Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam

by Lewis Sorley

“ Westmoreland is a great book, a classic by an author who knows his subject well and tells the story without hesitation.” — General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army (ret.), Commander, Army Training and Doctrine Command (1977–1981)

Is it possible that the riddle of America’s military failure in Vietnam has a one-word, one-man answer?

Unless and until we understand General William Westmoreland, we will never understand what went wrong in Vietnam. An Eagle Scout at fifteen, First Captain of his West Point class, Westmoreland fought in two wars and became Superintendent at West Point. Then he was chosen to lead the war effort in Vietnam for four crucial years. He proved a disaster. He could not think creatively about unconventional warfare, chose an unavailing strategy, stuck to it in the face of all opposition, and stood accused of fudging the results when it mattered most. In this definitive portrait, Lewis Sorley makes a plausible case that the war could have been won were it not for Westmoreland. The tragedy of William Westmoreland carries lessons not just for Vietnam, but for the future of American leadership. Westmoreland is essential reading from a masterly historian.

Genres: Biography, History, Military Fiction, Military History, War, Nonfiction, American

395 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2011

About the author

Lewis Stone "Bob" Sorley III was an American intelligence analyst and military historian. His books about the U.S. war in Vietnam, in which he served as an officer, have been highly influential in government circles.

Reviews

[Charles van Buren · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not an American success story

This quote from the book pretty well sums it up:

"Westmoreland's strengths eventually propelled him to a level beyond his understanding and abilities. The results were tragic, not just for him but for the Army and the nation he served, and most of all of course for the South Vietnamese, who sacrificed all and lost all."

The author does not ignore Westmoreland's strengths and abilities but makes it clear that he was well out of his depth as commander in Vietnam. I was in high school and early college during the Vietnam disaster and followed it closely. The only highly visible people more responsible for that disaster than Westmoreland were Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara. A trio of real life villains and military incompetents.

Fortunately my draft number was so high that I was not compelled to physically participate in what was very far from being America's finest hour. Many of my friends were not so blessed. Most faced the trial with fortitude and in several cases real bravery beyond the call of duty. I respect them all.

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 4 out of 5]

Scathing biography of William Westmoreland, the notoriously tradition-bound general who forfeited any chance of American in success in Vietnam. Westmoreland, Sorley argues, embodied the traditional virtues of the American soldier in his younger days in WWII and Korea, commanding the 101st Airborne and as West Point Commandant: personal bravery, tactical flexibility, loyalty to his subordinates and concern for his men. As he took over in Vietnam, however, his shortcomings loomed larger: lack of intellectual curiosity, stubborn adherence to conventional strategy against asymmetrical enemies, racial prejudice towards both his Communist opponents and South Vietnamese allies, over-reliance on technology and statistical measures of "victory" that amplified similar misapprehensions by his civilian commanders. Worst of all, Sorley argues, Westmoreland's obtuseness towards the media and public relations - for instance, declaring Tet a decisive victory while calling for massive reinforcements almost in the same breath - undermined his authority with his men and his credibility with the public. His final years are an alternately pathetic and hateful attempt at rehabilitation, from a botched political career to defensive, score-settling memoirs and an acrimonious lawsuit with CBS. While the title is a definite overstatement - Sorley earlier wrote A Better War, an overly glowing portrait of Creighton Abrams' efforts to salvage Westmoreland's failure - his main conclusions are inescapable. It's the classic recipe for military failure: an officer of modest talents and glaring flaws promoted well beyond his ability, with disastrous results.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

I served under Gen. Westmoreland, and I came away from the book a little disappointed--not in the author, who did a superb job, but in the highest ranking General I ever had anything to do with. I knew his story in Vietnam was murky, but so was everything else. This book made me realize without doubt that Gen. Westmoreland emobodied a mindset which did lead to our defeat in that unnecessary adventure.

[Mark Mortensen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Author, historian and PhD scholar Lewis Sorley accumulated great credentials and respect during 20 years of service in the U.S. Army. Sorley’s bold title selection certainly grabbed my attention and although he might have been a bit harsh on Four-Star General Westmoreland his facts were substantiated by others.

America was quick in its attempt to put the Vietnam War out of mind and move on, but for many of that semi-divided generation the long event was a life altering focal point. The war most notably affected those who bravely served our nation, but also to a lesser degree the stateside lot many of whom had reason to question America’s aggression and involvement. This book offers a critical look back as to where the process went wrong with no room for denial as obviously something went wrong and important lessons must be learned and passed on to future generations, so that mistakes are not repeated and proper checks and balances are in place. Through pointed root cause analysis of a sad situation a refreshing path forward aids the healing process.

Because of the magnitude of lessons learned I highly recommend this book not only to those with an interest in the Vietnam War, but to every military historian, politician and business scholar, as well as those with an inquisitive mind and general appreciation for American history.

[Katie · Rating 2 out of 5]

For saying how much research went into this book, and for saying that Sorley is capable of writing well, this book was really quite poor.

The book proudly displays the accolade of being "scalding" on the front cover, which sets the tone for the entire book. Sorley's desire to set the narrative up as revealing Westmoreland to be a stupid, lazy, pig-headed man begins in childhood, when he displays such cruelty as... maintaining middling grades, or being the favourite child of his father. This book does not work as a biography, as it's so clearly biased. It also doesn't wholly work as an analysis of his military record, as Sorley pins virtually the entire failings of the US effort in Vietnam in the 1960s on to one man and his strategic decisions. It cheapens legitimate criticisms of Westmoreland. Notable research absolving Westmoreland of total guilt have been around for decades, and Sorley's refusal to include them is to the detriment of his own work. Whilst he has a nice turn of phrase and is excellent at analysing the strategic failures of the commander, Sorley's own work will go down in history as a flawed interpretation of the man, rather than the definitive biography of his command.

[James Murphy · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is another biography which assassinates its subject. As the title indicates, Sorley lays a large part of the blame for America's defeat in Vietnam on William Westmoreland, commander of U. S. forces there from 1964 to 1968.

He'd had an exemplary military career. He was a West Point graduate, saw combat in World War II and Korea, rapidly rose through the ranks in distinctive commands, including that of Superintendent of West Point. But Sorley's description is of a man not considered one of the best and the brightest, a man extremely good at what he did yet rigid in thinking and limited in imagination, and therefore unsuited to army command, particularly in an asymmetrical war like Vietnam. Westmoreland is blamed for sticking to his strategy of attrition and thinking that the terrible losses the North Vietnamese experienced during the war would eventually force them to accept a divided Vietnam and negotiate a peace. It is true the strategy didn't work. The fighting was killing large numbers of the enemy, but they were willing to replace them. Westmoreland's doctrine of search and destroy moved the big battalions into the highlands and jungles away from the villages and population centers where the enemy continued to control the population. One of Sorley's main points is that tactical defeat for the NVA/NLF was inconsequential. He knew he could replace his losses and he knew American public opinion was strongly against the war. He didn't have to win battles in order to achieve his political/psychological goals, and so he was willing to continue fighting even when victory in the field was improbable. This realization was the assessment by Robert McNamara and other high-ranking officials that led them to decide our victory was unobtainable.

In studies of Vietnam, perhaps America's most complex war and that most dependent on perceptions, it's thought that the U. S. and South Vietnamese allies made positive gains against the North after Westmoreland left the command and the war was given a different direction, even as historians agree that given the limitations of the U. S. government's waging of the war, in effect seeking a stalemate, a holding of the line rather than a defeat of the North while the North itself sought to win and overthrow the regime in South Vietnam, there was little Westmoreland or any other commander could do to achieve a victory Americans would recognize. But Sorley insists on blaming Westmoreland and does so by writing criticisms which appear mean-spirited in that they omit and distort facts and attitudes, making the censure of Westmoreland more important than accuracy of those facts. He goes beyond saying the search and destroy/attrition was flawed. An entire chapter is devoted to that alone, and he quotes many senior commanders who agree with his analysis. But he uses other arguments as well. He makes a case for the ineffectiveness of the ARVN being caused by our not supplying them with the M-16 assault rifle, and says that was Westmoreland's decision. He says the Americans were surprised by the 1968 Tet Offensive, when they weren't.

It's true that Westmoreland wasn't the best man for the command of the war, even true that he was ill-suited for the post. But he deserves a better biography than this.

[Davy Bennett]

I thoroughly enjoyed John M Newmans book, JFK & Vietnam. Made me believe JFK was going to work hard to avoid the billion dollar quagmire, the one that LBJ readily submerged us into. Part of the big plan.

[Reuben · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is not a great book. Actually, it's rather mediocre. At times Sorley does a really good job of conveying Westmoreland's story, his life, the failure in Vietnam, and how Westland ultimately allowed that failure to define him as a person.

However, Sorley spends way too much effort not only criticizing Westmoreland but straight out calling him an incompetent soldier and deceiver more interested in 'shaping history' than doing his job. This much narrative eye rolling is unnecessary and unprofessional. The outside sources and Westmoreland's own actions do more than enough to convey Sorley's thesis. The only things one takes away from this are the author's personal dislike for his subject and the need to fill pages with narrative commentary.

In short, the work reminds me too much of something written by an inflammatory political talk show host (or a CBS news employee, jk) than a historian. No matter how much I might agree with the thesis (which is more than I'd like) the author can't get out of his own way and devalues what would have been a moderately interesting story.

[Joe L · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good look into Gen. Westmorelands life, mostly into his role as military commanders of US Forces in Vietnam from 1964-68.
This well researched and readable work traces the Generals spotless career trajectory until Vietnam soiled his once proud name.
Like Westmoreland, the author is a West Point grad and army officer who served in Vietnam and knows his stuff on the subject.
Compared with his book on Gen. Creighton Abrams whom the author admires, he takes a much harsher tone with “Westy”
Of course there was plenty of blame to share for the Vietnam debacle so then title is somewhat misleading.
Did Westy lose the war? You be the judge.

[Marc · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a strong and convincing indictment of William Westmoreland's dismal leadership of the American war in Vietnam. Well written, well researched and well argued.

[Josh · Rating 3 out of 5]

Lewis Sorley, who served as an officer in the Vietnam War, and later earned the Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins, has been one of the most influential historians of the Vietnam War since the publication of his most famous (or infamous) work, A Better War, that argued COMUSMACV Creighton Abrams had essentially achieved military victory in Vietnam by 1973 only to see his work undermined by feckless politicians at home and a public exhausted from eight years of conflict in Vietnam. Given Sorley's high opinion of Creighton Abrams it is no surprise that he does not particularly like General William Westmoreland. In fact, the subtitle of this book "The General Who Lost Vietnam" tells you the thesis of this book and his particular angle on Westmoreland's life—after all, Sorley bills this as a biography of Westmoreland.

Born William Childs Westmoreland on March 26, 1914 in Spartanburg County, South Carolina, to James Ripley Westmoreland and Eugenia Childs Westmoreland, the young "Westy" would be raised in a family of modest wealth (his father managed a textile mill) that revered Robert E. Lee and had ancestral roots four generations back in South Carolina. Westmoreland's father was well-connected in South Carolina politics and, during his teenage years, secured an appointment the U.S. Military Academy after being at The Citadel for one year. Westmoreland's early life, as Sorley notes, was a meteoric rise—Eagle Scout at 15, First Captain of his West Point class of 1936, a battalion commander at age twenty-eight with experience leading men in North Africa, a full colonel at thirty, a brigadier-general at thirty-eight while leading a regimental combat team in Korea, and a major general (the youngest in the Army) at forty-two. During the 1950s and 1960s he would serve as Division Commander for the famed 101st Airborne, Superintendent of the USMA, and eventually Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) in 1965.

Throughout the book, Sorley portrays Westmoreland as an ambitious man who, in his own words, remarked to a subordinate that "the aggressive guy gets his share—plus." Westmoreland knew how to groom his public image, hob-knob with Congressmen and Senators, and situate himself in the best possible situations for promotion within the Army. Sorley sarcastically jibes that Westmoreland ascended to COMUSMACV without any formal professional military education—Westmoreland had not attended the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Barracks, nor the Command and General Staff College (CGSC)—and limited experience leading larger combat units in war, relative to his peers. Thus, concludes, Sorley, Westmoreland engaged in "endless self-promotion that elevated him to positions and responsibilities beyond his capacity."

The bulk of the biography concerns Westmoreland's four years as COMUSMACV, where according to Sorley's portrayal, Westmoreland engaged in a single-minded "search and destroy" program that worsened the guerrilla war and relied on specious "body counts" to measure progress in the war. Conspicuously absent from this part of the narrative is the role played by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara whose obsessions with quantitative analysis may have played a more direct role in how Westmoreland designed his overall military strategy and measurements of progress than Sorley lets on. Sorley also musters anecdotal evidence from dozens of Westmoreland's subordinates to argue that Westmoreland was not especially intellectual (he almost never read or studied military history), bucked almost all wise counsel and advice, and became a public relations tool of the Johnson Administration by spending a lot of precious time in 1967-1968 going back to the United States to deliver optimistic speeches about a "light being at the end of the tunnel" in Vietnam that culminated with his speech to a Joint Session of Congress. Sorley also spends some time on the "Order of Battle" scandal, wherein Westmoreland apparently conspired to artificially lower the estimates of enemy combatants in South Vietnam to a figure less than 300,000 by removing from the calculations NLF and VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure, "Shadow Government") forces then engaging American soldiers in combat. This willful distortion of the enemy's Order of Battle made it appear that Americans were winning the war steadily, helped Johnson's public image at home, and maintained home front support for the war until the Tet Offensive on January 31, 1968, exposed the inaccuracy of such reports. The gravest mistake that Westmoreland made during his tenure in Vietnam was to virtually ignore "the Other war" of Pacification in the provinces. Westmoreland's failure to appreciate the nature of insurgency and design a military strategy that used an economy of force and emphasized winning "hearts and minds," says Sorley, essentially precluded any chance of American "victory" in Vietnam. [It would be Sorley's favorite Creighton Abrams who, succeeding Westmoreland, would implement a "One War" strategy that struck a proper balance between pacification and offensive operations].

The last third of the book examines Westmoreland's time as the Army Chief of Staff, a position he received by "failing upwards" when Johnson decided to replace Westmoreland with Abrams in Vietnam. Sorley is extremely critical of Westmoreland's time as Army Chief of Staff, saying that he spent the majority of his time traveling across the United States on a lecture circuit that was extremely apologetic of his strategy in Vietnam. His subordinates at the Pentagon, like General William DePuy, handled the day-to-day matters in Westmoreland's many absences. Also covered here is Westmoreland's retirement to Charleston, South Carolina, where he failed in a bid for the South Carolina governorship, sued CBS during the 1980s for libel, and eventually succumbed to Alzheimer's in his final years.

While I pretty much agree with Sorley's condemnation of Westmoreland's leadership in Vietnam and as Army Chief of Staff, I thought that the book's signal weakness was its overriding determination to cast Westmoreland in a wholly negative light. As a New York Times obituary acknowledged in 2005, Westmoreland "made himself the most prominent advocate for recognition of [Vietnam veterans'] sacrifices, spending the rest of his life paying tribute to his soldiers." In 1996, Westmoreland was named a Distinguished Graduate from the USMA, citing his "lifetime of extraordinary service to the United States Army and his fellow soldiers." However it was that Westmoreland championed the causes for Vietnam veterans during the 1980s and 1990s are conspicuously omitted from Sorley's biography in favor of presenting Westmoreland as a bitter, pathetic man whose sole obsession from 1968 until his death was defending the way he waged war in Vietnam. It's certainly true that Westmoreland died sticking to his convictions that he had been on the right track in Vietnam and that diverse and sundry factors (politicians, anti-war protestors, et al.) had conspired to undermine his position there, but Westmoreland comes off as a more complex figure than how Sorley chooses to portray him in this biography.

I recommend this book to anyone interested in the Vietnam War but, to quote Lewis Sorley's admonition about reading Westmoreland's memoir uncritically, I would echo that "Those seriously interested in the history of [t]his era, however, need to be aware of the distortions by omission in [this] volume."

Pairing this with Westmoreland's War by Gregory Daddis, may help correct for some of the biases in each biography. I believe that Daddis probably errs to far on the side of apologizing for Westmoreland and building up Westmoreland as a COIN-expert (when he clearly wasn't). But if Sorley and Daddis are read side-by-side, I think that one can come to appreciate Westmoreland's role in the Vietnam War in a deeper way.

[Charles · Rating 4 out of 5]

I didn't think much about U.S. commander Gen. William Westmoreland when I was in Vietnam. He was long gone by 1970. But the more I learn about Westmoreland the more I agree with the author of "WESTMORELAND: The General Who Lost Vietnam." The guy was promoted above his abilities and didn't have the historic context or brainpower to beat an insurgency. I did not know that Westmoreland was allowed almost a free hand for the first four years of our combat involvement in South Vietnam. Everybody deferred to his deficient judgment from LBJ to the Joint Chiefs to CINCPAC. He decided on a strategy of attrition against an enemy that was willing to sacrifice an entire generation of young men ... then manipulated estimates of enemy strength to show the strategy was working, when it wasn't. He adopted the body count as a metric of success, then graded his officers on how many "enemy" bodies they produced. He decided on the 12-month tour that damaged unit cohesion and hurt individual soldiers. He committed one mistake after another ... resulting in division and defeat. One part of the book explains the U.S. tactic of H&I or "harassment and interdiction" fire. Since there were so few real targets, U.S. artillery units would often just pick a likely looking patch of jungle and pound it with a few dozen artillery rounds in the hope some Viet Cong might be there. In some artillery units, 96% of rounds fired were H&I. No doubt Westmoreland has his supporters, but I haven't heard of any historians or military men leaping to his defense.

[Jim · Rating 3 out of 5]

while i agree with mr. sorley's general interpretation he also tends to tends to be hagiographical towards those he admires and overly denunciatory towards those he does not.

[Kerry · Rating 1 out of 5]

From official source documents, read what the President of the United States thought about Generals Westmoreland and Abrams:

***

“I like Westmoreland. He was one of four recommended to me. The other three were: General Abrams, General Palmer and General Johnson. Westmoreland has played on the team to help me.”

President Lyndon Johnson
(Message to Clark Clifford, Dean Rusk and advisors, March 26, 1968)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“I saw him [Westmoreland] the other day and the liberals and the doves have got him a little cowed and I am very fearful that he may feel that he has been demoted and humiliated. I didn’t feel that way. Buzz Wheeler told me that he wanted this assignment [promotion to U.S. Army Chief of Staff] … He came in and visited me the other day and he just didn’t have the warmth that he had had before and I believe he has been rocked a little. I believe he feels that we have lost confidence and I am sure you can get him out of that and for that reason I do think that playing it low key would be better. I want him to be strong and I want him to regain and recapture something that McNamara took away from the military.”

President Lyndon Johnson
(Message to Senator Richard Russell, June 3, 1968)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“In reading the January 31 news report on the Paris negotiations, it seems vitally important to me at this time that we increase as much as we possibly can the military pressure on the enemy in South Vietnam … I do not like the suggestions that I see in virtually every news report that we anticipate a “Communist initiative in South Vietnam.” I believe that if any initiative occurs it would be on our part and not theirs.”

President Richard Nixon
(Message to Henry Kissinger, February 1, 1969)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“Mr. President, inconceivable as it may seem, if our generals in Vietnam should again be so callous over the welfare of GIs who do the fighting and dying to order an assault on Dong Ap Bia, then let us hope that General Wright will personally lead that assault and be in the forefront of those young GIs to take part in it, and encourage them with his display of leadership and bravery. I suggest that Melvin Zais, who last month commanded the 101st Airborne Division in the attack on Hamburger Hill, be assigned to accompany him.”

Senator Stephen Young
(Address to U.S. Senate Floor, June 19, 1969)
See Samuel Zaffiri. Hamburger Hill, p. 277-278

[Note: By June 17, it was estimated that more than 1,000 Communist troops re-occupied Hamburger Hill after it was abandoned by General John Wright on June 5. When questioned about this, Wright said that he was ready to commit the entire division to assault the hill again, if necessary, and that brought the outrage from Senator Young].

***

“Since General Abrams’ instructions are to minimize U.S. casualties, if the enemy avoids combat, casualties and the level of fighting will decline ... If the lull continues this will affect our decisions on the rate of U.S. troop withdrawals.”

Henry Kissinger
National Security Advisor
(Message to President Richard Nixon, July 7, 1969)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams’ orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.”

President Richard Nixon
(Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, November 3, 1969)
https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/...

***

“In reading Abrams’ analysis of the military situation in South Vietnam, I get the rather uneasy impression that the military are still thinking in terms of a long war and an eventual military solution. I also have the impression that deep down they realize the war can't be won militarily, even over the long haul.”

President Richard Nixon
(Message to Henry Kissinger, November 24, 1969)
See William Hammond. Public Affairs: Military and the Media,
1968-1973, p.138

***

“Perhaps the war, and now Vietnamization, have become so routine that new proposals and new initiatives are scarcely feasible. No particularly new or fresh concepts were offered during our visit. I was somewhat surprised and disappointed ... We must give attention to eliciting, encouraging, and developing fresh new policy and tactical concepts.”

Melvin Laird
Secretary of Defense
(Message to President Richard Nixon, February 17, 1970)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“Nixon Would Be Wise to Heed Abrams’ Call For Pullout Pause”

Joseph Alsop
The Washington Post (March 30, 1970)

***

“The President then stated that he had noted a lot of chatter in the newspapers about the next withdrawal announcement and suggested that next Thursday the President, Mr. Kissinger and a small close-hold group should look at the next increment ... The President stated that prior to a decision he wanted absolutely no speculation on this issue.”

General Alexander Haig
Assistant NSC Advisor
(Message to NSC Advisor Henry Kissinger, April 1, 1970)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“You didn’t miss anything. It would make you climb the wall. Abrams has been going around Cambodia but he gave no analysis—just where the units are—the tactical situation. Then we decided about the role of tactical at the NSC meeting. There was nothing.”

Henry Kissinger
National Security Advisor
(Message to Secretary of State William Rogers, June 2, 1970)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“At midday, while Henry [Kissinger] and I were in, he did get into a general review of Laos. As Henry wrapped it up, it comes out as clearly not a success, but still a worthwhile operation. Both he and the P [Nixon] feel that they were misled by Abrams on the original evaluation of what might be accomplished, and that Abrams went ahead with his plan even though it was clear that it wasn’t working. Henry feels strongly that they should have followed Westmoreland’s advice and gone south to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail instead of going in to capture Tchepone, which was a visible objective but turned out to be basically a disaster. They concluded that they should pull Abrams out, but then the P [Nixon] made the point that this is the end of the military operations anyway, so what difference does it make.”

H. R. Haldeman
White House Chief of Staff
(Personal diary, March 23, 1971)
Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, pp. 376-377.

***

“Do you think Abrams put out ‘getting out by spring'? … I think we have to consider withdrawing the son-of-a-bitch … Get someone second in command that will keep him from drinking too much and talking too much.”

President Richard Nixon
(Message to Henry Kissinger, September 14, 1971)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“Now, let’s come to Abrams … what is his job out there? Just to do it in the numbers or is it his job to try to see that this kind of offensive is stopped? Now, I want you to understand, there’s some talk of Abrams going to Chief of Staff of the Army. I want you to know that I don’t intend him to have to go to Chief of Staff of the Army because of his conduct in this business. He’s shown no imagination. He’s drinking too much. I want you to get an order to him that he’s to go on the wagon throughout the balance of this offensive …

The other thing that’s going to happen is that he is going to start coming up with some ideas as to the use of the Air Force and so forth and as to the planning here, rather than just sitting back on his ass waiting for things to happen … Abrams and that MACV staff and all the rest, they’re to knock off all the parties … I want Abrams braced hard. His promotion depends upon how he conducts himself. Now—just—you weren’t here at the time. He screwed up Laos. He’s not going to screw this one up. Is that clear?”

President Richard Nixon
(Message to Admiral Thomas Moorer, April 3, 1972)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“If this isn’t fought more aggressively in another, by early next week, you might want to consider relieving Abrams. We just cannot play these games with the supremacy of the field commander. I know it’s rough and brutal, but that guy just does it too much by the numbers.”

Henry Kissinger
National Security Advisor
(Message to President Richard Nixon, April 4, 1972)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

“He’s had it. Look, he’s fat, he’s drinking too much, and he’s not able to do the job.”

President Richard Nixon
(Reply to above statements from Henry Kissinger, April 4, 1972)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“1. You will shortly receive a directive to conduct: (A) B52 bombing attack on North Vietnam south of 19 degrees north and (B) provide Arc Light support to the Barrel Roll area with particular emphasis on the Long Tieng battle. It must be realized that both of these actions have very heavy political as well as military objectives.

2. With respect to item 1.(A) above, the President was extremely out of patience with me this morning. He said that he had indicated his desire that the B52s attack NVN on 6 April and, so far, nothing has happened. He said here is a case where the military commanders have been given authorities and been given the resources over and above those requested and that, so far, nothing other than routine operations have occurred. He fully appreciates the military rationale contained in reference (A), but he wants to give the North Vietnamese as well as the Soviets a clear message that he intends to use whatever force is necessary in light of this flagrant invasion. He does not want to hear any more rationale—he wants action.”

Admiral Thomas Moorer
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Message to General Creighton Abrams, April 8, 1972)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“1. Am appalled by Saigon 0081 [message from U.S. embassy]. It is a self-serving egg-sucking, panicky lecture by Abrams. Does he think Thieu needs instruction on the gravity of his situation? He cannot make up now for his errors of the past two years”

Henry Kissinger
National Security Advisor
(Message to General Alexander Haig, May 2, 1972)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“The President is nearing the end of his patience with General Abrams on the issue of air action against North Vietnam. It must be clear to him that we are playing the most complex game with the Soviets involving matters which extend far beyond the battle in Vietnam as crucial as it is. Furthermore, without any requests from General Abrams and against massive bureaucratic opposition, the President since March 30 has ordered deployed 56 more B–52’s, 3 more aircraft carriers, and 129 land-based F–4’s to be available during this period. In addition, 72 more F–4’s have been directed to deploy and will begin arriving shortly.

The fact that General Abrams would dispatch an on-the-record cable to the effect that the diversion of some of these assets for a 48-hour effort in the North jeopardizes our security is increasingly difficult to comprehend. As you know, General Haig was sent to Saigon for the specific purpose of making these broader political considerations clear to General Abrams.”

Henry Kissinger
National Security Advisor
(Message to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, May 4, 1972)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“I need to send somebody over there as a cop to watch that son-of-a-bitch Abrams. I mean, Connally’s right. We should be firing him … Why don’t you call Laird in and say that we’re thinking of replacing Abrams.”

President Richard Nixon
(Message to Henry Kissinger, May 5, 1972)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“I am thoroughly disgusted with the consistent failure to carry out orders that I have given over the past three and a half years, and particularly in the past critical eight weeks, with regard to Vietnam …

I want some discipline put into our dealings with the State Department, with the Pentagon and with the CIA, and I want that discipline enforced rigidly from now on out. I want you to convey my utter disgust to Moorer which he in turn can pass on to the Chiefs and also convey it to Abrams and Bunker in the field. It is time for these people either to shape up or get out.”

President Richard Nixon
(Message to Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig, May 19, 1972)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

***

“So we put that asshole Weyand in there, who was worse than Abrams, if anything. Abrams is a—just a clod.”

President Richard Nixon
(Message to Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig, December 14, 1972)
https://history.state.gov/historicald...

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 4 out of 5]

Westmoreland is a scholarly murder. Sorley does a masterful job showing the meteoric rise and fall of General Westmoreland, a man propelled by his ambitions beyond his capabilities. I don't think there was single person with a negative opinion of Westmoreland who did not get a chance to stick a knife in by the end.

From youth, Westmoreland was marked for success. The child of a South Carolina mill manager, he was an eagle scout and chief of cadets at West Point in 1936. A field grade officer during World War 2, his active and aggressive style as commander of an artillery battery saw him promoted to colonel, mentored by airborne commander General Maxwell Taylor (later chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ambassador to South Vietnam). As he cycled through command of elite airborne units and a stint as commander at West Point, Westmoreland knew how to play on his looks, bearing, and political connections, and was tapped to take command of the war in Vietnam in 1964.

There, Westmoreland met the test of his life, and failed. Sorley describes Westmoreland's defeat in detail as a commander over the next four years: Neglecting ARVN in favor of fruitless search and destroy missions; requiring optimistic assessments from his subordinates, regardless of the truth; the whole fiasco of removing entire classes of Viet Cong guerrillas from the order of battle; focusing on selling the war in '67 instead of fighting it. The Tet Offensive shattered what remained of Westmoreland's credibility, and he was failed upwards to Army Chief of Staff.

There, Sorley is even harsher, recounting a tenure that ignored major problems in the army to focus on protecting Westmoreland's reputation in the official history. Westmoreland in retirement seemed a broken man, with a farcical run for governor, and an ill-advised libel suit against CBS for a special report on the Order of Battle. Westmoreland appears to have done good work for Vietnam Veterans, but none of that is mentioned, aside from a quote from his New York Time obituary.

The picture of Westmoreland that emerges is a man with a planetary sense of self-importance, a narcissus captured by being the image of the modern four-star general at the expense of actually winning a war. Sorley uses the ample archives of Westmoreland's actions to contradict the man's memoirs and later testimony. Westmoreland the strategist is one behind step events and trying to take credit for other people's work. His personal warmth and loyalty to his friends is countered by repeated accusations of gross stupidity, of an inability to learn, or clearly discern significant elements in confusing circumstances.

My other reading on the Vietnam War has focused on Westmoreland as a central figure, as the man who set American tactics in South Vietnam, who had the best opportunity to "win" the war, if it could be won, and who instead escalated it to a futile meatgrinder. This biography is a strong negative assessment of the man, but dances around two key issues: First, why was Westmoreland selected for such a key role as commander in Vietnam? It seems no one made the affirmative decision to send him there, he was merely a rising star in the right place. Second, search and destroy became a self-justifying mission for the war. Why did Westmoreland choose this set of tactics, and persist in it despite clear evidence of its inefficiency? Sorley is silent on Westmoreland's affirmative qualities.

[Clyde · Rating 3 out of 5]

Three and one half stars.
Lewis Sorley did a stupendous amount of research for this book. There is so much detail that it is almost suffocates the narrative at times.

I don't think he makes his case, however, that Westmorland lost the Vietnam War. He has convinced me that Westy played a large, perhaps pivotal, role in the loss. But, the war was very big and multifaceted; there is plenty of blame to go around. I lay a lot also on Presidents Johnson and Nixon, on McNamara, and on the US Congress. Heck, in one of the notes Sorley even intimates that Douglas MacArthur could share some blame for the loss.

Westmorland's "Americanization" of the war with emphasis on "search and destroy" and body count, while ignoring the needs of the Vietnamese people and army, was a very bad strategy indeed. Some people told him so at the time, but he didn't listen. Also, Westmorland obviously paid no attention to the advice the British gave him based on their Malaysian experience.

It is interesting to me that as his rank increased his ability to take reasonable advice seemed to decrease. He also got farther and farther from his men, eventually loosing all touch with the soldier in the field. I think he was a basically good man and he was a good commander at lower ranks. He was at his best as a division commander and was unsuited for the higher commands he was given. He is a good example of "The Peter Principle" in action.

The book also strongly implies that Westmorland wouldn't have risen so high if not for the social adeptness of "Kitsy" his wife. I don't doubt it. Perhaps the country would have been better served if he had been chosen by a less personable woman.

I think the latter chapters concerning various items after Vietnam -- litigation, and politics, and such -- were less interesting and weaker than the first part of the book. They tell a sad story actually.

[Robert · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book will not go down with many people who have a need to believe that the United States could not have achieved the goal of preserving South Vietnamese independence with competent leadership at home and abroad. I probably would have fallen into that camp had I not previously read Sorely's excellent predecessor to this volume, "A Better War." It also made me more receptive to this author that I had also read his biographies of Harold Johnson and Creighton Abrams.

It also will not go down well with those who have latched on to support for Westmoreland as a convenient rallying point for those who have long hated opponents of the war and see no need to examine the conduct of the war except for the purpose of identifying politicians and journalists upon whom much of the blame can be laid.

[Michael Wiggins · Rating 3 out of 5]

I bought this book for my father, who served two tours in Vietnam. Westmoreland grew up near here, and I wanted to find a better finish for this man who seemed to have started so well in life. It just wasn't to be found. The author was fairly rough on the general, but for the most part I couldn't disagree. I do believe, however, that the general was in an undeniably tough position fighting an unpopular, unconventional war while yoked to a fairly micromanaging commander-in-chief. But... no excuses. The man was a general and an Eagle Scout. God bless his family.
I hope modern-day commanders read this as a cautionary tale.

[Dan Ward · Rating 2 out of 5]

I couldn't finish this book. It just didn't hold my interest. The author clearly had an ax to grind with westmoreland from the beginning and I was surprised to find out that his career was in the military. The book just felt like a retelling of statistics without letting me into the real story.

[Miguel Hdz]

It was biased against the General, the author seems to blame everything on him, when in reality he did not control the political aspect of the war, the General was not without his shortcomings, but to blame the outcome of the war only on him....seems to me unfair.

[Gene Ledesma · Rating 4 out of 5]

Amazing that this guy was in charge of anything.Creighton Abrams should have been the man in charge, but it was all politics as usual with LBJ

[Stephen Morrissey · Rating 4 out of 5]

In 9 AD, Publius Quinctilius Varus, an overconfident commander brimming with optimism over a supposedly ungainly and uncivilized enemy force, led Roman legions into the Teutoburg Forest and never returned. His legions were lost; Rome was humiliated; and the upstart German tribes were put on the map of contemporary and historical consciousness.

The tale of General William Westmoreland, commander of US forces in Vietnam, echoes the fate of Varus and his legions. Sorley does a workmanlike job in relaying Westmoreland's upbringing and fast ascent through the ranks of the US Army, through World War II, the Korean War, and as Superintendent of West Point. No military figure seemed better prepared to lead US forces to victory in the far reaches of Southeast Asia than Westmoreland.

Unfortunately, the times and the position were wholly unsuited to Westmoreland's command. In Vietnam, as Sorley reports, Westmoreland becomes fixated on "search and destroy" missions, without venturing a complete strategic picture of the region and how to ultimately win the war except by brute firepower and force. More surprising, Westmoreland has the air of an ancient Roman governor, presiding in luxurious quarters and rarely venturing outside the physical and intellectual "bubble" of his war. Once cringes when Sorley relates how Westmoreland was utterly perplexed by pictures of American soldiers emerging from the jungles, covered in dirt with unruly hair. For his duration of the war, Westmoreland is seized by images and appearances, rather than any hard truths.

In Vietnam, Westmoreland focuses on aggregating ever more American units and soldiers, neglecting the supply and upkeep of the ARVN (South Vietnamese forces), even working against supplying ARVN units with modern M-16 rifles, rather than antiquated guns from wars past. Westmoreland marks the high point of his career as his joint speech to Congress, an odd choice for a military commander (can one imagine Eisenhower or Bradley offering such a claim?).

In the end, Sorley's tale of Westmoreland is a tragic one, a portrait of a man who could never escape his history in Vietnam, and never seemed to stop fighting the public relations war. With an army depleted and demoralized, a country lost to communist forces, and trust in the military and other political institutions forever sullied, Westmoreland's name, like Varus, has become a watchword not just for failure on the battlefield, but a failure of a much grander nature.

[Reza Amiri Praramadhan · Rating 5 out of 5]

In my opinion, William Childs Westmoreland cut a very sorry figure. From a promising early life and career that spanned from his childhood time as Eagle Scout, to his distinguished record in World War II, to becoming youngest Major-General in The Army (albeit for only one day), his legacy is forever tarnished due to his tenure as Supreme Commander in Vietnam War.

A believer in large battle, set piece tactics and supreme firepower, he put the US Military in pointless chases around Vietnam, embarking in a sort of war of attrition that was more detrimental to US public reaction than the ability of Vietnamese communists to replace their loss. He eagerly supported the body count policy, which caused some of the most horrible war atrocities of the Vietnam War. His believe that USA could get the job done in Vietnam by itself condemned the South Vietnamese military to US leftover armaments from World War 2, rendering itself helpless against the North Vietnamese military when the time came for America to pull itself out of the war. Obstinate to the end, Westmoreland refused to change his strategy, even as people around him saw the stupidity of his decision.

The sorry picture was not helped by his tendency to self-promote. Rather than correcting his own strategy on Vietnam, he spent most of his time in command in correcting what other people said about his strategy. After he was caught with his pants down after the communists' Tet Offensive, he was kicked upstairs as Chief of Staff of The US Army, in which capacity he spent more time in defending his Vietnam record rather than reforming the Army, which morale in sorry state after the Vietnam War. This obsession with Vietnam continued to haunt him to his later times, while his self-serving habit of spinning things and stories when it suited him put him in a losing libel suit against CBS that he initiated. He also embarked on a pathetic campaign for governorship of South Carolina, a campaign that was marked by his ineptitude as a candidate.

In the end, it is hard to feel sorry for Westmoreland. In my opinion, he failed to do what other old soldiers do, to fade away. Instead, like a dirty spot on a white cloth, he continued to be a nuisance, while his insistence to set straight his Vietnam War record put shame to his legacy, marring all achievements that he did before and after the forementioned war.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book places blame for the loss of Vietnam where it is deserved; at the top. For years I have heard from those who were there or lived through the era that "the politicians who tried to fight the battle from Washington" lost the war. This books expounds on that by telling the story of a man with a four-star ego that would come to haunt him later in life. Lewis Sorley's book is not an entire manuscript that is devoted to bashing Westmoreland. He gives accounts of his early successes as an army officer and the admiration he won early on from those in his command. However, once in Vietnam, his account of the general's life is unsympathetic to any shortcomings the commander had. He makes clear it was General Westmoreland that duped the leaders in Washington and was given too free a hand at managing (and ultimately mismanaging) the conflict while in command. Much to the author's credit, he suggests alternates courses of action that could have seen much more success in fighting the North Vietnamese, but were ignored by Westmoreland. As not to have the book appear only as an opinion piece of Mr. Sorley, countless references are included to support all the assertions made by the author. These include documented contradicting statements made by Westmoreland himself and instances noted by those who worked alongside of him. Even those who disagree with Sorley's belief that Westmoreland lost Vietnam will find this book an interesting read with evidence hard to refute.

[Filip · Rating 4 out of 5]

The American military and political debacle in Vietnam still haunts USA to this day. The strongest army in the world was unable to defeat primitive but determinated communist enemy in jungles of Vietnam. Bilions of dollars spent and tens of thousands dead American soldiers and communist still won the war.
There is lot of reaserch done to understand why America lost the war. Military historian Lewis Sorely, himself a Vietnam veteran, wrote about American faliure from the point of view of leading soldier in Vietnam - general William C. Westmoreland.
According to Sorely Westmoreland was main reason why American army failed in Vietnam. His leadership style, his questionable knowledge of Vietnam, his horrendus conduct of war (like search and destroy and body count as a measure of progress), his laying to the press and president Johnson are just a tip of the iceberg of his bad decisions in Vietnam.
Sorely did his reaserch and all of the book is filled with many footnotes that prove his point.
While Westmoreland is to blame for Vietnam debacle Sorely sometimes streches evidences too much while ignoring politics that was behind Vietnam strategy. Politics that didn't go in Westmorelands favour. It is to say that Westmoreland is to blame for most of Vietnam's problems but not all of them.
Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam is good reminder of what happens when you give hot crisis in the hands of a man who is not up to the task (to put it mildly).

[Thomas Radigan · Rating 3 out of 5]

As a biography of William Westmoreland, and a description of his character and attitudes the book seems credible enough. But it is less credible to claim that he was responsible for losing the Vietnam War, especially since he was only in command for the first four years, being replaced in 1968 with the war still raging and the outcome still uncertain.

The book makes the case that Westmoreland was unfamiliar with the concept of guerilla warfare, that he had little formal education in military affairs compared to other generals, he was not prone to changing his mind or his policies, and that he would cover his tracks when telling others how things were. Unfortunately the book fails to say much about what happened in Vietnam itself. What did the populace think of the American troops? Westmoreland effectively let US forces do most of the fighting, but how good, really was the South Vietnamese military? Why did Westmoreland not evacuate Khe Sanh? What was Westmoreland really allowed to do and not do by President Johnson and McNamara? The book mentions many US officials, but the opinions of the Vietnamese are neglected...in a book many years after the war.

This book covers Westmoreland's life, but says far too little about the Vietnam War itself. The case that Westmoreland was responsible for having lost it has not been made here.

[Ugo Marsolais · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mr. Sorley has penned a devastating, but realistic portrait of General Westmoreland. As you are reading it, it makes it painfully obvious how much Westmoreland was the wrong guy at the wrong place for the wrong job.

Westmoreland comes out as a narcissist person, of limited intellect, but lots of self-confidence. He looks good and looks the part. But this general with mostly World War II combat experience did not have the strategic mind required to fight in the very complex and frustrating conflict that was Vietnam. He was a very classic military officer, relying on brute force to get anything done. And he also had an obsession to control the public record about himself and the war, always spinning the US progress in the war in a positive light even if it was deceitful.

At some point in the book, Sorley tells the story of Westmoreland's revealing one-word reply to the question of a reporter about what was the answer to an insurgency: "Firepower". That answer gives everything you need to understand about how much Westmoreland did not get it. It tells you why, in spite of getting all the mind-boggling firepower the United States could muster to help him, in spite of winning almost all the battles of the Vietnam war, he was still the architect of the defeat.

[Corey Thompson · Rating 2 out of 5]

I can’t explain why this is but there’s some books that just take FOREVER to read. There’s a book where one page takes a minute to read and then this book where a page feels like it takes 10 minutes to read. It’s not as if this book is exceptionally dense or filled with technical details that require careful reading to understand. No, this book just took me a long time to read - perhaps the style was just not to my liking.

The author, in my opinion, is biased - he really doesn’t seem to like Westmoreland much at all. For right or for wrong the reader comes away from this book with a sense that the general was simply not that smart, not that imaginative, and not up to the task given him. That may in fact be the case, I don’t know - and the author’s obvious bias is largely to blame. I’m skeptical that what I read was an honest and truthful account of events.

[Wayne Haggart · Rating 2 out of 5]

Of course details the tragedies of the US and Westermoreland in Vietnam. A dinosaur from WW II that didn't read nor attend staff College! Vague chain of command where a general interacts with the President!? How could that work?
What struck me was the similarities with the US in Afghanistan. What is the strategic plan for force engagement/withdrawal? What is the enemy's center of gravity and how to best attack it? What forces need to be employed and how? What is the chain of command vis a vis political to military?

[Dick Hamilton · Rating 5 out of 5]

Terrific biography, the book really breaks into two pieces. The first is the part we forget, the General who is highly successful, admired in many ways but his negatives are not critical to his roles. But then, beginning in Viet Nam, the General really becomes a victim of the Peter Principal - he is promoted to a level beyond his capabilities. This, and his lack of introspection, ultimately lead to what is remembered - the man who lost the war.