I read "Hot Time in the Old Town" in four days, and for most of that time it was hard to put down (the ending dragged a bit). The book purports to be about the critical period of Theodore Roosevelt's life when he was a NYC police commissioner (during which time the heat wave of August 1896 killed thousands), but it ended up being less about Roosevelt than about the horrors of tenement life, the William Jennings Bryan / William McKinley race for president--and of course, the events leading up to and including the heat wave that helped turn Bryan's Madison Square Garden speech into a political disaster, effectively ending his run for president.
The book reminded me somewhat of "The Devil in the White City," which was also a great mix of history and biography (with a healthy dose of murder mystery tossed in for good measure). Although "Hot Time" doesn't track a Chicago serial killer, it proceeds at the same breathtaking pace, recounting biographical facts and historical events so effortlessly and compellingly that it reads like a novel.
One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the picture it paints of the Republican and Democratic parties, which by the end of the nineteenth century had apparently already evolved from their Civil War era predecessors into the respective forms they have today: the Democratic Party, even then concerned primarily with lost causes, union interests, moral issues, and the social problems plaguing poor and middle-class Americans, but too disorganized, poorly funded and ideologically fractured to solve many of those problems or to unify a winning percentage of voters; the Republican Party, already driven by huge amounts of corporate money, focused primarily on protecting the interests of the wealthy, and even a century ago, devilishly efficient at 'staying on message' (Sound familiar? This tactic was already being advised in the Republicans' 400 page 1896 campaign handbook) and insulating their candidate behind layers of protective propaganda and well-trained handlers.
Also interesting in “Hot Time” were its sporadic references to “bi-metallism,” an important plank in Bryan's political platform, the primary concern of the “Silver Republicans” who jumped party lines to support Bryan, and a hotly debated topic in 1896. Unfortunately, aside from a bit in the preface, the author doesn’t explain nearly enough about the bimetallist debate and says virtually nothing concerning its history, about which I knew nothing. This--and the annoying lack of footnotes--would be my only major criticisms of the book (a minor criticism is that it is repetitive in parts). These are puzzling defects, since so much of the book absolutely requires at least a cursory understanding of bimetallism, and since so many of the author's claims invite further research or spark a desire to hunt down sources. So, if you’re only interested in the review, you can stop reading here; above-mentioned caveats aside, I thought “Hot Time in the Old Town” was a pretty good book. If you’re planning on reading it, however, you might want to read the next two paragraphs, which constitute my poor attempt to summarize the six hours or so of research I did to make sense of the book’s numerous “bimetallist” and “Silverite” references.
A bimetal monetary standard is one in which currency is backed by reserves of both gold and silver, instead of by gold alone, or by neither gold nor silver. During the “free banking” era prior to the Civil War, when chartered banks were allowed to print their own currency, the U.S. used both gold and silver coins (whose face value roughly equaled their precious-metal worth) and over 7,000 (!) different sizes and designs of currency notes (whose face value was supposed to be backed by precious-metal reserves or government securities) printed by over 1,600 different state and private banks. This wild proliferation of paper notes predictably led to considerable confusion and widespread counterfeiting. A U.S. Treasury Department webpage currently estimates that roughly a third of all paper money in circulation by the end of the Civil War was counterfeit—though the U.S. government itself apparently contributed to this problem by secretly counterfeiting Confederate currency in order to undermine Confederate war efforts (a fact mysteriously omitted from the Treasury Department webpage). In 1861, to supplement dwindling coin reserves, and further finance the Civil War, the U.S. Treasury began printing for the first time since the Revolutionary War its own non-interest bearing “Demand” Notes, which could be exchanged “on demand” for an equal value of precious-metal coin (though this practice was halted before the end of the war in order to preserve gold and silver). Over the next several years, paper Demand notes were successively replaced by U.S. Promissory Notes (commonly called Greenbacks due to their green color), by United States Notes (legal tender), and in 1866, by National Bank Notes—all of which were standardized and detailed in various ways to reduce counterfeiting.
It had been common practice during these years to exchange (for a negligible minting fee) mined or prospected gold bullion for an equal value of minted gold coinage. “Silverites,” or “Free Silver” advocates, favored a monetary policy that would allow a similar “free” coinage of silver. In 1863, the government began issuing gold certificates for gold in an effort to replenish precious metal supplies, and ten years later, in 1873, the Fourth Coinage Act placed the U.S. on a mono-metallic gold standard by demonetizing silver. While the government also began issuing silver certificates in 1878, the Coinage Act had significantly devalued the silver then being mined in great quantities throughout the West (which is why it was derisively called “The Crime of ‘73” by its opponents). The Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 required the government to buy silver, and this bolstered somewhat the demand for it, and thereby bolstered its value as well. But that legislation reduced the profits of North-eastern bankers and investors by increasing inflation and thus decreasing the high value of the interest that borrowers (including many farmers from the West and Midwest) were paying on bank loans. Bank and farm failures, railroad collapses, and a run on gold initiated the Panic of 1893. In response, Grover Cleveland repealed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, which again drove down the price of silver and decreased inflation (which pleased eastern capitalists, but hurt struggling Westerners and Midwesterners indebted to Eastern banks). This repeal, coupled with the long-standing feud between wealthy Eastern lenders and needy Western borrowers over the monetary role of silver, is what triggered W. J. Bryan’s famous “Cross of Gold” speech at the Chicago convention, engendered the “Silverite” Democratic platform of 1896, split the Republican Party into Eastern “McKinley men” and Western “Silver Republicans,” and primed the 1896 presidential election for a “bi-metal” showdown. So, there you have it—as well as I can tell it.