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The Wars Against Napoleon
Popular and scholarly history presents a one-dimensional image of Napoleon as an inveterate instigator of war who repeatedly sought large-scale military conquests. General Franceschi and Ben Weider dismantle this false conclusion in The Wars Against Napoleon, a brilliantly written and researched study that turns our understanding of the French emperor on its head.Avoiding the simplistic clich?'s and rudimentary caricatures many historians use when discussing Napoleon, Franceschi and Weider argue persuasively that the caricature of the megalomaniac conqueror who bled Europe white to satisfy his delirious ambitions and insatiable love for war is groundless. By carefully scrutinizing the facts of the period and scrupulously avoiding the sometimes confusing cause and effect of major historical events, they paint a compelling portrait of a fundamentally pacifist Napoleon, one completely at odds with modern scholarly thought. This rigorous intellectual presentation is based upon three principal themes. The first explains how an unavoidable belligerent situation existed after the French Revolution of 1789. The new France inherited by Napoleon was faced with the implacable hatred of reactionary European monarchies determined to restore the ancient regime. All-out war was therefore inevitable unless France renounced the modern world to which it had just painfully given birth. The second theme emphasizes Napoleon's determined efforts ("bordering on an obsession," argue the authors) to avoid this inevitable conflict. The political strategy of the Consulate and the Empire was based on the intangible principle of preventing or avoiding these wars, not on conquering territory. Finally, the authors examine, conflict by conflict, the evidence that Napoleon never declared war. As he later explained at Saint Helena, it was he who was always attacked-not the other way around. His adversaries pressured and even forced the Emperor to employ his unequalled military genius. After each of his memorable victories Napoleon offered concessions, often extravagant ones, to the defeated enemy for the sole purpose of avoiding another war. Lavishly illustrated, persuasively argued, and carefully illustrated with original maps and battle diagrams, The Wars Against Napoleon presents a courageous and uniquely accurate historical idea that will surely arouse vigorous debate within the international historical community.
248 pages, Kindle Edition
First published December 15, 2007
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124 people want to read
About the author
Michel Franceschi
15 books1 followerGénéral (c.r.) Michel Franceschi is a French retired military officer of Corsican ethnicity. He is well known for his interest in the history of the Napoleonic era, and for his involvement in various organisations promoting the study of that history.
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Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
May 16, 2018
THE WARS AGAINST NAPOLEON : DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS
By Ben Weider and General Michel Franceschi (2008)
The greatest threat to peace in Europe in the early Nineteenth Century was the British Cabinet. With its millions in subsidies it fought a mainly proxy war against France before Napoleon, and France under Napoleon. It was other countries that basically did the dying for British ends. England had been fighting France for decades and, still smarting under the loss of the American colonies, who won their freedom with crucial French backing, the last thing it wanted was for ideas of freedom and equality to spread amongst its own downtrodden people.
The British population was held in contempt by its autocratic, aristocratic, oligarchic masters. The French Revolution was a match hovering over the keg of liberty and the British Cabinet was determined to put it out.
Napoleon solidified the gains of the Revolution. He was the only one strong enough and pragmatic enough to heal the wounds of French society and under him France became a serious player in the field of international relations once again. The ancient monarchies were terrified that under his leadership, the liberalisation fostered by revolutionary ideas would spread to their own realms. Hence they pocketed the English bribes and fostered a series of coalitions that were to expunge the French leader and all he stood for from the map of Europe.
In their excellent book, Michel Franceschi and Ben Weider raise dozens of points, particularly in regard to the diplomacy of the time, that will be a real eye-opener to British readers. Especially telling are the references to the British press and Opposition in 1815 who said that the war of that year against Napoleon was totally unjustified. And Marie-Louise's letter to her father, expressing her anguish that he could be contemplating war against his own son-in-law is very revealing - especially as she says the English were probably behind it.
One reviewer has stated sneeringly that the authors blame the loss at Waterloo on a bad thunderstorm. They do not say that: they rightly comment that the French were outnumbered. In fact, although Wellington hung on grimly, it was the arrival of 45,000 Prussians, 7,000 of whom died at the hands of the Young Guard at Placenoit, that sealed the Emperor's fate. Not many of those Prussians went to Eton by the way.
As a reader of dozens of books on this period, I can honestly say that this is the first one that I have come across that looks at things from Napoleon's perspective. Far from being called The Napoleonic Wars, the period 1799-1815 would be better dubbed The English Mercenary Wars. Five stars!
© 2008 John Tarttelin
A SOULADREAM PRODUCTION
Second Read
I have just re-read the book from May 14th 2018 to May 16th 2018. If anything, having read well over 100 books about Napoleon in the last ten years and written a book about him myself, I think this book is even better than I thought 10 years ago.
By Ben Weider and General Michel Franceschi (2008)
The greatest threat to peace in Europe in the early Nineteenth Century was the British Cabinet. With its millions in subsidies it fought a mainly proxy war against France before Napoleon, and France under Napoleon. It was other countries that basically did the dying for British ends. England had been fighting France for decades and, still smarting under the loss of the American colonies, who won their freedom with crucial French backing, the last thing it wanted was for ideas of freedom and equality to spread amongst its own downtrodden people.
The British population was held in contempt by its autocratic, aristocratic, oligarchic masters. The French Revolution was a match hovering over the keg of liberty and the British Cabinet was determined to put it out.
Napoleon solidified the gains of the Revolution. He was the only one strong enough and pragmatic enough to heal the wounds of French society and under him France became a serious player in the field of international relations once again. The ancient monarchies were terrified that under his leadership, the liberalisation fostered by revolutionary ideas would spread to their own realms. Hence they pocketed the English bribes and fostered a series of coalitions that were to expunge the French leader and all he stood for from the map of Europe.
In their excellent book, Michel Franceschi and Ben Weider raise dozens of points, particularly in regard to the diplomacy of the time, that will be a real eye-opener to British readers. Especially telling are the references to the British press and Opposition in 1815 who said that the war of that year against Napoleon was totally unjustified. And Marie-Louise's letter to her father, expressing her anguish that he could be contemplating war against his own son-in-law is very revealing - especially as she says the English were probably behind it.
One reviewer has stated sneeringly that the authors blame the loss at Waterloo on a bad thunderstorm. They do not say that: they rightly comment that the French were outnumbered. In fact, although Wellington hung on grimly, it was the arrival of 45,000 Prussians, 7,000 of whom died at the hands of the Young Guard at Placenoit, that sealed the Emperor's fate. Not many of those Prussians went to Eton by the way.
As a reader of dozens of books on this period, I can honestly say that this is the first one that I have come across that looks at things from Napoleon's perspective. Far from being called The Napoleonic Wars, the period 1799-1815 would be better dubbed The English Mercenary Wars. Five stars!
© 2008 John Tarttelin
A SOULADREAM PRODUCTION
Second Read
I have just re-read the book from May 14th 2018 to May 16th 2018. If anything, having read well over 100 books about Napoleon in the last ten years and written a book about him myself, I think this book is even better than I thought 10 years ago.
January 22, 2009
I realize that there are two sides to every story; especially when it comes to history. But, come on. Really? Napoleon was never to blame for anything? Seriously?
I can't decide which part I liked the best...the part that explained his strategy in war - being such a pacifist his goal was to eradicate his enemies Army to force them into peace negotiations...or maybe it was the part about how he killed all prisoners of war so he didn't have to feed them, but was really doing them a favor by putting them out of their misery...or maybe it was how the authors argued that Alexander I instigated the War of 1812 and that to prove he (Alexander) was the real warmonger he made sure that Napoleon's army attacked Russia. (That was brilliant on the part of Alexander!)
It was definitely written by people that adore Napoleon whose sole aim was to remove all responsibility and wrong doing from the Emperor and to place this short little man on a very large pedastal.
I can't decide which part I liked the best...the part that explained his strategy in war - being such a pacifist his goal was to eradicate his enemies Army to force them into peace negotiations...or maybe it was the part about how he killed all prisoners of war so he didn't have to feed them, but was really doing them a favor by putting them out of their misery...or maybe it was how the authors argued that Alexander I instigated the War of 1812 and that to prove he (Alexander) was the real warmonger he made sure that Napoleon's army attacked Russia. (That was brilliant on the part of Alexander!)
It was definitely written by people that adore Napoleon whose sole aim was to remove all responsibility and wrong doing from the Emperor and to place this short little man on a very large pedastal.
March 21, 2008
History typically is written by the winners, so it's no surprise that Napolean's triumphant foes would portray him as having no redeeming qualities whatsoever.
The author in this book goes to the polar opposite view: Napoleon was a saintly ruler without an ignoble motive or bone in his body. I would not have been at all surprised if at any point in the book, he was compared to Jesus. The truth is probably (as usual) somewhere between the 2 extremes.
The author seems to feel that this is a groundbreaking perspective, but I remember reading a 2-volume biography of Napolean over 20 years ago that held the same view.
The book's credibility takes a hit in my eyes by repeating as truth the supposition about Napolean being assasinated by arsenic on St. Helena. That theory has been long debated but never conclusively proven either way (a new study released in February 2008 concluded the arsenic in his system was the result of constant absorption throughout Napoleon's life). Regardless, there is doubt on this issue but the author ignores that. Of course, death from deliberate poisoning by his enemies fits perfectly with the portrayal of Napoleon as being relentlessly persecuted by foes who behaved despicably.
Still, this book makes some convincing points on how war was often forced on Napoleon; he was not seeking it. It is an entertaining read.
The author in this book goes to the polar opposite view: Napoleon was a saintly ruler without an ignoble motive or bone in his body. I would not have been at all surprised if at any point in the book, he was compared to Jesus. The truth is probably (as usual) somewhere between the 2 extremes.
The author seems to feel that this is a groundbreaking perspective, but I remember reading a 2-volume biography of Napolean over 20 years ago that held the same view.
The book's credibility takes a hit in my eyes by repeating as truth the supposition about Napolean being assasinated by arsenic on St. Helena. That theory has been long debated but never conclusively proven either way (a new study released in February 2008 concluded the arsenic in his system was the result of constant absorption throughout Napoleon's life). Regardless, there is doubt on this issue but the author ignores that. Of course, death from deliberate poisoning by his enemies fits perfectly with the portrayal of Napoleon as being relentlessly persecuted by foes who behaved despicably.
Still, this book makes some convincing points on how war was often forced on Napoleon; he was not seeking it. It is an entertaining read.
October 13, 2015
I really liked this book. Althought it does get lost in adoration occasionally, it clearly shows that basically all of the wars he fougth as consul and emperor were forced upon Napoleon. It doesn't hide his mistakes, such as 'spanish cancer' but also points out all the factors that were at play, from both sides.
November 21, 2022
General Franceschi has written a lively, if brief, narrative apologetic for the Emperor, and in so doing, mostly succeeds in at least putting Napoleon into the context of the times. Showcasing that Napoleon first restored order to a France utterly wracked with Revolutionary turmoil, corruption, and not a little bit of terror, the author then spends quite some time in this little work to detail Napoleon's civic achievements before going on to discuss the military affairs which dominated the era.
General Franceschi makes the case that Napoleon started almost none of the wars in which he was involved in. And that Napoleon had reasonably just motivations for opting for a first strike philosophy.
In the War of the Third Coalition Napoleon was presented with the fait accompli of a British financed Coalition built to strategically encircle France. Austrian invasion of Bavaria, a French ally but a declared neutral, gave Napoleon the casus belli for a preemptive strike.
Franceschi argues, convincingly, that Napoleon struck first to avoid placing France in an impossible strategic situation, and the subsequent successes of the Ulm and Austerlitz Campaigns convinced him of the pragmatic reliability of the strategy.
However, Franceschi stresses that Napoleon did put forth the effort to obtain peace diplomatically. Napoleon's own methodology of diplomatic prowess tended to hamper this, however, as the man simply wasn't phlegmatic enough in order to be a very successful diplomat in his own right.
And, sometimes, Napoleon's own fiery temperament legitimately hampered his strategic situation as his wont to shoot off at the mouth (while always pithy, and often hilarious (he has to rank as one of the most quotable world leaders in history)) did more to make enemies than friends. Franceschi argues that even despite this aspect of Napoleon's character, which the author downplays, he was more strenuous in seeking diplomatic solutions to crises than is usually thought.
While the oft accepted notion of Napoleon as a war mongering tyrant doesn't really hold water, especially in an age when pretty much everyone was so, to one degree or another, I do believe the author goes a tad too far in painting Napoleon as a man of peace.
First and foremost Napoleon was a man who sought, like Louis XIV, to make France the hegemonic power of Europe. This, as the author points out, was not done in a vacuum.
With France weakened by Civil War sparked by the Revolution, the other powers of Europe formed Coalition to take advantage of her weakness, and to aggrandize themselves, and their own Empires, at France's expense.
The Revolutionary Wars, largely ignored in favor of the 'sexier' Napoleonic Wars are necessary to understand the strategic thought processes of Emperor Napoleon. Napoleon was surrounded by either potential, or very real, threats to France, and he governed specifically to benefit France and her security.
While I do agree with Franceschi that Napoleon built his Empire largely by accident (as in he never initially sought to conquer one, it was just a happenstance of waging proactive Wars of self defense against larger, more powerful Coalitions), I don't see Napoleon as an altruistic bringer of Revolutionary Enlightening to the people's of Europe.
While that sentiment might be en vogue now, with a far more Liberal minded elite in France today, the truth was that Napoleon, despite his origins as a devotee of the Jacobins as a youth, rather quickly soured on them, and turned counter-Revolutionary by the time he staged the coup that brought him to power.
Napoleon was a conservative, and a bridge between the ancien regime, and the compromises forced by the Revolution. But first and foremost, he was a French patriot, and did what was needed for France. And in this, he did sow the seeds of his own downfall.
Treaties only last as long as they are mutually beneficial, Napoleon's treaties often benefitted France far more than anyone else, and we're leveled at the diplomats of the defeated as though they were the barrels of cannon. While the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 was an attempt to soften his approach, especially to a rival that Napoleon genuinely admired and respected (unlike what even some Russian historiography portrays him as, Napoleon was a Russophile), and hoped to make a lasting alliance with.
While General Franceschi is technically correct that Napoleon had just cause to interven in the corrupt turmoil in Madrid due to treaty obligations and the lack of respect paid them, his heavy handed approach all but assured a conflict.
Last, but not least, Napoleon's Continental System, the chief aim of all that he did, and the source to locate the true target of everything he did militarily, which was to in a peripheral way if not directly harm Great Britain, was the source of the erosion of the Treaty of Tilsit. Again, Napoleon was technically within his rites to enforce the terms of the 1807 Treaty with Russia in 1812, but his heavy handed refusal to offer Emperor Alexander wiggle room economically in regards to the Continental System, which was drastically harming Russia's economy, as well as his own rather myopic understanding of Russian views on the Duchy of Warsaw (Napoleon honestly believed that a Polish buffer state, whose foreign policy was controlled by him, would be welcomed by the Russians...entirely failing to comprehend the prior century and a half of relations between the two people's), once again assured that a war was the most logical outcome.
While I certainly enjoyed this book, running counter as it does to the Anglo centric narrative of the Wars, and while I agreed with many of the authors arguments, I do not entirely agree with his position.
Napoleon wasn't a war mongerer, nor was he a dedicated man of peace. He was, in many respects, no different than Louis XIV, or Charlemagne whom Napoleon purposefully drew inspiration from. Napoleon did what was best for France, and was willing to strike first to defend her, and to redraw the map, and to force opponents into disadvantageous treaties and alliances to secure her position and prominence. He also was not an enthusiastic exporter of Revolutionary ideals, as he overturned the vast majority of the Revolutionary reforms in France once he became First Consul.
And he governed his Empire through Kings and Lord's via a system of vasselage, and while giving lip service to religious tolerance, actively promoted the extension of the Catholic Church (and, albeit mildly, tended to harass Protestants, as Napoleon thought their brand of Christianity was for the undereducated, and simple minded). None of which was exactly Revolutionary.
In 1813, in the rigorous discussions with the greatest statesman in history, Count Clemens von Metternich, Napoleon's fiery temperament helped to erode sny good will that Vienna may have been willing to offer him, and his refusal to accept any kind of a compromised peace doomed him and his Empire.
Despite my reservations, this is a worthy book to add to your historical library. It does force you to think outside the established narrative box, and it brings a French perspective, which is mostly ignored in English language literature on the subject.
Definitely highly recommended.
General Franceschi makes the case that Napoleon started almost none of the wars in which he was involved in. And that Napoleon had reasonably just motivations for opting for a first strike philosophy.
In the War of the Third Coalition Napoleon was presented with the fait accompli of a British financed Coalition built to strategically encircle France. Austrian invasion of Bavaria, a French ally but a declared neutral, gave Napoleon the casus belli for a preemptive strike.
Franceschi argues, convincingly, that Napoleon struck first to avoid placing France in an impossible strategic situation, and the subsequent successes of the Ulm and Austerlitz Campaigns convinced him of the pragmatic reliability of the strategy.
However, Franceschi stresses that Napoleon did put forth the effort to obtain peace diplomatically. Napoleon's own methodology of diplomatic prowess tended to hamper this, however, as the man simply wasn't phlegmatic enough in order to be a very successful diplomat in his own right.
And, sometimes, Napoleon's own fiery temperament legitimately hampered his strategic situation as his wont to shoot off at the mouth (while always pithy, and often hilarious (he has to rank as one of the most quotable world leaders in history)) did more to make enemies than friends. Franceschi argues that even despite this aspect of Napoleon's character, which the author downplays, he was more strenuous in seeking diplomatic solutions to crises than is usually thought.
While the oft accepted notion of Napoleon as a war mongering tyrant doesn't really hold water, especially in an age when pretty much everyone was so, to one degree or another, I do believe the author goes a tad too far in painting Napoleon as a man of peace.
First and foremost Napoleon was a man who sought, like Louis XIV, to make France the hegemonic power of Europe. This, as the author points out, was not done in a vacuum.
With France weakened by Civil War sparked by the Revolution, the other powers of Europe formed Coalition to take advantage of her weakness, and to aggrandize themselves, and their own Empires, at France's expense.
The Revolutionary Wars, largely ignored in favor of the 'sexier' Napoleonic Wars are necessary to understand the strategic thought processes of Emperor Napoleon. Napoleon was surrounded by either potential, or very real, threats to France, and he governed specifically to benefit France and her security.
While I do agree with Franceschi that Napoleon built his Empire largely by accident (as in he never initially sought to conquer one, it was just a happenstance of waging proactive Wars of self defense against larger, more powerful Coalitions), I don't see Napoleon as an altruistic bringer of Revolutionary Enlightening to the people's of Europe.
While that sentiment might be en vogue now, with a far more Liberal minded elite in France today, the truth was that Napoleon, despite his origins as a devotee of the Jacobins as a youth, rather quickly soured on them, and turned counter-Revolutionary by the time he staged the coup that brought him to power.
Napoleon was a conservative, and a bridge between the ancien regime, and the compromises forced by the Revolution. But first and foremost, he was a French patriot, and did what was needed for France. And in this, he did sow the seeds of his own downfall.
Treaties only last as long as they are mutually beneficial, Napoleon's treaties often benefitted France far more than anyone else, and we're leveled at the diplomats of the defeated as though they were the barrels of cannon. While the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 was an attempt to soften his approach, especially to a rival that Napoleon genuinely admired and respected (unlike what even some Russian historiography portrays him as, Napoleon was a Russophile), and hoped to make a lasting alliance with.
While General Franceschi is technically correct that Napoleon had just cause to interven in the corrupt turmoil in Madrid due to treaty obligations and the lack of respect paid them, his heavy handed approach all but assured a conflict.
Last, but not least, Napoleon's Continental System, the chief aim of all that he did, and the source to locate the true target of everything he did militarily, which was to in a peripheral way if not directly harm Great Britain, was the source of the erosion of the Treaty of Tilsit. Again, Napoleon was technically within his rites to enforce the terms of the 1807 Treaty with Russia in 1812, but his heavy handed refusal to offer Emperor Alexander wiggle room economically in regards to the Continental System, which was drastically harming Russia's economy, as well as his own rather myopic understanding of Russian views on the Duchy of Warsaw (Napoleon honestly believed that a Polish buffer state, whose foreign policy was controlled by him, would be welcomed by the Russians...entirely failing to comprehend the prior century and a half of relations between the two people's), once again assured that a war was the most logical outcome.
While I certainly enjoyed this book, running counter as it does to the Anglo centric narrative of the Wars, and while I agreed with many of the authors arguments, I do not entirely agree with his position.
Napoleon wasn't a war mongerer, nor was he a dedicated man of peace. He was, in many respects, no different than Louis XIV, or Charlemagne whom Napoleon purposefully drew inspiration from. Napoleon did what was best for France, and was willing to strike first to defend her, and to redraw the map, and to force opponents into disadvantageous treaties and alliances to secure her position and prominence. He also was not an enthusiastic exporter of Revolutionary ideals, as he overturned the vast majority of the Revolutionary reforms in France once he became First Consul.
And he governed his Empire through Kings and Lord's via a system of vasselage, and while giving lip service to religious tolerance, actively promoted the extension of the Catholic Church (and, albeit mildly, tended to harass Protestants, as Napoleon thought their brand of Christianity was for the undereducated, and simple minded). None of which was exactly Revolutionary.
In 1813, in the rigorous discussions with the greatest statesman in history, Count Clemens von Metternich, Napoleon's fiery temperament helped to erode sny good will that Vienna may have been willing to offer him, and his refusal to accept any kind of a compromised peace doomed him and his Empire.
Despite my reservations, this is a worthy book to add to your historical library. It does force you to think outside the established narrative box, and it brings a French perspective, which is mostly ignored in English language literature on the subject.
Definitely highly recommended.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 17, 2024
Met veel plezier gelezen, maar toch 3 sterren?
Dat er veel verschillende manieren zijn om naar Napoleon te kijken is algemeen bekend. Tiran? Verlicht heerser? De antichrist?
In dit boek wordt Napoleon opgehemeld tot een ware messias.
De redenaties zijn vaak krom en lachwekkend. De schuld ligt altijd bij de ander. Napoleon was nagenoeg foutloos.
Toch ben ik een hoop nieuwe verhalen, verwijzingen en bronnen tegengekomen. Al met al de moeite waard om te lezen.
Dat er veel verschillende manieren zijn om naar Napoleon te kijken is algemeen bekend. Tiran? Verlicht heerser? De antichrist?
In dit boek wordt Napoleon opgehemeld tot een ware messias.
De redenaties zijn vaak krom en lachwekkend. De schuld ligt altijd bij de ander. Napoleon was nagenoeg foutloos.
Toch ben ik een hoop nieuwe verhalen, verwijzingen en bronnen tegengekomen. Al met al de moeite waard om te lezen.
January 12, 2018
My rating of a 4 is not quite accurate, for the prose is bad and the argument fails to appreciate Napoleon's less savory actions. Yet, I agree with the overall thesis. The monarchs of Europe wanted war more than Napoleon did, driven by the desire to weaken France and snuff out any trace of the French Revolution. The book though did not explain Napoleon's own later failures nor his willingness to trust the sword too readily. It was less that Napoleon was a true warmonger and more that he relied on his army to get him out of an increasingly bad diplomatic situation.
The four rating is mostly because this book runs counter to the sea of recent works that read as if they came out of Metternich's propaganda machine.
The four rating is mostly because this book runs counter to the sea of recent works that read as if they came out of Metternich's propaganda machine.
March 26, 2024
Is this revisionist writing by a clearly biased Napoleon partisan? Or is it a surprising re-evaluation of Napoleon's attitude to war and conquest? Perhaps it's both...and it certainly feels that way many times. You can't come to this cold, without a basic familiarity with Napoleonic history. Its concise nature makes it easy to read, but it also begs the question of whether or not a longer, more detailed side-by-side comparison of arguments would have been more effective. Ultimately, it did manage to shed a different light on an old-school topic, and for that I'm grateful.
February 19, 2020
This book's admiration for the Little Corsican is hilarious at times, but there is legitimate value in looking at the perfide behavior of that world-empire known as Britain (who always seems to accuse its enemies of wanting to conquer the world). As a libertarian I find the politics of the French revolution (and the American, for that matter) relatively detestable, but have little love for England and rotten ancient regime Europe.
The Revolution and Napoleon spread nationalist, political-religious ideas across Europe and tore apart many traditional communities while putting something just as bad in their place. This was the 'pre-WW1' and just as with WW1 it has few heroes. The authors of this book may come off as the 19th century equivalent of Hitler apologists, but just because Hitler Was a Very Bad Man does not mean that Churchill was not also a lying mass murderer who made things worse for everybody out of personal incompetence and a lust for personal power.
This book accurately depicts Albion as Perfide, unfortunately it loses the plot on Bonaparte and his revolutionary empire.
The Revolution and Napoleon spread nationalist, political-religious ideas across Europe and tore apart many traditional communities while putting something just as bad in their place. This was the 'pre-WW1' and just as with WW1 it has few heroes. The authors of this book may come off as the 19th century equivalent of Hitler apologists, but just because Hitler Was a Very Bad Man does not mean that Churchill was not also a lying mass murderer who made things worse for everybody out of personal incompetence and a lust for personal power.
This book accurately depicts Albion as Perfide, unfortunately it loses the plot on Bonaparte and his revolutionary empire.
August 16, 2024
Vind iemand die naar je kijkt zoals Michel Franceschi naar Napoleon kijkt.
Ik vind ook dat Napoleon te vaak als bloeddorstige tiran wordt afgebeeld, maar een iets kritischere blik dan Franceschi hier heeft zou wel goed zijn. Zelfs de slavernij in Haïti was volgens Franceschi slechts een ongelukkige samenloop van omstandigheden waar Napoleon helemaal niets aan kon doen.
Alsnog een vermakelijke contraire blik op de empire.
Ik vind ook dat Napoleon te vaak als bloeddorstige tiran wordt afgebeeld, maar een iets kritischere blik dan Franceschi hier heeft zou wel goed zijn. Zelfs de slavernij in Haïti was volgens Franceschi slechts een ongelukkige samenloop van omstandigheden waar Napoleon helemaal niets aan kon doen.
Alsnog een vermakelijke contraire blik op de empire.
September 30, 2019
I was bamboozled on this one. The book was hyped as debunking the myth and it was one of the newer entries to the age of Napoleon, so you would expect the authors to have new, groundbreaking material. Nope. Just another sympathetic view of Napoleon, this time more extreme than average.
February 17, 2020
Interesting story and history concerning Napoleon, just long and drawn out by the 2 authors. Really dry reading.
March 21, 2025
Very informative and fun to read but extremely biased 😂
February 19, 2015
An erratic rant more than a myth buster.
That the authors were passionate about their topic cannot be denied.
Unfortunately the book jumps randomly from one event to another, leaping a dozen years forward then back then forward again. Napoleon is attributed actions and feelings for which the authors provide no proof. "He would have pardoned the Duke". Well he didn't. The Duke was killed. We must take the authors' statement that Napoleon would have pardoned him as fact. No proof is provided that Napoleon had the intention to pardon him.
The book's intro states that Napoleon backers will be reconfirmed in their beliefs. Opponents will be shaken.
I am neither. I was just curious to read something different. What I read was an impassioned rant, but little proof.
That the authors were passionate about their topic cannot be denied.
Unfortunately the book jumps randomly from one event to another, leaping a dozen years forward then back then forward again. Napoleon is attributed actions and feelings for which the authors provide no proof. "He would have pardoned the Duke". Well he didn't. The Duke was killed. We must take the authors' statement that Napoleon would have pardoned him as fact. No proof is provided that Napoleon had the intention to pardon him.
The book's intro states that Napoleon backers will be reconfirmed in their beliefs. Opponents will be shaken.
I am neither. I was just curious to read something different. What I read was an impassioned rant, but little proof.
October 14, 2014
Do not read this book if you're looking for a a scholarly or academic analysis of the Napoleonic wars. This book was clearly written by two ardent admirers of Napoleon and is replete with epithets and superlatives that make it almost unreadable. The whole purpose is to exonerate Napoleon and acquit him from any guilt during the Napoleonic Wars. ANY.
Additionally, the book contains factual errors, such as the assertion that Napoleon was murdered by poison, an assertion that has been proven to be false.
It's a short, interesting read though, just to gain an alternative perspective on a very interesting time in history.
Additionally, the book contains factual errors, such as the assertion that Napoleon was murdered by poison, an assertion that has been proven to be false.
It's a short, interesting read though, just to gain an alternative perspective on a very interesting time in history.
January 8, 2013
Interesting take on Napoleon by renowned apologist(and unfortunately the late)Ben Weider in conjunction with Michel Franceschi (now where have I heard that name before?!)
This is a deliberate shot across the bows of the Emperor's vehement detractors, and worth reading for that fact alone. Whether you believe Bonaparte was a saint - as the authors do - or sinner - as most British historians seem to - or whether you steer a middle course, as I do, the book offers a glimpse into Napoleon's thinking often missing from biographies.
Whether you agree with the authors' views is another matter.
This is a deliberate shot across the bows of the Emperor's vehement detractors, and worth reading for that fact alone. Whether you believe Bonaparte was a saint - as the authors do - or sinner - as most British historians seem to - or whether you steer a middle course, as I do, the book offers a glimpse into Napoleon's thinking often missing from biographies.
Whether you agree with the authors' views is another matter.
November 6, 2013
Strong elaboration and telling of errors made in campaigning, as well as tactical errors that would ultimatley allow some of Napoleon's adversaries who's armies weren't as strong or hoed the weapons and technology that would allow him to conquer. A good telling though dry in some parts that would end with the mistakes of Waterloo.
March 27, 2015
A bit too one sided
I'm a Napoleonaphile , but the writers went way beyond in their homage to the little corporeal. The history could have been compelling but their devotion and worship of the Emperor sapped any credibility. The excerpts from Napoleon's writings were quite illuminating.
I'm a Napoleonaphile , but the writers went way beyond in their homage to the little corporeal. The history could have been compelling but their devotion and worship of the Emperor sapped any credibility. The excerpts from Napoleon's writings were quite illuminating.
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September 23, 2010"WARS AGAINST NAPOLEON, THE: Debunking the Myth of the Napoleonic Wars by General Michel Franceschi (2007)"
August 31, 2016
This book is extremely biased (and is not embarassed about it) that it reads like tabloid at times. Otherwise, it provides an interesting French perspective on Napoleon.
June 4, 2016
An excellent book for those seeking ti understand the society from which Napoleon grew and fought, as well as that of the victorious (re?)writers of history).
March 8, 2020
Napoleon's apology
Way to much on the side of Napoleon, perhaps the historic side is right, but historian are not supposed to take sides, and in this book the author clearly does
Way to much on the side of Napoleon, perhaps the historic side is right, but historian are not supposed to take sides, and in this book the author clearly does
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