Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit

by Alexandre Kojève, Allan Bloom (Editor), James H. Nichols (Translator)

"This collection of Kojeve's thoughts about Hegel constitutes one of the few important philosophical books of the twentieth century--a book, knowledge of which is requisite to the full awareness of our situation and to the grasp of the most modern perspective on the eternal questions of philosophy."--Allan Bloom (from the Introduction)

During the years 1933-1939, the Russian-born and German-educated Marxist political philosopher Alexandre Kojeve (1902-1968) brilliantly explicated--through a series of lectures--the philosophy of Hegel as it was developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This collection of lectures--originally compiled by Raymond Queneau and edited for its English-language translation by Allan Bloom--shows the intensity of Kojeve's study and thought and the depth of his insight into Hegel's Phenomenology. More important--for Kojeve was above all a philosopher and not an ideologue--this profound and venturesome work on Hegel will expose the readers to the excitement of discovering a great mind in all its force and power.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Theory, History, Politics, France, Classics

287 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1947

About the author

Alexandre Kojève was a Russian-born French philosopher and statesman whose philosophical seminars had an immense influence on twentieth-century French philosophy, particularly via his integration of Hegelian concepts into continental philosophy. As a statesman in the French government, he was instrumental in the creation of the European Union. Kojève was a close friend of, and was in lifelong philosophical dialogue with, Leo Strauss.

Reviews

[Roy Lotz · Rating 2 out of 5]

Generally speaking, there is a tendency to underestimate the difficulties of satisfaction and to overestimate those of omniscience.

Alexandre Kojève is easily one of the most influential thinkers of the last century. This is peculiar, considering that his reputation rests mainly on his interpretation of Hegel, an interpretation which he developed and propounded in a series of lectures in 1933-39. Many who attended these lectures—Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Lacan, to name just two—went on to be important intellectuals in their own right, reinterpreting Kojève’s ideas for their own purposes.

Kojève’s thinking extended beyond the lecture hall, shaping his whole intellectual milieu—deeply affecting Sartre, who may never have attended the lectures—and even extended to the United States. This was largely thanks to Leo Strauss, who sent his disciples to study under Kojève. One of these disciples was Allan Bloom—of The Closing of the American Mind fame—and, in turn, Bloom taught Francis Fukuyama, who heavily relied on Kojève for his controversial bestseller, The End of History and the Last Man. Once again, Kojève was influential.

It is too bad, then, that I found his most famous book to be of little merit. Frankly, I failed to see anything of serious interest in these pages: either as textual interpretation or as philosophy. Admittedly, the former did not surprise me. By common consent Kojève was a heterodox interpreter of Hegel, mixing Hegel’s ideas with those of Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger to create something quite different from what Hegel intended (whatever that was). But I did not expect this book to be so devoid of intellectual interest. Indeed, I am somewhat at a loss as to why or how it became so influential.

For one, Kojève’s writing style will be irksome to any who prize clarity and concision. He is boorishly repetitious, persistently vague, and pompously obscure. Every other word—when it isn’t an unnecessary foreign expression—is capitalized, italicized, wrapped in scare-quotes, or set aside in parentheses, as if simple words and commas were not enough to convey his subtle message. Meanwhile, his meaning, stripped of its pretentious shell, is either a banal truism, nonsense, or obviously wrong. This, by the way, is so often the case with turgid writers that I have grown to be deeply suspicious of all obscurity. In academic circles, dense prose is easily self-serving.

I cannot make these accusations without some demonstration. Here is Kojève on work: “Work is Time, and that is why it necessarily exists in time: it requires time.” Or Kojève on being: “Concrete (revealed) real Being is neither (pure) Identity (which is Being, Sein) nor (pure) Negativity (which is Nothingness, Nichts) but Totality (which is Becoming, Werden).” Another insight on the nature of existence:

One can say, then, that Being is the being of the concept “Being.” And that is why Being which is (in the Present) can be “conceived of” or revealed by the Concept. Or, more exactly, Being is conceived of at “each instant” of its being. Or else, again: Being is not only Being, but also Truth—that is, the adequation of the Concept and Being. This is simple.

Very simple.

As I said above, Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel is distinctly implausible. Kojève sees the Master-Slave dialectic as the key to Hegel’s whole system, whereas it is only one stage in Hegel’s Phenomenology, and Hegel does not frequently refer back to it. This focus on the issue of subjection, alienation, recognition, and work allows Kojève to read Hegel as a quasi-Marxist. Kojève also has lots of things to say about space, time, mortality, and freedom, most of which is derived from Heidegger and which are totally alien from Hegel’s thought. Kojève’s originality is not in any ideas unique to him, but to the conglomeration of these German philosophers that he conveys in these lectures.

I found all this to be academically slipshod. The attempt to make Hegel into a quasi-existentialist, deriving freedom from the cognizance of death, is especially unconvincing: Hegel was anything but an existentialist. Generally speaking there are not nearly enough citations of Hegel, nor is there any discussion whatever of Hegel’s background, development, or intellectual influences. Thus as an introduction to Hegel, the text is basically useless.

Even more intellectually irresponsible is his habit of deferring to Hegel’s text right when any argument is necessary. Statements like these are common: “Once more, I am not concerned with reproducing this deduction here, which is given in the entirety of the first seven chapters of the Phenomenology. But I shall say that it is irrefutable.” He does this quite often, merely asserting something and than insisting that, to prove it, one must read and understand the whole Phenomenology of Spirit. (This habit of deferring to infallible texts, by the way, is a typical move in religious arguments, and has no place in philosophy.) As a result, this book is one bloated series of unfounded assertions—seldom citing the text or providing anything resembling an argument—which makes it worse than useless.

Now, in case you think I am being overly harsh, let me quote one section where he does seem to be making an argument:

Let us consider a real table. This is not a Table ‘in general,’ nor just any table, but always this concrete table right here. Now, when ‘naive’ man or a representative of some science or other speaks of this table, he isolates it from the rest of the universe: he speaks of this table, without speaking of what is not this table. Now, this table does not float in empty space. It is on this floor, in this room, in this house, in this place on Earth, which Earth is at a determined distance from the Sun, which has a determined place within the galaxy, etc., etc. To speak of this table without speaking of the rest, then, is to abstract from this rest, which in fact is just as real and concrete as this table itself. To speak of this table without speaking of the whole of the Universe which implies it, or likewise to speak of this Universe without speaking of this table which is implied in it, is therefore to speak of an abstraction and not of a concrete reality.

This argument is part of Kojève’s general thesis that only holistic knowledge (which he calls “circular”) is true “Knowledge.” Putting aside the dreary, bombastic pointing out of the obvious—made to seem non-obvious with the use of insistent italics—this passage, insofar as it makes any point at all, is obviously incorrect. Kojève is saying that it is impossible to refer to concrete reality without having a complete, total knowledge (knowing everything about the table involves knowing everything about everything). This is false. To show this, as well as to demonstrate that philosophy need not always be written so badly, I will quote Bertrand Russell:

The fact is that, in order to use the word ‘John’ correctly, I do not need to know all about John, but only enough to recognize him. No doubt he has relations, near and remote, with everything in the universe, but he can be spoken of truly without taking them into account, except such as are the direct subject-matter of what is being said. He may be the father of Jemima as well as James, but it is not necessary for me to know this in order to know that he is the father of James.

Now, if this book were truly as devoid of value as I am making it out to be, it would lead to the question of how it became to popular and influential. Well, I can only guess. Perhaps Kojève’s dazzling obscurity, along with his sexy combination of the works of Marx and Heidegger—the two most influential thinkers in France at that time—allowed him to touch the Zeitgeist, so to speak. The attempt to reconcile a philosophical understanding of freedom and death (taken from Heidegger) with an understanding of oppression, historical progress, and work (taken from Marx and ultimately Hegel), may have given Kojève’s students an exciting impetus in the hectic days after the Second World War, when Europe was busy rebuilding itself. To any Kojève enthusiasts out there, please do let me know what you see in him. I remain blind.

[Ram · Rating 3 out of 5]

Jesus H. Deceased Christ. Kojeve makes everything far more difficult than I think it has to be. So, while this book was at times revelatory and made me feel like I was this close to "knowing" Hegel's mind, Kojeve always then launched into a 10 page (might as well have been 1000 page) discussion of how we can draw "The Idea" "IN Time" or "OUTSIDE of Time" as a circle, or two circles, or a square with a dildo glued on it, or whatever. The whole book was like that. Plus, Kojeve doesn't use modern words to talk about things. He uses some other vocabulary, one that looks like normal words but where the words don't mean anything but what he wants them to, when he wants them to. You can go pages and pages without figuring out that he was trying to make a key point. Of course, as the cover explains, Kojeve was a philosopher, not an ideologue, so his interpretation is "brilliant" (and Hegel is, what? Shit?). No wonder philosophizing so closely resembles sitting around and doing nothing!

Now, I shall read the actual Phenomenology of Spirit and we'll see if Hegel was indeed so impenetrable that he needed an interpreter to torture undergrads for 6 years explaining a book of only 500 pages.

This book is really better than I make it sound. But goddammit, I had to read the same pages over and over again for no reason except that Kojeve wanted to be a dick and confuse me.

[Michael A. · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this to be an engaging text. The lectures tend to really hammer home certain points, repeating the same points in slightly different ways, which leads to some fun reading as his points get clearer with further argumentation. I am new to Hegel, but Kojève's reading is apparently highly idiosyncratic and Marxist, so I will take it as his reading rather than what Hegel "actually meant" (which is probably a bit of a fool's endeavor anyway).

There's a vigor and vitality to his reading that makes me eager to read more of and more about Hegel.

[Aurelia · Rating 3 out of 5]

D’un point de vue profondément athée, considérant le Travail comme étant l’essence de l’Homme, opposant l’Homme de la Nature à celui de la Culture et de l’Histoire, Alexandre Kojève se lance dans une lecture idiosyncratique de la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit, qui va encore le mener plus loin, en annonçant non pas la Mort de Dieu, mais encore plus , la fin de l’Histoire, telle que l’homme l’a toujours connu et vécu.


C’est ouvrage est consacré dans sa grande partie à la dialectique. Kojève présente celle-ci comme une méthode de la description de la Conscience humaine et de l’Histoire, en tant que produit de l’Action de l’Homme, par opposition à la Nature. En effet, l’Homme de la Nature mène une existence limitée à ses besoins biologiques, il désire les objets, il n’a que la survie comme objectif. Il craint la mort, il ne risque jamais sa vie. Pour le Hegel de Kojève, la capacité du Discours raisonnée est nécessaire à l’Humanité de l’Homme, mais elle n’est pas suffisante. C’est seulement quand l’homme désire un objet non naturel (Kojève l’appelle le désir d’un autre désir humain), autrement dit la Reconnaissance, que commence l’Histoire. Cette Lutte sanglante pour la Reconnaissance, divise l’Humanité en deux. Les Maitres, n’ayant pas reculé devant le danger de la mort, réussissent à être reconnus, jouissent du travail des Esclaves. Ces derniers ayant préféré cette existence servile à la mort.


Mais l’issue de la Lutte pour la Reconnaissance n’est que l’élément catalyseur de l’Histoire. En effet, le Maitre, quoique reconnu, mène une existence oisive, vide de tout sens. Il est dans une impasse existentielle. L’Esclave, quoique vivant dans la crainte constante de son Maitre, commence à nier la Nature par son Travail et son Action, créant ainsi l’Histoire.


L’Histoire de la Civilisation Occidental est présentée comme un mouvement dialectique. L’Antiquité est l’Etat ou la division première s’est produite. C’est l’Etat guerrier ou une classe de Maitres dominent. Mais l’esclave veut être libre. Sa première réaction est le Stoïcisme, il se détache du Monde extérieur, il lui suffit d’être libre mentalement pour l’être réellement. Mais bientôt il s’aperçoit de son erreur : une pensée opposée au Monde est vide, illusoire, elle n’a pas de contenu. Il adopte l’attitude sceptique/nihiliste, il pense le moi sans penser le monde extérieur, il nie son existence. Ces attitudes, ne sont pas valables, parce qu’elles nient toute Action dans le monde réel. Sans l’Action, il n’y aura pas de Liberté, de Reconnaissance.


Un énorme pas va être franchi quand l’Esclave invente l’Au-delà, un monde où il sera vraiment libre, mais différent de ce monde où il vit maintenant. Néanmoins, il commence à travailler pour ce Dieu, pour garantir une Reconnaissance par lui. Autre évènement brusque de l’Histoire à cette étape, le Maitre le rejoint dans cette quête. L’homme religieux est ainsi maitre et esclave à la fois. On assiste à un premier rapprochement des deux conditions jadis radicalement opposées. C’est l’égalité devant la Divinité. L’Eglise est un prototype de l’Etat Moderne garantissant la Reconnaissance pour tout le monde.


L’homme religieux lui aussi se rend compte de son erreur, il devient l’homme de la Raison, il isole l’idée de la Liberté, il crée l’Etat et l’Histoire, il commence à penser soi-même pour et par soi-même. Par son Action dans ce monde commence l’Histoire Réelle. « L’Etre Vrai de l’Homme est son Action », chaque Idée, a une réalité révélée qui est sa vérité, c’est sa réalisation dans le Monde qui prouve sa Vérité. Les Intellectuels, les Hommes de lettres, sont des Esclaves sans Maitres, par ce qu’ils n’agissent pas. C’est par la Révolution sanglante que la Reconnaissance est obtenue, que la Vérité et donc la Réalité des idées sont prouvées. L’Etat Universel Moderne combine la Particularité presque animal de représentant de l’espèce humaine à l’Universalité d’un Etat, pour aboutir à son Individualité, ou cette particularité est élevée à une valeur universelle, il devient un Citoyen.


Le mouvement dialectique de l’Histoire implique la Négation de ce qui précède, mais ce n’est pas une destruction totale, c’est une sublimation. Les étapes précédentes de l’Histoire, et en parallèle avec elle la Conscience de l’Homme et son Savoir, sont niées mais sublimées pour créer de nouvelles étapes. Elles sont même toujours accessibles à nous grâce à leur description par un Discours Raisonné que constituent la tradition et l’Historiographie. La Dialectique comporte les catégories essentielles à la description de l’Etre : l’Identité, que l’Homme a de la Nature, la Négativité, grâce à son Travail et à son Action et enfin la Totalité, qui combine les deux précédentes.


Une fois la Reconnaissance et la Satisfaction de tous les humains assurées, la pleine Conscience de Soi et le Savoir Total eux aussi seront atteints. L’Homme a maintenant accès à un Livre, qui réunit tout ce mouvement dialectique, décrit toutes ces discussions précédente : la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit. Pour n’importe quelle question, on y trouvera la réponse, et pour y arriver il faut tout simplement refaire tout le cheminement que suit la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit. Elle est le Savoir Total, donc circulaire. C’est pour cette raison qu’Alexandre Kojève annonce la fin de l’Histoire, toute tentative de faire quoi que ce soit ne sera qu’un retour à une étape pour aboutir à la même conclusion.

[David M · Rating 5 out of 5]

So good I wonder if there's even any need to read Hegel (the answer, most likely, is YES, you fool!). The stuff about the end of history and the master-slave dialectic has really stuck with me.

[imaculata form · Rating 5 out of 5]

The deficiencies, but also the merits, of a such an approach are acutely felt after encountering the Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (Lectures on the "Phenomenology of Spirit," given from 1933 to 1939 at L'Ecole des hautes Etudes, collected and edited by Raymond Queneau, Paris: Gallimard, 1947. Fessard's note.). For M. Kojeve's work, also an explanation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, is the complete antithesis of a "good scholarly work": First of all by its presentation, where the disparate nature of the material gathered, the confusion of the lecture form, hardly favors the understanding of a text which is, moreover, teeming with repetitions and obscurities and does not even exclude certain mistakes. But above all, it is by its author's resolute option in favor of a Hegel who is perfectly and consciously an atheist. The extreme intelligence and the rigorous logic with which M. Kojeve defends his point of view will quickly make one forget the drawbacks in presentation, however. The most difficult texts of the Phenomenology, for example on the identity of Time and the Concept, that M. Hyppolite cited without prejudging their ultimate meaning are here taken as the center of the entire interpretation and are clarified by the light they shed on the whole. Basing himself on Husserl and even more on Heidegger, M. Kojeve makes the Master-Slave dialectic the essential part of the entire Phenomenology, and, after having explained that man's radical finitude alone allows us to understand history, he does not hesitate to see in Hegel someone who consciously "identified himself with Christ," but in order to reveal to humanity, along with the inanity of Christianity, the inexorable nothingness to which it is condemned.
In that perspective, where Hegel becomes not only a Feurbachian and Marxist, but also a Heidegerrian before the fact, it is undeniable that a large part of the Phenomenology and above all the influence of Hegelianism are explained and clarified far better than they ever have been before. Moreover, M. Kojeve raises the most passionate problems concerning the relations between history
and truth. Yet, all these merits are reversed when they are contrasted with the value of the impartial reserve to which M. Hyppolite confines himself. Let's say nothing about the fundamental absurdities M. Kojeve is led to by his intrepid logic, bringing Hegel and Marxism along with him. The Communist "intellectuals," who could benefit so much from this book, will have to take a stand vis-a-vis
the truths it establishes, and it will be very interesting to see their reaction in this regard. But will he be forgiven the notes on pages 388 and 435, where the inhumanity of the "end of history" they wish for is revealed?
Let's leave Marxism aside and stay at the level of Hegel interpretation. At what cost can M. Kojeve sustain his thesis of a consciously atheist Hegel convinced of man's radical finitude? At the price of qualifying Hegel's monism as a prejudice (p. 38)! On the condition of completely opposing natural and historical time in Hegel! On condition of discounting his vitalism, of completely ignoring the
Philosophy of Nature and even ignoring the same elements which are found in the Phenomenology. The "embarrassing part" of Hegelianism, it is said. I wish it were so; but things are not so simple. After the treatment he received from M. Kojeve, Hegel would have doubtless felt he was being mutilated. Let's not talk about atheism: we are content to refer to the Proofs of God's Existence,
translated by Father Niel and to the reaction of the Marxists! As for the dialectic, which, according to M. Kojeve is only possible on the hypothesis of the finitude of man, since Hegel says: "The essence of every finite being is to abolish itself . . . is it necessary to recall that abolish (aufheben) also means in Hegel's language to conserve and transcend? So that that citation says rather the complete opposite of M. Kojeve's interpretation, Hegel moreover adding in twenty different places: "It is the very nature of the finite to go beyond itself, to deny its negation and become infinite .

Gaston Fessard

[Erik Graff · Rating 4 out of 5]

We read this book along with the complete text of Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit in a course on the book taught by Henri Mottu, a visiting professor from French Switzerland teaching at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. The class was excellent, the reading of the Phenomenology an excitingly intriguing introduction to years of further study, but Kojeve's interpretation was too tendentiously Marxist (particularly the part on the Master-Slave dialectic) to be taken very seriously. Still, our arguments about it were fun.

[Alex Obrigewitsch · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kojéve's importance in bringing Hegel, and a particular reading of Hegel, to France cannot be overlooked. It is noticeable in the weighty influence he had on thinkers such as Lacan, Sartre, and Blanchot, to only name a few examples.

Kojéve's work is excellent in interpreting and expressing Hegel's often maddening thought. He had a great grasp of Hegel's thought, mixing in a sprinkling of Marx and viewed through a heavily Heideggerian lens (albeit anthropologically rendered).

His major stumbling block is his overly anthropological reading of Hegel. While he may elucidate the dialectic of Hegel wonderfully, his Marxian tendencies influence his understanding. He equates Geist many times with Man. While Man is a manifestation of Geist, Geist does not equal Man.
Man is a working-out of Geist, in and through History, as History. But Man is certainly not equal to Geist. Man is but a moment, a constituent-element, in the dialectical motion of Geist, for through Man Geist attains self-consciousness.

Kojéve interprets Heidegger athropologically as well (as many thinkers of that time were wont to do). But Kojéve had a very important part to play in the tradition of philosophy and thought, and this book is well worth the read for those struggling through the apparently labrinthian thought (or at least writing) of Hegel.

[Thomas · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you need a rigorous guide to the PoS that doesn't stray far from the text, look elsewhere. But if you are more interested in the history of philosophy, this book is enormously helpful for understanding how Hegel became a cornerstone for 20th century continental philosophy. Whether or not he is accurate or faithful, Kojeve distills provocative insights from Hegel's large and tedious body of work.

By the end of the book I found myself vehemently disagreeing with Kojeve-Hegel's anthropocentric ontology, but after beating my head against the first six chapters of the Phenomenology I just appreciate finding a reading of Hegel that is remotely fun and interesting to read.

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

Engage the PhG with your own mental armaments first, then consult this Introduction which is more of a commentary and elaboration. Kojeve is quite clear and takes time to emphasize his main points. The notorious End of History was much overstated and most premature but Kojeve makes a competant case for it. And whether the system of Absolute Knowldege must necessarily be airtight and infallible or else sink into worthless relativism is still debatable. Although not without its flaws both intrinsic and historical, no serious Hegelian (right or left) can excusably omit its study.

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

Review:

July 2006

A Brief Note on Tactics

This book, an 'Introduction to the Reading of Hegel', is a collection of transcripts and notes collected and edited by Raymond Queneau, that is the true beginning of the contemporary 'End of History' debate. But can there ever be a final reconciliation between the innumerable factions of human history? "...[H]e [i.e., Hegel] definitely reconciles himself with all that is and has been, by declaring that there will never more be anything new on earth. ('Introduction', p 168.)" Hegel, according to Kojeve, thought that History had come to an end; but the question of course is - exactly what does history 'think' - i.e., do? And that boils down to the question: what exactly is humanity doing? There is a not minor problem with making predictions in public that I would like to mention in this short note; these predictions become but another factor in human interactions. Kojeve, of course, is quite well aware of this; he regarded his 'philosophy' as little more than propaganda for the Hegelian position. This is no modesty, btw, in our posthistoire one can only make propaganda. (Briefly, according to Kojeve, 'History' properly understood ended with Hegel. We live today in a post-history that is nothing but the actualization of Hegelian philosophy throughout the World. When this actualization is complete the Universal Homogenous State then rises.) Thus Kojeve regards (correctly, given his premises) all 'philosophy' today as propaganda. But he has, in my humble opinion. spoken too soon.

Stanley Rosen, a student of Kojeve, alludes to this possibility in the title essay of 'Hermeneutics as Politics': "Had he remained silent, he could never have been refuted." How does one end History, possess the final knowledge - and then change ones mind? (On Kojeve's changing his mind see, for instance, the enigmatic 'Note to the Second Edition' in the 'Introduction to the Reading of Hegel'.) But there is more to the problem than that. By revealing the 'necessities' of History long before its final consummation (i.e., the rise of the UHS) he has allowed all enemies of the ongoing globalization to rally to any opposed cause, no matter how ephemeral. But it may turn out that these short-lived oppositional movements are well-nigh innumerable. ...So, exactly what should Kojeve, given his intentions, have done? He should have worked in the French Ministry (Kojeve is the true architect of the European Union, a building block of the World State), brought out the unjustly ignored, and posthumously published, 'Outline of a Phenomenology of Right', and told Queneau precisely where he could stick his class notes. By publishing the technical, legal and economic 'Outline' and keeping his philosophical speculations permanently to himself he could have (perhaps!) prevented his followers from squabbling over issues that cannot even be decided until the UHS rises...

For as Kojeve admitted in a letter to Leo Strauss, "Historical action necessarily leads to a specific result (hence: deduction), but the ways that lead to this result, are varied (all roads lead to Rome!). The choice between these ways is free, and this choice determines the content of the speeches about the action and the meaning of the result. In other words: materially history is unique, but the spoken story can be extremely varied, depending on the free choice of how to act." (On Tyranny, p 256). Thus the propaganda (i.e., 'the spoken story', theory) is not essential, and here Kojeve remains true to his (peculiar) Marxism, what is crucial is 'material' History. By this Kojeve means the technical, economic and legal forces that inexorably (or so it seems) drive us towards the World State (i.e., UHS). Thus Kojeve's propaganda and predictions, best embodied in the 'Introduction', were always secondary. ...Would we be closer to the UHS if the 'Introduction' never saw the light of day? Of course we will never know. But this possibility can never be discounted either.

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Review:

April 2005

Four and a half stars, Five reserved for Hegel

What has really been puzzling so many readers of the Introduction is the so-called `Japanization' note (p 159) added to the second edition of the Introduction. It is this perplexing note that I would like to address in this review. This note is where Kojeve first admits that posthistory, as he originally conceived it, was contradictory, that if "Man becomes an animal again, his arts, his loves, and his play must become purely natural again." Humans would "construct their edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their webs, would perform musical concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas, would play like young animals, and would indulge in love like adult beasts."

Truly frightening. -Men as beasts! It reminds one of the myth of Plato's (269bff) Reversed Cosmos in the Statesman; men living as contented animals, growing ever more ignorant under the care of the gods/who Kojeve would say equal nature. But it gets worse! ""The definitive annihilation of Man properly so-called" also means the definitive disappearance of human Discourse (Logos) in the strict sense." After comparing the ruins of language (in posthistory) to the language of bees Kojeve says "[W]hat would disappear, then, is not only Philosophy or the search for discursive Wisdom, but also that Wisdom itself. For in these post-historical animals, there would no longer be any "[discursive] understanding of the world and of self."" The Wisdom gained for humanity by the correct understanding of the ruses of History - Hegelianism/w Kojeve - would be lost forever. Thus there would be no Sages contemplating the History that could only (perhaps!) have led to them.

Then he goes on to say that this view was mistaken, he came to realize (1948-1958) that posthistory was already here and that Americans(!) most closely embodied it. By posthistory he means that all history, since the publication (1806) of the Phenomenology, has simply been the activity of `backward' nations becoming more like what Hegel envisioned for them (embodying the laws/institutions of the French Revolution) and various anachronisms (in all states) being gradually eliminated. Obviously, since 1806, Logos (discursive understanding) has not disappeared entirely from the face of the earth - even in America! (Kojeve appears long after 1806, and he has American readers, and Kojeve is indeed a Sage. ...Whew!) "I was led to conclude from this that "the American way of life" was the type of life specific to the post-historical period, the actual presence of the United States in the world prefiguring the "eternal present" future of all humanity. Thus Man's return to animality appeared no longer as a possibility that was yet to come, but as a certainty that was already present." The problem and contradictions of his first understanding seem to be solved with this second (Americanization) understanding. Discursive understanding endures, the Sages will come, the Circularity of the Whole will be comprehended (if only by the Sages) and Kojeve will be remembered. - Problem solved.

...But he doesn't end the note with that. He next speaks of Japanization - but why? His `contradictory' understanding has been corrected by the above. The possibility of discursive understanding remains; the Hegelian/Kojevean Sages can continue to discuss the History that leads to Them and Their Understanding. So why does Kojeve continue his note? He doesn't exactly tell us why. We need to ferret it out. "Now, the existence of the Japanese nobles, who ceased to risk their lives (even in duel) and yet did not for that begin to work, was anything but animal." But he had just shown, thanks to the `Americanization' thesis, that, strictly speaking, animality would not occur. Why is the `Japanization' Thesis necessary?

...Hmmm. The Japanese had experienced the End of History by isolating themselves for 300 years. But they kept a nobility! America hasn't done that. (Is this why Japanization is superior to Americanization? It keeps a nobility? Is this merely a sop to 'exceptions' + sophists that will not become Sages? But why even bother with a concession? Can History actually be restarted - remember, according to the `Americanization' Thesis History has already ended - again?) How did Japan keep a nobility? Through snobbery! Kojeve says there is no Religion, Morals, Politics in the European or historical (by this he means the dialectically expansive Hegelian) sense in Japan. Are we to understand by this that there is "Religion, Morals, Politics" in some non-European, non-historical sense?

The last sentence made us pause; the next sentence makes us stop. "Bur Snobbery in its pure form created disciplines negating the "natural" or "animal" given which in effectiveness far surpassed those that arose, in Japan or elsewhere, from historical Action - that is, from warlike and revolutionary Fights or from forced work." What exactly does Kojeve mean here by effectiveness? How could Snobbery surpass in effectiveness the "historical Action" so unforgettably understood in Hegel's Phenomenology? ...Examples of Snobbery (which are "peaks equaled nowhere else") listed by Kojeve, which one would hope answer our question about effectiveness, are Noh Theater, the tea ceremony and the art of flower display!

I do not mean to sound like a Snob :-) but all this (Noh Theater, etc) does seem to somewhat lack the drama and import (to say the least!) of Hegel's Phenomenology or even Kojeve's commentary. ...So, what is the effectiveness that Kojeve speaks of? He continues by saying that "all Japanese without exception are currently in a position to live according to totally formalized values-that is, values completely empty of all "human" content in the "historical" sense." What Kojeve is indicating is that some form of humanity (values) is still possible after history ends, after no one any longer Fights or risks their life. There still is perfectly gratuitous suicide - hari-kari - but as Kojeve points out, this suicide "has nothing to do with the risk of life in a Fight waged for the sake of "historical" values that have social or political content."

Again, we ask, why does Kojeve find all this so effective? Japanization seems, if anything, thanks to its ahistorical nature, to be the exact opposite of effectiveness from a Hegelo/Kojevian perspective. Kojeve continues, "This seems to allow one to believe that the recently begun interaction between Japan and the Western World will finally lead not to a rebarbarization[!] of the Japanese but to a "Japanization" of the Westerners (including the Russians)." We need to be more than surprised when Kojeve refers to the Westernization of Japan as a rebarbarization. The rebarbarization that Kojeve is speaking of is the bringing of Japan into line with the Hegelian/Kojevean History. ...One is left wondering if Kojeve believed his theory as little as Leo Strauss did.

...Or perhaps only the human consequences of his theory are what troubled Kojeve, not its correctness. "Now, since no animal can be a snob, every "Japanized" post-historical period would be specifically human." But how can the animal Man, as Snob, remain Human when he no longer Fights or Works? Kojeve, in the penultimate sentence of this note says, "To remain Human, Man must remain a "Subject opposed to the Object," even if "Action negating the given and Error" disappears." For the Sages there is no longer Error in posthistory because there is no more historical change. (Man does not live temporally any longer, now, at the End of History, he lives spatially, he is only another piece of nature.) But how can man live non-temporally?

Kojeve ends this note thusly; "This means that, while henceforth speaking in an adequate fashion of everything that is given to him, post-historical Man must continue to detach "form" from "content," doing so no longer in order actively to transform the latter, but so that he may oppose himself as a pure "form" to himself and to others taken as "content" of any sort." This then, of course, is what Kojeve means by the "effectiveness" of `Japanization.' The Sages keep their discursive understanding of the Circularity of the Concept while the `nobility' (exceptions, sophists) unfortunate enough to live at the End of History will continue to struggle, but fundamentally only with(in) themselves. There will be exactly zero Historical import to these struggles. History has ended but the struggle for recognition, in an entirely non-Historical sense, continues thru Snobbery. Thus we have Absolute Knowledge and (a rather peculiar) Humanity at the same time. Kojeve thus sets the table, in the `eternally present future' of the End of history, for us to always have our cake (our Humanity) while eating it (Knowing this Humanity in a complete, absolute, unchanging and adequate manner) too. ...This is what Kojeve is pleased to call `effectiveness'.

At this point some minor observations may be in order. This note we have been considering is an addendum to a note that began on page 157. The paragraph that the first (or original) note attempted to clarify had at least one remarkable statement (p 156) in it: "The Real resists Action not Thought." If this is true (and I believe it is) we see another example of the effectiveness of the `Japanization' thesis. While material/institutional History may End exactly as Hegel/Kojeve say it will end it would seem there is more than one way to `discursively understand' this End.

Kojeve had indicated something similar to this in an earlier letter to Strauss (Sep 19 1950) that says:

"Historical action necessarily leads to a specific result (hence: deduction), but the ways that lead to this result, are varied (all roads lead to Rome!). The choice between these roads is free, and this choice determines the content of the speeches about the action and the meaning of the result. In other words: materially history is unique, but the spoken story can be extremely varied, depending on the free choice of how to act."

The similarity between this note (in a letter) to Strauss and the remark quoted above is that material history is unique (because the Real resists Action, erroneous action is purged by the very Real process of History) but the difference is that in this letter Kojeve seems to be insisting that speech follows the (material) results of Action. This is in fact contradicted by the statement: The Real resists Action not Thought. This says, for those that have ears to hear, that even though (or if) History ends exactly as Hegel/Kojeve say it must end there is no guarantee that the discursive (ahem) `understanding' of this unique and necessary End will be `correct' - by `correct' I merely mean Hegelo-Kojevean.

This is perhaps where the `effectiveness' of the `Japanization' Thesis really lies. Whatever `chatter' arises - after the unavoidable Unique + Necessary End of History in the Hegel/Kojevean sense - among the non-Sages can be understood as a form of Snobbery! Even a non-historical Religion/Politics/Morals, as Kojeve indicates in the Note (P 161) to the Second Edition, would seem to be possible! Thus the Japanization Thesis is not merely a concession to the exceptions/sophists that cannot (or will not) become Sages; it is also (more profoundly) a concession necessitated by the fantasy-like nature of thought itself. The material (and institutional) End of History, as envisioned by Hegel/Kojeve, may well be unavoidable and unique but, given the fact that the Real doesn't resist Thought, exactly anything can be said (or thought, which inevitably becomes speech) of this unavoidable End. And the Sages, at the end of this Unique History, point to the chattering sophists/exceptions and they say - Snobbery! The only unanswered question these Sages now face is can these thoughtful fantasies, when spoken, restart History? Or to put this another way, is it thru these thoughtful snobbish dreams that Mastery, in the Historical sense, re-enters the world?

[Anmol · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a really interesting set of lectures on Hegel - but Hegel is really a starting point, a muse, for the philosophising of Kojève. You can really see the origin of a lot of post-WW2 continental philosophy here. Kojève takes a Marxian approach to the Phenomenology, locating the master-slave dialectic as the central impetus to the evolution of consciousness into spirit. The first 100 pages of this were absolutely fantastic in locating history as the struggle of conflict between the master and slave (which Marx would repeat in the famous first lines of the Communist Manifesto as the struggle between the bourgeois and the proletariat).

The second aspect for which Kojève's interpretation is (in)famous is the "end of history" thesis. The master-slave divide is over with the French Revolution, a homogenous Man in a permanent State has been achieved, and thus, history as understood by us is over. It may be wondered whether Kojève-Hegel-Marx's homogenous Man is actually the Nietzschean Last Man, and we still await the Superman. The end of history argument actually makes a lot of sense when you read Kojève, but I can't help but think that as limited beings, it is too pompous of us to say that there is no future.

[Alina · Rating 2 out of 5]

I went into this book without any background in Hegel or Marx. A professor recommended this text as a major work that inspired existentialist thinkers like Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, and that gives a Heideggarian interpretation to Hegel's primary ideas in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I have a background in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and an intense fascination with the idea of the master-slave dialectic, so I thought this book would be well worth a try.

The first chapter was intellectually and emotionally gripping. Unfortunately, after the first 30 pages, the next 60 pages or so were tediously repetitive. Then, later chapters dealt with claims that I couldn't take seriously enough, so I couldn't gain an interest in them, though I sincerely tried to. For example, some later claims include: true wisdom amounts to perfect self-awareness, self-satisfaction, and virtuosity, and the only person to have attained this is Hegel; or, religion and philosophy are identical on all respects, except that philosophy is more 'self-conscious,' while religion is merely 'conscious'. If the claims throughout this book weren't totally silly, they were presented in such an unclear manner that I couldn't tell whether they were silly or not.

Readers interested in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit should turn to other introductory texts than this one, given that its writing style isn't any more lucid than Hegel's, it seems. Readers interested in the historical influences on Merleau-Ponty shouldn't turn to this text either; I'm pretty familiar with Merleau-Ponty and couldn't trace any of this thoughts to the claims raised in Kojève's work. I would recommend this book, however, to readers interested in an existentialist take on the master-slave dialectic. This requires reading the first 30 pages of this book.

Because I found those pages quite interesting, I will summarize the main points here. Kojève explicates the existential roles of master and of slave, and the social relation between them, which amounts to a disequilibrium that drives human history. He starts with the claim that self-consciousness is the defining characteristic of human beings, and that the genetic origin of this type of consciousness is found in a simpler animalistic consciousness. Having a desire for objects found in the world is necessary for consciousness, and having a desire for other desires is necessary for self-consciousness.

Humans uniquely desire not concrete objects but the desires of other human beings (particularly, when we desire that other people share our desires -- it seems that Kojève uses 'desire' as synonymous with values). We desire, particularly, that others recognize and assent to our own values, which make up our sense of selfhood. This would allow us to be truly seen by others, and thereby to exist in the phenomenal realities beheld by others. In this way, our selfhood gains reality and objectivity, and we crave having this more substantial existence.

This means when a person encounters another, she tries to force the other to adopt her values. Both people in the encounter do this. There are three possible outcomes: both die (metaphorically or existentially); one dies; or, both live. Only the third outcome leads to the possibility of the development of self-consciousness. In this case, the person who succeeds in imposing her values on the other becomes the "master," and the person on which the values are imposed becomes the "slave". The master craves to have her values recognized by another human being; but the paradoxical aspect of this outcome is that the slave is sub-human in the master's perspective, so her aim remains unfulfilled. In contrast, the slave's values are recognized by the master, a full human being, and so her aim to be recognized is fulfilled. These values, however, are alien and imposed in the perspective of the slave.

This tense situation for the slave is the prerequisite for self-consciousness, and the progression of human history. The slave is consumed by terror at the master, and such fear drives her to work for the master. Over such work, the slave disciplines her original instincts and cultivates new dispositions. This amounts to self-transcendence; the slave becomes a new person, can look back at her former self, and can have true self-consciousness, or awareness and ownership of her values. The master, in contrast, remains idle and static, and never comes to such self-consciousness. Thus, the slave, not the master, is the one who is ultimately recognized by other humans, has her subjectivity gain a status of objectivity, achieves self-consciousness, and produces innovative work that lets humanity advance.

I am not sure how faithful Kojève's explication of the master-slave dialectic is to Hegel's original idea, but I found it formulated powerfully and clearly, and see it as a sort of conceptual scheme that can be applied to various phenomena. We have imperialism and colonization. We have enemies and abusers in our lives. We have our own self-critical voices, which abuse us (Nietzsche articulates this). The dimension of Kojève's analysis that I find most radical is that the origins of such conflicts is the desire to be recognized by others and to feel more 'real'; and that the suffering and toil of the slave is necessary for the precise type of transformation that is necessary to truly be recognized and to establish the objectivity of one's values.

[blank · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book and Kojève's keen insights on Hegelian philosophy, idealism generally, and even the various allusions to certain Marxist insights along the way. An excellent 'contemporary' account of philosophy after the period of German Idealism, Kojève remains able to focus on the spirit of Hegel in such a fashion that approaching the Phenomenology feels safer.

[Gerald Sigmund · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was enjoyable and readable. I'm 100% sure that the book being introduced is torture and I'll hate myself for starting it. 🙃

[TL]

How excellent and irrefutable (in some decisive sense) is Hegel and Kojève's demanding question, usually unstated: “Who cares?” They ask this of thinkers of those thoughts or “accomplishments” that have no correlate, no confirmation (which in fact can take multiple forms) in concrete reality. They're against thoughts that are pure air, that are empty: the mere shuffling of signs. This question demands an answer, or else you are merely playing around, you are not serious (though one can be perfectly serious without in the least sacrificing the richest sense of humor: see Nietzsche — doesn't he ask this question too?).

This who cares demand is what secretly guided me to pragmatism in the first place, two years or so ago, to Nietzsche earlier than that (who's a pragmatist too, a mad pragmatist, not in the sense of anger in its unenlightened meaning but of madness, though this madness is crazy wisdom), to Buddhism later, to the rejection of most analytic philosophy (seriously: who cares about Russell and Quine? Next to the great continental spirits these are really just games (and not even fun ones, having become game-like thanks to their total implicit ignorance of history with a capital H, of the total historical process, merely knowing instead that tiny little fenced-in island of the history of analytic philosophy, the history of itself, apparently, which is the only history it typically has and really studies and builds upon. I hyperbolize, but I don't care.)).

Hegel’s question annihilates “head-in-the-clouds” undialectical thinking, shames that subjectivity which plays with itself alone, allergic to what has actually happened and is happening now. Subjectivity playing with itself alone is allowed in absolute knowing alone, and it is only allowed there because the subject is not in fact 'alone' after all, because the object is in fact not excluded from subjectivity but utterly reconciled with it. Complete commensurability, a much superior sort of play, serious play. And we are fully free to reject this final identity of concept and object, as Adorno does (probably rightly), while maintaining the sharpness, precision, and ‘checkmate’ quality of Hegel’s question: “who cares?”

Nietzsche goes down an entirely different road than him — it seems to us now like one of the few major roads after Hegel, besides Heidegger, otherwise one runs the probable risk of running into Hegel over and over again, unwittingly. If you're serious choose one of these roads then, get on these avenues that actually take you somewhere. Start walking and maybe take off running. If you want lots of laughter you have good taste: take Nietzsche's. His way is so brilliant and malicious and joyful and silly that with his philosophy concrete historical reality may actually justify 'thinking in the clouds' after all at some point, maybe now in this dreadful and bizarre epoch, maybe justify insane play and theatrics and the forgetting, somehow, of this very historical reality that made it possible to start lying in the first place. You lie out of the splendor of your secret spices, those thoughts that “make you sneeze and laugh.” Nonetheless your 'schizophrenia' emerges out of genuine engagement and therefore has a quality of genuine wisdom. Deleuze and Guattari took the Nietzschean road. This mode of thought is impossible for Hegel, yet it answers the question of who cares? just as decisively as his. Intellectuals and scholars should ask this question of themselves, because it wakes them up to themselves and to exigency. It puts them back on the Path.

[Jesse · Rating 5 out of 5]

EDIT: After grappling with this text a bit more, I've realized that, while still an extremely manipulative text, with a heavy anti-conceptual bias following Heidegger, and a wacky version of the Marxist class struggle/End of History thesis, that I actually understand Hegel much better now. There is a strong dualistic note within Hegel that I hadn't appreciated before, trying to build a form of dualism within his monist framework.



The most blatantly manipulative book of philosophy I've ever read. Kojève's project is to reinterpret Hegel as a Heideggerian, using biased translations, selective quotations, and an explicit rejection of Hegel's metaphysical theories as developed in the Science of Logic.


This is best conveyed by Kojève's correspondence with Tran Duc Thao:
"[M]y work does not constitute a historical study—it mattered relatively little to me to know what Hegel himself meant in his book. I gave a course on phenomenological anthropology in which I made use of Hegelian texts, but said only what I considered to be the truth, leaving aside whatever seemed to me to be, in Hegel, an error. Thus in renouncing Hegelian monism, I consciously parted ways with that great philosopher. On the other hand, my course was primarily a work of propaganda, intended to make an impression. That is why I consciously reinforced the role of the master/slave dialectic and, in a general way, schematized the content of the Phenomenology."


This book is also responsible for endless nonsense about Hegel's supposed "End of History". Yes, Hegel may have thought that the highest form of political and scientific principles had been discovered, but he didn't think that this state is "homogeneous", with humans reverting to animals and all desire and risk extinguished from life. This seems like a projection 20th century anxiety about the growing technocracy in the US and the USSR.

[Joe G]

Incredibly readable - despite being a collection of lectures on the infamously tough work by Hegel. Kojeve clearly has his views on what in the original book is worth spending time on, and being a self-proclaimed Marxist, this means a lot on the Master/Slave chapter. His stuff on Hegel's notion of time and concept was beautiful, in contrast to the thinkers prior to him.

The final, and most lengthy, chapter on dialectics had really useful moments, despite the sad reduction of the idea to 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis', which many thinkers that I like go red in the face trying to disprove. But his stuff on negation = history and the 'Wise Man' at the end of history still puzzles me >.<

[Kang · Rating 5 out of 5]

hands-down the most profound reflections on hegel in the 20th C i have yet read--and from a russian frenchman, no less! which is not to say that kojeve gives us hegel's philosophy. kojeve shows us what can be done with hegel rather than what hegel wished to do/teach. if i were to rate this "book" on the basis of the promise contained in its title, i would have to give kojeve an "F"; this is a *horrible* introduction to the reading of hegel. but i imagine the title was chosen with no small irony. that kojeve, always a jokester!

[Zoonanism · Rating 4 out of 5]

To lecture on Hegel and to make wit. Kojeve manages to make some absurdities in the Phenomenology near sensible. I was surprised by the Heideggerian undertone. The value of this witty treatment is in part to warn the reader of the charms of dialectical consistency.

[s · Rating 3 out of 5]

tf’nin bölümlerini genel olarak ele alıp açıklamalarla desteklemesi ve terimleri parantez içinde almancasıyla vermesi güzel olan ancak belli fikir ve alıntıların tekrar tekrar anlatılarak anlam veremediğim şekilde boğucu ve uzun soluklu kısımlarıyla sanırım iyi bir giriş kitabı olmuş.

çoğu insan bu tarz kitapları okurken ne düşünüyor merak ediyorum, daha önce hegel’i anlatan bir şeyleri açıp uzun soluklu okumamış olsam dahi gördüğüm tezlerde, makalelerde, alıntı ve yorumlarda hegel’e dair bir fikrim oluşmuş ve onu desteklemiş olduğumu bilerek açtığım bu kitapta hem hali hazırda bildiklerimi tekrarlanarak görmek beni yordu hem de tf’de anlam veremediğim terimlerin açıklanmasını görmekle yeni şeyler öğrendim, o yüzden bilmiyorum ne hissettiğimi.

[Ari · Rating 3 out of 5]

مدخل لقراءة هيغل ما يحاول يبسط أو يقدّم مدخل مباشر، بقدر ما يختار زاوية معيّنة ويمشي فيها بعيد. كوجيف يركّز على مفاهيم مثل الرغبة والاعتراف والعمل، ويعتمد عليها كمفاتيح لفهم تطور الوعي والتاريخ من منظور هيغلي خاص فيه.

الأسلوب كثيف، فيه تكرار وثقة عالية، لكنه يملك طاقة فكرية واضحة. مو من النوع اللي يعطي إجابات، بالعكس يتركك في حالة تفكير وتوتر ذهني، وكأن القارئ مطلوب منه يكمل الطريق بنفسه. الكتاب ما يعطي صورة شاملة عن هيغل، لكنه يخلّي الرجوع له تجربة مختلفة، مليانة أسئلة ومحاولات فهم. ورغم إنه ما يناسب اللي يدور على مدخل بسيط، إلا إنه يترك أثر واضح، وهذا كافي يخليه يستحق القراءة

[Ethan Rogers · Rating 4 out of 5]

Especially the English version edited by Allan Bloom is not a good introductory text. Not only is it quite a difficult text to read, the fact that it is abridged means that it jumps from point to point in a way that would too difficult to follow without prior familiarity with Hegel.

That said, if you are someone who enjoys playing with ideas, these lectures make for stimulating reading. Kojeve has a way of teasing the reader with what seem like fundamental insights, though without fully elaborating them or persuading us of their correctness. This makes for an engaging stimulus to thought. Bloom makes the point in the introduction that, whether his position is persuasive or not, Kojeve does point out many basic options in the history of thought that are worth reflecting on. The elaboration of basic options for understanding intelligibility and constancy in the world is what I found most engaging in this book.

[Blaze-Pascal · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book a lot. It pushed me to finish the Phenomenology earlier as I would refer to it after reading significant parts of the book. I learned about Kojeve via my Lacan readings. I really enjoyed this book a lot, and it is very helpful for my path as a philosopher becoming a counsellor. Teach psychoanalysts how to be. Hegelian psychoanalysts. This is amazing work.

[Randal Samstag · Rating 4 out of 5]

The most straightforward summary of the Phenomenology giving the materialist interpretation of Hegel. The book is edited by Allan Bloom, the intellectual father of Fukuyama and The End of History.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

read this not the Hegel original. if you like it, try hegel

[Dmitry · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Introduction to the Reading of Hegel" is the most famous text of Alexandre Kojève, which is, from a purely compositional point of view, transcripts and summaries of lectures given during 1933-1939 in Paris: these lectures, by the way, at various times visited people like Raymond Aron and Maurice Merleau-Ponty - not the last persons in the European philosophy. In his lectures, Kojève explains the first and one of the most famous works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel - the book "Phenomenology of Spirit", published in 1807. His meticulousness is impressive: he is often able to explain the meaning of one or two sentences for half the lecture (he does so, for example, with one Hegelian observation of the Time and Being which consists of one and a half lines: Kojève parses it for three lectures).
Throughout the whole course Kojève focused on the issues arising from Hegel's text - the interpretation of history as the development of man and antropogenic meaning of struggle for recognition, which appears as the prime engine of human history itself. For many modern readers perhaps the most important are the places where Kojève develops (often quite freely interpreting) Hegelian words about History as a process of Geist's self-development - here one can easily find the origins of an idea that thundered throughout the world in the 1990's, the idea of ​​the "End of History." Developing Hegelian thought, Kojeve says (I'd like to remind: there's 1930's on calendar, the Second World War, the Holocaust and Hiroshima are right at the doors) that history actually nearing to its completion. The victory of basic liberal ideals of the French Revolution (embodied in the battle of Jena in 1806) along with the spread of the democratic form of government (and, more broadly, the idea of ​​freedom as a value in itself) means that a Man has reached (not yet finally, but only in principle, in project, which is continue to realize) the form of social organization, which is able to give him a complete and universal recognition.
Another important detail: Kojève believes that the Last Man, which arises (and creating) a Homogeneous and Universal state, necessarily atheistic, since he finally (after thousands of years of Struggle and Work) understands that history is a process exclusively materialistc, devoid of external Other (anthropomorphic God or Nature) - Hegelian "Weltgeist" is the "Geist" of a human, not divine, being. It's a very radical, I must say, interpretation of Hegelianism, which is usually interpreted as the apotheosis of idealism ("absolute idealism"; the term which Kojève also concerns, saying that its misunderstood, and the system of Hegel actually has little to do with idealism).
I could tell much more about this book. But instead I'll just focus on fact that it's is a key text for understanding not only the philosophy of the twentieth century, but also (and especially) a modern political philosophy. Kojève is amazing. He looks like titan, standing over the great mass of interesting, boring, pretentious authors - titan, who shaped the most important vector of social and political thought in the twentieth century, and still and he helped to implement it.

[Czarny Pies · Rating 2 out of 5]

Dans son "Introduction à la lecture de Hegel" Kojève essaie d'unir (zusammenkleben) l'hégélianisme et le marxisme. Le résultat déplaira forcément aux deux camps. Heureusement Kojève offre le lecteur aussi une réflexion sur les cultures populaires postmodernes des É.-U. et du Japon qui vont apparaitre après la fin de l'histoire.
D'abord, Kojève est de l'avis que Hegel est athée. Selon Hegel, le but de l'histoire de l'humanité est d'atteindre le Savoir Absolu (das absolute wissen). Pour y arriver l'homme avait besoin de la révélation chrétienne (dans sa forme luthérienne) qui contribue la conscience (das Bewußtsein) et la philosophie (tel qu'élucidée par Hegel) contribue la conscience de soi (das Selbstbewußtsein). Le Savor absolu (Das Absolute Wissen) marque la fin de l'histoire. À ce stage, on laisse tomber le christianisme pour rester avec la philosophie ce qui froissera les croyants. Les Marxistes qui croient que la religion n'est que l'opium du peuple ou une idéologie vide n'en seront plus contents.
À la fin de l'histoire selon Hegel, l'homme qui possède le savoir absolue on fondera un État égalitaire de citoyens libres ce qui est selon Kojève la même chose que la dictature du prolétariat. Encore c'est difficile de prévoir si cette idée offensera plus les hégéliens ou les Marxistes.
Les plus grandes surprises se trouvent dans les dernières pages du livre. Dans une note ajoutée pendant les années 1950, Kojève constate que "la fin hégélo-marxiste de l'Histoire" (p. 436) s'installe partout sur la planète. La Russie est soviétique et la Chine est communiste. Aussi, Kojève fait l'annonce fracassante: "les États-Unis ont déjà atteint le stade finale du communisme marxiste." (p. 436) Pour justifier cette position, Kojève dit qu'il n'a jamais eu de système de classe aux É.-U. ce qui est vrai à la limite mais de là c'est tout un saut de dire que la société américaine est communiste.
"Introduction à la lecture de Hegel" a aussi la réputation d'être une œuvre de base du mouvement artistique et littéraire le postmodernisme. Ici je peux citer "Génération Otaku: Les enfants de la postmodernité" d'Hiroki Azuma. Le postmodernisme est donc un phénomène de la période qui suit la fin de l'histoire. Selon Kojève seulement deux modes de vie sont possible au temps postmoderne: l'américaine et la japonaise. Il explique:
"J'ai été porté à en conclure que l'American Way of Life était le genre de vie à la période post-historique. C'est à la suite d'un récent voyage au Japon (1959) que j'ai radicalement changé d'avis. ... Le snobisme à l'état pur (qui existe au Japon) y créa des disciplines négatrices qui dépassent de loin celles qui existent aux É.-U. et ailleurs."
Par snobisme, Kojève veut dire que la vie Japonaise post-historique est dominé par rituels et formalismes nés pendant l'époque historique. La force de l'attachement des Japonais à ces formalismes et rituels permettraient aux Japonais de maintenir un style culturel unique (ou différent du style américain) à l'époque postmoderne. Cette idée semble être farfelue mais Azuma est loin d'être le seul à l'appuyer.

[Andrew Fairweather]

An… “inspiring” collection, but at a certain point we must admit that we’re no longer reading about Hegel’s philosophy—rather, we are reading one man’s wild speculative liberatory fantasy after having read Hegel. There’s nothing wrong with that, but this book is not an “introduction to reading Hegel” by any means…

[homoness · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a revelation. Thanks to ooiaur for the rec. When I first read Hegel's Phänomenologie, I got nothing. Now, I do get everything. Thanks Mr. Kojève.