The Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions

by Alan Zimm

“Uses modern methods of operational analysis to determine exactly how the Japanese planned and executed the great raid . . . a worthy, useful analysis” (Naval History).The December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor has been portrayed by historians as a dazzling success. With most American historians concentrating on command errors and the story of participants’ experiences, the Japanese attack has never been subjected to a comprehensive critical analysis of the military side of the operation. This book presents a detailed evaluation of the attack on the operational and tactical level. It examines such questions Was the strategy underlying the attack sound? Were there flaws in planning or execution? How did Japanese military culture influence the planning? How risky was the attack? What did the Japanese expect to achieve, compared to what they did achieve? Were there Japanese blunders? What were their consequences? What might have been the results if the attack had not benefited from the mistakes of the American commanders?The book also addresses the body of folklore about the attack, assessing contentious issues such as the skill level of the Japanese aircrew; whether mini submarines torpedoed Oklahoma and Arizona, as has been recently claimed; whether the Japanese ever really considered launching a third-wave attack—and the consequences for the Naval Shipyard and the fuel storage tanks if it had been executed. In addition, the analysis has detected for the first time deceptions that a prominent Japanese participant in the attack placed into the historical record, most likely to conceal his blunders and enhance his reputation. The centerpiece of the book is an analysis using modern Operations Research methods and computer simulations, as well as combat models developed between 1922 and 1946 at the US Naval War College. The analysis sheds new light on the strategy and tactics employed by Yamamoto to open the Pacific War, and offers a dramatically different appraisal of the effectiveness of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, American History, Aviation, Japan

465 pages, Kindle Edition

First published April 9, 2011

About the author

Dr. Alan D. Zimm is a member of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, where he heads a section in the Aviation Systems and Advanced Concepts Group. He is a former officer in the US Navy, completing his service as a Commander, and holds degrees in Physics, Operations Research, and Public Administration with a concentration on Policy Analysis and Strategic Planning.

Reviews

[Peter Goodman · Rating 4 out of 5]

“The Attack on Pearl Harbor: strategy, combat, myths, deceptions,” by Alan D. Zimm (Casemate, 2011). In which Zimm (Cdr, USN, Ret.) shows that just about everything we think we know about the Pearl Harbor attack is wrong. It was not a brilliant, precision operation using elite pilots and superb tactics, but a misbegotten mess that never should have happened. Zimm uses detailed, sophisticated analysis of every phase of the operation, from the underlying motivation (mostly because Yamamoto was a risk-taking gambler who hoped that the attack would sufficiently demoralize the Americans that they would negotiate a peace). Many of the Japanese pilots were completely green, the formations and tactics used were clumsy and ineffective, the weapons---torpedoes, armor piercing, and general purpose bombs---were used on the wrong targets---the Japanese were generally inflexible and did not learn from their mistakes. It was almost luck that four battleships were sunk (which was what Yamamoto wanted). They attacked the wrong ships, ignored many targets (such as cruisers and destroyers), got in each others’ way, wasted ammunition, etc. He says that the Americans would have survived much better if the ships had been at sea---watertight compartments closed, guns manned, ships able to maneuver. The channel to the sea could not have been blocked by sinking anything in mid-channel (no vessel was long enough to block its full width). He says there was never any plan for a third wave, and that an attack on the fuel tanks and support systems would have been a waste of time (they were hard to destroy in the first place, and would have been easily repaired). If the Americans had at least been as alert as in the weeks before, the Japanese would have suffered heavy losses, and far fewer ships would have been sunk or badly damaged. He goes deep---examining whether the ships’ voids would have stopped more damage, whether hatches were dogged down tightly enough. He criticizes many of the commanders, especially Fuchida, the air commander. Fuchida apparently both lied and made things up about what happened and where he was. Zimm is also very harsh on previous authors, especially Gordon Prange, for not being skeptical enough about what he was told. Fascinating and persuasive---although, as one reviewer pointed out, what the Japanese did was unprecedented. They sent a carrier fleet very far from home to carry out a huge, difficult assault that succeeded in wreaking havoc on an enemy fleet in its home port. Really challenging and interesting book.

https://www.usni.org/people/alan-d-zimm

[Kristi Thielen · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am an avid reader of anything about Pearl Harbor and have read Gordon Prange's mammoth "At Dawn We Slept," twice. This book was written not by a professional historian but a military man. He reaches many conclusion Prange does not, and convincingly demolishes many long cherished myths about the attack.

Zimm successfully argues that it was not a brillant effort by the Japanese, but lacking much - especially in flexibility; that General Short and Admiral Kimmel WERE at fault for not doing more to be prepared for such an attack; that Yamamoto really was right to not follow up the successful raid with an additional attack and that the failure to deliver the 14th part of the 14-part memo from the Japanese government wouldn't have changed anything because (contrary to what nearly everyone believes) the 14th part was not a declaration of war anyway.

One small note, that puts a lump in the throat of an American reader: After the war, Japanese pilots noted how surprised and impressed they were that American sailors were so quick to return fire once they realized they were being attacked.

Sure, it was Sunday morning at approx. 8 a.m. and a good portion of the fleet was hung-over from Saturday night at liberty. But anti-aircraft guns on deck of at least one battleship were blazing in less that five minutes of the first incendiary. LESS THAN FIVE MINUTES. The pilots were sure that Japanese sailors could never have responded with such speed.

Damn!

[Mike Crawford · Rating 3 out of 5]

Through, analytical (much more quantitative than expected), thoughtful, comprehensive and includes helpful commentary about other historical reports and TV documentaries. Negatives: poor editing (repetitive in idea and words -- even a full paragraph is repeated verbatim when quoting prior historian's work; also several typos). Too detailed for the mass market; if you're just a casual reader, read the summary chapter and see if you want to go into ridiculous detail on each point.

[Mike Kershaw · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a detailed examination using operations research methodology to the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. It is not for the faint-hearted. Zimm spends a considerable amount of time debunking several 'myths' he believes skew our view of the raid -- the employment of the midget submarines, the 'brilliance' of the plan, the ability to the Japanese to mount a 'third' strike on the harbor installations in particular. In doing this, he paints and much more realistic picture of the attack and the slim margins under which it was not only executed but succeeded. As he demonstrates, the Japanese were successful in their goal of sinking four BBs but that their target selection and distribution of attack assets were flawed -- a trait they would demonstrated on subsequent engagements as well, not allowing them to optimize their ability to achieve surprise. Zimm rates them highly in this category, demonstrating that the defenses of Pearl Harbor were substantive by examine the loss rates of Japanese aircraft. He points out, as others have done, at the much higher lost rate on second wave than the first because of alerted defenses and the numbers of aircraft brought down by the few US Aircraft that did get airborne. Not only were the Japanese Strike forces detected, so were their reconnaissance aircraft and their midget submarines -- they were exceptionally fortunate in that the considerable defense apparatus, recently rehearsed but not validated, was uncharacteristically inept on this day -- and that among the US forces, both Army and Navy, there wasn't a shared appreciation of the real threat to the Pacific Fleet. He is critical of the Japanese target selection and distribution and highlights the fact that only the areas of battleships and counter air were they successful -- and almost all that success was registered by a handful of aircraft in the first wave. As with most military operations, there was considerable friction, poorly developed contingencies and execution of tasks clearly in contravention of targeting priorities because of lack of situational awareness and poor communication. Like Wilmott in other books, he demolishes the 'myth' of the third strike and puts another nail in the coffin of the post-war histories that overly relied on one or two self-serving Japanese sources. He additionally points out other incongruities with the plan -- the entire submarine effort and the midget plan as well -- and does much to counter the arguments that a midget submarine successfully made an attack on Battleship row -- he accounts for all five attackers. Finally, he delves into the ordnance and weaponry problems faced by the IJN, which in part accounts for the sub-optimal results -- bomb failures, weapons not fully tested, inexperience aircrew, etc...which has been lost in much of the analysis. My only critcisms are that he is overly critical of the role the battleship would plan in the remainder of the war. Although their engagements were few, the commitment of BB's by both sides during the Solomons campaign in particular were critical and, at least in the American's case, were partially responsible for tipping the balance in their favor, particularly in the waters off of Guadalcanal. The fast Battleships in particular would play an important, albeit secondary role, throughout the remainder of the campaign. Finally, he limits his analysis to the raid itself, and only partially deals with the context of how the Japanese were able to get the First Carrier STriking Force off Pearl Harbor at the right time and place -- no mean feat and probably the one decisive to surprise in this case -- but similar to the rest of the attack, done on the margins and with little or no flexibility. These arguments are made in Wilmott's works on the Pacific Campaign as well which I would read in tandem with this as well as Paschall's "Shattered Sword" which he utilizes. An excellent book.

[alphonse p guardino · Rating 4 out of 5]

Far more technically oriented than any other book I've read about Pearl Harbor. Some of the technical details may be off-putting to people looking for light reading or excitement. I found it interesting and informative, especially when the Mr, Zimm uses hard evidence to debunk myths.

[Tekken · Rating 3 out of 5]

Minu enda mängijakarjäär algas tegelikult Zimmiga, nii et tema raamatu suhtes olid mul üsnagi kõrged ootused. Tutvustuses tõotatud poltide-neetide tasandi analüüs on mulle ka alati peale läinud. Lubadus müüte murdma hakata jäi täiesti kahe silma vahele ja see oli viga.

Üsna varsti selgus, et autori lemmikvõtteks on õlgmehikese peksmine. Tekstist kumab läbi tõsiasi, et leidub hulk ookeanitaguseid ajaloolaseid, kes saavad asjadest aru hoopis teistmoodi kui tema. Selle raamatu põhiliseks eesmärgiks paistabki olevat neile ära teha. Mingi siseringi omavahelisele arveteklaarimisele on pühendatud lausa uskumatult palju täheruumi. Samas on fotod enamasti viletsa kvaliteediga, kaardid väikesed ja mitte eriti ülevaatlikud. Lk 61 ja 65 leiduvad imepisikesed koopiad mingist sõjajärgsest manuaalist – no kas oli raske natukegi parem CG tellida? Ja kus on ülejäänud pommid-torpeedod? Tabelid seevastu on suured, kusjuures tihtipeale ka täpsemad kui muu tekst.

Zimm paistab olevat lühemate lugude mees ja suurem osa tema analüüsist koosnebki valangu-stiilis artiklitest, mille pikkus kõigub kolme ja kolmekümne lause vahel. Selline teksti liigendus ei tööta ja pigem raskendab lugemist. Autori stiil on üsna ühetaoline ja tema toimetaja on lausa uskumatu hulga trükivigu või mõttetuid korduseid läbi lasknud. Pall käib kogu aeg ühes väravasse ja need müüdid, mida uskumatu innuga lammutama asutakse, pärinevad enamasti USA autoritelt või parema puudusel lausa netist. Analüüs läheb kohati tõsiselt tehniliseks, aga samas kipuvad autoril ühikud segi minema ja tema tõendusmaterjal pärineb üpris suvaliselt valitud allikatest (sageli ühest, ilmselgelt vananenud allikast). Mõni lugu, mis Walter Lordile omal ajal vähe kahtlasena tundus, esineb siin juba täiesti usaldusväärse faktina. Lk 68 tunnistab Zimm, et pealtnägijate mälestused ei pruugi alati tõele vastata... ainult selleks, et ise neid natuke hiljem põhilise allikana kasutada.

Suures müüdimurdmise tuhinas on Zimm ise omajagu müüte alla neelanud, eriti kui need tema agendat otseselt või kaudselt toetavad. Lk 58 kritiseeritakse mingit lennukit sellepärast, et tema kütusepaak asus piloodiistme all. Ilmselt arvab autor, et see oli üks väga halb mõte. Kuidagi kahe silma vahele on jäänud kümned tuhanded samal perioodil tegutsenud teiste riikide aeroplaanid, mille kütus asus sealsamas, kaasa arvatud üle 12000 tema kodumaal ehitatud F6F Hellcati. Kas võib olla, et projekteerijate arvates oli selline lahendus lenduri turvalisuse seisukohast OK? Äkki on tal muidki eeliseid? Aga autoril ilmselt neid küsimusi ei tekkinud.

Lk 179 väidetakse, et inglaste Royal Oak uppus pärast 3 torpeedotabamust – tegelikult võis neid ka rohkem olla. Itaallaste Caio Duilio ei läinud pärast tabamust põhja, vaid pukseeriti madalamasse vette, täpselt nagu Littorio, mille kohta Zimm märgib „intentionally grounded“. Vast parim kirjeldus tema vigastuste ja päästmise kohta leidub Emilio Bagnasco ja Augusto De Toro kogumiku „Le corazzate delle classi „Conte di Cavour“ e „Duilio“ (1911-1956)“ 2. osas, lk 251-253 ja Francesco Mattesini „La notte di Taranto: 11 novembre 1940 (Storia Vol. 61)“ lk 166. Taranto rünnakul on selles raamatus päris oluline koht, aga samas jääb mulje, et autoril on seal toimunust pehmelt öeldes idealiseeritud ettekujutus.

Netis surfates jääb mulje, et Vaikse ookeani sõjast kirjutavad autorid jagunevad laias laastus kaheks: ühed, kes suudavad esmaallikatele (sh vastaspoole omadele) ligi pääseda ja teised, kes esimeste uurimusi vastavalt oma vajadusele tõlgendavad. Zimm kuulub sinna teise gruppi. Erilisi üllatusi ei olnud ja pärast lõpetamist valdas mind paras pettumus. See selleks – kindlasti leidub ka hullemaid analüüse. Esmakordselt selle temaatikaga kokkupuutujale leidub seal mõtlemisainet küllaga ja tabelite/taktika osa soovitaks soojalt.

[Louis Dominguez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent analysis

The book requires at least some knowledge of what happened at Pearl Harbor. The great amount of statistical information throne at the reader makes the first part of the book heavy sledding. However, the more one got into the book, the better it got. The author points out many inconsistent actions that could have made the attack either more or less successful. Ultimately, the war was not decided at Pearl Harbor. There are some myths that could be argued, places he did not go into other possibilities that are ignored, but that would be another full book.

[Reader · Rating 1 out of 5]

The dumbest book on Pearl Harbor I have ever read! The point of the book seems to be that our defeat on Dec 7 could have been much worse if the Japanese had been smarter. Really can’t understand why this book was written-sure glad I got it free.

[Stephanie Cohu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic book on Pearl Harbor!

This book deals with the analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack. The author gives great examples of telling how this incredible attack had a lot of holes in the execution of the attack. I’d really enjoyed the book.

[Bob Grove · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book, though it may not be for the casual reader. It analyzes the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is a fact-based post-attack look at what went well, what went poorly, and why some of the common historical accounts may need to be reevaluated.

[David Hyder]

A new perspective

A blow by blow analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack. The analysis was done by a naval officer. That makes a difference in conclusions.

[Sam Benson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another good book that upends previous assumptions.
The author does a good job dissecting the strategy and tactics and showing that the Japanese attack had some very serious deficiencies.

[Owen L. Deutsch · Rating 3 out of 5]

very detailed but draggy

Dispels many myths by carefully examining all evidence. Detailed to a grinding dull fault. Requires much perseverance to get all the way through.

[Billy Leon · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a hard book to review. Basically it comes down to two columns. The first column would be content. I think Zimm raises some very interesting questions and blows away some previously held beliefs with argument that is on point, well supported, and critically thought out. The author raises several key points and explains why they are valid and why others are not quite convincingly. From this point I enjoyed the book very much, and now view characters such as Yamamoto, Nagumo, Fuchida and others in sort of a different light. The impression left that the Imperial Japanese Navy comes across as a collection of bungling idiots that succeeded in severely damaging the United States Pacific Fleet just on the basis of luck and ineptitude on the part of the high command of the Army and Navy I don't feel really gives either side their due respect. The US Navy felt certain that Pearl Harbor was untouchable by torpedo attack and that if the Japanese were to hit us, they would have struck the Philippines. The fact that they were able to solve the "torpedo" problem and approach Pearl Harbor in secrecy in my mind makes them more than just a collection of inept zealots.
The Army and Navy were content in the fact that the base was not on the menu of the Japanese strategists. Information from Washington supported this belief. Of course the attack in itself was a rude awakening and a reminder that we did not necessarily have the Japanese all figured out.
The other part of the book was the editing. It was wrought with typographical errors. One here or there is acceptable, but this book has them in excess. It strikes me at times as nothing more than a published rough draft. They acted as speed bumps and interrupted the flow of the intended writing. I thought the content of the book was interesting and thought provoking, while the editing struck me as third rate if it was edited at all.

[Justin · Rating 4 out of 5]

A book filled with excellent ideas and revelations about Japan's so called "brilliantly planned and executed" attack on Pearl Harbor. This book is a 'must-read' on the topic despite the handful of criticisms that I will detail below.

One word of warning (though certainly not a criticism) is that this book is not intended to be a narrative of the battle. If you are looking for a blow-by-blow account from the inception of the operation through to its conclusion you will have to look elsewhere. This work assumes that you already have an idea of how the attack unfolded and instead focuses its time on the finer details.

'Attack on Pearl Harbor' is kept from being five stars by its numerous spelling errors and overall inconsistent writing quality. One chapter will flow relatively well and the next will be disjointed and awkward to read. I also lost track of the number of times that Alan Zimm would present an interesting piece of information and yet fail to cite the exact source. Now, this is not to say that he did not do his 'homework', since the information itself is quite accurate. It is just frustrating that as a graduate student I can't easily trace his original source for a given piece of information.

To end on a positive note, I gave this book four stars for a reason. Make sure that you read the 12-page long appendix D, which portrays the author's view of the 'perfect' Pearl Harbor strike. I won't spoil it, but the last paragraph was so tongue-in-cheek that it left a smile on my face.

[David Abernethy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Zimm presents a professional assessment of the attack with good writing style. For those who are not interested in operational details, Chapter 1, Strategic and Operational Setting, contains items of interest even to those already having a good general knowledge of the early moves in this theater of war. The author's opinion of the three greatest limitations of Japan's war effort is presented on page 42; Japan's missed prediction of the targets of American subs due to mirror-imaging is on page 44; and the highly surprising features and limitations of Japanese forward bases begins on page 41.
This reader does wish that the chapter's final pages on the irony, in light of prewar Japanese strategy, of Yamamoto's desperate attempt at Midway to force a final decisive battle were footnoted, as it is difficult to believe that no author prior to Zimm had noticed the irony of Japan's following the path which it had previously predicted would lead to American defeat.
Page citations above are from the hardback Casemate Publishers edition.

[Urey Patrick · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent analysis of the attack on Pearl harbor from an operations research point of view. The author makes a compelling argument that the Japanese were more lucky than good - borne out by the subsequent developments of the ensuing war. Japanese planning, characteristic "bushido" mentality, and lack of joint operations and coordinated use of resources were huge flaws. The Pearl Harbor attack illustrates all of the weaknesses that became increasingly magnified over the course of the war. The author is persuasive - indeed, compelling in his analysis and arguments bringing in forensic, historical and cultural evidence. At times the repetition of his points and his analysis/conclusions and the particular argument he is addressing becomes tedious reading - as does his detailed operational analysis including probabilities, statistical analyses, etc.
Still - a fascinating work that opens new insights and a better understanding of what actually happened, and why, at Pearl Harbor.

[Jeff · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of the best analytical history books I've read. I rank it right up there with Shattered Sword. In this book, Dr. Alan Zimm examines the purpose, planning, and execution the Pearl Harbor attack from the professional naval officer's viewpoint. His findings, which are based in part on statistical and mathematical analysis, are that the exceptional outcome of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has completely obscured its serious flaws in strategy, operational planning, and execution. Instead, authors like Gordon Prange have led most people to believe that the attack was "brilliantly planned and executed". If you read this analysis, Dr. Zimm makes a strong case against that notion, as well as taking issue with several "myths" that have arisen about the attack. If you have a mind for analyzing history rather than simply reading about it, then this book gets my strongest recommendation. It's a must-read.

[Robert · Rating 2 out of 5]

While he discredits and disproves some long-held myths, this is basically a Monday morning quarterback book. In some areas, it gets highly repetitive (i.e. he reiterates a multitude of times the overkill by torpedo bombers on West Virginia and Oklahoma). The author also gets bogged down into statistics on the planned hit rates v. actual hits rates of torpedos or bombs. Yes, the Japanese could have inflicted a greater loss on the U.S. Was the attack a success in meeting the Japanese desires for the attack, yes. Were mistakes made, there always are in any plan and the implementation of that plan. The only redeeming factor of this book is the dispelling of some of the long-held myths regarding the attack (i.e. Fuchida's control and the midget submarines).

[Lee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pearl Harbor, and its many what-ifs and mysteries, has been one of my historical favorite topics, that I will come back to again and again. This book will be one of my "go-to" references from now on.

Very interesting delve into the details of the Pearl Harbor attack. The planning decisions and execution both fell short of ideal, and Mr. Zimm takes them all to task. I got to attend his lecture on this at Origins War College this summer, and it was an eye-opener. Of course, I bought the book from him on the spot.

There is some time devoted to myths and what-ifs, using some statistical analysis to back up the findings.

[Mike Hughes · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good analysis of the attack from a very different point of view instead of just repeating previous written accounts. I am not quite sure I agree with all of his assumptions but it does make you think about it. A lot of what he says makes sense.

Not for the average person though. Very technical in scope and descriptions. If you haven't read any of the other works mentioned it might not mean much to you. I would not recommend it for the very first book that someone would read about the attack. I think Walter Lord's 'Day of Infamy' should be the best starting place.

[Steve Scott · Rating 5 out of 5]

A trmemendously informative book that shows the Japanese navy's success at Pearl Harbor was NOT the result of tactical brilliance and a well executed plan. It was a battle they shouldn't have won, and wouldn't have won but for the leadership failures of American commanders.

Americans and Japanese have pushed forward with mythical narratives about the attack for decades in order to save face. Zimm shows why and how this came about.

Military history geeks will love this.

[Larry · Rating 5 out of 5]

Zimm's analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor is a towering achievement. It reveals the defects of both the Japanese attack plan and the process that produced it. Its section on what likely would have happened given a 40-minute warning is extremely well done. The book ranks with Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully's excellent analysis of Midway, "Shattered Sword."

[Glyn Gardner · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was a game changer for me. I'm a huge history buff, and thought the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor was tacticly brilliant, if a strategic blunder. This book showed me how wrong I was. Mr Zimm views the raid with the eye of a trained staff officer conducting an after action report.

[Manolo González · Rating 5 out of 5]

W O W! This is the book you must read if you are really into the technical and operational aspects of the attack on Pearl Harbor, its truly a masterpiece, really interesting and mindblowing!
PS: Do not read if you are looking for the story of the attack, this is statistics and probability.

[Jared Bryson · Rating 5 out of 5]

An analytical take on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; incredible in that it completely re-frames the narrative of the battle, both strategically and tactically.

[Nishant Pappireddi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book that details the many flaws of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and how the plan mainly succeeded due to American incompetence.

[Kenny · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very informative

[Paul · Rating 4 out of 5]

Enlightening.

It also provides a good case study on why it's necessary to examine 'what everyone knows' - while sticking to evidence based conclusions.