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Studies in Industry and Society
From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States
David A. Houndshell's widely acclaimed history explores the American genius for mass production and races its origins in the nineteenth-century American system of manufacture.
Previous writers on the American system have argued that the technical problems of mass production had been solved by armsmakers before the Civil War. Drawing upon the extensive business and manufacturing records if leading American firms, Hounshell demonstrates that the diffusion of arms production technology was neither as fast now as smooth as had been assumed. Exploring the manufacture of sewing machines and furniture, bicycles and reapers, he shows that both the expression mass production and the technology that lay behind it were developments of the twentieth century, attributable in large part to the Ford Motor Company.
Hounshell examines the importance of individuals in the diffusion and development of production technology and the central place of marketing strategy in the success of selected American manufacturers. Whereaas Ford was the seedbed of the assembly line revolution, it was General motors that initiated a new era with its introduction of the annual model change. With the new marketing strategy, the technology of the changeover became of paramount importance. Hounshell chronicles how painfully Ford learned this lesson and recounts how the successful mass production of automobiles led to the establishment of an ethos of mass production, to an era in which propoments of Fordism argued that mass production would solve all of America's social problems.
Previous writers on the American system have argued that the technical problems of mass production had been solved by armsmakers before the Civil War. Drawing upon the extensive business and manufacturing records if leading American firms, Hounshell demonstrates that the diffusion of arms production technology was neither as fast now as smooth as had been assumed. Exploring the manufacture of sewing machines and furniture, bicycles and reapers, he shows that both the expression mass production and the technology that lay behind it were developments of the twentieth century, attributable in large part to the Ford Motor Company.
Hounshell examines the importance of individuals in the diffusion and development of production technology and the central place of marketing strategy in the success of selected American manufacturers. Whereaas Ford was the seedbed of the assembly line revolution, it was General motors that initiated a new era with its introduction of the annual model change. With the new marketing strategy, the technology of the changeover became of paramount importance. Hounshell chronicles how painfully Ford learned this lesson and recounts how the successful mass production of automobiles led to the establishment of an ethos of mass production, to an era in which propoments of Fordism argued that mass production would solve all of America's social problems.
436 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 1984
About the author
David A. Hounshell
4 books3 followersDavid Allen Hounshell is the David M. Roderick Professor of Technology and Social Change in the Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Department of History, and the Department of Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University. He earned his B.S. in electrical engineering at Southern Methodist University in 1971 and his M.S. (1975) and Ph.D. (1978) at the University of Delaware.
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August 31, 2014
A. Synopsis: To determine how mass production arose and define its historical background. The thesis is that mass production differed in kind and in scale from the techniques of the American System of Manufactures. The American system had a strong beginning in the armories, but it did not spread immediately to other industries. High end products like Singer sewing machines and McCormick reapers were sold by successful marketing techniques and craft production. The bicycle served as a bridge between the American System and mass production. It was only with Ford that the first true mass production began.
B. The American System arose in the Armories
1. The origins of the American System of arms production was in France where Honoré Blanc attempted a “uniformity” system for their weapons
a) Jefferson then introduced this idea into America in 1788
b) Since France was so influential in our American Revolution their ideas were regarded highly
c) Soon the US War Department and ordnance officers demanded interchangeability
2. Simeon North and Eli Whitney received government contracts for interchangeable guns
a) North used the principle of “If A=B and B=C, then A=C” and developed gauges for his parts
b) Whitney understood the principles of interchangeability but never employed they effectively (he was more of a publicist than a creator)
3. The government established armoires at Springfield, Mass. And Harpers Ferry
a) John Hall’s rifle works was located at Harpers Ferry where two important streams of manufacturing technology merged
b) Interchangeable parts was combined with mechanization (machines could make things better and faster than man)
c) The result was the American System of Manufactures (1827)
4. Other areas of mass production in the Ante-bellum period were clocks
C. The American System did not immediately spread to other industries. The Singer Machine Company was slow to adopt these techniques
1. The Singer Co. is case which contradicts long held assumptions about the quick diffusion of manufacturing technology in the 19th
2. Singer was continually beset by production problems
3. What saved them was not their better production technology but their marketing capability.
a) They used trained women to sell the capabilities of their machine
b) Also Singer introduced its products with a high price tag
c) Customer support through dealerships and service centers
4. While increased marketing allowed their sales to rise the company continues to use the job-shop manufacturing approach (mechanics filing and fitting parts to assemble)
5. In 1880 production was updated to use various parts of the armory system--yet their machines still remained unchangeable
6. The Singer factory was a compromise between two worlds of production technology--American and European
D. McCormick Harvesting Machine Company (1841-1885)
1. Till 1880 the McCormick Works in Chicago depended on skilled blacksmiths, mechanics, and woodworkers to build its reapers
a) Cyrus McCormicks younger brother Leander was responsible for the production of the reaper using the traditional European system
b) Leander did little to incorporate the developments of the American System of Manufactures (did not use the fixtures, jigs, and gauges method)
c) Leander was a blacksmith and ran the factory like a large blacksmith shop
d) In 1880 the brothers had a fight. Cyrus wanted to produce more machines but Leander was very conservative. Leander was also very jealous of his brothers popularity
2. In 1880 Cyrus fired Leander and hired Lewis Wilkinson
a) Wilkinson was well trained at the American System from his days at the Colt Armory
b) Wilkinson stayed with the McCormick company for a year, during which time he taught Cyrus Jr. The techniques of the jig, fixture, and gauge system
c) In 1881 Cyrus Jr. Takes over production and put into practice the armory techniques
3. Thus, the myth that the use of interchangeable parts was widespread throughout the 19th is dispelled
E. About this time a new product (bicycle) that would serve as a bridge between the American System and mass production
1. Bicycle craze 1890-96 and collapsed in 1897
2. The bicycle was a stepping stone towards the auto
a) Early auto chassis consisted of bicycle tubing and tires
b) It introduced the benefits of personal transportation to America
c) Speed in transportation came to be seen as a virtue and thus hastened acceptance of the auto
3. Alexander Pope was the father of the American bike industry. Production improvements were also made by the Western Wheel Works
a) His bike the Pope Columbia was manufactured with traditional armory techniques and through aggressive advertising maintained a high price. Therefore the myth that interchangeable parts always meant lower costs is dispelled.
b) Pope used drop forging with solid steel. 80% had to be removed by cutting techniques
c) The Western Wheel Works used a different technique of stamping and bending flat steel into a tube. The ends would be fastened together with resistance welding
4. But a problem arose. The American System became so good at turning out masses of parts that a bottleneck began to occur at the assembly point
F. Ford and the first true mass production (1908-15)
1. The answer was the assembly line. The American System was fundamentally changed by Henry Ford as true mass production arose
a) Ford sought to manufacture for low prices and to use continuing price reductions to stimulate demand
b) This was in direct opposition to what the contemporary theory of monopoly was
c) As a result an economic revolution ensued due to advances in production technology and the assemble line
2. Fords production engineers had synthesized two different approaches to production that prevailed in the bicycle era
a) Ford adopted the techniques of armory practice (jig, fixture, gauge)
b) Adopted sheet steel punch and press work
3. These developments provided almost unlimited components and the assembly line eliminated assembly bottlenecks
4. Although similar to Taylor’s ideas--Taylor did not contribute to the Ford system
a) Taylor did not change the job itself--he improved efficiency. Ex. If a job was hand loading coal he did not mechanize, he invented a better shovel.
b) Ford mechanized and changed the very nature of the work
5. The assembly line was adopted quickly throughout industry due to the openness of his company to outside observers(within 18 months all subassemblies were using assembly lines)
a) However, it did bring serious labor problems. Turnover soared to 380% as the men were themselves mechanized.
b) To counteract this problem Ford instituted $5 a day pay which doubled the earnings of the workers and allowed them to buy the cars that they produced.
6. Another problem arose: For the first time supply outstripped demand
G. The answer came from Alfred Sloan and marketing strategies at GM of “flexible mass production”
1. Ford’s system: single-purpose machinery, assembly line, large volume, high wages, low prices
2. The new mass production needed to adapt to frequent consumer changes and individuality
a) Gm adopted the policy “a car for every purpose and every purse.” Annual models, buying on credit, luxury and budget cars.
b) This ushered in the era of “flexible mass production.” Americans were allowed to “climb the ladder of consumption”
3. Gm began discussing this idea in 1925 and by 1932-33 Ford had adopted it
a) In 1922 William Knudsen left Ford to join Chevrolet and attempt to build up their share of the market
b) Instead of copying the Ford system he built up a new system that could easily incorporate changes (general purpose machines not single purpose)
c) He also pursued decentralization: Ex. Motors and axles were manufactured in Flint while Toledo produced transmissions. Decentralization accommodated change.
d) Ford was not equipped for change. The transition between the T and the A caused the factory to shut down for 6 months
4. Sloanism triumphed over Fordism. It was important to “keep the customer dissatisfied”
5. Note: Hounshell dealt almost entirely with the transition at Ford from 1925-32 and virtually ignored the GM advances. At one point he stated that the GM records were closed and possibly nonexistent for this period. Nevertheless, GM should have been the culmination of his story.
6. Thus, the great paradox was that the mass production that was ushered in with Ford in 1913, died in 1926 as Ford attempted to adopt to GMs policy with the Model A.
H. This mass production ethos did not translate very well to other areas of production
1. Foster Gunnison developed prefabricated homes
2. The ASME attempted to mass produce furniture
3. The reason these failed is that for some reason Americans did not let their tastes succumb to standardization in these areas
4. Technology was not the limiting factor
5. There were cultural critics of mass production
a) Aldous Huxley Brave New World. This carried Fordism to the extreme of standardizing humans (different models)
b) Charlie Chaplin Modern Times. Trapped in the cogs of the machine.
c) Diego Rivera. A Mexican artists commissioned by Ford to paint frescoes at the Detroit Institute of Art. He painted workers who were dominated by anthropomorphic machines.
B. The American System arose in the Armories
1. The origins of the American System of arms production was in France where Honoré Blanc attempted a “uniformity” system for their weapons
a) Jefferson then introduced this idea into America in 1788
b) Since France was so influential in our American Revolution their ideas were regarded highly
c) Soon the US War Department and ordnance officers demanded interchangeability
2. Simeon North and Eli Whitney received government contracts for interchangeable guns
a) North used the principle of “If A=B and B=C, then A=C” and developed gauges for his parts
b) Whitney understood the principles of interchangeability but never employed they effectively (he was more of a publicist than a creator)
3. The government established armoires at Springfield, Mass. And Harpers Ferry
a) John Hall’s rifle works was located at Harpers Ferry where two important streams of manufacturing technology merged
b) Interchangeable parts was combined with mechanization (machines could make things better and faster than man)
c) The result was the American System of Manufactures (1827)
4. Other areas of mass production in the Ante-bellum period were clocks
C. The American System did not immediately spread to other industries. The Singer Machine Company was slow to adopt these techniques
1. The Singer Co. is case which contradicts long held assumptions about the quick diffusion of manufacturing technology in the 19th
2. Singer was continually beset by production problems
3. What saved them was not their better production technology but their marketing capability.
a) They used trained women to sell the capabilities of their machine
b) Also Singer introduced its products with a high price tag
c) Customer support through dealerships and service centers
4. While increased marketing allowed their sales to rise the company continues to use the job-shop manufacturing approach (mechanics filing and fitting parts to assemble)
5. In 1880 production was updated to use various parts of the armory system--yet their machines still remained unchangeable
6. The Singer factory was a compromise between two worlds of production technology--American and European
D. McCormick Harvesting Machine Company (1841-1885)
1. Till 1880 the McCormick Works in Chicago depended on skilled blacksmiths, mechanics, and woodworkers to build its reapers
a) Cyrus McCormicks younger brother Leander was responsible for the production of the reaper using the traditional European system
b) Leander did little to incorporate the developments of the American System of Manufactures (did not use the fixtures, jigs, and gauges method)
c) Leander was a blacksmith and ran the factory like a large blacksmith shop
d) In 1880 the brothers had a fight. Cyrus wanted to produce more machines but Leander was very conservative. Leander was also very jealous of his brothers popularity
2. In 1880 Cyrus fired Leander and hired Lewis Wilkinson
a) Wilkinson was well trained at the American System from his days at the Colt Armory
b) Wilkinson stayed with the McCormick company for a year, during which time he taught Cyrus Jr. The techniques of the jig, fixture, and gauge system
c) In 1881 Cyrus Jr. Takes over production and put into practice the armory techniques
3. Thus, the myth that the use of interchangeable parts was widespread throughout the 19th is dispelled
E. About this time a new product (bicycle) that would serve as a bridge between the American System and mass production
1. Bicycle craze 1890-96 and collapsed in 1897
2. The bicycle was a stepping stone towards the auto
a) Early auto chassis consisted of bicycle tubing and tires
b) It introduced the benefits of personal transportation to America
c) Speed in transportation came to be seen as a virtue and thus hastened acceptance of the auto
3. Alexander Pope was the father of the American bike industry. Production improvements were also made by the Western Wheel Works
a) His bike the Pope Columbia was manufactured with traditional armory techniques and through aggressive advertising maintained a high price. Therefore the myth that interchangeable parts always meant lower costs is dispelled.
b) Pope used drop forging with solid steel. 80% had to be removed by cutting techniques
c) The Western Wheel Works used a different technique of stamping and bending flat steel into a tube. The ends would be fastened together with resistance welding
4. But a problem arose. The American System became so good at turning out masses of parts that a bottleneck began to occur at the assembly point
F. Ford and the first true mass production (1908-15)
1. The answer was the assembly line. The American System was fundamentally changed by Henry Ford as true mass production arose
a) Ford sought to manufacture for low prices and to use continuing price reductions to stimulate demand
b) This was in direct opposition to what the contemporary theory of monopoly was
c) As a result an economic revolution ensued due to advances in production technology and the assemble line
2. Fords production engineers had synthesized two different approaches to production that prevailed in the bicycle era
a) Ford adopted the techniques of armory practice (jig, fixture, gauge)
b) Adopted sheet steel punch and press work
3. These developments provided almost unlimited components and the assembly line eliminated assembly bottlenecks
4. Although similar to Taylor’s ideas--Taylor did not contribute to the Ford system
a) Taylor did not change the job itself--he improved efficiency. Ex. If a job was hand loading coal he did not mechanize, he invented a better shovel.
b) Ford mechanized and changed the very nature of the work
5. The assembly line was adopted quickly throughout industry due to the openness of his company to outside observers(within 18 months all subassemblies were using assembly lines)
a) However, it did bring serious labor problems. Turnover soared to 380% as the men were themselves mechanized.
b) To counteract this problem Ford instituted $5 a day pay which doubled the earnings of the workers and allowed them to buy the cars that they produced.
6. Another problem arose: For the first time supply outstripped demand
G. The answer came from Alfred Sloan and marketing strategies at GM of “flexible mass production”
1. Ford’s system: single-purpose machinery, assembly line, large volume, high wages, low prices
2. The new mass production needed to adapt to frequent consumer changes and individuality
a) Gm adopted the policy “a car for every purpose and every purse.” Annual models, buying on credit, luxury and budget cars.
b) This ushered in the era of “flexible mass production.” Americans were allowed to “climb the ladder of consumption”
3. Gm began discussing this idea in 1925 and by 1932-33 Ford had adopted it
a) In 1922 William Knudsen left Ford to join Chevrolet and attempt to build up their share of the market
b) Instead of copying the Ford system he built up a new system that could easily incorporate changes (general purpose machines not single purpose)
c) He also pursued decentralization: Ex. Motors and axles were manufactured in Flint while Toledo produced transmissions. Decentralization accommodated change.
d) Ford was not equipped for change. The transition between the T and the A caused the factory to shut down for 6 months
4. Sloanism triumphed over Fordism. It was important to “keep the customer dissatisfied”
5. Note: Hounshell dealt almost entirely with the transition at Ford from 1925-32 and virtually ignored the GM advances. At one point he stated that the GM records were closed and possibly nonexistent for this period. Nevertheless, GM should have been the culmination of his story.
6. Thus, the great paradox was that the mass production that was ushered in with Ford in 1913, died in 1926 as Ford attempted to adopt to GMs policy with the Model A.
H. This mass production ethos did not translate very well to other areas of production
1. Foster Gunnison developed prefabricated homes
2. The ASME attempted to mass produce furniture
3. The reason these failed is that for some reason Americans did not let their tastes succumb to standardization in these areas
4. Technology was not the limiting factor
5. There were cultural critics of mass production
a) Aldous Huxley Brave New World. This carried Fordism to the extreme of standardizing humans (different models)
b) Charlie Chaplin Modern Times. Trapped in the cogs of the machine.
c) Diego Rivera. A Mexican artists commissioned by Ford to paint frescoes at the Detroit Institute of Art. He painted workers who were dominated by anthropomorphic machines.
December 21, 2011
An amazing study of the development of American manufacturing, from early Springfield Muskets to Ford Model As.
The centerpiece of the story is the evolution of the "armory system" or the "American system." This was the system of interchangeable parts constructed through special-purpose machines, often falsely attributed to Eli Whitney. It in fact originated as a dream in the pre-revolution French military, another off-shoot of the Enlightenment goal of uniformity and universality, then traveled with some French officers to America during our revolution. It truly took off in the US at the Springfield and Harper's Ferry federal armories after the War of 1812 showed how many broken rifles could be repaired if only the parts could be easily substituted with each other. Those manufacturers who urged the system on the government were often denounced as "visionary theorists."
I had heard about interchangeable parts before but I never understood their importance until this book. With interchangeable parts one could dispense with the innumerable fitters, filers, and finishers, who had to take the multitude of the products of a factory and file them down and shove them together to fit to a single completed product that was completely unlike any other. The uniformity from interchangeable parts, though, required specialized machines and special models and gauges to make sure the product of every operation was exactly the same. This led to the possibility of truly mass production. As Henry Ford, who in a 1925 Encyclopedia Britannica entry written by his press manager practically invented the term, said, "In mass production there are no fitters."
The armory system spread through the employment of military mechanics in sewing machine factories and automatic harvesters, among other industries. What the author shows, however, is that this early form of "mass production" was not cheaper than previous methods. In fact it was significantly more expensive, and factories that bought or created the many machines required to implement the system were usually at the highest end of the market. The most successful entrepreneurs, such as Singer in sewing machines and McCormick in reapers, often resisted the armory system for years but were successful due to their marketing campaigns. As the author shows, the goal of "interchangeable parts" was often more of a slogan or dream than, as was once thought, the inevitable endpoint of every industry. For instance, when Model A production began at Ford, the factory stymied by Ford's insistence on the cast iron forges of the armory system rather than the new metal stamping tools perfected in the bicycle industry. The armory system, and all that came with it, could be both a curse and a blessing.
I can't do justice to the wealth of research and insight in this book. Hounshell manages to discover the nature of U.S. manufacturing in dozens of establishments spanning over a hundred years through odd snippets, such as pointing out the files in magazine lithographs of Singer assembly rooms to show how the company had not instituted the truly interchangeable parts that they claimed they had, or by measuring the expense of gauges in business inventories to show the advance of uniformity. At time the detail can be numbing, but the unparalleled glimpse at the world of early manufacturing in the U.S. is available nowhere else. For a history of both business and technology, this book stands alone.
The centerpiece of the story is the evolution of the "armory system" or the "American system." This was the system of interchangeable parts constructed through special-purpose machines, often falsely attributed to Eli Whitney. It in fact originated as a dream in the pre-revolution French military, another off-shoot of the Enlightenment goal of uniformity and universality, then traveled with some French officers to America during our revolution. It truly took off in the US at the Springfield and Harper's Ferry federal armories after the War of 1812 showed how many broken rifles could be repaired if only the parts could be easily substituted with each other. Those manufacturers who urged the system on the government were often denounced as "visionary theorists."
I had heard about interchangeable parts before but I never understood their importance until this book. With interchangeable parts one could dispense with the innumerable fitters, filers, and finishers, who had to take the multitude of the products of a factory and file them down and shove them together to fit to a single completed product that was completely unlike any other. The uniformity from interchangeable parts, though, required specialized machines and special models and gauges to make sure the product of every operation was exactly the same. This led to the possibility of truly mass production. As Henry Ford, who in a 1925 Encyclopedia Britannica entry written by his press manager practically invented the term, said, "In mass production there are no fitters."
The armory system spread through the employment of military mechanics in sewing machine factories and automatic harvesters, among other industries. What the author shows, however, is that this early form of "mass production" was not cheaper than previous methods. In fact it was significantly more expensive, and factories that bought or created the many machines required to implement the system were usually at the highest end of the market. The most successful entrepreneurs, such as Singer in sewing machines and McCormick in reapers, often resisted the armory system for years but were successful due to their marketing campaigns. As the author shows, the goal of "interchangeable parts" was often more of a slogan or dream than, as was once thought, the inevitable endpoint of every industry. For instance, when Model A production began at Ford, the factory stymied by Ford's insistence on the cast iron forges of the armory system rather than the new metal stamping tools perfected in the bicycle industry. The armory system, and all that came with it, could be both a curse and a blessing.
I can't do justice to the wealth of research and insight in this book. Hounshell manages to discover the nature of U.S. manufacturing in dozens of establishments spanning over a hundred years through odd snippets, such as pointing out the files in magazine lithographs of Singer assembly rooms to show how the company had not instituted the truly interchangeable parts that they claimed they had, or by measuring the expense of gauges in business inventories to show the advance of uniformity. At time the detail can be numbing, but the unparalleled glimpse at the world of early manufacturing in the U.S. is available nowhere else. For a history of both business and technology, this book stands alone.
August 4, 2021
I have used David Hounshell’s fine book over the past several years but I never got around to recording it here. With August here, I am working through it to get ready for Fall, so it is a good opportunity.
This is a well known history of American manufacturing, with a focus on factories. It covers from the start of this activity in the US arsenals making weapons up through the Gilded Age and the beginnings of industrialization. The book culminates in the temporary dominance of Ford and the beginnings of its competition with General Motors at the start of the Great Depression. The general story line of the book is identified in its title: From the American System to Mass Production: 1800-1932. While Ford and the River Rouge plant is almost universally associated with what we call “mass production”, there was a long process during which the Ford system evolved from its beginning in the world of generally interchangeable parts and specialized production tools away from the importance of craftsmen and towards what we have come to see as a factory. (The development of a modern “mega-factories” is another topic altogether around which a rich literature has developed.)
What is so interesting about factories? Just about everything, but that is another story. I had the good fortune to grow up around a large small and medium industrial park, with factories that always hired a number of students during the summers. We thought we were clever in suggesting we might not return to school, but I still remember the factory manager explaining that the students, who were temporary, put pressure on the regular workers to be more productive. Of course, this was explained to us while we were leaving. Realizing the different backgrounds of people on different shifts was also enlightening. For example, I worked a summer with someone who looked old beyond his years who had done double shifts for sixteen years so that he could afford to send his son to college. I had never met such people in such settings before. But I digress…
Hounshell’s book is organized by chapters, each one of which is a detailed case study of an American firm – or group of related firms - that could form a separate book or monograph. The cases are outstanding and include such firms as Colt, Singer, McCormick, and Ford, along with such related industries as woodworking and bicycle manufacture. There is a lot of data presented in numerous tables, although there is little modeling and statistics, so the data exhibits are accessible to general readers. Just as interesting to me are the photos and etchings of the different factory settings, production machinery, and finished products. Far too many people today have never even been in a factory. That is not a problem for readers of Hounshell’s book. There are a number of business settings that are not covered in the book, such as sales establishments, business back offices, and banks. Research on these is available elsewhere and there is just too much material for one volume.
As one might imagine, the book is sometimes hard to work through, but that goes with the territory, I guess. As a general account and source for the development of US manufacturing, it is unmatched.
This is a well known history of American manufacturing, with a focus on factories. It covers from the start of this activity in the US arsenals making weapons up through the Gilded Age and the beginnings of industrialization. The book culminates in the temporary dominance of Ford and the beginnings of its competition with General Motors at the start of the Great Depression. The general story line of the book is identified in its title: From the American System to Mass Production: 1800-1932. While Ford and the River Rouge plant is almost universally associated with what we call “mass production”, there was a long process during which the Ford system evolved from its beginning in the world of generally interchangeable parts and specialized production tools away from the importance of craftsmen and towards what we have come to see as a factory. (The development of a modern “mega-factories” is another topic altogether around which a rich literature has developed.)
What is so interesting about factories? Just about everything, but that is another story. I had the good fortune to grow up around a large small and medium industrial park, with factories that always hired a number of students during the summers. We thought we were clever in suggesting we might not return to school, but I still remember the factory manager explaining that the students, who were temporary, put pressure on the regular workers to be more productive. Of course, this was explained to us while we were leaving. Realizing the different backgrounds of people on different shifts was also enlightening. For example, I worked a summer with someone who looked old beyond his years who had done double shifts for sixteen years so that he could afford to send his son to college. I had never met such people in such settings before. But I digress…
Hounshell’s book is organized by chapters, each one of which is a detailed case study of an American firm – or group of related firms - that could form a separate book or monograph. The cases are outstanding and include such firms as Colt, Singer, McCormick, and Ford, along with such related industries as woodworking and bicycle manufacture. There is a lot of data presented in numerous tables, although there is little modeling and statistics, so the data exhibits are accessible to general readers. Just as interesting to me are the photos and etchings of the different factory settings, production machinery, and finished products. Far too many people today have never even been in a factory. That is not a problem for readers of Hounshell’s book. There are a number of business settings that are not covered in the book, such as sales establishments, business back offices, and banks. Research on these is available elsewhere and there is just too much material for one volume.
As one might imagine, the book is sometimes hard to work through, but that goes with the territory, I guess. As a general account and source for the development of US manufacturing, it is unmatched.
January 15, 2018
Glenn Porter notes in his forward that Hounshell demonstrates the spread of "mass production technologies":
The techniques were spread and improved by a close-knit network of key mechanics, who moved out in concentric circles from the armories to the machine tool companies, the sewing machine manufacturers, and the rest, all the way to the automobile makers. (p. xv)
Others have discussed mass production as a twentieth century phenomenon, and they have pointed vaguely to Eli Whitney as the "father" of mass production. What Hounshell has done is map the trajectory through the 19th C to the 20th in a comprehensive way.
Starting in his "Introduction," Hounshell traces the historiography of mass production techniques and situates himself within it. Starting with Robert S. Woodbury's T & C essay that showed Eli Whitney was not the originator of mass production, he then discusses the role of Merritt Roe Smith's work on the Harper's Ferry armory. Nathan Rosenberg he credits with putting an emphasis on machine tool industries as a key means of distributing know how throughout the land. Hounshell differs from Rosenberg in that he argues this distribution of knowledge was halting and proceeded in fits and starts. The spread of mass production technology, according to Hounshell was uneven and coexisted with older technologies throughout. As Roe Smith points out in his review, "the impression one comes away with is how bumpy and twisted the path of technological progress really is." (p. 160)
In "The Sewing Machine and the American System of Manufactures" he describes how the Wheeler and Wilson company adopted "armory practice" well before I M Singer & Co. did. Singer relied on older craft practice into the 1880s, purposely marketing the machines as the best money could buy and selling them at a premium. The "armory practice" employed by Wheeler and Wilson evidently did not mean cheaper machines mass produced would capture the market, since they were absorbed by their higher priced (up market) competitor Singer in the 1860s.
In "The McCormick Reaper Works and American Manufacturing Technology in the Nineteenth Century," he describes how Cyrus McCormack followed the same strategy as Singer, selling the best product money could buy at a premium price. McCormack, even more than Singer relied on craft methods and advertising to dominate their market sectors, not on armory practice. The annual need to come out with new models foiled the attempts of Cyrus McCormack, Jr. to introduce armory methods of production. Rather than reapers or sewing machines as the site for transfer of armory practice to mass production, Hounshell points instead to the bicycle industry.
In "From the American System toward Mass Production: The Bicycle Industry in the Nineteenth Century," he describes how the bicycle industry started to use stamped sheet metal parts to assemble their product. Albert A. Pope's Columbia bicycle "was made by methods growing directly out of the New England armory practice and refined by sewing machine manufacturers," however these machines weren't sold at the lowest price -- rather they were the most expensive bicycles in the industry!
It wasn't until Henry Ford's Model T that products made with armory methods were sold at the cheapest possible price. In a chapter entitled "The Ford Motor Company and the Rise of Mass Production in America," he explains how it was that "together, armory practice [here the creation of fully interchangeable parts] and sheet steel work equipped Ford with the ability to turn out virtually unlimited components. It remained for the assembly line to eliminate the remaining bottleneck - how to put these parts together. " (p. 10) He then considers the limits of mass production in a chapter called "Cul-de-sac: The Limits of Fordism and the Rise of Mass Production in America." By the 20s Ford ran into the need to implement a more flexible form of mass production and was forced to bend to the consumer's desire for more variety in the cars they chose.
Hounshell ends the book with a concluding section on critiques of the "ethos" of mass production, which held that men could be mechanized too. As Merritt Roe Smith mentions in his review, this last section seems somewhat disjointed from the remainder of the book. As a historian of technology, Hounshell is a master -- as a historian of cultural criticism, he is a little less convincing.
The techniques were spread and improved by a close-knit network of key mechanics, who moved out in concentric circles from the armories to the machine tool companies, the sewing machine manufacturers, and the rest, all the way to the automobile makers. (p. xv)
Others have discussed mass production as a twentieth century phenomenon, and they have pointed vaguely to Eli Whitney as the "father" of mass production. What Hounshell has done is map the trajectory through the 19th C to the 20th in a comprehensive way.
Starting in his "Introduction," Hounshell traces the historiography of mass production techniques and situates himself within it. Starting with Robert S. Woodbury's T & C essay that showed Eli Whitney was not the originator of mass production, he then discusses the role of Merritt Roe Smith's work on the Harper's Ferry armory. Nathan Rosenberg he credits with putting an emphasis on machine tool industries as a key means of distributing know how throughout the land. Hounshell differs from Rosenberg in that he argues this distribution of knowledge was halting and proceeded in fits and starts. The spread of mass production technology, according to Hounshell was uneven and coexisted with older technologies throughout. As Roe Smith points out in his review, "the impression one comes away with is how bumpy and twisted the path of technological progress really is." (p. 160)
In "The Sewing Machine and the American System of Manufactures" he describes how the Wheeler and Wilson company adopted "armory practice" well before I M Singer & Co. did. Singer relied on older craft practice into the 1880s, purposely marketing the machines as the best money could buy and selling them at a premium. The "armory practice" employed by Wheeler and Wilson evidently did not mean cheaper machines mass produced would capture the market, since they were absorbed by their higher priced (up market) competitor Singer in the 1860s.
In "The McCormick Reaper Works and American Manufacturing Technology in the Nineteenth Century," he describes how Cyrus McCormack followed the same strategy as Singer, selling the best product money could buy at a premium price. McCormack, even more than Singer relied on craft methods and advertising to dominate their market sectors, not on armory practice. The annual need to come out with new models foiled the attempts of Cyrus McCormack, Jr. to introduce armory methods of production. Rather than reapers or sewing machines as the site for transfer of armory practice to mass production, Hounshell points instead to the bicycle industry.
In "From the American System toward Mass Production: The Bicycle Industry in the Nineteenth Century," he describes how the bicycle industry started to use stamped sheet metal parts to assemble their product. Albert A. Pope's Columbia bicycle "was made by methods growing directly out of the New England armory practice and refined by sewing machine manufacturers," however these machines weren't sold at the lowest price -- rather they were the most expensive bicycles in the industry!
It wasn't until Henry Ford's Model T that products made with armory methods were sold at the cheapest possible price. In a chapter entitled "The Ford Motor Company and the Rise of Mass Production in America," he explains how it was that "together, armory practice [here the creation of fully interchangeable parts] and sheet steel work equipped Ford with the ability to turn out virtually unlimited components. It remained for the assembly line to eliminate the remaining bottleneck - how to put these parts together. " (p. 10) He then considers the limits of mass production in a chapter called "Cul-de-sac: The Limits of Fordism and the Rise of Mass Production in America." By the 20s Ford ran into the need to implement a more flexible form of mass production and was forced to bend to the consumer's desire for more variety in the cars they chose.
Hounshell ends the book with a concluding section on critiques of the "ethos" of mass production, which held that men could be mechanized too. As Merritt Roe Smith mentions in his review, this last section seems somewhat disjointed from the remainder of the book. As a historian of technology, Hounshell is a master -- as a historian of cultural criticism, he is a little less convincing.
August 29, 2010
Well, this book is required reading for my STS/HIST 5206: History of Technology course. It is an overview of the evolution of mass production within the U.S. I would recommend skimming Chapters 1-7, but focusing on the Introduction and Chapter 8.
Want to Read
March 12, 2026As heard on Business History (Henry Ford Invented the Modern World... Then Got Left Behind)
https://omny.fm/shows/business-histor...
Farm boy Henry Ford hated toil. If only someone could invent ways to work more efficiently, as well as cheap, reliable machines to take some of the strain. Ford was a tinkerer and a lover of the newly invented automobile - so he started building cars in a new, streamlined way that made them affordable to many more Americans.
Thanks to Ford’s production line techniques, the Model T became the biggest selling car in the world. And other factories copied his system to manufacture the radios and vacuum cleaners that kickstarted the modern boom in consumerism. But then Henry Ford stopped listening to what car buyers wanted.
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October 28, 2024
One of the best books about design and technology ever written. Hounshell explains what Henry Ford's great breakthrough in the Detroit factory actually was, why it took a hundred years to achieve, and why it wasn't the foundations of Ford's long term success.
November 1, 2011
The early days of the American republic were categorized not by the "American system of mass production" but by determined entrepreneurs who made skilled use of workers. Hounshell tracks several industries including woodworking, International Harvester, Singer Sewing machines and gun manufacturing showing how scale and interchangeable parts came into existence. The first half of his book tries to dispel the myth of the American System of manufacturing and provides great technical insight into each of the industries mentioned above.
The second half looks at how the principles of mass production were applied. Particular attention is paid to Pope bicycles which were among the first items mass produced. You can clearly see how technology built upon one another to form the mass production we know today. The last three chapters of the book focus mostly on Ford and their production models from the Model T to the Model A. Some attention is given to GM and their efforts to undermine the cheap characteristics of Ford and create the car industry as we know it today. It considers the idea of mass production and debates what Ford really did create.
The book does an excellent job of looking at how industries progressed over a long period of time and while getting lost in the details it does come through. There is some thick description were the technological explanation is more than someone would want to know but mostly it is good solid information. This is a great book for those who are just beginning to study the history of technology or for the experts.
The second half looks at how the principles of mass production were applied. Particular attention is paid to Pope bicycles which were among the first items mass produced. You can clearly see how technology built upon one another to form the mass production we know today. The last three chapters of the book focus mostly on Ford and their production models from the Model T to the Model A. Some attention is given to GM and their efforts to undermine the cheap characteristics of Ford and create the car industry as we know it today. It considers the idea of mass production and debates what Ford really did create.
The book does an excellent job of looking at how industries progressed over a long period of time and while getting lost in the details it does come through. There is some thick description were the technological explanation is more than someone would want to know but mostly it is good solid information. This is a great book for those who are just beginning to study the history of technology or for the experts.
Want to Read
April 24, 2010Recommended by Seth Godin in
Linchpin
.
Read
November 21, 2009None
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