An unflinching portrait of a supreme opportunist. Although Mussolini considered himself a man of destiny, he program consisted of little more than aggression overseas, suppression at home, and an aping of Hitler's racial laws. In the end, that "destiny" led to his nation's collapse and his own destruction.
It struck me reading this book how Mussolini and his Italy were most probably, outside the BBC, the dominant influences on George Orwell in writing 1984. From this biography there is a sense of how constant and overwhelming the joyful references to violence and war were in fascist Italy and how Mussolini's basic mental framework was orientated towards violence, with war as it's socially organised consequence.
Only war was to decide the ranking of nations. As such it required a militarised population and a big population, made possible by serried ranks of child bearing women. Mussolini's fascism had long perspectives on the one hand - fearing that the Roman spirit had been corrupted by too many enfranchised slaves and Levantine influences, and short ones on the other with his eagerness to go to war, starting with Ethiopia, being far in advance of Italy's ability to sustain a military endeavour in any practical way.
And it is here that Denis Mack Smith's presentation emphasises, or maybe this is inescapable, a comic-opera element to the entire Italian fascist endeavour. His Mussolini could be just a charlatan simply out for power for himself, certainly his about turns and contradictory statements are stressed throughout this book.
However this is a book in which we don't come all that close to Mussolini because of the sources for those self-contradicting statements which come from journalism, interviews, and in particular book length studies that Mussolini commissioned, had translated and made widely available (different language editions were deliberately not identical), and it is easy to see that Mussolini was striking a variety of poses meant for public consumption. The only constants appear to be war and violence. As a consequence we don't really get close to him, we see only the series of masks that he presented to viewer, there is no sense of his inner life once we leave the discussion of his youth, and his mistresses are barely mentioned, I have a vague memory that Margherita Sarfatti at least was quite influential on his politics at one stage - until she left the country on account of the turn to anti-Semitism.
In his interest in media control and aiming to impress through poses and imagery he comes across as a contemporary politician, more-so than when this book was first published in 1981. Whether Mussolini was more substantial than some world leaders of recent times or if his foreign policy too was simply an extension of the media management of his image is not an issue discussed in this book. Mussolini whenever possible tried to have international conferences or summit meetings between leaders take place on Italian soil - this allowed him to present this to Italian as foreigners coming to Mussolini to solve their problems. Mussolini also never took an interpreter to meetings with Hitler, as a young man he had worked in Switzerland and Austria as a labourer and in various casual jobs, doubtless he knew some German, but Denis Mack Smith reads this rather as not having a witness to how he was brow beaten. The great leader must always be seen as the great leader, particularly when they aren't.
Mussolini comes across as a mistrustful man, believing in the untrustworthiness of others he attempted to do everything himself, at times holding up to nine ministerial positions at one go. Here it struck me that Mussolini was attempting to run a country in the same way that as an editor he had directed a newspaper before seizing power in Italy. Image was important, presentation was important, orders were given but there was never any structure to check that they were carried out, and indeed Mussolini's insistence on intervening to make decisions at any and all levels of government down to the date when the police should change into their summer uniforms was very helpful in establishing his credentials as an omnipresent superman who decided all aspects of Italian life, but with the unsurprising consequences that he suffered from ulcers and headed an administration comprising of yes-men who told him what he wanted to hear.
I was surprised that Syme's The Roman Revolution did not feature in the bibliography. I far as I understand it Syme was inspired to re-evaluate Augustus and the beginning of the Roman Empire by his understanding of the events in Italy (and perhaps also to some extent in Germany and Spain) under fascism. Yet we can also read this argument backwards - that the use of violence, and even more importantly the control of ones own image, the re-purposing of existing institutions, the self-creation of Mussolini as an ideal was drawn from the example of Augustus (although perhaps indirectly via Napoleon). Alternatively perhaps we can say there are ways in which dictatorships and tyrannies will always be very similar to one another irrespective of when and where in the world we may find them.
Denis Mack Smith ends up telling a very familiar tale of posing for the cameras, controlling the media, promising a return to untold greatness to people who he felt - once things went badly- were undeserving of his brilliance, of a man who came to believe his own propaganda, and who was a little afraid of his own wife . And while one of his mistresses insisted on dying at his side, she had also been spying on him for the Germans.
In modern times when we see films of Benito Mussolini, strutting like a peacock, with out thrust chin and arms folded across his chest, we see a buffoon. In this unsparing biography the author shows us that this was not quite the case. Mussolini was a prodigious con man with great powers of persuasion who had a talent for seeing which way the political winds were blowing and used this talent to become Il Duce, the man responsible for damaging Italy almost beyond repair.
He was an anarchist, nationalist, imperialist, constantly changing his political position until he settled on fascism but never seemed to be able to explain in a consistent manner exactly what the tenets of fascism were. His strength was in his belief that the power of words was the essential art of government and that the masses were moved by emotion and not by reason. He kept his government totally in the dark while he indulged his passion for petty administrative details and they were left to guess at his policies. He had no original thought and based his leadership on lies and fantastic exaggeration. Mussolini even criticized Napoleon for a flaw in his character by which dreams of empire and military victories overwhelmed him and led to his fall.,,,,,he did not perceive that same flaw in his own actions which would lead, not to exile, but to an ignominious death.
I recommend this highly readable biography of one of the most improbable leaders in Italian history.
Smith is a first-rate historian - but he does not understand this topic, in my opinion. He thinks Mussolini was simply a charlatan, without any ideological core -- and this is simply incorrect. His book on Mazzini looks interesting - and I'll check it out someday -- but it must have been a challenge for a no-nonsense empirical Brit like Mack Smith to make sense out of a revolutionary spiritualist-nationalist like Mazzini...
The life of Mussolini was one that was filled with tragedy for the state of Italy. Mussolini is not lionized by Dennis Mack Smith but instead taken apart for the inadequacies in his rule during the World War 2 era. Mussolini never really had control of the situation in Italy and was most of the time a confused dictator. He believe his strength to be far greater than it was and considered Italy a great power in the world. He was quickly becoming a pawn of Hitler and his indecisiveness led Italy down a path of destruction. There is little to be proud of given the evidence posted in this book and it brings to light a perspective that should be analyzed. The book is very well written and is not bogged down in heavy detail. It highlights the salient points and provides a context for life in Italy under Mussolini. While Mussolini's thugs did terrorize the populace form time to time the country really ran as it did in the per-fascist days. The security forces were police state at times but nominally Mussolini, especially as the war went on, quickly fell out of favor with the people. He lost his touch with reality and while no one wanted to challenge his perceptions it did not matter as Italy was driven back again and again over the course of the war. This is a must read for those who want to understand how Italy fit into World War 2 beyond simply a military context.
Imagine your country run by the Three Stooges, with Moe the President, Larry the Treasury Secretary, and Curly in charge of all three branches of the military. Such was Italy under Mussolini, only Mussolini played all three stooges–a super-stooge!–but one that caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.
Mussolini was first a journalist, obsessed with words and images that manipulate people and governments, distorting reality on a national scale. He spent hours every day reading the papers, writing articles, and controlling the news in a way not even Germany’s Göebbels achieved. He spread lies, came to believe them, then committed his country to act on them. For instance, he repeated over and over that his army had eight million soldiers ready to fight, including two tank divisions. In fact, Italy had fewer than one million soldiers, no panzer units, and an air force of 400 obsolete planes. The Italians had a difficult time taking over Ethiopia. Shortly thereafter they came up against the British and Americans in North Africa which led to Mussolini’s defeat. Was it Mussolini’s fault? Yes, almost completely.
He recruited and promoted only C and D level talent, those who were no threat to him. He did not plan military operations, he gave orders, changed them, skipped logistics, lost control of the Mediterranean–“the Italian Sea”–promoted bunglers, genuflected to Hitler, and launched one unsuccessful campaign after another, which the Germans then had to salvage.
Mussolini began life as a thug and petty criminal, he ended life as a master thug and war criminal murdered by his own people. This book covers his life and government in detail; following Mussolini, various ministers, and generals as they fail their country. The writing is punchy, colorful, and British. I am reading biographies of the leaders of the major countries who fought in world war two and I chose this book for my Mussolini. I am glad I did. Denis Mack Smith is no David McCulloch, but he can turn a phrase and he keeps the focus on the man, his actions, and the results, exactly as needed.
Denis Mack Smith's Mussolini is one of the standard English-language biographies of Il Duce, and with good reason. Smith eschews the sympathetic tone of biographers like Christopher Hibbert or Jasper Ridley, who view Mussolini either as a witless clown in over his head or, more bizarrely, a tragic figure compared to the monstrous Hitler. Smith focuses heavily on Mussolini's background as a mercurial radical, shifting from far left to far right before World War I steeled his resolve as a reactionary, and how he took advantage of frustration over Italy's "mutilated victory" in that war and the weakness of the liberal government in Rome to install himself in power. Smith shows that Mussolini was a brilliant propagandist whose journalistic background enabled him to manipulate the public and his fellow politicians, despite his essential shallowness. Aside from Adrian Lyttleton's The Seizure of Power, I'm hard-pressed to think of a work that handles Mussolini's early years better: his control remained precarious until the Left's refusal to confront him over Matteotti's murder allowed him to solidify absolute dictatorship. While his squadrisiti terrorized the public into acquiescence, Mussolini tried and discarded economy and domestic policies with amateurish abandon. But Mussolini's passion, ultimately, was renewal of national character through war: hence his farcical, but bloody imperial adventures in Ethiopia, Libya and Eastern Europe, which showcased hweakness and cruelty rather than strength and civilization. By the time Mussolini embraced Hitler and rushed his country into the maelstrom of World War II, he had already all but wrecked it through his incompetence and reckless policies. An excellent biography.
Had expected a lot more, unfortunately he isn't writing much on Mussolinis youth as well as the time after Mussolini became Leader of the Salo Republic. The book still explains much of his actions as Dictator of Italy, debunks a lot of myths surrounding him. If you want to Study Fascism and Italian history its worth reading.
I’ve read numerous books over the years on infamous people like Hitler, Himmler, Ho Chi Mihn, Mao, and more, but I’ve never learned anything about Mussolini and I’ve always wanted to because I’ve heard so much about him, but really no details. So I happened upon this book recently and was thrilled. Just finished it and was really impressed. It’s well researched and well written. Details Mussolini’s life in a chronological fashion from birth to death in fairly good detail and in really sheds light on his mind and thinking and fascism and Italy’s role in World War Two. Fascinating.
To put it bluntly, Mussolini was completely insane. He was quite possibly the most delusional person who ever lived. He had no concept of reality. He insulated himself entirely, hired only yes men dunces for major posts, fired and/or executed anyone who criticized or disagreed with him, shut down any presses that weren’t ardently pro-Mussolini, made it impossible to obtain foreign journalism in Italy, was a master at propaganda so that his people believed the world feared and respected him and his country like no other. He had total command of the military during the war, even though he had no training and was a journalist by trade. He destroyed the military by not listening to his generals, even firing them for disagreeing with him, by making serious decisions about battles, etc., and not telling anyone at all, thus destroying logistics, supply lines, none of which were prepared. He bragged of having a ten million man army when he didn’t even have one million and even then, he didn’t even have enough uniforms for them, nor enough weapons. He bragged about his extensive modern weapons and he apparently fought the war with weapons from World War One. He bragged about his heavy tank battalions, when he had no tanks whatsoever. The only “armor” he had were armored cars. It’s literally stunning. And it’s impossible to know if he actually believed his lies or if he was just trying to impress Hitler and bluff the rest of the world. Unreal. He bragged about having the biggest and best air force in Europe. He had perhaps 400 serviceable planes, most of which were shot down. He bragged about his grand navy, most of which was destroyed by the British. He bragged about invading the great military country of Ethiopia. He had such a hard time, he had to send 300,000 troops and even then had to bribe the Ethiopian leaders to surrender after months of fighting. After he joined Hitler in forming the Axis, and of course Mussolini thought Hitler was a dolt while Hitler thought Mussolini was a fraud, Mussolini didn’t want to fight, just wanted Germany to fight and wanted to come in at the end of the battles to get “booty.” Hitler pressured him to do … something, anything, so he decided to attack Greece, without telling his generals. He said the war would be over in days. Within days, his army had been pushed out of Greece back to Albania where they remained in retreat for six months getting their asses kicked by a much smaller force before Germany intervened. Hitler pressured Mussolini to take North Africa from the British, particularly Egypt and Malta. Italy had a chance to take Malta and passed it up. They already had control of Libya and were poised to march on Egypt, but Mussolini didn’t understand the need for motorized vehicles for his army in the desert, thought they could march hundreds of miles in the heat with minimal supplies. His generals and he kept putting it off, so Hitler sent Rommel and German troops who promptly attacked the British and drove them back, kicking their ass, infuriating Mussolini, who was supposed to be in charge of the North African campaign and wanted all the glory for himself. Rommel did whatever he wanted and Mussolini finally sent his troops forward. They accomplished nothing. Mussolini kept bragging about his ten million troops. Of course, Hitler knew he didn’t have them, but he asked Mussolini to send 25 divisions to Germany to help with the war effort there. Mussolini didn’t have 25 divisions, only 10, so he ignored the request and pretended he never got it. Which was his normal course of action. He was the most indecisive man who ever lived. He changed his mind some 50 times a day or more. He gave people conflicting orders. He told people what he wanted them to hear and what he thought they wanted to hear. One moment, he decided he wanted to help Germany fight Russia. Ten minutes later, he thought that was insane and wanted no part of it. This was every day of his life. Of course, he ended up helping fight Russia, sending 100,000 men. The Russians slaughtered them. For some reason, he especially hated the British and looked down on the Americans. As the British and Americans moved up Italy after invading the country, he told the world that Churchill and Roosevelt were going to be tried as war criminals when they shortly lost the war. His country was embroiled in civil war with half the Italians helping the Allies, numerous people looking for the Duce, a price on his head, his already having been deposed once, his power and army shrunk, Germany losing the war, Russia at Berlin’s door. He was insanely delusional, although no one will ever know if this kind of stuff was mere bravado or if he insanely believed this shit. I think he actually believed it because no one told him the truth about anything, just what he wanted to hear. Only “good” stuff. He had no clue. He was a narcissistic, insecure, psychopathic, sociopathic, moron of the tenth degree. When it became apparent he was about to be captured, he took off with his few remaining fascist friends to try to cross over into Switzerland in disguise, but his own border guards recognized him, captured him, executed him and his colleagues, and sent their bodies to the capital for display. He had gone from being possibly the most beloved Italian leader in some time 15 years earlier to the most hated Italian leader in centuries, if not of all time.
Mussolini was born in a small village and was a sociopathic, psycho from birth. In elementary school, he was sullen and hostile and as he grew older in school, he was kicked out of a number of schools, several times for stabbing fellow students, among other things. He was constantly getting gangs together and starting fights, was a major bully, although he himself was not physically imposing. He always believed in violence as the answer to everything. He grew up a socialist in a royally screwed up parliamentary country with no good political system whatsoever. However, he seemed to change his mind about his politics on a near daily basis, which was a pattern he would follow in virtually everything for the rest of his life. After school, he became a school teacher and taught in several countries, but was either fired and his contract was not renewed after his first year at each location because of child and parental complaints that he was too cruel and violent and frightening and he then turned to journalism, since he had been writing columns for socialist papers at the time anyway. He eventually rose to the position of editor and eventually became editor of the biggest socialist paper in the country. But his views were changing. He was moving to the right and thought things should be more authoritarian, thought the socialists were too close to communists, which apparently was a bad thing even though he admired Lenin. He developed the idea of fascism, a totalitarian political ideology that would ultimately center around centralized authoritarian control in the form of a dictator – him – based upon violence, getting rid of the socialists, the liberals, intellectuals, and many others in society he disagreed with, by any means necessary, preferably through violence, ideally lethal. He formed roaming gangs of fascist men who used castor oil to torture and kill their opponents, as well as more normal types of weapons, and numerous people were killed and injured. The fascists gained power and eventually, several were voted into parliament, including Mussolini himself. He cozied up to the corporations, got the capitalists and their money behind him, told Italy they needed to toughen up, they needed to obtain greater standing in the world, get theirs, if you will. He promised to bring Italy to the forefront and started making rumblings about attacking France and Britain, as well as Austria and Yugoslavia, among smaller countries. He wanted to mirror some of the other countries in their imperialist ambitions and increase Italy’s empire. Which he did by annexing a couple of tiny neighboring places. BFD. Somehow, someway, the fascists ultimately gained total power as he talked the Italian population into voting for them and into buying into his idea of Italy becoming this great world power, this great military power. This was in the 1920s, long before Hitler and Germany came along to steal his thunder. Finally, at some point in the early 1920s, he was named prime minister by the king and had complete power. But it wasn’t good enough. As he started modifying everything all of the papers and magazines could write and publish, as he started controlling all of the media that went into and out of Italy, as he started trying to build up Italy’s armed forces, he worked hard to decrease Parliament’s power, so that in a few years, he was literally named “Dictator” and Parliament no longer had power, nor did his ministers or generals or anyone else. The only person in the country who could make any decisions was Mussolini. Unreal. So, years later, when he went to Africa to review the military situation and got stuck there for several weeks, everything in Italy literally ground to a complete halt until his return. It was a disaster. He refused to listen to his ministers or generals. His wife and children remained at his country home while he lived in a small apartment in the city and kept a mistress nearby. He kept to himself, virtually completely isolated and refused to take advice from anyone for anything because he knew what was best in every situation. When he had to meet with Hitler, at first, he tried to dominate their meetings, but as time went by and it became apparent he was full of shit and Hitler knew it, Hitler dominated the meetings entirely and lectured him and Mussolini was too proud to bring a translator with him, so he quite often agreed to things he didn’t even understand, thus making himself out to be an even bigger dumbshit than before in Germany’s eyes.
I could go on and on. This book was very revealing, a real eye opener, very educational. I can’t believe what a total dunce and fraud Mussolini was, especially when you consider his fearsome reputation. Italy did nothing in World War Two. I already knew they were Axis failures, but I didn’t know they were THAT bad. I mean, Greece kicked their ass! Mussolini was an insane tyrant who took his beloved country and literally destroyed it in two decades, slaughtering millions of people needlessly just to satisfy his stupid ego. For that alone, he deserves to burn in hell for eternity, if such a place exists. The book is good, a little dry, but that’s to be expected in a historical biography from an Oxford academic. I enjoyed it immensely and thought it was quite good. Is it a five star book? I’m not sure it is. But it’s certainly a four star book, no problem. If you want to learn as much as possible about Mussolini, this is definitely the resource for you. Recommended.
Saggio di grande prestigio e molto interessante di Denis Mack Smith, uno degli storici stranieri più importanti sulle vicende italiane. Il ritratto di Mussolini che esce da queste pagine è quello di un bruto camaleontico, un uomo che - mascherando una profonda insicurezza personale con dei modi machisti e forti - fingendo un atteggiamento “decisionista” che, in più occasioni sarà fatale per l’Italia, governa il Paese in pace e in guerra al timone di un regime che, nonostante la sua pretesa di essere granitico e totalitario, era anch’esso una maschera che celava al di sotto contraddizioni e falsità.
This competent and interesting biography of Benito Mussolini is very relevant for the current state of affairs here in the United States as well as in Europe. There are many parallels between Mussolini and Trump. The lying, boasting, deception, indecisiveness, always placing blame on others, inept decision making, racial scapegoating, lack of empathy for those hurt by their decisions, inability to take criticism and on and on.
One difference is that Mussolini was quite a clever propagandist and skilled at taking and consolidating power. Whereas Trump is, in the words of his own staff an “idiot”, a “fucking moron”, and a “goddamn dumbbell”.
Non fiction should be the complete truth but as for each person the truth might be different, this is especially the case about historical subjects, wars, ... . This book talked about Mussolini the person and didn't focus on Facism, even though it is of course a huge part of him. Saying Mussolini or Facism is for many people the same. At the same time Facism is seen in a different way by people from the same background, country but also by people from different countries. The main image is taught different at school too. This book was very interesting to find out mroe about the person Mussolini and at the same time to introduce you to important people of that time. Mussolini has also been a little boy going to school. A young guy who had dreams and went abroad to find a job. He had his troubles like anybody else. Of course not everybody gets into the political environment and this is what happened to Mussolini who first tried to have influence by his writings in newspapers. Journalism stayed an important part of whatever he did in his life. I am planning to read more abut Mussolini because the whole book written by this author ahs everywhere the negative image around Mussolini, which seems to me to be a bit too much. It is for sure possible that this book was very factual, but also that it wasn't. Of course being in Predappio, the area where Mussolini was born, the books would be at the other side and be very positive. Life goes on in Predappio more than 60 years after the dead of the Duce, but there is also that different feeling hanging around. At the cemetry Mussolini can still be honoured by his followers from after his dead as from his own time.
I’ve always wondered why we don’t hear more about Italy in WW2. Now I know. Mussolini had some serious problems, but his main problem, as far as trying to be a leader, was having absolutely no talent for administration. That sounds very dull and boring, but it destroyed his country. He made extravagant claims about industry, the military, etc. and instead of following up and making sure they were done (build tanks, enlist soldiers) it seems as though he just expected the Italians to spontaneously do them, with no planning. What a tragedy.
Denis Mack Smith’s biography "Mussolini" is widely regarded as a classic and informative account of the Italian dictator and the fascist regime. However, it suffers from ideological bias and a lack of historical nuance, offering a one-sided portrayal that downplays Mussolini’s capabilities and ignores the broader context of his era.
A very unusual person The biography opens by labeling Mussolini as a “very unusual person” and proceeds to depict him as erratic, egotistical, and politically inconsistent. While these traits were indeed present, Mack Smith’s portrayal ignores important qualities such as Mussolini’s rhetorical skill, political adaptability, and early administrative successes. Even his political opponents like Churchill once admired his charisma and early achievements. Presenting Mussolini purely as a disordered opportunist overlooks the reasons why he gained popular support in the first place.
the socialist who became nationalist A major shortcoming of the book is its failure to contextualize Mussolini’s ideological transformation from socialism to nationalism. Born into a socialist household, Mussolini was an anti-war, anti-imperialist activist who worked for the socialist newspaper Avanti! and was imprisoned for his views. Yet, with the outbreak of World War I, he reversed course and supported Italy’s entry into the war, a decision that remains underexplored in Mack Smith’s account. In my opinion Mussolini’s shift reflects not just personal opportunism but also the widespread cultural embrace of war in early 20th-century Europe, where conflict was often seen as a unifying and purifying force. Such contextual factors, largely absent from the biography, are essential to understanding his ideological journey.
The book also emphasizes fascist violence as central to Mussolini’s rise, focusing on the activities of fascist squads and high-profile acts of political terror. While these events are accurately described, Mack Smith fails to place them within the broader interwar climate, which saw significant left-wing violence as well — including socialist militias and widespread labor unrest in Italy. Without acknowledging the mutual escalation of violence between left and right, the narrative appears biased and oversimplified.
Yes but... Similarly, it downplays the regime’s achievements through a consistent “yes, but” framing. For instance, while acknowledging economic stabilization, improved infrastructure, and reconciliation with the Vatican, Mack Smith quickly qualifies these successes by emphasizing their authoritarian cost. According to the critique, this method prevents a balanced assessment and diminishes the complexity of the fascist era. While moral judgment is valid, the complete dismissal of practical successes can lead to historical distortion.
Mack Smith also presents Mussolini as both an autocrat and a puppet of Italy’s industrial and military elites — a contradiction inadequately explored. In fact, Mussolini often acted independently and sometimes opposed elite interests when it suited his political goals.
An inspirational leader... Another neglected area is the international admiration Mussolini received in the 1920s and 1930s. Figures like Churchill, P.T. Marinetti, de Valera, Yeats, George Bernard Shaw, and Ezra Pound expressed admiration for him, as did prominent Americans such as Henry Ford, Thomas Edison and Charles Lindbergh. Mack Smith’s omission of these perspectives weakens his portrayal of Mussolini’s global influence during that period.
The Ethiopian campaign Military successes under fascism are similarly underplayed. The 1935–1936 war in Ethiopia, for example, is described primarily in terms of Italian war crimes — notably the use of chemical weapons. While these actions are rightly condemned, Mack Smith ignores both the military and political effectiveness of the campaign, as well as the historical context of European colonial expansion in which Italy participated alongside other powers. Moreover, earlier failed Italian efforts to conquer Ethiopia predated fascism entirely, but this continuity is not acknowledged.
Finally, the biography’s coverage of Mussolini’s downfall is rushed and emotionally detached. Though Mack Smith makes valid points about Italy’s unpreparedness for total war and the weaknesses of its military leadership, he exaggerates Mussolini’s cowardice and omits personal losses, such as the death of two of his sons (who served in the army) during the war. The dictator’s final years and dramatic end are treated briefly, denying readers a more comprehensive view of his decline.
In sum, while Mussolini by Denis Mack Smith is valuable for its information and detail, it offers a selective and ideologically slanted view of its subject. By failing to provide sufficient historical context, acknowledge real accomplishments, or explore Mussolini’s appeal and contradictions, the book ultimately lacks the depth and balance needed for a full understanding of one of the 20th century’s most consequential figures.
Το «Mussolini» του Denis Mack Smith είναι αναμφίβολα ένα κλασικό έργο, το οποίο προσφέρει πολύτιμες πληροφορίες για τον Ιταλό δικτάτορα και το φασιστικό καθεστώς. Ωστόσο, πάσχει από ιδεολογική μονομέρεια και έλλειψη ιστορικού σχετικισμού.
"Ένα πολύ ασυνήθιστο άτομο" Ο συγγραφέας ξεκινά τη βιογραφία του Μουσολίνι χαρακτηρίζοντάς τον ως «πολύ ασυνήθιστο άτομο», έναν χαρακτηρισμό ασαφή και γενικόλογο. Στην πορεία, όμως, τον σκιαγραφεί ως έναν αριβίστα, αλλοπρόσαλλο και ψυχικά διαταραγμένο ηγέτη, χωρίς σταθερές απόψεις και με τάσεις μεγαλομανίας. Αυτή η εικόνα, παρότι δεν είναι εντελώς ανακριβής, παραμένει μονομερής, καθώς αγνοεί τις πραγματικές ικανότητες του Μουσολίνι: τη ρητορική του δεινότητα, τη διορατικότητα, την πολιτική του ευελιξία και την επιτυχία του – τουλάχιστον στο πρώτο μισό της διακυβέρνησής του – στην ανασυγκρότηση της Ιταλίας. Ακόμα και πολιτικοί αντίπαλοί του, όπως ο Τσώρτσιλ, αναγνώριζαν τη χαρισματική του προσωπικότητα. Ο Μουσολίνι ήταν πολλά περισσότερα από έναν απλό «ιδιόρρυθμο» ή έναν κοινό καιροσκόπο της πολιτικής. Βασική αδυναμία του βιβλίου είναι ότι παρουσιάζει τον Μουσολίνι αποκομμένο από το ευρύτερο ιστορικό πλαίσιο της εποχής του με αποτέλεσμα πολλές πλευρές της προσωπικότητας και της συμπεριφοράς του να διαστρεβλώνονται ή να μένουν σκοτεινές. Οι παρακάτω περιπτώσεις είναι χαρακτηριστικές:
1.Αφήνεται ανεξήγητη η μεταστροφή του Μουσολίνι από τον σοσιαλισμό στον εθνικισμό. Ο Μουσολίνι μυήθηκε από νωρίς στον σοσιαλισμό. Το μικρό του όνομα ήταν επιλογή του σοσιαλιστή πατέρα του εμπνευσμένο από τον Benito Juarez, τον επαναστάτη-ήρωα του Μεξικού. Σύμφωνα με τον συγγραφέα, ο Μ. ήταν χαρακτήρας παράφορος, ατίθασος, αθυρόστομος και ευερέθιστος, με έντονη αντικοινωνική συμπεριφορά (εξ αιτίας της οποίας αποβλήθηκε από το σχολείο του). Ωστόσο, αγαπούσε την μόρφωση και κατάφερε να πάρει πτυχίο δημοδιδασκάλου. Γνώριζε άπταιστα γαλλικά, γερμανικά και μέτρια αγγλικά. Διάβαζε με πάθος λογοτεχνία και ιταλική ιστορία. Πέρα από τον Marx και τις μελέτες για τον σοσιαλισμό, διάβαζε Sorel, Nietzsche και Schopenhauer. Τον τελευταίο, είχε επιχειρήσει να τον μεταφράσει στα ιταλικά. Εργαζόταν ως δημοσιογράφος στην σοσιαλιστική εφημερίδα «Avanti» και όπως κάθε σοσιαλιστής, ήταν κατά του πολέμου και αντίθετος με την αποικιοκρατία. Για τις ιδέες του αυτές φυλακίστηκε δύο φορές : μία στην Ιταλία και μία στην Αυστρία. Όμως με το ξέσπασμα του Α΄Π.Π. ο νεαρός σοσιαλιστής αλλάζει. Υποστηρίζει την είσοδο της Ιταλίας στον πόλεμο, με αποτέλεσμα την απόλυσή του από την «Avanti». Τι συνέβη και ο φανατικός ειρηνιστής, σοσιαλιστής και αντι-ιμπεριαλιστής, μεταστράφηκε σε θιασώτη του πολέμου και της ιδέας μιας Μεγάλης Ιταλίας; Πιστεύω ότι η στροφή αυτή μπορεί να εξηγηθεί μόνο σε σχέση με το ευρύτερο κοινωνικό και πολιτικό πλαίσιο της εποχής. Το νεοσύστατο ιταλικό έθνος-κράτος είχε σφυρηλατήσει την ανεξαρτησία του και την ενότητά του (Risorgimento) μέσω του πόλεμου. Δεν πρέπει να ξεχνάμε ότι στις αρχές του 20ου αιώνα ο πόλεμος δεν θεωρείτο αποτρόπαιος και δεν αντιμετωπιζόταν με τον σκεπτικισμό που αντιμετωπίζεται σήμερα. Η καθολική αποστροφή προς τον πόλεμο είναι σχετικά πρόσφατο φαινόμενο, αποτέλεσμα της φρίκης και των μαζικών καταστροφών που συνέβησαν κατά τους δύο παγκόσμιους πολέμους. Μέχρι τότε όμως, πολλά ευρωπαϊκά έθνη είχαν γεννηθεί, ισχυροποιηθεί και ενοποιηθεί μέσω του πολέμου και χάρη σ’ αυτόν. Η Γερμανία, η Ιταλία και η Ελλάδα είναι χαρακτηριστικές περιπτώσεις. Ειδικά στην Ελλάδα, της οποίας η ύπαρξη συνδεόταν με τον πόλεμο και τον αλυτρωτισμό, η κήρυξη πολέμου προκαλούσε σχεδόν πάντα ρίγη ενθουσιασμού. Στις παραμονές του Α'Π.Π. μια μεγάλη μερίδα του λαού αλλά και του πολιτικού κόσμου στην πρόσφατα ενοποιημένη Ιταλία, προσέβλεπε στον πόλεμο ως την μεγάλη ευκαιρία για την πραγμάτωση της εθνικής της ολοκλήρωσης. Διανοούμενοι και καλλιτέχνες εξήραν τον πόλεμο ως μέσον για την ανάδειξη των υψηλότερων αξιών και αρετών. Ο ποιητής Filippo Tomaso Marinetti, ιδρυτής του φουτουριστικού καλλιτεχνικού κινήματος, δήλωνε ότι «τασσόταν υπέρ του πολέμου πρωτίστως για λόγους αισθητικής !». Είναι επομένως πολύ πιθανόν ότι με το ξέσπασμα του Μεγάλου Πολέμου ο Μ. παρασύρθηκε από τον πολεμικό παροξυσμό που συνεπήρε τότε όλη σχεδόν την Ευρώπη. Ενδέχεται όμως να υπήρχαν και άλλες αιτίες πίσω από την αλλαγή της στάσης του. Ίσως να οφειλόταν σε καθαρό οπορτουνισμό. Μπορεί απλά να απογοητεύτηκε από την σοσιαλιστική ιδεολογία, ή ακόμη και να είχε προσωπική εμπάθεια με άτομα μέσα στην εφημερίδα και το σοσιαλιστικό κόμμα. Πιθανόν και να συνυπήρχαν όλοι οι παραπάνω λόγοι ή κανένας από αυτούς. Δύσκολο να το πει κανείς. Όμως αυτοί οι προβληματισμοί θα έπρεπε να έχουν τεθεί πρωτίστως από τον βιογράφο του Μουσολίνι. Και δυστυχώς ο Mack Smith έχει την τάση να αποφεύγει τα δύσκολα και να μην εμβαθύνει. Αρκείται να παραθέτει τα γεγονότα χωρίς να διερευνά τα αίτια ούτε να προτείνει ερμηνείες. Έτσι η αναπάντεχη ιδεολογική μεταστροφή του Μ. (γεγονός καθοριστικής σημασίας τόσο για τον ίδιο όσο και για την Ιταλία), προσπερνιέται βιαστ��κά χωρίς καμιά βαθύτερη εξέταση.
2. Διαστρεβλώνει τη σχέση του Μ. με τη βία Η φασιστική βία παρουσιάζεται ως ο βασικός μοχλός του Μουσολίνι για την κατάκτηση της εξουσίας. Ο Mack Smith περιγράφει εύστοχα την οργανωμένη τρομοκρατία των Fasci di Combattimento και των squadristi (των «ταγμάτων εφόδου»), τις διαπομπεύσεις, τους ξυλοδαρμούς και τις δολοφονίες πολιτικών αντιπάλων που κορυφώθηκε με το κάψιμο των γραφείων της εφημερίδας Avanti και την υπόθεση Ματεόττι. Ωστόσο, εδώ αναδεικνύεται η σημαντική αδυναμία του βιβλίου: η αποκοπή της φασιστικής βίας από το ευρύτερο πολιτικό και κοινωνικό πλαίσιο της εποχής. Η Ευρώπη του Μεσοπολέμου βρίθει από παραδείγματα πολιτικής βίας. Στη Γερμανία, οι Σπαρτακιστές συγκρούονται στους δρόμους με τα Freikorps, ενώ στη Ρωσία ο Λένιν έχει ήδη θεσμοθετήσει τη βία ως μέσο επιβολής του κομμουνισμού. Στην Ελλάδα, οι ένοπλες συγκρούσεις μεταξύ των Βενιζελικών και των αντιπάλων τους κατέληγαν συχνά σε εν ψυχρώ δολοφονίες, με κορυφαίο παράδειγμα την δολοφονία του Ίωνα Δραγούμη. Στην Ιταλία του 1919-1921, η λεγόμενη Biennio Rosso χαρακτηρίζεται από καταλήψεις εργοστασίων, επιθέσεις σε ιδιοκτήτες γης και τη δημιουργία ένοπλων σοσιαλιστικών πολιτοφυλακών (Guardie Rosse). Ο συγγραφέας αποτυγχάνει να εντάξει τη φασιστική βία ως ανταγωνιστικό αλλά συμμετρικό φαινόμενο εντός μιας ευρύτερης, ήδη βίαιης πολιτικής σκηνής – όπου η Αριστερά δεν ήταν λιγότερο επιθετική. Η μονομερής καταδίκη του φασισμού, χωρίς αντίστοιχη θεώρηση της βίας της Αριστεράς, καταλήγει να παραποιεί την ιστορική αλήθεια. Η πορεία προς τη Ρώμη τον Οκτωβριο του 1922 παρουσιάζεται από τον Mack Smith περίπου ως φαρσοκωμωδία. Μια απλή επίδειξη δύναμης, σε μια ανίσχυρη και διστακτική πολιτική σκηνή. Αυτό δεν είναι βεβαίως ανακριβές, αλλά και πάλι ο συγγραφέας αποσιωπά τις συνθήκες που εξηγούν γιατί ο φασισμός έγινε αποδεκτός – αν όχι ευπρόσδεκτος – από σημαντικά τμήματα της ιταλικής κοινωνίας. Η Ιταλία της δεκαετίας του ’20 βρισκόταν σε βαθιά κρίση: οικονομική (υψηλός πληθωρισμός, φτώχεια), κοινωνική (εργατικές αναταραχές, αγροτικές εξεγέρσεις), εθνική (η απογοήτευση από την "κατακρεουργημένη νίκη" του Α’ Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου). Μέσα σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, ο Μουσολίνι εμφανίστηκε ως φορέας τάξης, ενότητας και εθνικής αποκατάστασης, κάτι που ο Mack Smith δεν διερευνά επαρκώς.
3. Η κριτική αντιμετώπιση των επιτευγμάτων του φασισμού: "Ναι μεν, αλλά…" Ο συγγραφέας δείχνει εμφανή απροθυμία να αναγνωρίσει, έστω και ως πραγματικότητα, ορισμένα αδιαμφισβήτητα επιτεύγματα της φασιστικής διακυβέρνησης, επιλέγοντας να τα αποδυναμώσει με διαρκείς επιφυλάξεις. Μερικά παραδείγματα: Ναι, τα τρένα έφταναν στην ώρα τους, αλλά αυτό έχει υπερτονιστεί. Ναι, σταθεροποιήθηκε το νόμισμα και αντιμετωπίστηκε ο πληθωρισμός, αλλά με κόστος για τα εργατικά δικαιώματα. Ναι, το δημόσιο χρέος προς τις ΗΠΑ εξοφλήθηκε, αλλά επιβλήθηκε βαριά φορολογία στο λαό. Ναι, υπήρξε συμφιλίωση με το Βατικανό (συνθήκη του Lateran 1929), αλλά κυριάρχησε ο αυταρχισμός. Ναι, η ιταλική μαφία εξαρθρώθηκε, αλλά αυτό κατέστη εφικτό επειδή το καθεστώς ήταν αυταρχικό. Με αυτό το επαναλαμβανόμενο «ναι μεν αλλά», ο συγγραφέας παραθέτει όλα τα επιτεύγματα του Μ. υπονομεύοντάς τα ταυτόχρονα. Μια τέτοια αξιολόγηση όμως δεν μπορεί να χψαρακτηριστεί αντικειμενική.
4. Η πολιτική απομόνωση του Μουσολίνι: Μύθος ή πραγματικότητα; Ο Mack Smith εμφανίζει τον Μουσολίνι ως απόλυτο αυθέντη, αλλά ταυτόχρονα ως δέσμιο των βιομηχάνων και του στρατού. Όμως η αλήθεια είναι πιο σύνθετη: οι φασιστικές ομάδες προϋπήρχαν της επίσημης πολιτικής του εμπλοκής, ενώ η υποστήριξη των ελίτ (βιομηχάνων, γαιοκτημόνων) από τον Μ. δεν ήταν χωρίς όρους – ούτε τον καθιστούσε μαριονέτα τους. Αντίθετα, αρκετές φορές έδρασε αυτόνομα και πολιτικά ευέλικτα,ενω συχνά επέβαλε τη θέλησή του στους βιομηχάνους, όποτε το έκρινε αναγκαίο.
5. Η διεθνής αποδοχή: Παραλείψεις με σημασί Αν και ο συγγραφέας αναγνωρίζει μερικές διεθνείς φιλοφασιστικές φωνές, δεν αποτυπώνει επαρκώς το μέγεθος του διεθνούς θαυμασμού που έτυχε ο Μουσολίνι στις δεκαετίες του ’20 και του ’30. Πολιτικοί όπως ο Churchill και ο de Valera, διανοούμενοι όπως ο George Bernard Shaw, ο Yeats, ο Marinetti και άλλοι, δεν έκρυψαν τον θαυμασμό τους προς τον νέο δυναμικό ηγέτη της Ιταλίας. Οι στενές σχέσεις του καθεστώτος με τις ΗΠΑ, όπου υπήρχαν ισχυρές καθολικές κοινότητες και προσωπικότητες όπως ο Henry Ford, ο Charles Lindberg ή ο Thomas Edison, είχαν εκφραστεί απροκάλυπτα υπέρ του Μ. είναι άλλο ένα στοιχείο διεθνούς επιρροής που υποτιμάται συστηματικά στο βιβλίο. Είναι εντυπωσιακό ότι ο συγγραφέας αποφεύγει επιδεικτικά να αναφερθεί μεταξύ άλλων και στην περίπτωση του κορυφαίου αμερικανού ποιητή Ezra Pound, ο οποίος εγκαταστάθηκε στην Ιταλία και υποστήριξε με πάθος το καθεστώς μέχρι τέλους.
6. Οι στρατιωτικές επιτυχίες του καθεστώτος Στην περίοδο 1929-1940 το φασιστικο καθεστώς παρουσίασε σημαντικές στρατιωτικές επιτυχίες, με χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα τον πόλεμο της Αιθιοπίας. Ο Mack Smith όμως έχει την τάση να υποβαθμίζει τα θετικά και να υπερτονίζει τα αρνητικά στοιχεία. Και εδώ παραβλέπει το ιστορικό και πολιτικό υπόβαθρο της αποικιακής επέκτασης στην οποία συμμετείχε ενεργά και η Ιταλία πριν την άνοδο του φασισμού. Ο πόλεμος της Αιθιοπίας που διεξήχθη επί Μουσολίνι (1935–1936) δεν ήταν ο πρώτος, αλλά ο δεύτερος. Ο πρώτος είχε ξεκινήσει στα τέλη του 19ου αιώνα από τη δημοκρατική κυβέρνηση, σε μια προσπάθεια να ενισχύσει τη διεθνή θέση της νεοσύστατης Ιταλίας. Αυτή η απόπειρα, όμως, κατέληξε σε μεγάλη ήττα των Ιταλών στη μάχη της Αντοβα το 1899. Το γεγονός ότι ο συγγραφέας δεν κάνει σαφή αναφορά στο αποικιοκρατικό πλαίσιο της εποχής, κατά την κριτική, δημιουργεί μια παραπλανητική εντύπωση. Κατά την περίοδο εκείνη, οι περισσότερες ευρωπαϊκές δυνάμεις ανταγωνίζονταν έντονα για τον έλεγχο εδαφών στην Αφρική και την Ασία. Η Ιταλία δεν διέφερε ουσιαστικά από άλλες ευρωπαϊκές δυνάμεις και δεν πρέπει να θεωρείται ως ιδιαίτερα επιθετική ή να εξετάζεται μεμονωμένα. Επιπλέον, είναι ειρωνικό ότι ο Μουσολίνι, όταν ήταν σοσιαλιστής, είχε ταχθεί κατά της αποικιοκρατίας και είχε καταδικάσει τη στρατιωτική επέμβαση στη Λιβύη το 1911–1912, μια ενέργεια που επίσης είχε πραγματοποιηθεί από φιλελεύθερες και δημοκρατικές κυβερνήσεις. Ο συγγραφέας επικεντρώνεται υπερβολικά στη χρήση χημικών όπλων (αέρια μουστάρδας) και στους μαζικούς βομβαρδισμούς, που παραβίασαν το Πρωτόκολλο της Γενεύης του 1925. Ωστόσο, αυτή η προσέγγιση απομονώνει τη στρατιωτική διάσταση του πολέμου και αγνοεί την επιχειρησιακή επιτυχία της Ιταλίας. Η κατάκτηση της Αιθιοπίας αποτέλεσε μια σημαντική επιτυχία για το καθεστώς του Μουσολίνι, τόσο στρατιωτικά όσο και πολιτικά, εκτοξεύοντας στα ύψη το κύρος του ίδιου και της Ιταλίας. Αυτή η άνοδος του γοήτρου δεν πρέπει να παραβλέπεται, ανεξάρτητα από το ηθικό ή πολιτικό πλαίσιο, καθώς αποτελεί μέρος της ιστορικής πραγματικότητας.
7. H Κατάρρευση Είναι αλήθεια ότι, σε αντίθεση με την Γερμανία, η Ιταλία δεν μπόρεσε να παρουσιάσει άλλη ανάλογη στρατιωτική επιτυχία. Στην Ισπανία ο ιταλικός στρατός γνώρισε για πρώτη φορά την ήττα στη μάχη της Γκουανταλχάρα. Και αν η επιτυχημένη έκβαση της εκστρατείας επέτρεψε στον Μουσολίνι να σώσει τα προσχήματα, στη συνέχεια οι ήττες του στρατού του στο πεδίο της μάχης πολλαπλασιάστηκαν. Στη Γαλλία, στην Ελλάδα, στην Αφρική, στην Ρωσία, ο ιταλικός στρατός υπέστη βαριές ήττες και το γόητρο του Μ. ως ηγέτη επλήγη σοβαρά. Εδώ ο Mack Smith κάνει ορισμένες εύστοχες παρατηρήσεις: υπογραμμίζει το δυσανάλογο για τις δυνατότητες της Ιταλίας φορτίο ενός ολοκληρωτικού πολέμου και αποδίδει την στρατιωτική της κατάρρευση στον ελλιπή εξοπλισμό και στην ανικανότητα της στρατιωτκής ηγεσίας, για την επιλογή της οποίας ήταν υπεύθυνος ο ίδιος ο Μ. Υπερβάλλει όμως εσκεμμένα, όταν τον κατηγορεί για ευνοικρατία και έμμεσα για δειλία. Αποφεύγει να αναφέρει το γεγονός ότι έχασε τους δύο από τους τρεις γιούς του στον πόλεμο, και ότι επισκέφθηκε την πρώτη γραμμή του μετώπου το 1940 στον πόλεμο κατά της Ελλάδας. Τα γεγονότα που ακολούθησαν κατά τα τελευταία δύο χρόνια (1944-1945), περιγράφονται σχεδόν αποσπασματικά, ενώ για το τραγικό τέλος του δεν διαθέτει παρά μια παράγραφο.
Δυστυχώς, παρά τις ενδιαφέρουσες πληροφορίες και παρά τις νηφάλιες αναλαμπές του ο MackSmith παρουσιάζει μια επιλεκτική και ενίοτε παραποιημένη εικόνα του Μ. , παραλείποντας στοιχεία που θα μπορούσαν να δώσουν μια πιο σφαιρική και νηφάλια θεώρηση της πραγματικότητας.
Fascism has become a fashionable topic this past year, so I wanted to take a closer look at where it all started. Mussolini is typically presented as Hitler's comically incompetent sidekick, but I figured there had to be more to the man who founded one of the three defining ideologies of the twentieth century. Apparently not, at least if this book is anything to go by. It seems fascism was not some sort of third-way synthesis of capitalism and socialism, but rather the flailings of a man determined to hold on to power under any circumstance, but with no particular plan as to what he means to do with it. And the only thing impressive about this man is his vanity -- one episode that stuck with me is that he refused to take an interpreter to his meetings with Hitler, but spoke German about as well as I speak French, and thus ended up nodding and agreeing to everything without any clue as to what Hitler was actually saying.
As for the book itself, the author does warn that it is meant to be a political biography of Mussolini rather than a history of Fascist Italy, but as a consequence it can be hard to follow. Since it's a political biography, the linear narrative is dropped as soon as Mussolini comes to power, and instead the book progress through various themes and events of his reign. However, since the book is not a history, it only deals with these themes and events to the extend Mussolini was personally involved with them. Which is to say, he ordered them, he countermanded his orders, and after a few cycles of this he forgot all about it. So you won't find any figures or assessments or insight into how the country managed to run itself for twenty years, because apparently Mussolini had no idea himself. He was involved only with the press releases, and seemed to show zero interest in how things actually turned out.
The mystery is how such a man managed to seize power in the first place, and the book doesn't do a good job of explaining that. It seems he was the editor of a relatively unimportant newspaper with no popular support, wealth, or powerful connections. Yet for some reason big business, the liberal establishment, the king, and the bloody Pope began prostrating themselves before him, thrusting power upon him, and bailing him out when he messed up (which was often). Either the author was missing some important details, or the Italians were a very strange bunch.
I'm a little perturbed by rating this book with only 3 stars; I'd like to give it more, though I can't quite see it making 4. Maybe 3 and a half? The author covers Mussolini's life thoroughly, and gives you a sense of what Italy and the world was like when he was alive. I came away from the book mystified at someone who had such total control of a society for such a long time, that they could make their country attempt such large, difficult projects (for example, conquering Yugoslavia and Greece) without any effective preparations being made. My biggest criticism of the book is that this question isn't really addressed. The author does clearly describe what was done and when decisions were made, and Mussolini's inconsistent planning and organization. Another question is why Mussolini was able to amass such influence and power. Again, the author describes the process by which he did so, but Mussolini must have had a very powerful personality and ability to influence and manipulate people. This is mentioned in the book, but given its importance it should have been stressed much more. Even so, this book seems to be a very complete presentation of Mussolini's life and career as a dictator.
I knew precious little about Mussolini. I had a vague idea that he was regarded as a bit of a figure of fun. Nothing here that DMS writes would suggest that my initial view was too far wrong.
The book is clearly written. Somehow, I felt the author hadn't enjoyed writing it. Unsurprisingly, therefore, I didn't particularly enjoy reading it. Mussolini's rise to power was his greatest achievement. What he did with it: much less so.
An amateur, when compared with Hitler, who he was in awe of; I kept seeing Arthur Lowe in his role as Captain Mainwaring as I read more about Il Duce. Very distracting, but not a million miles from the truth it seems. I was pleased to finish the book, by which time the “joke” was beginning to wear thin and a few thousand litres of blood had been shed along the way.
I have nothing to compare this with as I haven't read another biography of M. and it may just be that DMS didn't like him. Perhaps I should try someone else's approach. Somehow I just think I won't bother.
A caricature which makes of Mussolini a stupid violent clown and uncritically cites every bad thing anyone said about him. If he was really that pathetic, how could he so efficiently take power and keep it for so long? Smith doesn't even try to answer this question. Every good biographer should try to understand his subject and to some extent to sympathize with him, at least at some moments of his life, even if subject is a monster like Hitler or Stalin ― or, in this case, Mussolini. Otherwise neither he nor his readers would learn anything useful. Unfortunately, that's exactly the problem with this book: it's not a bio but a prosecutor's speech.