A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs

by Theodore Draper

Details the origins of the Iran-Contra scandal, the roles of Reagan, Bush, CIA Director Casey, and others, and argues that President Reagan clearly set the policy then feigned ignorance to escape blame

Genres: History, Politics, American History, Nonfiction, American, Iran, Crime

704 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1991

About the author

Theodore H. "Ted" Draper was an American historian and political writer. Draper is best known for the 14 books he completed during his life, including work regarded as seminal on the formative period of the American Communist Party, the Cuban Revolution, and the Iran-Contra Affair. Draper was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the 1990 recipient of the Herbert Feis Award for Nonacademically Affiliated Historians from the American Historical Association.

Reviews

[Clif · Rating 5 out of 5]

Every significant political event needs a complete review because the public, even members of it that are most interested, can never know what is going on at the time it happens or even when there is an investigation of what happened. Time must pass for it all to gel. Theodore Draper gives us a thorough review then follows it up with strong analysis and history of the balance of power, or rather lack of it, between the legislative and executive branches on the conduct of foreign policy.

The title of the book is plural, indicating that there were two separate operations, one involving the attempt to get hostages released in exchange for weapons sold to Iran and another supplying weapons to the Contras fighting the government of Nicaragua. Congress had specifically forbidden aid to the Contras. President Reagan along with Congress agreed that no weapons should be sold to Iran and the countries of the world were warned not to do so at a time when Iran and Iraq were at war.

Draper does an excellent job giving the reader a thorough background of information before proceeding to the story. He takes the reader into the bureaucracy of the White House, telling of how the National Security Council made up of heads of departments and intended to advise the president is quite separate from the National Security Council staff that reports only to the National Security Adviser. This staff, though it is supposed to be purely advisory and not involved in operations, is entirely under the president's authority to be used as he sees fit.

President Reagan was sincerely interested in freeing American hostages held in Lebanon. He was strongly in favor of supporting the Contras against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, meeting in private with wealthy individuals who contributed on their own to the Contra effort. Knowing of his views, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, who had been detailed to the NSC staff got carried away. At first he was to advise on how the Contras could be supported but this quickly turned into figuring out how to take money that had been raised from private parties and foreign countries (Saudi Arabia and Taiwan) turn it into weapons and get them delivered to Honduras where the Contras were attacking Nicaragua, all this specifically forbidden by Congress. The charade was that it wasn't US money that was funding the weapons purchases.

Then, in what was a completely separate operation at first, working with a shadowy character named Manucher Ghorbanifar as go-between and the state of Israel as a weapons transfer agent, Ollie North attempted to work a deal with Iran of arms for American hostages held in Lebanon. It was Ghorbanifar who came up with the suggestion that Iran could be overcharged and after Ghorbanifar had subtracted his generous take some of the leftover money could help the Contras. Again a charade was produced. Israel, not the US, would be supplying weapons to Iran. Of course, the US would then top up Israel's supply of weapons, but who would ever know there was a direct connection?

The story is a remarkable account of North not knowing who he is really dealing with in Iran, of Ghorbanifar, a private individual looking for wealth making himself indispensable to both North and Iran, though neither side trusted him, of Iran not wanting to release more than one hostage in any given deal for fear of losing its ability to make more deals, of Swiss bank accounts, of several people enriching themselves deciding for themselves on their percentages, of outdated weapons being foisted on the Iranians, of a botched landing strip created in El Salvador without the knowledge of the country's government, of a CIA airplane shot down in Nicaragua, and so much more.

And this doesn't even touch on the farcical cover-up attempts once the cat is out of the bag and the press with Congress far behind get on the case. There are interesting personalities here and Draper goes into their behavior deeply enough to keep you turning pages.

The reader should be warned that the central part of the book, at least 300 pages, is devoted to the seemingly endless negotiations between North and Iran by way of Ghorbanifar, a man with his own agenda. Will a deal be made? Have the arms been sent? Uh-oh, something went wrong. Iran isn't happy. No hostages have been released. Try again, more problems, try again, arrange a meeting in Europe then in Tehran. Standoff. Try again.

Throughout, one can't help but be impressed with Oliver North's incredible work ethic. The man puts in countless hours, is always providing comprehensive memos to his boss, the National Security Advisor, first Jim McFarlane and then McFarlane's successor, John Poindexter, all three military men with a can-do attitude toward the mission, no limits on loyalty to the commander-in-chief and no respect whatsoever to the rule of law as passed by Congress.

This book is an excellent view of how people in power in Washington behave toward each other. Of course there are turf wars, but a critical factor in making this particular mess possible is "compartmentalization"; the effort to keep from knowing what is going on in order to protect if not oneself then certainly the president. "I don't want to know" is the rule if you are talking with someone who is not either your subordinate or your superior. If you know the president would like something done, then do it in any way you can, but by all means don't let him know how it is being done so that he can deny responsibility if your deeds are revealed.

Draper leaves no doubt that President Reagan did know what was going on, even if not in great detail, primarily because he had to sign "presidential findings" which are statements that permit an activity to take place with the justification for it stated. These were required after the CIA was investigated by the Church Commission in the 1970's and found to be a loose cannon. Most outrageously, Reagan willingly signed a finding that was made after the activity it was supposed to allow had already happened.

I give five stars for this excellent historical reference. Some readers may find parts of it boring, others may be reminded of a Gilbert and Sullivan play. I closed the book wondering what goes on in Washington at any given time that we know nothing about and I include with "we" even heads of departments in our government.

There is one thing I learned that I must pass on. At the height of negotiations between Ollie North and Iran, the very top priority for Iran, above obtaining weapons, was the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Here we are in 2017 with Iran as always presented as the heart of evil, yet the U.S. has spent trillions of dollars doing the very thing Iran most wanted - we got rid of Saddam Hussein.

[Alison Fulmer · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was perplexed when George Bush was nominated for president as to why this was even possible given his involvement in the Iran Contra affairs. The situation was complex and murky at the time and it was years before I had time and inclination to look back at the situation. I was unable to find a concise history and headed in to this exhaustive tome. The book has every historical detail that exists well documented and is interesting and informative. It is a big read though and I took some time getting through it. George Bush knew what was going on, had disingenuous arguments about why he did not object, and should never have gone on to the presidency in my opinion after reading this book. Reagan should have been impeached.

[Ann · Rating 4 out of 5]

A detailed, even exhaustive description of the Iran-Contra Affairs. The author starts with a description of who-does-what in Washington, including the apparent oxymoron that the "NSC Staff" has very little to do with the "NSC". Then we move towards the Contra Affair, as such. As I understand it, Congress had voted, twice, not to provide military aid to the Contras and had forbidden the CIA to become involved. But Ronald Reagan really, really, really wants to support the Contras in their fight against the communist-inspired Sandinistas. So what do his faithful servants McFarlane, Poindexter and North, all military personnel used to carrying out orders, do ? They figure out a way by which the "NSC Staff", meaning North and his growing cohort of wannabe-covert operatives, can funnel aid to the Contras. This could take the shape of direct advice, of building a convenient airstrip in a neighboring Central American country, of helping to solicit wealthy old ladies for donations, of directing Saudi money towards the Contras. Skulduggery and chicanery galore!

So while Oliver North and his associates are running around Central America, two Middle Eastern arms dealers, Kashoggi and Ghorbanifar, concoct the idea that they might get some profit out of another one of Ronald Reagan's preoccupations, namely the liberation of a handful of American hostages in Lebanon. Their client, Iran, embroiled in a war with Iraq, wants weapons. The USA had forbidden the sales of arms to Iran, which it considers "a terrorist state". So what if Israel were to sell their (USA-made) weapons to Iran, which would then use its influence in Lebanon, to get the hostages released?

So, let's connect the dots : hostages in one country (Lebanon) would be released after another country (Iran) would have used its influence with Hezbollah in Lebanon, out of gratitude for having been able to purchase weapons from yet another country (Israel), who would be able to replenish their stock from yet another country (USA). The USA would be happy to have its hostages back without having had to counter its own policy of selling arms to Iran. Iran would be happy because it got more weapons to try and get rid of Sadam Hussein, their archnemesis. Israel would be happy to be of service to their friends, the USA. And Kashoggi and Ghorbarifar would be happy because of the enormous profits.

Only one dot is missing : how did this Middle-Eastern haggling over weapons involve the Contras, on the other side of the globe? Simply by two facts : Oliver North, the can-do guy, became involved in the arms-for-hostages deal, and some of the money from deals ended up in a bank account controlled by Oliver North's associates for the express purpose of funneling money to the Contras.

The old cliche that truth is stranger than fiction, absolutely applies here. That same indefatigable fixer, Ollie North, flying around the globe, popping up with 7-steps plans, meeting with Israeli and Iranian middlemen, essentially taking it upon himself to invent, implement and hide an approach to Iran that is totally contrary to the official policy (and largely unknown to the State Department). The classic cat-and-mouse game of promising just one more hostage for ever-increasing amounts of weapons (with the weapons to be delivered first, of course). The idea that this arms-for-hostage deal was essentially an incentive for the kidnapping of more Americans does not seem to have troubled the initiators of this deal too much. Nor the fact that for the longest time they brought no translators of their own, and were thus entirely dependent on Ghorbarifar. It didn't take long for the Americans to realize that he had been making incompatible promises to both the USA and Iran (where it wasn't even clear who his contacts were), and yet they continued down this path with this unreliable con man, for lack of a better alternative.

Can one wonder that this whole edifice had to come crashing down? It actually happened remarkably fast, given the pre-internet and pre-cell phone era. And yes, of course Ronald Reagan knew about the illegal support for the contras, and he knew about the arms-for-hostage deal (which may not have been illegal, but was certainly hypocritical in terms of his own blustering against Iran as a terrorist state). He might not have known how the 2 affairs intersected, but he did know of, and was apparently totally fine with, the existence of a small group of devoted military personnel who were trying to make his wishes come true, without pesky Congressional oversight or other limitations.

And in the end, after months and months of palavering, a couple of successful deals and a totally botched delivery of weapons in November 1985, only about 2, or perhaps 3, hostages were freed as a result. The basic premise was flawed : the hostage takers were in Lebanon, not Iran - why would they snap to order and release hostages after Iran received weapons? Why would Iran, or Lebanon, or anyone else in possession of a couple of precious bargaining chips, work towards releasing them all in a single go, rather than drip-drip-dripping them out, arms deal by arms deal?

[TheyreTakingTheHobbitsToIsengard · Rating 5 out of 5]

Let’s just say “pleasure reading” and “historical non-fiction” have a hard time in the same sentence. Indeed, this book revealed things which astounded, shocked, and infuriated almost with the same page. Meticulous researched, it is based on documents and testimonials of almost everyone involved. I was vaguely familiar with what happened, and saw bits of the Oliver North trial as a teen. The similarities between Iran-contra and the impeachment of 45 in substance, cast of characters, and political climate are too many to list. Denials of quid pro quo, the threat of impeachment, cover-up, threats of communism, Iran’s apparent intransigence, an attorney general trying to get ahead of bombshell revelations to avoid impeachment, loyalty over truth - it all could have happened in the past year. The last chapter of the book, “Unfinished Business,” in fact, refers to the fact the climate which produced Iran-contra still has not been resolved, and in fact could easily lead to another. I would argue the impeachment over a “perfect” phone call last year was in part due to that business remaining “unfinished.” The abuses which gave rise to Iran-Contra and the arguments exonerating the perpetrators were, in part, repeated with the latest impeachment debacle.

At the heart of the affair is a conflict over the role of the president in foreign policy. On one side, from Alexander Hamilton to Jesse Helms, argue for a strong presidency, which does not need congressional approval in foreign policy, one in fact that appears to be “above the law.” Draper refers to this as a “bifurcated “ presidency, one which is democratic and therefore subject to Congressional oversight on one hand, but another part which is autocratic and accountable only to itself or to other countries. And there’s the rub. An executive branch which is courting “favors” from other countries outside of Congressional oversight is a recipe for disaster. In Iran-Contra, the details are labyrinthian but at the heart was a hostage-for-arms deal with Iran where it was overcharged through crooked intermediaries and that money funneled to the counter-revolutionaries (Contras) in Nicaragua, called the “diversion.” Both operations were not approved by Congress, and in the case of selling arms to Iran, hypocrisy, as it ran counter to U.S. policy: “We don’t negotiate with terrorists,” as part of “Operation Staunch,” and in the case of supporting the Contras, exploiting a loophole in a law to get around Congressional oversight, the “Boland Amendment” which forbade supporting the Contras. In the case of the Contras, the president wasn’t using taxpayer money to fund the Contras, but money from another country (in this case, Iran). So while technically legal at the time, it violated the spirit of the Boland Amendment. The problem of course is “donor countries” are not going to do something for free, and in fact will expect a “quid pro quo” which is independent of Congressional awareness and oversight. The executive could do these shadow deals with other countries if, for example, they thought it would help their chances for re-election. In Iran-Contra, various agencies were co-opted into unwitting participation, and through a policy of “plausible deniability” and presidential pardons, all actors were exonerated. Congress passed but H.W. Bush vetoed a law which would have forbade the president from using money from a “donor country” to pay for policies Congress does not approve or support. In other words, not much has changed since Iran-Contra.

There are many take-aways from reading this book. Iran’s paranoia and distrust of the U.S. is well-grounded. Our hypocritical foreign policies of saying one thing and doing another, along with sheer incompetence, doesn’t build trust. The whole hard line of “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” is just balderdash, as indeed we did at the time and even propped up Saddam Husein, in the early 80’s when it was clear he was both a tyrant but friendly towards oil companies. Iraq attacked Iran and we were happy for the two of them to duke it out without any clear winner for as long as possible. When reformers were ready to topple Saddam in Iraq, we initially encouraged them, but because they were Shiite, Saudi Arabia wasn’t comfortable and discouraged us from going forward. Saudi Arabia, of course, is one of our primary sources for oil and a huge market for our weapons. Hence, thousands of Shiia were slaughtered and displaced by Iraqi forces. This was in 1991 during the Gulf War and outside the scope of the book, but I mention it to show that we are not really interested in democracy when it conflicts with our business or political interests. The reason Reagan and his neocons supported the Contras was from a perceived threat of Communism in Nicaragua. However, the contras actually were associated with reinstating a brutal dictator’s dynasty which ruled Nicaragua for decades (Samoza family) and, of course, were friendly to U.S. business interests. All this talk of “stopping communism” was really about keeping Nicaragua open to exploitation for U.S. businesses. Concerning U.S. policy towards Iran, the book opened my eyes that our problems with Iran have nothing to do with foreign policy, but domestic politics. In order to appear “tough” with Iran to voters, GOP politicians feel compelled to take a hard stance against them. Hence the whole “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” line and “Operation Staunch.” Iran is of minor business importance; it needs us more than we need it. Our meddling during the 1950’s was a bitter betrayal and to this day Iran has not forgotten. It was once a flourishing democracy but thanks to U.S. involvement, has become a dictatorship that’s subject to frequent protests which are usually met with brutal oppression. It is ripe for reform but the U.S. is beholden to the conservatives who still hold to the “Operation Staunch” mentality, which only further strengthens its dictators; perceived as a duplicitous liar, the U.S. can’t be trusted, but the Iranians can trust their own government, as corrupt and brutal as it may be. Pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal had nothing to do with Iran not living up to its part of the bargain, but because U.S. conservatives perceived it as a “very bad deal,” and a sign of weakness.

Many seem content to let the CIA do their thing under the auspices that it’s in the president’s prerogatives; “the ends justify the means.” But what if those means go against American values and strategic goals? What if they are for the financial and personal gain of the president and not the nation? The executive pushed the limits by either belatedly informing Congress or not informing them at all of covert operations in the Iran-Contra affairs. What kind of presidency do we have? When our current president’s financial entanglements are obscure and unknown, this answer to this question has grave consequences, especially now.

[Tyler Sprecker · Rating 5 out of 5]

In retrospect, many of the people involved conceded they had been walking a very thin line. Theodore Draper explains just how thin in his book that recounts the true story of how a National Security Council staffer named Oliver North, under the direction of the National Security Adviser, helped orchestrate two illegal, covert operations with the help of a small cabal of government officers and private citizens in 1985 and 1986, a scandal that came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affairs.

The Iran piece refers to the arms for hostages deal of which many people will have heard. Believing that Iran exercised influence, if not control, over Lebanon where a small group of US citizens were being held hostage, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and North agreed to sell US missiles and other kit and equipment to Iran via a network of intermediaries - namely, Israel and two private citizens - in the hopes of winning the hostages’ release. The Contra Affair refers to US Government (USG) support to rebels fighting the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in violation of the Boland Amendments. While separate in origins, the two covert operations were later entwined operationally, and financially via the diversion of profits from the sale of arms to the Contras.

Draper recounts in detail the network of personnel and the systems created by North and his team involving private citizens and third parties to manage these operations covertly, with limited resources from official USG channels.

This book is indispensable reading for anyone interested in American foreign policy or covert operations.

[Fred Kohn · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was shaking my head all through this book at what a mess this affair was. On the back cover Daniel Moynihan is quoted as calling the Iran-contra affair(s) "the most ominous constitutional crisis in modern history." The book is hard to follow in spots and is worth reading again. I was more than half way through when I realized that there was a guide to the "players" in the back of the book, and I wish I had known about it sooner. The main thing that makes the book hard to follow is that in many cases there are multiple versions of an important meeting or event and what happened depends on who you believe. Rather than parsing out what he thinks happened, Draper has decided to present all versions and let the reader decide. That certainly makes the book more confusing but also more complete.

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting. I had thought the Iran-Contra affairs were basically one scheme and that the CIA was behind it. In reality, they were almost completely separate except for one diversion of funds and the few individuals that were involved in both affairs. The CIA was only loosely involved, with the main characters being Oliver North on the NSC Staff and the two national security advisors, McFarlane and then Poindexter.
It's amazing to me that not only did Reagan not get impeached for this, but his VP Bush got elected president in the next election. Bush wasn't too involved in it, but he was obviously aware of it and did nothing to prevent it.

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 4 out of 5]

Theodore Draper's A Very Thin Line is still considered the definitive account of Iran-Contra; it's certainly commendable in its depth, if occasionally exhausting in presentation. Draper weaves a dizzying chronicle of the disparate networks of White House and intelligence officials, right-wing activists, foreign arms dealers and countries involved in the scheme; it's more convoluted than a Robert Ludlum novel, and one's amazed that it worked as well as it did (less amazed, perhaps, that congressional investigations struggled to pin wrongdoing on anyone higher than Oliver North). Spread out over years and with dozens of parties involved, it makes Watergate, the Clinton scandals or our current Idiot-in-Chief's problems look absurdly petty. Then again, it was all To Preserve Freedom, so who can gainsay their efforts?

[Ryan Nary · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reading this further opened my eyes to the revolving door inside the Beltway and to just how little accountability there is in Washington. Ollie North is president of the NRA now, Elliott Abrams is the special envoy to Venezuela. Truly sickening

[Sarah Robertson · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the funniest books I’ve ever read. Stellar research. Bravo, Mr. Draper.

[S S · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very entertaining for such a long book. If there is something more exhaustive on Iran Contra I do not want to read it!!

[Hilary · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very in-depth account of the Iran-contra affairs. In fact, a little too much detail for what I was looking for. But, it was almost necessary to bring to light the wrongdoings and cover-ups that occurred during Reagan's presidency. Nevertheless, it was an interesting and informative account of the situation. I still cannot believe that Reagan recovered from this deeply embarrassing fiasco.

I think the following quotes sum up the affairs pretty well:

"Colonel [Oliver North], you have on several occasions made reference to the term 'plausible denial ability,' with reference to covert operations. I really do not want anyone to think that the concept as you described it had any real validity today. . . . We did away with this concept that you referred to after the Church and the Pike committee investigations in the mid-1970s. That is why we have a statute that requires Findings. That is why we require that authority from the President to be in writing. That is why we require that professionals conduct covert operations. That is why Congress is informed. There is no plausible denial as far as the President is concerned. The establishment of permanent intelligence committees--oversight committees in the Congress means there is no plausible denial to Congress. What we seek to do on covert operations is to mask the role of the United States from other countries, not from our own government." -- US Rep. Louis Stokes

"The combination of compartmentation, denial ability, and secrecy made it possible for a few of the self-elect to become...'people with their own agenda.' This phrase starkly expresses what was most significant about the Iran-contra affairs--the takeover of governmental policies by a few strategically placed insiders infatuated with their own sense of superiority and incorruptibility."

"The premise of a presidential monopoly in foreign policy emboldened Reagan, Poindexter, and North to play fast and loose with constitutional constraints. In its ultimate significance, nothing was more important in these affairs than how the power of the president in foreign policy was understood--and nothing was more neglected. The Iran-contra affairs were not an aberration; they were brought on by a long process of presidential aggrandizement, congressional fecklessness, and judicial connivance. If anything is to be gained from this costly experience, it should be the belated realization that this process has put the Constitution in danger."

[Gavin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Extremely detailed book on the Iran-Contra Affair and how Oliver North and John Poindexter took our country's foreign policy off the rails by getting involved further and further in an arms for hostages deal that was bad enough, but then the diversion of funds for the Contra's and the hiding thereof could have resulted in the impeachment of President Reagan.

Oliver North in particular gets particular attention as he used his appearance of speaking for the White House in his dealing with parties he needed to get something he needed. North further deviates from the understanding he received from Poindexter in letting Iran change the release of all of the hostages to one at a time, which necessitated further arms attempts and more comedy of errors. And all the while North as the plot falls apart is offering to be a political scapegoat and then is surprised and furious to be a criminal scapegoat.

How President Reagan let North and Poindexter get around better advisers than George Schultz and Casper Wienberger is also amazing and probably never revealed.

Oh, Vice-President George H. W. Bush got off light and pretended to be unaware although made this admission to Dan Rather:
"I went along with it--because you know why, Dan...when I saw Mr. Buckley, when I heard about Mr. Buckley being tortured to death, later admitted as a CIA Chief. So if I erred, I erred on the side of trying to get those hostages out of there."

Damning, but more than we get from President Reagan.

Loved the book, but it's a tough slog and complex. Will have to reread at some point, but now for a book on McGeorge and William Bundy.

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

In a nutshell the author has reviewed the voluminous data, (transcripts, interviews, personal logs and diaries, etc.) and has written a coherent and engaging book documenting an extremely convoluted and complicated foreign policy initiative, (actually several initiatives) during the Reagan presidency. Aid to the contras, weapons sold to Iran and the diversion of funds from those weapons sales are tracked from inception to implementation to the exposure of these "affairs". This includes all the high hopes and noble causes, the "zeal" of the Americans involved, the greed and corruption of the middlemen used for the transactions, and at times the sheer incompetence which led to the inevitable exposure of what was really happening behind the scenes.

This last item being the crux of the book - the hijacking of US foreign policy in the Middle East and Central America by a handful of men, (at times overworked, completely in over their heads and out of their league), outside of any purview, oversight or review by the White House, Cabinet or Congress. As for who knew what and when, from President Reagan on down, the author also does a very good job documenting this time line and each of the major players involved. (As an aside, Sec. of State Schultz's involvement, or really conscious lack thereof, was an eye opener for me.) As for the timeliness of re-visiting this affair 20 years later and any lessons to be learned, if any, .... All I know is I found this book both fascinating and a little scary.

[Diane Reynolds · Rating 3 out of 5]

About eight or 10 years ago, it being the sort of thing I do once or twice a year, as if I were still a student, or want to feel like one, I come upon a remake an acquaintance with a topic, or any author, and I gather together all I can find, and read (or reread) it all in one go. I'd just finished reading a relative lot on John F. Kennedy, and cleansed by palate with some dark-as-it-comes American conspiracy. Those in my age cohort are all well-versed in the Watergate scandal (apparently, we had real scandals in those days, not the fake ones of today), but everyone was too tuckered out by the time this doozy came along to pay much attention. It really deserved much more of our attention, and although I lived the constantly leaking news on this one, I'd not kept up with the rather learned spate of histories that emerged from the era.

I can't say that the writing is ethereal or masterful; it's a good solid job of mastering a vast, truly vast amount of information and plain old data bits that piled up around this scandal, one that I believe dealt real damage to our civic

[Lora · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very in-depth study of the Iran-Contra Affair. While it took awhile to read, I walked away really understanding the depth of the Presidency with foreign power and just how quickly things can get skewed and off course. It is gave a much better understanding of who those in power skew the Constitution and Supreme Court decisions to their way of thinking, chunking up bits and pieces to inevitably have it read in their favor. More than anything, it is a warning that to give absolute power to any one branch and to listen blindly to those in charge, leads to bad things happening.