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Samuelson Friedman: The Battle Over the Free Market
In 1966 two columnists joined Newsweek magazine. Their assignment: debate the world of business and economics. Paul Samuelson was a towering figure in Keynesian economics, which supported the management of the economy along lines prescribed by John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory. Milton Friedman, little known at that time outside of conservative academic circles, championed “monetarism” and insisted the Federal Reserve maintain tight control over the amount of money circulating in the economy.
In Samuelson Friedman, author and journalist Nicholas Wapshott brings narrative verve and puckish charm to the story of these two giants of modern economics, their braided lives and colossal intellectual battles.
Samuelson, a forbidding technical genius, grew up a child of relative privilege and went on to revolutionize macroeconomics. He wrote the best-selling economics textbook of all time, famously remarking "I don’t care who writes a nation’s laws—or crafts its advanced treatises—if I can write its economics textbooks." His friend and adversary for decades, Milton Friedman, studied the Great Depression and with Anna Schwartz wrote the seminal books The Great Contraction and A Monetary History of the United States. Like Friedrich Hayek before him, Friedman found fortune writing a treatise, Capitalism and Freedom, that yoked free markets and libertarian politics in a potent argument that remains a lodestar for economic conservatives today.
In Wapshott’s nimble hands, Samuelson and Friedman’s decades-long argument over how—or whether—to manage the economy becomes a window onto one of the longest periods of economic turmoil in the United States. As the soaring economy of the 1950s gave way to decades stalked by declining prosperity and "stagflation," it was a time when the theory and practice of economics became the preoccupation of politicians and the focus of national debate. It is an argument that continues today.
In Samuelson Friedman, author and journalist Nicholas Wapshott brings narrative verve and puckish charm to the story of these two giants of modern economics, their braided lives and colossal intellectual battles.
Samuelson, a forbidding technical genius, grew up a child of relative privilege and went on to revolutionize macroeconomics. He wrote the best-selling economics textbook of all time, famously remarking "I don’t care who writes a nation’s laws—or crafts its advanced treatises—if I can write its economics textbooks." His friend and adversary for decades, Milton Friedman, studied the Great Depression and with Anna Schwartz wrote the seminal books The Great Contraction and A Monetary History of the United States. Like Friedrich Hayek before him, Friedman found fortune writing a treatise, Capitalism and Freedom, that yoked free markets and libertarian politics in a potent argument that remains a lodestar for economic conservatives today.
In Wapshott’s nimble hands, Samuelson and Friedman’s decades-long argument over how—or whether—to manage the economy becomes a window onto one of the longest periods of economic turmoil in the United States. As the soaring economy of the 1950s gave way to decades stalked by declining prosperity and "stagflation," it was a time when the theory and practice of economics became the preoccupation of politicians and the focus of national debate. It is an argument that continues today.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2021
54 people are currently reading
1326 people want to read
About the author
Nicholas Wapshott
16 books38 followersNicholas Wapshott is a journalist and the author of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A Political Marriage. A former senior editor at The Times of London and the New York Sun, he lives in New York.
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
December 20, 2021
I listened to this as an audiobook which is about the right way to read it—if you read it at all. There was a lot that was interesting but even more that did not work for me and may not work for anyone. I liked Nicholas Wapshott’s Keynes Hayek: The Clash that Defined Modern Economics somewhat more but that book also had shortcomings.
This book uses the dueling Newsweek columns by Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman to shape a narrative about their debate over the free market. It begins with short biographies of the beginnings of their careers, their similarities and differences, and the ways they crossed paths at Chicago that was mostly new and interesting to me. It then described their debates primarily over macroeconomic issues, particularly the role of fiscal policy, monetarism, the causes and solutions to inflation, most of which is not actually about the “free market” which is more of a microeconomic issue.
The pairing provided some narrative interest and it was nice to read (or, in my case, hear) some of the kind letters that Paul Samuelson wrote to Friedman and his wife Rose over the years, picturing a 70-year long friendship, debate, respect, and irritation.
But the pairing is an imperfect way to tell the story. For starters the book is primarily about the two economists’ impact on the public debate not their academic work. As such, Friedman looms much larger than Samuelson who devoted a larger fraction of his career to a much more impressive and lasting set of academic contributions. The book does not pretend to be an intellectual history but it is somewhat problematic that it writes out just about everyone else (James Tobin?) who was part of developing the ideas and participating in the debate.
The last third of the book is borderline dreadful, a potted history of economic events in the 1990s, 2000s, the financial crisis and COVID that neither Samuelson nor Friedman had much to directly to do with, most of which were presented in a relatively conventional and shallow manner in service of Wapshott’s thesis which he makes clear in the concluding chapter where he writes, that Friedman “ Laid the foundations for the election of President Trump. Could there have been a President Trump without Friedman? Perhaps. But Friedman’s long libertarian march helped pave the way.”
That argument conveniently blames Friedman for everything Wapshott does not like. But what if part of the 2016 election was voters frustrated by immigration, whatever Friedman’s views they were not influential on that topic. Or if 2016 was in part a reaction to the unpopularity of the Affordable Care Act, which could sort of be blamed on Samuelson (at least if you had to pick one of the two men to credit for it).
More generally, Wapshott appears to miss all the ways Friedman was vindicated, to name just one the idea of floating exchange rates untethered to anything was a kooky one in the 1950s and now is not even remarkable for advanced economies and the trend in policy advice to emerging economies too. Other ideas like occupational licensing were echoed by the Obama and Biden administrations. Or now the fully refundable child tax credit which is basically like Friedman’s negative income tax.
Moreover, Wapshott’s superficial potted history acts as if Friedman’s small government ideas won the day and have been strangling government ever since. While we do not have the government (or level of taxes) that I want, it is the case that the government keeps increasing its role in healthcare, mostly increasing it in anti-poverty programs, college financing, and a range of other areas—including regulations. If anything the trend seems to be against Friedman.
The above was all quite negative but half of the book is reasonably good, the half the sticks closer to the two men, their lives, their direct impact, and humanizes them and their interactions, providing the political and intellectual context for their ideas. It is just a shame that it came bundled with everything else it did that you could get anywhere and did not particularly need the framing of these two intellectual giants.
This book uses the dueling Newsweek columns by Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman to shape a narrative about their debate over the free market. It begins with short biographies of the beginnings of their careers, their similarities and differences, and the ways they crossed paths at Chicago that was mostly new and interesting to me. It then described their debates primarily over macroeconomic issues, particularly the role of fiscal policy, monetarism, the causes and solutions to inflation, most of which is not actually about the “free market” which is more of a microeconomic issue.
The pairing provided some narrative interest and it was nice to read (or, in my case, hear) some of the kind letters that Paul Samuelson wrote to Friedman and his wife Rose over the years, picturing a 70-year long friendship, debate, respect, and irritation.
But the pairing is an imperfect way to tell the story. For starters the book is primarily about the two economists’ impact on the public debate not their academic work. As such, Friedman looms much larger than Samuelson who devoted a larger fraction of his career to a much more impressive and lasting set of academic contributions. The book does not pretend to be an intellectual history but it is somewhat problematic that it writes out just about everyone else (James Tobin?) who was part of developing the ideas and participating in the debate.
The last third of the book is borderline dreadful, a potted history of economic events in the 1990s, 2000s, the financial crisis and COVID that neither Samuelson nor Friedman had much to directly to do with, most of which were presented in a relatively conventional and shallow manner in service of Wapshott’s thesis which he makes clear in the concluding chapter where he writes, that Friedman “ Laid the foundations for the election of President Trump. Could there have been a President Trump without Friedman? Perhaps. But Friedman’s long libertarian march helped pave the way.”
That argument conveniently blames Friedman for everything Wapshott does not like. But what if part of the 2016 election was voters frustrated by immigration, whatever Friedman’s views they were not influential on that topic. Or if 2016 was in part a reaction to the unpopularity of the Affordable Care Act, which could sort of be blamed on Samuelson (at least if you had to pick one of the two men to credit for it).
More generally, Wapshott appears to miss all the ways Friedman was vindicated, to name just one the idea of floating exchange rates untethered to anything was a kooky one in the 1950s and now is not even remarkable for advanced economies and the trend in policy advice to emerging economies too. Other ideas like occupational licensing were echoed by the Obama and Biden administrations. Or now the fully refundable child tax credit which is basically like Friedman’s negative income tax.
Moreover, Wapshott’s superficial potted history acts as if Friedman’s small government ideas won the day and have been strangling government ever since. While we do not have the government (or level of taxes) that I want, it is the case that the government keeps increasing its role in healthcare, mostly increasing it in anti-poverty programs, college financing, and a range of other areas—including regulations. If anything the trend seems to be against Friedman.
The above was all quite negative but half of the book is reasonably good, the half the sticks closer to the two men, their lives, their direct impact, and humanizes them and their interactions, providing the political and intellectual context for their ideas. It is just a shame that it came bundled with everything else it did that you could get anywhere and did not particularly need the framing of these two intellectual giants.
July 9, 2022
Beginning 1966 and extending well into the early 1980s, two veritable titans nursing tangentially different ideologies in the domain of economics, pitted their wares against each other by penning alternating columns for the Newsweek magazine. Such a marvelous exercise or experiment even, has not been repeated since by either Newsweek or any other publication. Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman were chalk and cheese when it came to identifying the contours and expounding the benefits of a free market economy. Samuelson was a staunch Keynesian, who advocated informed and calculated government interventions in the workings of the economy. Friedman, an Ayn Rand acolyte, in stark contrast was the very epitome of leaving business alone to conduct business and thoroughly antagonistic to any form of government intervention. Friedman was arguably the most committed, passionate and incorrigible libertarian of his time, and possibly as many may argue, of all time.
Nicholas Wapshott’ s new book, Samuelson Friedman, chronicles the echoes arising out of the battle between Samuelson and Friedman whose reverberations can be felt even today. While one school continues to cry foul about the need and workings of a welfare state, another school is quick to point out the mendacity that is the free market economy. Wapshott captures an invigorating period where two dueling professionals who continued to remain faithful friends, cleaved the world of economics, and consequently politics. As Wapshott informs his readers the spill over effect of the Samuelson Friedman debates influenced not just the common reader but also many a policy maven. Samuelson v Friedman was also Carter v Reagan and James Callaghan v Margaret Thatcher.
The editor of Newsweek in the 1960s, Osborn Elliott in an attempt to best his eternal rival Time hit upon an idea of securing two economists cut out of a different clothes to pen argumentative columns that would whet the appetite of a younger audience. While bagging Samuelson was nothing short of a coup, Friedman needed strong persuasion from Rose, his wife, to accept the job. A prescient Rose instantly detected the merits of Friedman in going head-to-head with the man who was then acknowledged to be one of the greatest economists ever, and a true successor to the greatest ever, John Maynard Keynes. A formidable economist herself, Rose Friedman also doubled up as the co-author of innumerable works emanating from the Milton stable.
At the heart of the Samuelson Friedman debate lay the scourge of inflation. The causes of inflation and the potential remedial measures to curb it were the two topics which caused immense and intense difference of opinion between these two warring giants. Friedman along with economist, Anna Schwartz, in his magnum opus “A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960” argued that the Great Depression would not have materialized had the Federal Reserve Board done its job and stabilized the money supply. Friedman was of the unshakeable belief that policy makers could lend a great degree of stability to an economy by ensuring steady, slow growth in the money supply. Samuelson, on his part choose to adopt a more traditional Keynesian/neo-classical approach by advocating a measured and judicious blend of increased taxes and opening up the spigot of public spending.
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher both came to power placing their trust more towards “Friedmanism” than banking on Samuelson’s tenets. Reagonomics proceeded to slash taxes, (but primarily on and for the wealthy), and curbed the power of trade unions. Reagan also clamped down on a lot of necessary welfare schemes primarily aimed at sustaining minority groups such as single black mothers. But all those naysayers who were busy writing the epitaph on Keynesianism were in for a rude jolt.
The insidious financial recession exposed the fatal chinks in the armour of “Friedmanism”. A plethora of materials abound on the vulnerability of Friedman’s theories when applied in the context of a recessionary condition. Even Ben Bernanke, the erudite Chairman of the Fed (incidentally an authority on Depressions since his doctorate thesis was on the Great Depression of 1929) and an unabashed Friedman fan, had to ultimately rely on the humongous Troubled Asset Relief Package (“TARP”) that infused close to $700 billion into a fragile economy bursting at its seams. It was finally fiscal policy and Keynesianism that ruled the roost.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the extraordinary measures implemented to reign it in further lent credence to the importance of Government intervention in shoring up an ailing economy. The disbursement of funds as part of stimulus packages across the globe did not warrant even a reluctant whisper of the dreaded word “Austerity”. Direct Benefit Transfers to migrant labourers and employees furloughed or displaced by the pandemic paid unabashed homage to the Keynesian notion of a welfare state.
In conclusion, I personally feel that it is time for economics to take a stab at heterodoxy. Science, even if it is a dismal one, needs to evolve in lockstep with the passage of time. The assumption that all individuals are rational and take economic decisions that maximise their utility is a theory that has long passed its sell by date. Behavioural economics has demonstrated this in no great uncertainty. Individuals are more often than not are refreshingly irrational rather than being cold, calculated and cunning rational creatures, and are driven by factors such as coercion, coaxing, social constraints and paucity of information. New and emerging theories such as institutional, feminist, Post-Keynesian and Modern Monetary Theories need to be evaluated seriously to complement the neo-classical synthesis.
Even Samuelson would have accorded his wholehearted approval to such a notion!
Nicholas Wapshott’ s new book, Samuelson Friedman, chronicles the echoes arising out of the battle between Samuelson and Friedman whose reverberations can be felt even today. While one school continues to cry foul about the need and workings of a welfare state, another school is quick to point out the mendacity that is the free market economy. Wapshott captures an invigorating period where two dueling professionals who continued to remain faithful friends, cleaved the world of economics, and consequently politics. As Wapshott informs his readers the spill over effect of the Samuelson Friedman debates influenced not just the common reader but also many a policy maven. Samuelson v Friedman was also Carter v Reagan and James Callaghan v Margaret Thatcher.
The editor of Newsweek in the 1960s, Osborn Elliott in an attempt to best his eternal rival Time hit upon an idea of securing two economists cut out of a different clothes to pen argumentative columns that would whet the appetite of a younger audience. While bagging Samuelson was nothing short of a coup, Friedman needed strong persuasion from Rose, his wife, to accept the job. A prescient Rose instantly detected the merits of Friedman in going head-to-head with the man who was then acknowledged to be one of the greatest economists ever, and a true successor to the greatest ever, John Maynard Keynes. A formidable economist herself, Rose Friedman also doubled up as the co-author of innumerable works emanating from the Milton stable.
At the heart of the Samuelson Friedman debate lay the scourge of inflation. The causes of inflation and the potential remedial measures to curb it were the two topics which caused immense and intense difference of opinion between these two warring giants. Friedman along with economist, Anna Schwartz, in his magnum opus “A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960” argued that the Great Depression would not have materialized had the Federal Reserve Board done its job and stabilized the money supply. Friedman was of the unshakeable belief that policy makers could lend a great degree of stability to an economy by ensuring steady, slow growth in the money supply. Samuelson, on his part choose to adopt a more traditional Keynesian/neo-classical approach by advocating a measured and judicious blend of increased taxes and opening up the spigot of public spending.
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher both came to power placing their trust more towards “Friedmanism” than banking on Samuelson’s tenets. Reagonomics proceeded to slash taxes, (but primarily on and for the wealthy), and curbed the power of trade unions. Reagan also clamped down on a lot of necessary welfare schemes primarily aimed at sustaining minority groups such as single black mothers. But all those naysayers who were busy writing the epitaph on Keynesianism were in for a rude jolt.
The insidious financial recession exposed the fatal chinks in the armour of “Friedmanism”. A plethora of materials abound on the vulnerability of Friedman’s theories when applied in the context of a recessionary condition. Even Ben Bernanke, the erudite Chairman of the Fed (incidentally an authority on Depressions since his doctorate thesis was on the Great Depression of 1929) and an unabashed Friedman fan, had to ultimately rely on the humongous Troubled Asset Relief Package (“TARP”) that infused close to $700 billion into a fragile economy bursting at its seams. It was finally fiscal policy and Keynesianism that ruled the roost.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the extraordinary measures implemented to reign it in further lent credence to the importance of Government intervention in shoring up an ailing economy. The disbursement of funds as part of stimulus packages across the globe did not warrant even a reluctant whisper of the dreaded word “Austerity”. Direct Benefit Transfers to migrant labourers and employees furloughed or displaced by the pandemic paid unabashed homage to the Keynesian notion of a welfare state.
In conclusion, I personally feel that it is time for economics to take a stab at heterodoxy. Science, even if it is a dismal one, needs to evolve in lockstep with the passage of time. The assumption that all individuals are rational and take economic decisions that maximise their utility is a theory that has long passed its sell by date. Behavioural economics has demonstrated this in no great uncertainty. Individuals are more often than not are refreshingly irrational rather than being cold, calculated and cunning rational creatures, and are driven by factors such as coercion, coaxing, social constraints and paucity of information. New and emerging theories such as institutional, feminist, Post-Keynesian and Modern Monetary Theories need to be evaluated seriously to complement the neo-classical synthesis.
Even Samuelson would have accorded his wholehearted approval to such a notion!
October 4, 2021
Having adored Keynes Hayek upon first reading in 2017, I couldn’t wait to get my hands on this. Although neither Samuelson nor Friedman have the allure of Keynes especially, the rich debate and correspondence between the two should have filled the void in this iteration.
Disappointingly, I have a number of criticisms. Firstly, I have a myriad of pencil marks where I felt Wapshott needed to add caveats or counter arguments towards both economists, however, Friedman in particular (I will not deny that my exuberant displeasure for libertarian ideas tilts my bias against Friedman). This point also relates to the expected reader - is the book aimed at economists or the general reader? At times the analysis is far too simplistic and lacking for an economist, yet during others Wapshott becomes (what I believe to be) too technical for the average reader. Non-fiction without a true purpose will always feel disjointed and at times I unfortunately felt this. Samuelson’s contribution to the mathematic ‘enhancement’ of economics is mentioned, yet we are given nothing on the assumption of ergodicity or how Samuelson achieved his breakthroughs.
The general flow of the book is amiss and the chapter order and length don’t seem to align. At points it feels like the author is trying to stretch basic points to hit the alluring, yet trivial, mark of circa 300 pages. How this is the case when the clash is taking place during one of the richest periods of economic history, I am not quite sure. A number of chapters need augmented and broadened, whilst others need purged of the frequent and hugely frustrating repetition of simple points. Wapshott’s writing style does not lend itself to forming captivating narratives and this contributes to my harshness.
Sadly this book was a disappointment, however, I can only hope it ignites the same degree of passion and critical thinking in others.
Disappointingly, I have a number of criticisms. Firstly, I have a myriad of pencil marks where I felt Wapshott needed to add caveats or counter arguments towards both economists, however, Friedman in particular (I will not deny that my exuberant displeasure for libertarian ideas tilts my bias against Friedman). This point also relates to the expected reader - is the book aimed at economists or the general reader? At times the analysis is far too simplistic and lacking for an economist, yet during others Wapshott becomes (what I believe to be) too technical for the average reader. Non-fiction without a true purpose will always feel disjointed and at times I unfortunately felt this. Samuelson’s contribution to the mathematic ‘enhancement’ of economics is mentioned, yet we are given nothing on the assumption of ergodicity or how Samuelson achieved his breakthroughs.
The general flow of the book is amiss and the chapter order and length don’t seem to align. At points it feels like the author is trying to stretch basic points to hit the alluring, yet trivial, mark of circa 300 pages. How this is the case when the clash is taking place during one of the richest periods of economic history, I am not quite sure. A number of chapters need augmented and broadened, whilst others need purged of the frequent and hugely frustrating repetition of simple points. Wapshott’s writing style does not lend itself to forming captivating narratives and this contributes to my harshness.
Sadly this book was a disappointment, however, I can only hope it ignites the same degree of passion and critical thinking in others.
May 28, 2023
I learned a lot about Samuelson and Friedman but the author blames the January 6th Capitol invasion on Friedman????? Because supposedly those guys are anarchists and it was an anarchist protest? And Friedman isn’t an anarchist but as a libertarian it’s his fault?
February 16, 2023
Excellent follow-up to Wapshott's Keynes Hayek book. As in the previous book, some of the sketched economic ideas went over my head, but the text gives a very nice overview of Friedman's monetarism - cleverly recounted through the personal histories of two economists.
I wish the chapter on the Thatcher's attempts at implementing Friedman's ideas was longer. It would would have allowed me to better understand the flaws of monetarism that go beyond the simple difficulty of measuring the quantity of money or of choosing the type of money to measure.
I wish the chapter on the Thatcher's attempts at implementing Friedman's ideas was longer. It would would have allowed me to better understand the flaws of monetarism that go beyond the simple difficulty of measuring the quantity of money or of choosing the type of money to measure.
October 3, 2021
Lifelong friends, Nobel laureates, dueling intellects from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum throughout decades of profound political and social change, Samuelson and Friedman remain as central characters in the history of economic thought. As the author reminds the reader, monetarism made only a fleeting and generally discredited impact on economics, but Friedman’s influence on politics and the political economic agenda in the US, the UK and post-communism Eastern Europe was considerable and remains today. Samuelson’s contributions to economics transformed the discipline from a form of philosophy into the mathematics-based social science we see today. His influence is pervasive and strong.
The book is an enthralling read.
The book is an enthralling read.
March 25, 2025
ENGLISH
“Samuelson Friedman” portrays the fundamental ideological dispute over capitalism that raged throughout much of the 20th century, embodied in the works of two giant economists, Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman. The author previously chose John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek to frame fundamentally the same discussion of opposing ideas within the Liberal field at the beginning of the century (my review here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...).
Liberalism is an ideological force, even if all the lessons in its manual are not fully applied to concrete problems. On and off some new author or politician comes up advocating that State should interfere as little as possible in private lives so that individual greed can produce its positive effects to society. With the 1929 U.S. stock market crash and the ensuing Great Depression, economic liberal ideas had perhaps its hardest test in History. The crisis put the premise of laissez faire into serious question. Keynes, an author from within Liberalism — a student of then greatest character of economic Liberalism Alfred Marshall — came to “save” it with a stark call to realism: either the State intervened in the economy to heat up demand and consumption in times of crises, or the system could go entirely broke.
In fact that was what the U.S. government had done before Keynes wrote his masterpiece. So Keynes put in writing something that a reasonable politician with a normal sense of risk would do: find a solution using a power as great as only a State has. Thus, Keynes ushered in Macroeconomics as an entirely new dimension of Economics, but he also expressly recognized an important role for the State in times of crisis.
Another important test for Liberalism was the Cold War during the great part of 20th century. Surprised by the sudden alleged growth of the Soviet Union in the following years after WWII, and the constant threat of nuclear destruction, the free market response had to be solid. And it was, while the Soviet Union, with its central state planning and execution of the entire economy, fell apart.
Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman continued the debate on the superiority of pure Liberal or Keynesian ideas for many years through the pages of Newsweek magazine, where they wrote periodic columns.
The author makes a good journey through the writings of both authors, building the narrative with frequent quotes from both or others. Wapshott tries to make it balanced by dedicating relatively the same extension for both. When it comes to importance to the economics debate, though, Wapshott does not hide his emphasis on Samuelson. Wapshott portrays Friedman as a radical libertarian who had more influence on politics, going through important examples of this — with his approximation to candidate for U.S. presidency Barry Goldwater, then presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, and then Margret Thatcher in the UK.
However, Wapshott makes it clear that Friedman’s radical, libertarian ideas had never been fully applied in practice. No politician, once in executive power, no matter how radical, in his right mind, was (or would be) able to fully apply Friedman's ideas. Nixon came with the discourse of less interference, but later Friedman complained of the great quantity of legal regulation that was produced while he was in office. Reagan also had a strong discourse on Liberalism, but military spending in his term soared as a strategy to trap the Soviet Union into huge technological catching up costs, which ultimately broke it.
According to the author, the UK was the country where Friedman and other liberals’ ideas were perhaps most deeply applied. Wapshott, however, does not spare Friedman’s ideas of the blame for the economic crisis the UK went through mainly in the 80s. Friedman’s obsession with tight monetary policy and cuts in Government spending found resonance in Thatcher. The result applied nevertheless led to unemployment and reduction of competitiveness of UK’s economy. As politics always has a very pragmatic side, Thatcher showed no remorse when she saw her Friedmanite policies fail and decided to move forward, abandoning such strict monetary precepts without much justification.
Friedman had a clear, straightforward stance on the ideas he advocated. He never recognized to be wrong — at least publicly. He would insist that inflation was fundamentally a monetary phenomenon and that if there is a role for government in the economy it is to adjust the quantity of money — in fact, central banks could be replaced by a computer. He was also an advocate of free markets and non-interventionism. He argued that drug use should be fully legalized. However, as History progressed, his political leanings became more closely associated with right-wing conservatism — which for Wapshott resulted in the Republican Tea Party and ultimately Donald Trump.
Samuelson, in turn, is portrayed as an academic giant, whose textbook was the Bible for students of economics for decades. He was perhaps the most prominent Keynesian, with his “neoclassical synthesis”. The expression refers to the harmonization of the neoclassical hardline based on microeconomics, with assumptions of rational choice and use of mathematics, and Keynesian insights at the macro level, advocating state intervention to contain the negative effects of crises. Samuelson’s prolific work is recognized for its use of abstraction and mathematics to solve economic problems, which contrasts with Friedman’s greater emphasis on the use of data, although the latter also relied heavily on ideological principles.
“Samuelson Friedman” is rich in quotes from the authors, which gives the narrative good credibility, though tiring the reader a bit. The readers’ tiredness, in fact, is not something the author seemed too bothered with, as he extends the narratives in most chapters through pages and pages without any pauses — which almost made me give the book a 3-star rate just for that. But the theme and contents are worth it for those who like me are interested in History of Economic Thought — in this case, very recent History, with repercussions to this day.
PORTUGUÊS
“Samuelson Friedman” retrata a disputa ideológica fundamental sobre o capitalismo travada em grande parte do século XX, personificada no trabalho de dois gigantes da Economia, Paul Samuelson e Milton Friedman. O autor escolheu anteriormente John Maynard Keynes e Friedrich Hayek para enquadrar fundamentalmente a mesma discussão de ideias opostas dentro do campo liberal no início do século (minha análise aqui: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...).
O Liberalismo é uma força ideológica, mesmo que todas as lições de sua cartilha não venham a encontrar aplicação integralmente em problemas concretos. De vez em quando, algum novo autor ou político surge defendendo que o Estado deve interferir o mínimo possível nas vidas privadas para que a ganância individual possa produzir seus efeitos positivos para a sociedade. Com a quebra do mercado de ações dos EUA em 1929 e a Grande Depressão que se seguiu, as ideias econômicas liberais tiveram talvez seu teste mais difícil na História. A crise colocou seriamente a premissa do laissez faire em dúvida. Keynes, um autor de dentro do Liberalismo — um estudante do então maior personagem do Liberalismo econômico, Alfred Marshall —, veio para "salvá-lo" com um forte chamado ao realismo: ou o Estado intervinha na economia para aquecer a demanda e o consumo em tempos de crise, ou o sistema poderia ir à falência.
Na verdade, foi isso que o governo dos EUA fez antes de Keynes escrever sua obra-prima. Então Keynes colocou por escrito algo que um político razoável com noção normal de risco faria: encontrar uma solução usando um poder tamanho que só um Estado tem. Assim, Keynes inaugurou a Macroeconomia como uma dimensão totalmente nova da Economia, mas também reconheceu expressamente uma função importante para o Estado em tempos de crise.
Outro teste importante para o Liberalismo foi a Guerra Fria durante grande parte do século XX. Surpreso pelo repentino suposto crescimento da União Soviética em seus primeiros anos após a Segunda Guerra Mundial e a constante ameaça de destruição nuclear, a resposta do livre de mercado deveria ser sólida. E foi, enquanto a União Soviética, com seu planejamento e execução centrais de toda a economia pelo Estado, desmoronou.
Paul Samuelson e Milton Friedman continuaram o debate sobre a superioridade das ideias puramente liberais ou keynesianas por muitos anos nas páginas da revista Newsweek, onde escreveram colunas periódicas.
O autor faz uma boa jornada pelos escritos de ambos, construindo a narrativa por meio de citações frequentes de ambos ou de outros. Wapshott tenta tornar a narrativa equilibrada dedicando relativamente a mesma extensão para ambos. Quando se trata de importância para o debate econômico, no entanto, Wapshott não esconde sua ênfase em Samuelson. Wapshott enquadra Friedman como um libertário radical que teve mais influência na política, passando por exemplos importantes disso — no caso da aproximação dele ao candidato à presidência dos EUA, Barry Goldwater, dos então presidentes Richard Nixon e Ronald Reagan, o ditador do Chile Augusto Pinochet e depois Margret Thatcher no Reino Unido.
No entanto, Wapshott deixa claro que as ideias radicais e libertárias de Friedman nunca foram totalmente aplicadas na prática. Nenhum político, uma vez no poder executivo, não importa quão radical, em seu perfeito juízo, foi (ou seria) capaz de aplicar totalmente as ideias de Friedman. Nixon veio com um discurso de menos interferência, mas depois Friedman reclamou da grande quantidade de regulamentação legal que foi produzida em sua presidência. Reagan também fez um discurso forte sobre o Liberalismo, mas os gastos militares em seu mandato soaram como uma estratégia para prender a União Soviética em custos de recuperação tecnológica, o que acabou quebrando-a.
De acordo com o autor, o Reino Unido foi o país onde as ideias de Friedman e outros liberais foram talvez mais profundamente aplicadas. Wapshott, no entanto, não poupa as ideias de Friedman da culpa pela crise econômica que o Reino Unido passou principalmente nos anos 80. A obsessão de Friedman com uma política monetária rígida e cortes nos gastos do governo encontrou ressonância em Thatcher. O resultado aplicado, no entanto, levou ao desemprego e à redução da competitividade da economia do Reino Unido. Como a política sempre tem um lado muito pragmático, Thatcher não demonstrou remorso quando viu sua política inspirada em Friedman fracassar e decidiu seguir em frente abandonando preceitos monetários tão rigorosos sem muita justificativa.
Friedman tinha uma posição clara e direta sobre as ideias que defendia. Ele nunca reconheceu estar errado — pelo menos publicamente. Ele insistia que a inflação era um fenômeno fundamentalmente monetário e se há um papel para o governo na economia é ajustar a quantidade de dinheiro — na verdade, os bancos centrais poderiam ser substituídos por um computador. Ele também era um defensor do livre mercado e do não intervencionismo. Defendia que o uso de drogas deveria ser completamente legalizado. Não obstante, conforme a História evoluiu e sua aproximação com os políticos mostrou, ele acabou sendo relacionando mais com o conservadorismo de direita — o que para Wapshott resultou no Tea Party Republicano e finalmente em Donald Trump.
Samuelson, por sua vez, é retratado como um gigante da Academia, cujo livro didático foi a Bíblia da Economia para estudantes por décadas. Ele foi talvez o mais proeminente keynesiano, com sua “síntese neoclássica”. A expressão remete à harmonização da linha dura neoclássica baseada em lições microeconômicas apoiadas na suposição de escolha racional e uso da matemática, bem como insights keynesianos no nível macro defendendo a intervenção estatal para conter os efeitos negativos das crises. O trabalho prolífico de Samuelson é reconhecido pelo uso da abstração e da matemática para resolver problemas econômicos, o que contrasta com a ênfase maior de Friedman no uso de dados, embora este também fortemente dependente de princípios ideológicos.
“Samuelson Friedman” é rico em citações dos autores, o que dá à narrativa boa credibilidade, embora canse um pouco o leitor. O cansaço dos leitores, na verdade, não é algo que pareceu incomodar o autor, pois ele estende as narrativas na maioria dos capítulos por páginas e páginas sem nenhuma pausa — o que quase me fez dar ao livro uma classificação de 3 estrelas só por isso. Mas o tema e o conteúdo valem a pena para aqueles que, como eu, se interessam por História do Pensamento Econômico — nesse caso, bem recente, com reflexos até hoje.
“Samuelson Friedman” portrays the fundamental ideological dispute over capitalism that raged throughout much of the 20th century, embodied in the works of two giant economists, Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman. The author previously chose John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek to frame fundamentally the same discussion of opposing ideas within the Liberal field at the beginning of the century (my review here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...).
Liberalism is an ideological force, even if all the lessons in its manual are not fully applied to concrete problems. On and off some new author or politician comes up advocating that State should interfere as little as possible in private lives so that individual greed can produce its positive effects to society. With the 1929 U.S. stock market crash and the ensuing Great Depression, economic liberal ideas had perhaps its hardest test in History. The crisis put the premise of laissez faire into serious question. Keynes, an author from within Liberalism — a student of then greatest character of economic Liberalism Alfred Marshall — came to “save” it with a stark call to realism: either the State intervened in the economy to heat up demand and consumption in times of crises, or the system could go entirely broke.
In fact that was what the U.S. government had done before Keynes wrote his masterpiece. So Keynes put in writing something that a reasonable politician with a normal sense of risk would do: find a solution using a power as great as only a State has. Thus, Keynes ushered in Macroeconomics as an entirely new dimension of Economics, but he also expressly recognized an important role for the State in times of crisis.
Another important test for Liberalism was the Cold War during the great part of 20th century. Surprised by the sudden alleged growth of the Soviet Union in the following years after WWII, and the constant threat of nuclear destruction, the free market response had to be solid. And it was, while the Soviet Union, with its central state planning and execution of the entire economy, fell apart.
Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman continued the debate on the superiority of pure Liberal or Keynesian ideas for many years through the pages of Newsweek magazine, where they wrote periodic columns.
The author makes a good journey through the writings of both authors, building the narrative with frequent quotes from both or others. Wapshott tries to make it balanced by dedicating relatively the same extension for both. When it comes to importance to the economics debate, though, Wapshott does not hide his emphasis on Samuelson. Wapshott portrays Friedman as a radical libertarian who had more influence on politics, going through important examples of this — with his approximation to candidate for U.S. presidency Barry Goldwater, then presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, and then Margret Thatcher in the UK.
However, Wapshott makes it clear that Friedman’s radical, libertarian ideas had never been fully applied in practice. No politician, once in executive power, no matter how radical, in his right mind, was (or would be) able to fully apply Friedman's ideas. Nixon came with the discourse of less interference, but later Friedman complained of the great quantity of legal regulation that was produced while he was in office. Reagan also had a strong discourse on Liberalism, but military spending in his term soared as a strategy to trap the Soviet Union into huge technological catching up costs, which ultimately broke it.
According to the author, the UK was the country where Friedman and other liberals’ ideas were perhaps most deeply applied. Wapshott, however, does not spare Friedman’s ideas of the blame for the economic crisis the UK went through mainly in the 80s. Friedman’s obsession with tight monetary policy and cuts in Government spending found resonance in Thatcher. The result applied nevertheless led to unemployment and reduction of competitiveness of UK’s economy. As politics always has a very pragmatic side, Thatcher showed no remorse when she saw her Friedmanite policies fail and decided to move forward, abandoning such strict monetary precepts without much justification.
Friedman had a clear, straightforward stance on the ideas he advocated. He never recognized to be wrong — at least publicly. He would insist that inflation was fundamentally a monetary phenomenon and that if there is a role for government in the economy it is to adjust the quantity of money — in fact, central banks could be replaced by a computer. He was also an advocate of free markets and non-interventionism. He argued that drug use should be fully legalized. However, as History progressed, his political leanings became more closely associated with right-wing conservatism — which for Wapshott resulted in the Republican Tea Party and ultimately Donald Trump.
Samuelson, in turn, is portrayed as an academic giant, whose textbook was the Bible for students of economics for decades. He was perhaps the most prominent Keynesian, with his “neoclassical synthesis”. The expression refers to the harmonization of the neoclassical hardline based on microeconomics, with assumptions of rational choice and use of mathematics, and Keynesian insights at the macro level, advocating state intervention to contain the negative effects of crises. Samuelson’s prolific work is recognized for its use of abstraction and mathematics to solve economic problems, which contrasts with Friedman’s greater emphasis on the use of data, although the latter also relied heavily on ideological principles.
“Samuelson Friedman” is rich in quotes from the authors, which gives the narrative good credibility, though tiring the reader a bit. The readers’ tiredness, in fact, is not something the author seemed too bothered with, as he extends the narratives in most chapters through pages and pages without any pauses — which almost made me give the book a 3-star rate just for that. But the theme and contents are worth it for those who like me are interested in History of Economic Thought — in this case, very recent History, with repercussions to this day.
PORTUGUÊS
“Samuelson Friedman” retrata a disputa ideológica fundamental sobre o capitalismo travada em grande parte do século XX, personificada no trabalho de dois gigantes da Economia, Paul Samuelson e Milton Friedman. O autor escolheu anteriormente John Maynard Keynes e Friedrich Hayek para enquadrar fundamentalmente a mesma discussão de ideias opostas dentro do campo liberal no início do século (minha análise aqui: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...).
O Liberalismo é uma força ideológica, mesmo que todas as lições de sua cartilha não venham a encontrar aplicação integralmente em problemas concretos. De vez em quando, algum novo autor ou político surge defendendo que o Estado deve interferir o mínimo possível nas vidas privadas para que a ganância individual possa produzir seus efeitos positivos para a sociedade. Com a quebra do mercado de ações dos EUA em 1929 e a Grande Depressão que se seguiu, as ideias econômicas liberais tiveram talvez seu teste mais difícil na História. A crise colocou seriamente a premissa do laissez faire em dúvida. Keynes, um autor de dentro do Liberalismo — um estudante do então maior personagem do Liberalismo econômico, Alfred Marshall —, veio para "salvá-lo" com um forte chamado ao realismo: ou o Estado intervinha na economia para aquecer a demanda e o consumo em tempos de crise, ou o sistema poderia ir à falência.
Na verdade, foi isso que o governo dos EUA fez antes de Keynes escrever sua obra-prima. Então Keynes colocou por escrito algo que um político razoável com noção normal de risco faria: encontrar uma solução usando um poder tamanho que só um Estado tem. Assim, Keynes inaugurou a Macroeconomia como uma dimensão totalmente nova da Economia, mas também reconheceu expressamente uma função importante para o Estado em tempos de crise.
Outro teste importante para o Liberalismo foi a Guerra Fria durante grande parte do século XX. Surpreso pelo repentino suposto crescimento da União Soviética em seus primeiros anos após a Segunda Guerra Mundial e a constante ameaça de destruição nuclear, a resposta do livre de mercado deveria ser sólida. E foi, enquanto a União Soviética, com seu planejamento e execução centrais de toda a economia pelo Estado, desmoronou.
Paul Samuelson e Milton Friedman continuaram o debate sobre a superioridade das ideias puramente liberais ou keynesianas por muitos anos nas páginas da revista Newsweek, onde escreveram colunas periódicas.
O autor faz uma boa jornada pelos escritos de ambos, construindo a narrativa por meio de citações frequentes de ambos ou de outros. Wapshott tenta tornar a narrativa equilibrada dedicando relativamente a mesma extensão para ambos. Quando se trata de importância para o debate econômico, no entanto, Wapshott não esconde sua ênfase em Samuelson. Wapshott enquadra Friedman como um libertário radical que teve mais influência na política, passando por exemplos importantes disso — no caso da aproximação dele ao candidato à presidência dos EUA, Barry Goldwater, dos então presidentes Richard Nixon e Ronald Reagan, o ditador do Chile Augusto Pinochet e depois Margret Thatcher no Reino Unido.
No entanto, Wapshott deixa claro que as ideias radicais e libertárias de Friedman nunca foram totalmente aplicadas na prática. Nenhum político, uma vez no poder executivo, não importa quão radical, em seu perfeito juízo, foi (ou seria) capaz de aplicar totalmente as ideias de Friedman. Nixon veio com um discurso de menos interferência, mas depois Friedman reclamou da grande quantidade de regulamentação legal que foi produzida em sua presidência. Reagan também fez um discurso forte sobre o Liberalismo, mas os gastos militares em seu mandato soaram como uma estratégia para prender a União Soviética em custos de recuperação tecnológica, o que acabou quebrando-a.
De acordo com o autor, o Reino Unido foi o país onde as ideias de Friedman e outros liberais foram talvez mais profundamente aplicadas. Wapshott, no entanto, não poupa as ideias de Friedman da culpa pela crise econômica que o Reino Unido passou principalmente nos anos 80. A obsessão de Friedman com uma política monetária rígida e cortes nos gastos do governo encontrou ressonância em Thatcher. O resultado aplicado, no entanto, levou ao desemprego e à redução da competitividade da economia do Reino Unido. Como a política sempre tem um lado muito pragmático, Thatcher não demonstrou remorso quando viu sua política inspirada em Friedman fracassar e decidiu seguir em frente abandonando preceitos monetários tão rigorosos sem muita justificativa.
Friedman tinha uma posição clara e direta sobre as ideias que defendia. Ele nunca reconheceu estar errado — pelo menos publicamente. Ele insistia que a inflação era um fenômeno fundamentalmente monetário e se há um papel para o governo na economia é ajustar a quantidade de dinheiro — na verdade, os bancos centrais poderiam ser substituídos por um computador. Ele também era um defensor do livre mercado e do não intervencionismo. Defendia que o uso de drogas deveria ser completamente legalizado. Não obstante, conforme a História evoluiu e sua aproximação com os políticos mostrou, ele acabou sendo relacionando mais com o conservadorismo de direita — o que para Wapshott resultou no Tea Party Republicano e finalmente em Donald Trump.
Samuelson, por sua vez, é retratado como um gigante da Academia, cujo livro didático foi a Bíblia da Economia para estudantes por décadas. Ele foi talvez o mais proeminente keynesiano, com sua “síntese neoclássica”. A expressão remete à harmonização da linha dura neoclássica baseada em lições microeconômicas apoiadas na suposição de escolha racional e uso da matemática, bem como insights keynesianos no nível macro defendendo a intervenção estatal para conter os efeitos negativos das crises. O trabalho prolífico de Samuelson é reconhecido pelo uso da abstração e da matemática para resolver problemas econômicos, o que contrasta com a ênfase maior de Friedman no uso de dados, embora este também fortemente dependente de princípios ideológicos.
“Samuelson Friedman” é rico em citações dos autores, o que dá à narrativa boa credibilidade, embora canse um pouco o leitor. O cansaço dos leitores, na verdade, não é algo que pareceu incomodar o autor, pois ele estende as narrativas na maioria dos capítulos por páginas e páginas sem nenhuma pausa — o que quase me fez dar ao livro uma classificação de 3 estrelas só por isso. Mas o tema e o conteúdo valem a pena para aqueles que, como eu, se interessam por História do Pensamento Econômico — nesse caso, bem recente, com reflexos até hoje.
October 5, 2021
A great book, providing a history of macroeconomic theory and application in the late 20th and early 21st century. The author, British journalist Nicholas Wapshott, continues the story of macroeconomics from his previous book, “Keynes Hayek.” This book covers in detail the development of Friedman’s Monetary Theories, Samuelson’s continued reconciliation of a post-Keynesian consensus, and the role both men played influencing policy makers through the economic cycles of the late 60s to the Great Recession. Wapshott makes great use of the lengthy correspondence between the two men, their individual papers, and, most importantly, their columns in Newsweek to craft an informative ‘debate’ between the two men. I really appreciated the author’s ability to efficiently explain the very complicated theories underpinning macroeconomics. If you want to better understand the science behind many of the economic conversations taking place today, this book is a place to start. Highly recommended for anyone wanting to better appreciate the back-and-forth between today’s fiscal policy proponents and monetary theorists.
November 7, 2021
My bias at the outset. I'm a Friedman-ite.
The book was a very good read and I enjoyed the insights into the two men's stories and relationship.
I'm willing to accept for now that Friedman's recommendations in the 1908s for Volcker and Thatcher were tried and found wanting. But I may read some more on this to verify Wapshott's conclusions.
But, to conclude that Friedman's influence led to major deregulation of financial services which in turn led to the 2008 financial crisis is one theory - not settled wisdom yet. Others remind us that financial services were still pretty regulated. And others point to Washington's push to expand mortgages may have been the culprit. So I'm far from willing to accept that interpretation. No doubt Friedman would have been very distraught at the loss of moral hazard through the various rescue packages.
And I think the logic to go from Friedman's push for freer trade to the rise of Trump and Jan. 6 is very tenuous.
Looking forward, though, to reading Wapshott's book on Hayek and Keynes.
The book was a very good read and I enjoyed the insights into the two men's stories and relationship.
I'm willing to accept for now that Friedman's recommendations in the 1908s for Volcker and Thatcher were tried and found wanting. But I may read some more on this to verify Wapshott's conclusions.
But, to conclude that Friedman's influence led to major deregulation of financial services which in turn led to the 2008 financial crisis is one theory - not settled wisdom yet. Others remind us that financial services were still pretty regulated. And others point to Washington's push to expand mortgages may have been the culprit. So I'm far from willing to accept that interpretation. No doubt Friedman would have been very distraught at the loss of moral hazard through the various rescue packages.
And I think the logic to go from Friedman's push for freer trade to the rise of Trump and Jan. 6 is very tenuous.
Looking forward, though, to reading Wapshott's book on Hayek and Keynes.
May 9, 2025
More of a charge against Milton Friedman than an in depth discussion of the intellectual debate raging about the origins of inflation and the place of the State in dealing with business cycles and economic life. The author constantly refers disapprovingly to Friedman's idea of abolishing licensing for doctors while ignoring the widespread sympathy among Keynesian economists of the 70s like Samuelson for price and foreign exchange controls, which certainly exacerbated the 1973 oil shock crisis (not to mention the admiration of MIT in the 70's for Soviet economic "growth"). Last chapter is also atrocious, linking Trump to Friedman as well as stating that extreme monetary expansion following the Great Recession did not cause widespread inflation (that aged well for about 2 years following the publication of the book).
An interesting review nonetheless (even if not deep enough to my taste) of the political and economic debate on the 1970's and 1980's.
An interesting review nonetheless (even if not deep enough to my taste) of the political and economic debate on the 1970's and 1980's.
October 8, 2021
This book extends the debate between Keynes and Hayek into a new generation with two columnists writing for Newsweek. Milton Friedman stands on the right and Paul Samuelson on the left.
But then the book doesn't really provide a battle. There is no blow by blow review of how they battled it out in the pages of the magazine. In fact none of their columns, oddly, are included in the text. It might have been nice if they had been. Instead this is mostly a book about the trajectory of Friedman and how he struggled against the Keynesian bias of academic economics. His rise as advisor to presidents and prime ministers and his fall as the policies he advocated for fell out of favor are all covered here. Friedman's prescription for a monetarism cure to inflation proved unworkable in both the Reagan administration and then in Margaret Thatcher's government in the UK.
Samuelson's own work does not feature in this book very much, but he provides a foil to Friedman.
His own economics textbook was very successful and went through many editions. Ironically, the footprint of Friedman in the book increased over time, showing how his ideas made some headway against the Keynesian consensus. Both men lived into their 90s and when Friedman finally died, the monetarism he championed had been largely discredited. Samuelson gets the final word and gets to burry Friedman as the last man standing. Keynesian economics survives but somewhat tempered by the challenges brought by Friedman to its hegemony.
But then the book doesn't really provide a battle. There is no blow by blow review of how they battled it out in the pages of the magazine. In fact none of their columns, oddly, are included in the text. It might have been nice if they had been. Instead this is mostly a book about the trajectory of Friedman and how he struggled against the Keynesian bias of academic economics. His rise as advisor to presidents and prime ministers and his fall as the policies he advocated for fell out of favor are all covered here. Friedman's prescription for a monetarism cure to inflation proved unworkable in both the Reagan administration and then in Margaret Thatcher's government in the UK.
Samuelson's own work does not feature in this book very much, but he provides a foil to Friedman.
His own economics textbook was very successful and went through many editions. Ironically, the footprint of Friedman in the book increased over time, showing how his ideas made some headway against the Keynesian consensus. Both men lived into their 90s and when Friedman finally died, the monetarism he championed had been largely discredited. Samuelson gets the final word and gets to burry Friedman as the last man standing. Keynesian economics survives but somewhat tempered by the challenges brought by Friedman to its hegemony.
May 16, 2024
I must confess I wish the book had focused more on the intricacies of there arguments and perhaps included more of there actual writing, in place of the numerous platitudes about there respective views on “big government”. Indeed it is slightly ironic to me that book was in many ways more confusing then it needed to be as it ignored the technique popularized by Samuelson and Friedman of using math and empirics to clarify one arguments and assumptions. On the flip side, the book was filled with many brilliant quotes and anecdotes that made the thing worth reading.
July 7, 2024
Good idea, poorly focused. Idea: Use the sparring Newsweek columns of Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman to explore economic history. Some interesting facts come up about interactions between the two. But the author strays beyond their era, into the 1990s and even Covid. And he misses Samuelson’s take on Thatcher.
August 10, 2025
Nicholas Wapshott was even weaker in this book than in the one before it on Hayek and Keynes. He could not properly show the reasons behind the two economists' difficulties. It's a nice book, but it does not present an accurate picture. Both economists, ultimately, are unprincipled political thinkers. I favor Friedman over Samuelson by a lot, however, since he was not a charlatan.
May 18, 2022
Both Samuelson and Friedman deal with heritage of Keynes as public adversaries and lifetime friends , more resemble Lenin and Stalin respectively as vivid readers of Marx, in old communist way. with Samuelson being open minded and pragmatic and Friedman being cruel and stubborn.
August 20, 2023
An enjoyable history that balances fact with narrative expertly. I found the final chapter on modern legacy more complete than those in Keynes Hayek.
Perhaps too much time is given to their relationship over their differences in opinion on economics.
Perhaps too much time is given to their relationship over their differences in opinion on economics.
January 13, 2024
Good book about more recent economic history and two of the most influential economists during that time. Not as good as the Keynes Hayek book, partly because Keynes and Hayek are such towering figures.
April 28, 2025
A great book and then fell apart at the end as the author let his partisan filters cloud his analysis including somehow making a connection between Milton Friedman and the events of Jan 6 2021 storming of the capital. Ignore the last chapter and enjoy the rest of the book.
January 23, 2022
Good book but did not reach the heights of Keynes vs. Hayek
December 20, 2022
Great book. Accessible to the non-academic reader, but at the same time quite informative. Wapshott is very good at explaining economic ideas and phenomena.
January 4, 2023
Fascinating overview of the public images of Samuelson and Friedman, though an actual account of their scholarship is quite light.
November 13, 2023
Well researched and fantastic writing as always from Whapshott
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