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Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly
A NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW EDITORS' CHOICE
Following the trail of espionage and technological innovation, and making use of newly opened archives, Michael D. Gordin provides a new understanding of the origins of the nuclear arms race and fresh insight into the problem of proliferation.
On August 29, 1949, the first Soviet test bomb, dubbed "First Lightning," exploded in the deserts of Kazakhstan. This surprising international event marked the beginning of an arms race that would ultimately lead to nuclear proliferation beyond the two superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States.
With the use of newly opened archives, Michael D. Gordin follows a trail of espionage, secrecy, deception, political brinksmanship, and technical innovation to provide a fresh understanding of the nuclear arms race.
Following the trail of espionage and technological innovation, and making use of newly opened archives, Michael D. Gordin provides a new understanding of the origins of the nuclear arms race and fresh insight into the problem of proliferation.
On August 29, 1949, the first Soviet test bomb, dubbed "First Lightning," exploded in the deserts of Kazakhstan. This surprising international event marked the beginning of an arms race that would ultimately lead to nuclear proliferation beyond the two superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States.
With the use of newly opened archives, Michael D. Gordin follows a trail of espionage, secrecy, deception, political brinksmanship, and technical innovation to provide a fresh understanding of the nuclear arms race.
417 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 29, 2009
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166 people want to read
About the author
Michael D. Gordin
25 books36 followersMichael Gordin is Rosengarten Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at Princeton University, where he specializes in the history of modern science. In 2013-4 he served as the inaugural director of the Fung Global Fellows Program. He came to Princeton in 2003 after earning his A.B. (1996) and his Ph.D. (2001) from Harvard University, and serving a term at the Harvard Society of Fellows. In 2011 he was awarded a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship and was named a Guggenheim Fellow. He has published on the history of science, Russian history, and the history of nuclear weapons.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
May 6, 2023
“The first Soviet test was not simply a technical experiment that confirmed the ability of the Soviet Union to build nuclear bombs; it was equally an international event that marked the beginning of an arms race that would ultimately lead to nuclear proliferation beyond the two superpowers. From the moment the Manhattan Project successfully produced the first nuclear weapons – even earlier, in fact – Americans were fraught with anxiety over the possibility that these explosives would spread over the world. It would be bad enough if a “friendly” nation, such as Britain or France, weakened American dominance by developing a nuclear capacity of its own; it would be far worse if these weapons fell into the hands of a potentially threatening enemy. In the context of the incipient cold war, it required little imagination to see the Soviet Union as that future antagonist…From very early on, arms-control proposals, espionage, and scientific devices were marshaled in an effort at first to forestall, then detect, and finally react to a Soviet nuclear test…”
- Michael D. Gordin, Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly
Michael D. Gordin’s Red Cloud at Dawn is a thoughtful examination of a thin slice of early Cold War history: the period from August 1945 to August 1949 in which the United States had the world’s only nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union scrambled desperately to catch up.
As Gordin persuasively argues, the atomic monopoly – and the ending of that monopoly – had a profound impact on some very big policy decisions. During the monopoly, the United States demobilized millions of soldiers, allowed its hardware to languish, and slashed its defense spending, all in the belief that the atomic bomb would keep Joseph Stalin’s massive legions from sweeping over Western Europe. When the monopoly ended, it led to a nuclear arms race, proliferation beyond the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and to an increased American defense budget that has kept rising ever since.
The atomic monopoly also represented perhaps the only chance the community of nations ever had to really control these immensely destructive weapons. With the closing of that window, the world remains just one unstable leader away from a nuclear exchange that could kill tens of millions, flatten cities, and poison vast swaths of the earth.
***
Gordin divides Red Cloud at Dawn into seven chapters that are arranged by both chronology and theme. These chapters cover American actions during the monopoly; U.S. estimates as to how long the monopoly would last; Soviet efforts to learn the secrets of the Manhattan Project; the building and explosion of First Lightning, the Soviet Union’s inaugural A-bomb; the work done by America to detect this explosion; America’s initial response once this news became public; and finally, the longer-term U.S. policy decisions that followed.
This seems like a relatively straightforward framework, but Gordin’s execution is far different from what I expected.
***
At just 306 pages of text, Red Cloud at Dawn does not attempt to be comprehensive. It can’t be. Rather, Gordin approaches these aforementioned topics with incisive idiosyncrasy. Eschewing wide-angles and a broad scope, he prefers to find a subtheme or two upon which to dwell. For example, the opening chapter on the atomic monopoly is mainly devoted to the Baruch Plan, a multilateral arms control proposal set before the United Nations. He not only analyses the plan, but all the various responses to it, presenting an in-depth discussion of the hope, fear, and distrust that marked the attempt, as well as all limitation attempts that followed.
Later, in describing the detonation of First Lightning, Gordin is less interested in how the Soviets overcame the technological challenges, and more interested in meditating on how their perspectives upon viewing this explosion differed from that of the scientists at Alamogordo. That is, he focuses on how the Soviets – who knew a nuclear bomb was possible, but were unsure if theirs would work – described their experiences when compared to the Trinity test observers, where the participants did not yet know whether theory could be translated to practice. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Soviets were far more dispassionate than their counterparts. Unlike J. Robert Oppenheimer, none of them admitted to thinking of lines from the Bhagavad Gita.
***
In all honesty, it took me a chapter or two to warm to Gordin’s style. Expecting a straightforward narrative, I was a little thrown at his pseudo-Socratic tendencies. Once I accepted that Gordin was doing things his way – with a lot of rhetorical questions – I really started to enjoy this.
Especially good is Gordin’s explanation of the effect of Soviet espionage on their ability to produce a working weapon of mass destruction. While spying certainly helped, Gordin carefully describes its limitations. He also believes that the biggest Soviet advantage came from open-source knowledge, specifically the Smyth Report: the official – and declassified – report on the U.S. development of the atomic bomb.
Relatedly, Gordin’s chapter on America’s early nuclear detection capabilities is thoroughly engrossing. Entirely unable to penetrate the Soviet Union with human agents, the United States had to rely on technological expertise in monitoring Soviet bombmaking. Gordin not only describes the ingenious air-sniffing patrols that caught whiff of First Lightning, but he delves into the difficult decision faced by President Harry Truman over whether to announce the Soviet accomplishment, or wait for Stalin to say something.
***
The downside to Red Cloud at Dawn’s structure is that its range is narrow, its coverage is necessarily incomplete, and there are a lot of gaps. As already noted, for instance, Gordin’s account of the actual creation of First Lightning is only briefly described. Beyond that, Gordin has little room for background, meaning that this might be frustrating to readers who do not have at least some familiarity with the timeline of the early Cold War, and the participants involved in it.
***
Early in Red Cloud at Dawn, Gordin mentions America’s struggle to corner the world’s supply of uranium. This early stab at clamping down on proliferation – meant to deny the Germans – was very successful. Unfortunately, once the U.S. discovered local supplies, it lost interest in its material monopoly. This is just one of the missed opportunities Gordin enumerates, which he believes might have slowed – if not stopped – the wild multiplication of nuclear weapons after 1949.
Unlike Gordin, I don’t think anything could’ve prevented proliferation. Given scientific advances in the twentieth century, nuclear weapons were always bound to be made, whether at Los Alamos or Semipalatinsk or somewhere else. As soon as that lethal genie escaped its bottle, spread became inevitable, not just to the superpowers, but to unhinged minor nations like North Korea, where a potentially-psychotic man-child threatens nuclear war whenever he feels like no one is paying attention to him.
***
In the end, no one country could control the physics; no one country could control all the necessary ingredients; no powerful country – or any country with pretensions to power – could deny itself this ultimate force multiplier. On the one hand, this means that no single nation can unduly leverage atomic arms to get what they want, though some continue to try. On the other, it means that there are a lot more people around to make history’s biggest mistake.
- Michael D. Gordin, Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly
Michael D. Gordin’s Red Cloud at Dawn is a thoughtful examination of a thin slice of early Cold War history: the period from August 1945 to August 1949 in which the United States had the world’s only nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union scrambled desperately to catch up.
As Gordin persuasively argues, the atomic monopoly – and the ending of that monopoly – had a profound impact on some very big policy decisions. During the monopoly, the United States demobilized millions of soldiers, allowed its hardware to languish, and slashed its defense spending, all in the belief that the atomic bomb would keep Joseph Stalin’s massive legions from sweeping over Western Europe. When the monopoly ended, it led to a nuclear arms race, proliferation beyond the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and to an increased American defense budget that has kept rising ever since.
The atomic monopoly also represented perhaps the only chance the community of nations ever had to really control these immensely destructive weapons. With the closing of that window, the world remains just one unstable leader away from a nuclear exchange that could kill tens of millions, flatten cities, and poison vast swaths of the earth.
***
Gordin divides Red Cloud at Dawn into seven chapters that are arranged by both chronology and theme. These chapters cover American actions during the monopoly; U.S. estimates as to how long the monopoly would last; Soviet efforts to learn the secrets of the Manhattan Project; the building and explosion of First Lightning, the Soviet Union’s inaugural A-bomb; the work done by America to detect this explosion; America’s initial response once this news became public; and finally, the longer-term U.S. policy decisions that followed.
This seems like a relatively straightforward framework, but Gordin’s execution is far different from what I expected.
***
At just 306 pages of text, Red Cloud at Dawn does not attempt to be comprehensive. It can’t be. Rather, Gordin approaches these aforementioned topics with incisive idiosyncrasy. Eschewing wide-angles and a broad scope, he prefers to find a subtheme or two upon which to dwell. For example, the opening chapter on the atomic monopoly is mainly devoted to the Baruch Plan, a multilateral arms control proposal set before the United Nations. He not only analyses the plan, but all the various responses to it, presenting an in-depth discussion of the hope, fear, and distrust that marked the attempt, as well as all limitation attempts that followed.
Later, in describing the detonation of First Lightning, Gordin is less interested in how the Soviets overcame the technological challenges, and more interested in meditating on how their perspectives upon viewing this explosion differed from that of the scientists at Alamogordo. That is, he focuses on how the Soviets – who knew a nuclear bomb was possible, but were unsure if theirs would work – described their experiences when compared to the Trinity test observers, where the participants did not yet know whether theory could be translated to practice. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Soviets were far more dispassionate than their counterparts. Unlike J. Robert Oppenheimer, none of them admitted to thinking of lines from the Bhagavad Gita.
***
In all honesty, it took me a chapter or two to warm to Gordin’s style. Expecting a straightforward narrative, I was a little thrown at his pseudo-Socratic tendencies. Once I accepted that Gordin was doing things his way – with a lot of rhetorical questions – I really started to enjoy this.
Especially good is Gordin’s explanation of the effect of Soviet espionage on their ability to produce a working weapon of mass destruction. While spying certainly helped, Gordin carefully describes its limitations. He also believes that the biggest Soviet advantage came from open-source knowledge, specifically the Smyth Report: the official – and declassified – report on the U.S. development of the atomic bomb.
Relatedly, Gordin’s chapter on America’s early nuclear detection capabilities is thoroughly engrossing. Entirely unable to penetrate the Soviet Union with human agents, the United States had to rely on technological expertise in monitoring Soviet bombmaking. Gordin not only describes the ingenious air-sniffing patrols that caught whiff of First Lightning, but he delves into the difficult decision faced by President Harry Truman over whether to announce the Soviet accomplishment, or wait for Stalin to say something.
***
The downside to Red Cloud at Dawn’s structure is that its range is narrow, its coverage is necessarily incomplete, and there are a lot of gaps. As already noted, for instance, Gordin’s account of the actual creation of First Lightning is only briefly described. Beyond that, Gordin has little room for background, meaning that this might be frustrating to readers who do not have at least some familiarity with the timeline of the early Cold War, and the participants involved in it.
***
Early in Red Cloud at Dawn, Gordin mentions America’s struggle to corner the world’s supply of uranium. This early stab at clamping down on proliferation – meant to deny the Germans – was very successful. Unfortunately, once the U.S. discovered local supplies, it lost interest in its material monopoly. This is just one of the missed opportunities Gordin enumerates, which he believes might have slowed – if not stopped – the wild multiplication of nuclear weapons after 1949.
Unlike Gordin, I don’t think anything could’ve prevented proliferation. Given scientific advances in the twentieth century, nuclear weapons were always bound to be made, whether at Los Alamos or Semipalatinsk or somewhere else. As soon as that lethal genie escaped its bottle, spread became inevitable, not just to the superpowers, but to unhinged minor nations like North Korea, where a potentially-psychotic man-child threatens nuclear war whenever he feels like no one is paying attention to him.
***
In the end, no one country could control the physics; no one country could control all the necessary ingredients; no powerful country – or any country with pretensions to power – could deny itself this ultimate force multiplier. On the one hand, this means that no single nation can unduly leverage atomic arms to get what they want, though some continue to try. On the other, it means that there are a lot more people around to make history’s biggest mistake.
December 21, 2021
I purchased this book used at the Dickson Street Bookshop in Fayatteville, AR when visiting the area in October 2021. I am giving this book three stars out of five, not because it is not well-written or informative, but because it simply isn't the book I thought it was. Based on the title and a quick read of the dust jacket, I was expecting a detailed recounting of the Soviet efforts to engineer and build their first atomic bomb. This is definitely covered in the book, albeit briefly. The book is more focused on the American and international politics and policies during the roughly four years of the American atomic monopoly following WWII, and how those policies were adjusted in the wake of Soviet proliferation in August 1949. Given my lack of interest in those angles of the story, I was hard pressed to finish this book. On the bright side, the book does have a good description of the development and use of the means to remotely detect that a nuclear detonation has taken place, and I found that part interesting.
In purchasing this book I guess I should have cleaved more closely to a couple of time-honored Latin sayings: "Caveat emptor" (buyer beware) and "Semper lege parvas litteras lit" (always read the small print). Three out of five stars.
In purchasing this book I guess I should have cleaved more closely to a couple of time-honored Latin sayings: "Caveat emptor" (buyer beware) and "Semper lege parvas litteras lit" (always read the small print). Three out of five stars.
April 8, 2013
Great descriptions of important events of the early nuclear age. Covers Potsdam, the years of American nuclear monopoly and the decisions made on that basis; espionage and its impact (my favorite topic of course), and the results of
This is the only book I have found that explains project Vermont- how did the Americans detect the Soviet's test of their first atomic bomb? (first lightning/Joe-1) It was not inevitable at all and took considerable politicking to get the budget and program and scientific ability in place, all for a possibility that no one thought was imminent...until it happened.
There's also a good chapter, unique (in my reading experience) in how detailed and analytical it gets, on time-estimates and why the Americans kept getting their predictions wrong about when the Soviets would get the bomb. Also unique is his analysis of the Smyth report, which I hadn't heard before but found it very convincing (in short- Gen. Groves thought it was a good idea and would help not hurt security- but actually the Russians found it very useful. Whoops.)
I think the author must have been fluent in Russian based on some of the reading he does, and arguments he makes comparing nuances between English and Russian versions of things. Also EXCELLENT bibliography. if a bit overwhelming. my goodness every other footnote quotes, like, five separate sources just to make a small point.
This is the only book I have found that explains project Vermont- how did the Americans detect the Soviet's test of their first atomic bomb? (first lightning/Joe-1) It was not inevitable at all and took considerable politicking to get the budget and program and scientific ability in place, all for a possibility that no one thought was imminent...until it happened.
There's also a good chapter, unique (in my reading experience) in how detailed and analytical it gets, on time-estimates and why the Americans kept getting their predictions wrong about when the Soviets would get the bomb. Also unique is his analysis of the Smyth report, which I hadn't heard before but found it very convincing (in short- Gen. Groves thought it was a good idea and would help not hurt security- but actually the Russians found it very useful. Whoops.)
I think the author must have been fluent in Russian based on some of the reading he does, and arguments he makes comparing nuances between English and Russian versions of things. Also EXCELLENT bibliography. if a bit overwhelming. my goodness every other footnote quotes, like, five separate sources just to make a small point.
October 15, 2023
Like so many readers going into this book, I went into Red Cloud at Dawn expecting the story of how the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons. What Michael D. Gordin instead offered up was something far more wide-ranging. Yes, the Soviet's road to their first atomic bomb test is part of the book (with the actual test itself presented as a fascinating single chapter). This is more the story of the bomb's impacting the wider realms of political and military thinking. From secrecy to Stalin's push for the bomb and why US experts were taken by surprise when they did (and why they shouldn't have been), Gordin captures it all. It makes for some intriguing reading, though Gordin does get lost in minutia from time to time, causing things to drag. But it does paint, decades on, a portrait of the the era of nuclear monopoly and it's end.
July 2, 2019
This book did what I wanted it to do; told the story of how the United States was able to detect that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic bomb in August 1949. But, it also makes a compelling argument that the bilateral arms race that took off after this event was not inevitable. Gordin traces how and why this was the result of Joe-1. What I do think is the most interesting bit of the argument is Gordin's assessment that it was our decision to monopolize atomic intelligence rather than the raw materials needed to make nuclear weapons that has led to our current situation: a world in which nuclear proliferation is an ongoing threat.
As a side note, the assessment of the differences between US and Soviet intelligence gathering was extremely helpful. I am sure it is not new, but it is described well and I finally get it. American culture emphasized “technical ingenuity and inventiveness. It seemed obvious to unleash the spirit of Edison to solve the problems of atomic intelligence." (297)
As a side note, the assessment of the differences between US and Soviet intelligence gathering was extremely helpful. I am sure it is not new, but it is described well and I finally get it. American culture emphasized “technical ingenuity and inventiveness. It seemed obvious to unleash the spirit of Edison to solve the problems of atomic intelligence." (297)
January 13, 2024
This's a book on the Soviet and American nuclear programs in the leadup to the first Soviet atomic bomb. We hear of American questions about nuclear policy during the temporary atomic monopoly; we hear of the American disputes over how much information to release; we hear of the Soviet espionage; we hear of the Soviet program as a whole.
It turns out their program depended on espionage surprisingly little - there was perhaps one crucial bit of information, but most of it was just used for checking and reassurance. The crucial reason that the Soviets got a bomb before America thought they would is that America had overestimated how hard it would be to get a nuclear bomb once you were working on it and knew it was possible.
This's an interesting story, well-told.
It turns out their program depended on espionage surprisingly little - there was perhaps one crucial bit of information, but most of it was just used for checking and reassurance. The crucial reason that the Soviets got a bomb before America thought they would is that America had overestimated how hard it would be to get a nuclear bomb once you were working on it and knew it was possible.
This's an interesting story, well-told.
February 9, 2018
well-written and very well-researched, but it just didn't seem to go much of anywhere. lots of speculation and "what ifs" without solid conclusions. if you're a nuclear aficionado, you already know everything in here.
also, at one point he says "thermonuclear weapons fuse hydrogen, helium, and lithium" which the "lithium" there is indirect at best (n+Li->He+T) and the "helium", no, the triple alpha process is not a large contribution to weapon yield, ugh.
also, at one point he says "thermonuclear weapons fuse hydrogen, helium, and lithium" which the "lithium" there is indirect at best (n+Li->He+T) and the "helium", no, the triple alpha process is not a large contribution to weapon yield, ugh.
February 3, 2024
For Cold War science and technology
April 24, 2013
A lovely read! Classically historian in nature, it seems like Gordin has read (and incorporated) every possible scrap of paper related to the topic. He has made the four years of atomic monopoly interesting, and that is no mean feat. Further, his method highlights that the characteristics of the ways all the key players handled the monopoly carried over to the Cold War years.
March 17, 2015
Excellent book!
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews