This year begins the centennial of the Philippine War, one of the most controversial and poorly understood events in American history. The war thrust the U.S. into the center of Pacific and Asian politics, with important and sometimes tragic consequences. It kept the Filipinos under colonial overlordship for another five decades and subjected them to American political, cultural, and economic domination.
In the first comprehensive study in over six decades, Linn provides a definitive treatment of military operations in the Philippines. From the pitched battles of the early war to the final campaigns against guerrillas, Linn traces the entire course of the conflict. More than an overview of Filipino resistance and American pacification, this is a detailed study of the fighting in the "boondocks."
In addition to presenting a detailed military history of the war, Linn challenges previous interpretations. Rather than being a clash of armies or societies, the war was a series of regional struggles that differed greatly from island to island. By shifting away from the narrow focus on one or two provinces to encompass the entire archipelago, Linn offers a more thorough understanding of the entire war.
Linn also dispels many of the misunderstandings and historical inaccuracies surrounding the Philippine War. He repudiates the commonly held view of American soldiers "civilizing with a Krag" and clarifies such controversial incidents as the Balangiga Massacre and the Waller Affair.
Exhaustively researched and engagingly written, The Philippine War will become the standard reference on America's forgotten conflict and a major contribution to the study of guerrilla warfare.
This was an outstanding book, and probably the most definitive military account of the war. Linn effectively explains the transition from conventional operations to counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Additionally, Linn clearly articulates how this struggle had regional distinctives from island to island. We used this work in one of the Army schools I recently completed. There are quite a number of lessons learned which could and should be applied to the current COIN battle in Afghanistan. However, we don’t seem to be paying attention. An effective COIN strategy takes years to implement and reflects sober political and military objectives. There is absolutely no evidence of long term planning and consideration with this current Administration. We are embedded in a culture whose men would rather shave the backs of their legs with a cheese grater than have us in their villages. Anyway. It was a good book.
We come with peace and good tidings but all we ask if for you to kneel to your new rulers...
I really wanted to give this book a 1 star review but it's too good of an account... from the American side.
Linn starts off stating this is just an unbiased review and just states the facts. He also states that he tried to get information for the Philippines itself but gave up. This is your first indication for what to expect. He then goes to describe that the journalist had to get their messages approved by the military but the military would allow all messages... then why get them approved unless they weren't all approved and McKinley wanted to paint a picture of good overseer just trying to improve their colony. Another contradictory statement is that he starts to list out who was court marshalled and uses this as evidence that the military did not get in trouble. Later in the book however he states the commanders looked the other way multiple times as long as their direct reports got the job done and didn't get wanted attention.
Linn continues these outrageous blindfolded claims exaggerating the fighting by stating that the miliary had to fight off the attackers... The military was armed with the best rifles, gatling guns, cannons and navy warships against the freedom fighters who were lucky to have funs and mostly fought with machetes. Yes knives vs guns and when they had guns they had 0 training in military affairs. Let's not forget that the Filipinos had just finished a war with Spain who they had pushed so far back that the archipelago was essentially Spainish free when the Americans rolled up.
He later condemns Aguinaldo as an ineffective leader who did not have the leadership or military fighting power as the American Revolutionaries. He condemns the tactics of trying to prolong the war so the Americans would get tired of fighting while forgetting that's exactly how the Americans beat the British and we had great great assistance from the French.
This is not to say that Filipinos did not cause other Filipinos harm. Some wanted to fight while others had essentially given up hope of independence. Linn plays a contrast in these saying that Filipinos were grateful for the Americans when in reality a lot of the Filipinos citizens were under the threat of being shot if they did not comply. He also plays upon the fact that schools, sanitation systems and cities were restored by the army but he fails to mention that these were built by Filipino slave labor.
Linn relies heavily on the senate committee that was sent to investigate but even this committee downplayed the atrocities that happened in the country. This is where Linn fails to apply the Filipinos take of these rapes, murders, burning houses and churches. The committee was trying to not stir up a growing base of anti imperialist under McKinley and TR.
Last but not least he finally touches on the reconcentration camps that the Americans imposed but he rarely mentions them by name until Samar. This is not to say they weren't used before Samar. He describes them in detail but never uses the word to wiggle around the fact that it was a common wide spread tactic. Does he mention the wide spread death that these concentration camps caused? Of course not... just the ones in Samar are reported to have caused up to 10k+ civilian deaths.
If we just look at the death toll perspective it's clear that Linn's story does not add up.
US Miliary Deaths - about 4,200 Filipino Combatants - 20,000 Filipino Civilians - I've seen this range from 100 - 200k but more than likely around 140k.
Let's break this down further: It's estimated that of this 140k civilian's the Filipino combatants were responsible for 13k while the Americans were responsible for 128k.
In the end Linn wanted to paint a picture of a wrong story told of the Philippine War however he cannot see beyond his tunnel vision.
One last note; by this point I have read multiple war books. This is the only ONLY book that I have read where there is nothing written at all that states what is going on in politics such as the precedential cabinet, the upper management thought process and the American public sentiment. There is probably a rationale for this as it doesn't fit into Linn's perspective he wants to paint.
Few Americans remember the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902, and even fewer have enough real knowledge about this conflict to comment on it intelligently. These gaps can be remedied by reading Professor Linn's fine account of this now forgotten war, in which the USA successfully combined tactically sophisticated combat, occasionally brutal anti-insurgency policies and the raising of the Filipinos' standard of living to defeat the rebellion against American rule of those islands. Linn is unswervingly objective in his take on how both sides fought this controversial war and on the performance of its various commanders, on both sides. This was how the USA "took up the white man's burden."
The operations in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War are often overshadowed by the action in Cuba. This work discusses military action and the politics of the war in the Philippines beyond Admiral Dewey and Manila Harbor. A good read for a more balanced view of that war.
This book seemed promising on one level, but came up short on another.
"The Philippine War" should be considered, in the good way, a major revisionist work that analyzes, critiques and corrects faulty history of the US's war against Philippine independence movement after the Spanish American War. As a military work, it is an excellent, detailed account of conventional military action. Battles, skirmishes, tables or organizations and tactics are well described, and add to our understanding of the state of US armed forces at the time.
Contemporary news reports and popular accounts are accounted for and corrected through detailed study and primary sources. Linn correctly describes the rather nebulous nature of "Philippine" national identity and the internal political divisions that preceded the US's arrival. He also discusses, too brief in my opinion, the US domestic scene and debate of the US's potential imperial role.
Nevertheless, Linn fails to consider the full context of the Philippine War. This is a highly detailed conventional military account, but much of the effects of the war are completely ignored. I didn't expect him to delve into the social effects of the war, but he is quick to dismiss the irregular warfare that went on, to consider it simply part of the culture of the time and then cast aside. Towards the end of the book he points to a big gaping hole by explaining, "The campaign in the Department of Southern Luzon, which began so promisingly with the invasion of January 1900, ended in appalling devastation and controversy seventeen months later." That elision negates this from getting 5 stars.
A solid military history work, but one that is not too technical or jargon-laden, so anyone could pick it up and read it through. It talks about one of our longer, but currently, less-discussed, counter-insurgency campaigns in the Philippines. After the US claimed the Philippines from Spain in the 1890s, the US looked to establish control over the islands. However, Philippine leadership did not share that vision, and from there, conflict emerged. Some of the problems in US equipment, leadership and personnel could easily apply to today's counterterrorism wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, even with these challenges, the US did manage to subdue the insurgency and turn the Philippines into a stable territory for US interests for the 1st half of the 20th century. It helped that even with the US failings, the insurgents and their leaders were also flawed, and ultimately, their errors proved more costly than the Americans. I would recommend this book for those in the military or into military history, especially for those studies dealing with counter-insurgencies and planning for those operations.
This book is exact opposite of a page turning. Linn falls into all of the bad cliches of historical writing. He devotes entire pages to the sequence of battles, repeats the same information over again, and is clearly biased in his description of events. This book made me completely lose interest the topic of the Philippine War.
Tough read on an unpopular topic. It was interesting reading about the internal Filipino political actors and movements, but much of this book is one-sided, repetitive, and a chore to read. It seemed like a lot of times Linn became focused on the minutiae and missed making more poignant assessments of the conflict.
In the Philippine War Brian McAllister Linn portrays a more complex history of America's anti-guerilla tactics in 1899-1902. The policy swung between "benevolent assimilation" and severe "chastisement". A brutal conflict that tarnished the US army but subjugated the islands
This is a great book for an overview of the Philippine War. Linn provides a narrative of events combined with keen analysis. In many areas he works to correct long standing myths about the conflict. The book lacks much in the way of participant perspectives.
This is an interesting book on a relatively little known part of American history. It's also a great secondary source for the subject of American imperialism in the early 20th century
Mostly an academic text with the overtly stated purpose to correct the myths (that we apparently all hold dear?) about America's initial invasion and colonization(?) of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. Linn does a great job about not choosing sides and giving credit where credit is due on both sides, but it's primarily told from the American perspective. Again, no fault of his, that has as much to do with availability of usable resources as anything.
I did like the detail and the insight into what worked in the war, what didn't, and why. A lot of the significance, however, has to be done by the reader. Linn doesn't want to tell you why the subject *matters*, at least not beyond its significance in the academic dialogue. In fact, it's not until the last sentence of the last paragraph that he makes an oblique reference to the lessons learned being applicable in the modern day. In addition, the book offers no reference to which accomplishments and missteps of the war had a lasting effect in Philippine society. I assume that he didn't want to give it short shrift and wanted to stay within the timeline set forth in the book's title, but the fact that he makes no reference to the country existing beyond 1902 comes across as strange. The book doesn't conclude so much as it Just Ends. A justifiable choice, to be sure, but one I found kind of frustrating.