2013 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, American Political Science Association
- One of Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles Top 25 Academic Books for 2013
- from Princeton University Press
This book analyzes policy preferences of the nation's majority, and the preferences of demographic groups including income strata, and compares that to whether polices similar to those are enacted within 4 years of the opinion poll. While the author knows this is not a perfect method to see how majority will is / isn't carried out, he explains why other methods are more flawed. The analysis finds the most affluent 10% have much more political influence than the other 90%. The book doesn't go into depth about the top 1% or 0.1% because there's insufficient definitive datafor a fully scientific case. The book isn't limited to simply saying the top 10% have more influence, but tries to find more specific rules on when, in which areas and why the 10% have how much more influence.
Please note: the opinion polls used are all pre-2008. Generally, the discussion of events is from that earliers period, but there are a few references to Citizen United, Obama and such which occurred before publication (2012.)
The book begins by addressing underlying considerations. For instance, he addresses the claim that below-average income people may lack the knowledge or competence to make policy choices. (He finds that on issues of personal importance they seem informed and often follow the lead of more informed people / groups.) He also discusses questions on how to judge how government policy relates to public opinion. (For instance, if you only analyze votes taken in Congress, you overlook policies supported by the public which never get voted on.) There's also discussion of the methodology for analyzing the data. All in all, the book seems to make great efforts to find the best approach to a scientific analysis and how to see which of alternate possible interpretations are best supported by the data.
The general conclusion is that the most affluent are strongly more influential. However, the book spends chapters finding more about how there are variations depending on policy category, point in the election cycle, the likelihood of losing in the next election, the role of interest groups, etc. One of the situations in which the rich are most dominant is illustrated by the fact when 80% of the public favored a social welfare policy which the affluent opposed, fewer than 1/3 were enacted. (In the minority of cases in which it was enacted, there often were additional factors such as support from a particular industry.)
He discusses the roles of the two major parties. He finds that they seem to act on policies related to their "core activists and their policy demanding groups." When it's campaign season or the parties are evenly split in Congress [they're at risk of losing power], they're more responsive to public opinion than otherwise. He finds that the Democrats act closer to public opinion on social welfare issues. Republicans act closer to public opinion in other policy areas (religion, economy, national security.) [In some areas, this reflects the wealthy being more liberal on "moral" issues such as abortion and gay rights than lower income people, and public support for recent wars / security.] Each party has areas where it varies from the preferences of the affluent, but (generally) policy favors the affluent more than others.
[On national security issues, there may have been bias in the public opinion polls. The book has examples of wording in polls. One example showed two polls asking similar military policy questions which stated one side's argument, but not the other side. See blog iink below for more on this.]
Contrary to stereotype of the two parties, the business de-regulation trend began under Pres. Carter, and other non-stereotypical policies have been carried out by following Democrats.
Although both parties are more responsive to the majority in election years, data shows that policies enacted in election years are more likely to be de-funded later than is legislation enacted in non-election years.
The data shows that over the last few decades the affluent's influence on policy has been increasing.
When a survey asked voters what they liked about the Democrats, only 32% mentioned policies or philosophy. When asked about Republicans, 56% mentioned policy / philosophy. Later, the book tells us over the years there's been an increase in voters saying they preferred candidates based on policy and a decrease in those saying they chose based on character.
In 2006, Congressional campaign spending (adjusted for inflation) was 4 times as large as in 1974.
Read more in blog
- Winner of the 2013 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, American Political Science Association
- One of Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles Top 25 Academic Books for 2013
- from Princeton University Press
This book analyzes policy preferences of the nation's majority, and the preferences of demographic groups including income strata, and compares that to whether polices similar to those are enacted within 4 years of the opinion poll. While the author knows this is not a perfect method to see how majority will is / isn't carried out, he explains why other methods are more flawed. The analysis finds the most affluent 10% have much more political influence than the other 90%. The book doesn't go into depth about the top 1% or 0.1% because there's insufficient definitive datafor a fully scientific case. The book isn't limited to simply saying the top 10% have more influence, but tries to find more specific rules on when, in which areas and why the 10% have how much more influence.
Please note: the opinion polls used are all pre-2008. Generally, the discussion of events is from that earliers period, but there are a few references to Citizen United, Obama and such which occurred before publication (2012.)
The book begins by addressing underlying considerations. For instance, he addresses the claim that below-average income people may lack the knowledge or competence to make policy choices. (He finds that on issues of personal importance they seem informed and often follow the lead of more informed people / groups.) He also discusses questions on how to judge how government policy relates to public opinion. (For instance, if you only analyze votes taken in Congress, you overlook policies supported by the public which never get voted on.) There's also discussion of the methodology for analyzing the data. All in all, the book seems to make great efforts to find the best approach to a scientific analysis and how to see which of alternate possible interpretations are best supported by the data.
The general conclusion is that the most affluent are strongly more influential. However, the book spends chapters finding more about how there are variations depending on policy category, point in the election cycle, the likelihood of losing in the next election, the role of interest groups, etc. One of the situations in which the rich are most dominant is illustrated by the fact when 80% of the public favored a social welfare policy which the affluent opposed, fewer than 1/3 were enacted. (In the minority of cases in which it was enacted, there often were additional factors such as support from a particular industry.)
He discusses the roles of the two major parties. He finds that they seem to act on policies related to their "core activists and their policy demanding groups." When it's campaign season or the parties are evenly split in Congress [they're at risk of losing power], they're more responsive to public opinion than otherwise. He finds that the Democrats act closer to public opinion on social welfare issues. Republicans act closer to public opinion in other policy areas (religion, economy, national security.) [In some areas, this reflects the wealthy being more liberal on "moral" issues such as abortion and gay rights than lower income people, and public support for recent wars / security.] Each party has areas where it varies from the preferences of the affluent, but (generally) policy favors the affluent more than others.
[On national security issues, there may have been bias in the public opinion polls. The book has examples of wording in polls. One example showed two polls asking similar military policy questions which stated one side's argument, but not the other side. See blog iink below for more on this.]
Contrary to stereotype of the two parties, the business de-regulation trend began under Pres. Carter, and other non-stereotypical policies have been carried out by following Democrats.
Although both parties are more responsive to the majority in election years, data shows that policies enacted in election years are more likely to be de-funded later than is legislation enacted in non-election years.
The data shows that over the last few decades the affluent's influence on policy has been increasing.
When a survey asked voters what they liked about the Democrats, only 32% mentioned policies or philosophy. When asked about Republicans, 56% mentioned policy / philosophy. Later, the book tells us over the years there's been an increase in voters saying they preferred candidates based on policy and a decrease in those saying they chose based on character.
In 2006, Congressional campaign spending (adjusted for inflation) was 4 times as large as in 1974.
Read more in blog
October 31, 2014
A really excellent piece that attempts to draw together a wealth of recent studies and original statistical analysis into a useful narrative for policymakers. Warning: The book reads very much like a dry text book, so be prepared for a bit of a slog. Also, some knowledge of statistics would be very useful for the reader. This piece seems really only for people who want to get a nuanced understanding of Gilens' work. For others, several articles and summaries are readily available to provide the gist.
May 2, 2016
Don't get me wrong, this is an excellent book, but if you've read Gilens's 2005 Public Opinion Quarterly article and his more recent "oligarchy" article with Ben Page, there's not much new here. That said, the book does offer a very detailed and systematic review of his methodology and offers a great example of how to do excellent social science research.
April 11, 2016
The rigorously compiled but deeply depressing story of the control of the US political system by the top 1% of voters by income. Shows how nothing actually gets passed that is contrary to their interests and just how little influence the average voter has on legislation. Short on solutions but long on the problem.
November 19, 2024
A very empirically-driven, somewhat technical, dry economic book whose main thesis is that there is a pronounced inequality between the rich and the poor/middle class in terms of whose policy preferences are listened to and instantiated by the governing class. Gilens terms this “representational inequality”, and most of the book is devoted to making the empirical case for this broad phenomenon, exploring nuances such as how big the inequality is, which policies does this observed phenomenon apply to, and exceptions to the rule.
The first chapter is devoted to making the somewhat provocative case that 1) citizens are poorly informed in their political knowledge, but that this does not imply that 2) their preferences are ill-informed or should be ignored. Because aggregated opinions of the electorate are more reasonable than individual opinions, this 3) “constitute[s] a reasonable basis for decision-making” (p. 13). One piece of empirical support for the above is that, while individual opinions may be biased, aggregating these biases will lead to adopting moderate preferences that reflect the average voter on average assuming the errors are random. But Gilens notes several situations and what-if scenarios where errors are not random, and as such will then be likely to produce biased preferences.
After a second chapter on data sources and methodology (the primary dataset spans from 1981-2002)—which I’ll skip over in this review—Gilens dives deep into the main descriptive results that support his thesis (chapter 3). The central finding is that policies are much more likely to conform to the preferences of the top income decile, with even slightly less affluent deciles being much less represented. Moreover, there is a clear status quo bias: “when three out of four Americans support a policy change, that change occurs about 39 percent of the time, but when three out of four Americans oppose a policy change, that change is rejected about 78 percent of the time” (p. 74). Interestingly, Gilens’ results conflict with the “median voter theorem”, the simplest version of which says that voters will elect the candidate preferred by the median voter (assuming a unidimensional political spectrum and some other conditions). Gilens also spends some time refuting possible explanations for his main finding: affluent voters have stronger policy preferences on average than lower- and middle-income voters; affluent voters are more homogeneous in their opinions; education is more important than income. None of these explanations is well-supported by the evidence.
The rest of the book is honestly a very dry and technical read, in which more granular results are explored. Gilens begins by exploring the policy domains where representational inequality is greatest (moral and religious) and least (social welfare). Next, he assesses whether interest groups overshadow affluent voters’ preferences, finding that interest groups have an independent effect on policy outcomes. Sometimes, interest groups have preferences that align with affluent voters and other times not, while on the whole having preferences that are uncorrelated to any income group. The implications are that subjugating interest groups’ effect on policy outcomes will not reduce the documented representational inequality/bias that favours affluent voters.
Next, Gilens presents data to suggest that American political parties are more “policy maximizers” (focusing more on core activists and interest groups) as opposed to “vote maximizers” (adopting policies to appeal to voters more broadly). While presidential elections temporarily increase policy responsiveness across income levels, affluent voters still hold disproportionate sway. Gilens then looks at how government responsiveness has changed over time (augmenting his dataset with additional data that goes back to the ‘60s), highlighting the growing influence of affluent voters.
The final chapter is devoted to examining the relationship between economic inequality and political inequality, ultimately providing some policy recommendations that could reduce political inequality. Gilens remarks that American democracy resembles that of a plutocracy given the representational inequality documented throughout the book. Even in domains where inequality is the least (social welfare), poorer Americans’ preferences typically align more with affluent Americans’ preferences. Since there is substantial evidence that affluent Americans dominate the political process through financial influence, this provides an obvious route to limit representational inequality, such as by limiting large campaign contributions, and increasing electoral competitiveness (e.g., with nonpartisan redistricting and voter mobilization campaigns).
My takeaway is actually closer to Bryan Caplan’s takeaway of the book: since most voters are dreadfully misinformed about what are actually economically optimal policies, and affluent voters are less misinformed, the main empirical result could actually be interpreted as hopeful! The only caveat I’d issue is that for a democracy to be stable, doesn’t the public on some level have to feel like their voice matters and that their preferences are at least somewhat being satisfied?
Overall, an interesting albeit dry read. Worth reading chapters 1 and 3, and skimming the rest.
The first chapter is devoted to making the somewhat provocative case that 1) citizens are poorly informed in their political knowledge, but that this does not imply that 2) their preferences are ill-informed or should be ignored. Because aggregated opinions of the electorate are more reasonable than individual opinions, this 3) “constitute[s] a reasonable basis for decision-making” (p. 13). One piece of empirical support for the above is that, while individual opinions may be biased, aggregating these biases will lead to adopting moderate preferences that reflect the average voter on average assuming the errors are random. But Gilens notes several situations and what-if scenarios where errors are not random, and as such will then be likely to produce biased preferences.
After a second chapter on data sources and methodology (the primary dataset spans from 1981-2002)—which I’ll skip over in this review—Gilens dives deep into the main descriptive results that support his thesis (chapter 3). The central finding is that policies are much more likely to conform to the preferences of the top income decile, with even slightly less affluent deciles being much less represented. Moreover, there is a clear status quo bias: “when three out of four Americans support a policy change, that change occurs about 39 percent of the time, but when three out of four Americans oppose a policy change, that change is rejected about 78 percent of the time” (p. 74). Interestingly, Gilens’ results conflict with the “median voter theorem”, the simplest version of which says that voters will elect the candidate preferred by the median voter (assuming a unidimensional political spectrum and some other conditions). Gilens also spends some time refuting possible explanations for his main finding: affluent voters have stronger policy preferences on average than lower- and middle-income voters; affluent voters are more homogeneous in their opinions; education is more important than income. None of these explanations is well-supported by the evidence.
The rest of the book is honestly a very dry and technical read, in which more granular results are explored. Gilens begins by exploring the policy domains where representational inequality is greatest (moral and religious) and least (social welfare). Next, he assesses whether interest groups overshadow affluent voters’ preferences, finding that interest groups have an independent effect on policy outcomes. Sometimes, interest groups have preferences that align with affluent voters and other times not, while on the whole having preferences that are uncorrelated to any income group. The implications are that subjugating interest groups’ effect on policy outcomes will not reduce the documented representational inequality/bias that favours affluent voters.
Next, Gilens presents data to suggest that American political parties are more “policy maximizers” (focusing more on core activists and interest groups) as opposed to “vote maximizers” (adopting policies to appeal to voters more broadly). While presidential elections temporarily increase policy responsiveness across income levels, affluent voters still hold disproportionate sway. Gilens then looks at how government responsiveness has changed over time (augmenting his dataset with additional data that goes back to the ‘60s), highlighting the growing influence of affluent voters.
The final chapter is devoted to examining the relationship between economic inequality and political inequality, ultimately providing some policy recommendations that could reduce political inequality. Gilens remarks that American democracy resembles that of a plutocracy given the representational inequality documented throughout the book. Even in domains where inequality is the least (social welfare), poorer Americans’ preferences typically align more with affluent Americans’ preferences. Since there is substantial evidence that affluent Americans dominate the political process through financial influence, this provides an obvious route to limit representational inequality, such as by limiting large campaign contributions, and increasing electoral competitiveness (e.g., with nonpartisan redistricting and voter mobilization campaigns).
My takeaway is actually closer to Bryan Caplan’s takeaway of the book: since most voters are dreadfully misinformed about what are actually economically optimal policies, and affluent voters are less misinformed, the main empirical result could actually be interpreted as hopeful! The only caveat I’d issue is that for a democracy to be stable, doesn’t the public on some level have to feel like their voice matters and that their preferences are at least somewhat being satisfied?
Overall, an interesting albeit dry read. Worth reading chapters 1 and 3, and skimming the rest.
May 1, 2013
better off just reading the 30 page journal article than the whole damn book
April 22, 2020
My initial thought is that this book will probably do more than about anything else to blackpill me on electoralism. Gilens is a stats guy and writes with a lot of academic poli-sci language, but couched in that jargon is the conclusion that we basically live in a plutocracy. There is essentially zero correlation between the preferences of poor and middle-income Americans and the policy enacted by lawmakers. Policy correlates pretty strongly with the preferences of Americans at the 90th percentile of income, but not at all with the rest of us.
Biggest criticism: if you're like me and not terribly interested in methodology or the ins-and-outs of statistical analysis, you could get away with just reading chapters 3-4 and maybe finish with chapter 8. The most important information is in two graphs on a single page.
Biggest question: he states this openly at the end, and it's extremely important. It's totally possible that the correlation between policy and preferences at the 90th income percentile exists because the 90th percentile (the affluent) happen to agree on many things with the truly rich, the 99th and 99.9th percentiles. It's possible that that much smaller group has the real muscle in terms of influence, and the 90th percentile correlation is a coincidence. After all, that's where income inequality really takes off. The problem is that that's a pretty small group of Americans, they tend to be private, and there isn't good survey data on their preferences.
Biggest criticism: if you're like me and not terribly interested in methodology or the ins-and-outs of statistical analysis, you could get away with just reading chapters 3-4 and maybe finish with chapter 8. The most important information is in two graphs on a single page.
Biggest question: he states this openly at the end, and it's extremely important. It's totally possible that the correlation between policy and preferences at the 90th income percentile exists because the 90th percentile (the affluent) happen to agree on many things with the truly rich, the 99th and 99.9th percentiles. It's possible that that much smaller group has the real muscle in terms of influence, and the 90th percentile correlation is a coincidence. After all, that's where income inequality really takes off. The problem is that that's a pretty small group of Americans, they tend to be private, and there isn't good survey data on their preferences.
May 23, 2021
I absolutely live it when analysis includes constraints, identifies conjectures and assesses multiple viable/plausible interpretations of the data under consideration. This book is so well thought out I wish more authors were so meticulous in their studies and as dutiful in their representations.
Very well done.
Very well done.
December 13, 2023
Quant study book. Solid for polci.
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