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An Introduction to Evolutionary Ethics
Offering the first general introductory text to this subject, the timely "Introduction to Evolutionary Ethics" reflects the most up-to-date research and current issues being debated in both psychology and philosophy. The book presents students to the areas of cognitive psychology, normative ethics, and metaethics.
The first general introduction to evolutionary ethics
Provides a comprehensive survey of work in three distinct areas of research: cognitive psychology, normative ethics, and metaethics
Presents the most up-to-date research available in both psychology and philosophy
Written in an engaging and accessible style for undergraduates and the interested general reader
Discusses the evolution of morality, broadening its relevance to those studying psychology
The first general introduction to evolutionary ethics
Provides a comprehensive survey of work in three distinct areas of research: cognitive psychology, normative ethics, and metaethics
Presents the most up-to-date research available in both psychology and philosophy
Written in an engaging and accessible style for undergraduates and the interested general reader
Discusses the evolution of morality, broadening its relevance to those studying psychology
239 pages, Paperback
First published December 6, 2010
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111 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
July 4, 2013
AN INTRODUCTION TO EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS NOTES:
No exaggeration, this book has spellbindingly thought provoking high moments. Even if you have previously gone over all the material covered in the book i.e. even if you already "know" all this stuff, the author Scott M. James does an amazing job of curating the material and leading you through the historical arguments - step by step - and (at least in my case) eliciting juicy, fun, engaging new insights and questions. I know, I know, that's what good philosophers do, but this guy does it real good! And this subject is plump! So that's all I'm sayin. That being said.......
WARNING: the first (excruciatingly long) section deals with "prisoners dilemma" games in (excruciating) detail. Not that there's anything wrong with that. Its actually quite fascinating. Just be forewarned, all you perspective readers. This book starts out dry and academic. It's probably not going to be 100% interesting reading if you're not seriously interested in evolutionary psychology and philosophy and or behavioral economics. Just in case all of that that was not somehow evident based on the title and cover of the book. But if you are one of those evolutionary ethics nerds (you know who you are-R-U-1-im-1-2), or if you have a serious interest in evolutionary psychology and philosophy, and you're willing to do a bit of work, than get this book cuz this book can get it.
The book is a well crafted, carefully considered overview of the field of evolutionary ethics. I think parts of the book are in need of revision, because (frankly speaking) I think Jonathan Haidt's more recent 2012 work on moral intuition (The Righteous Mind) sorta changes the evo-ethics game. Not completely, just sorta. For instance, many (if not all) of the historical arguments covered throughout the book presume that "moral thinking" (moral reasoning), rather than moral feeling (moral intuition) is the driver of moral behavior. This is an understandable assumption based on a powerful intuition, but Haidt's work on moral dumbfounding drives a big ol' wedge into it. Lets hear it for experimental moral psychology, yeah! Joshua Green's work (his book hasn't come out yet, but his research is cited all over the field) resuscitates moral reasoning. But in reaction to Haidt's work. i.e. you can't ignore Haidt any more.
Sam Harris's The Moral Landscape is another recent, important little treatise that sent a shockwave through the evo-neuro-ethics scene. This book (introduction To Evolutionary Ethics) came out before The Moral Landscape. But I believe Harris is also a game changer. He asks some seriously provocative and frankly confusing questions regarding the role of science and morality. The dude has BIG BALLS if nothing else, oh yeah, he's a frickin incredible writer too. The point being, this book could benefit from a revision in light of all the important new work that has recently emerged.
The book (you know, the one I'm supposed to be reviewing) begins by examining the debate about weather or not evolution played a role in human moral behavior. I personally find it difficult to seriously entertain opinions that evolution didn't/doesn't play at least some kind of a role in the development of human moral behavior. Patricia Churchland's recent book Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality does a pretty swell job of connecting the dots between neurobiology, evolutionary theory and moral behavior. At least for the harm/care foundation. Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind also does a pretty great (less technical but broader in scope ) job of the same.
If nothing in biology makes sense outside of an evolutionary framework (and it doesn't) than nothing about the human mind does either, as the human mind is an emergent property of the (quite biological) brain-body. I think few would seriously argue that the human moral apparatus is somehow not related to the human mind-brain-body in some significant sense. Or that humans are born without cognitive/behavioral biases. At this stage of the game. I think the burden of proof clearly lies on the part of those who think we are born "blank slates", or that there is a "ghost in the machine".
One of the interesting concepts covered in detail in the middle part of the book is Marc Hauser's poverty of moral stimulus theory (POMS). This theory builds on Chomsk's poverty of stimulus (POS) theory. POS asserts that language should be unlearnable by children, given the relatively limited data available to them during first language acquisition. Therefore, language acquisition must be supplemented with an innate linguistic cognitive module, what Chomsky called the language acquisition device (LAD). Analogously, Hauser posits a similar cognitive module for learning moral behavior. NOTE: In 2011, Harvard university found Hauser guilty of scientific misconduct (i.e. he was bullshitting about his data, i.e. he was making shit up and calling it Harvard) and he resigned shortly there after. That kind of makes it hard to put too much stock in to his ideas right? That being said I still think POMS is an interesting little theory, and the book covers it in great detail, and I like that.
Critics of Hauser counter that moral behavior is a result of cultural evolution (memes) as opposed to biological evolution (genes), a claim that Jonathan Haidt's moral intuitionist theory pretty much vanquishes. Not by dismissing one or the other, but by incorporating both (nature and nurture). You can dismiss Hauser as a cheater, but you can't legitimately dismiss his work via the old postmodernist tactic of flippantly labeling everything a social construct. Nice try, but seriously, fuck off real quick! Besides, that is so 90's. Any way, where were we? Oh yeah, the book review.
The second half of the book begins with a wonderful overview of the common misinterpretations of evolution via natural selection, including: The Great Chain of Being: which posits that all evolutionary history has had a direction (towards perfection), ultimately building up to the pinnacle of creation (you guessed it) human beings. And, Social Darwinism; the theory that individuals or groups achieve advantage over others as the result of self evident genetic or biological superiority. Tautology anyone? I have to admit, I have never heard anyone destroy these straw men quite so effectively as Mr James. I can't do it justice here, so I'll just say that it is brilliant, and fun, and urge you to read it for your self.
From there, the author does an equally tremendous job of clarifying the perils of the is–ought problem as first articulated by David Hume. For those of you not familiar with this ol' chestnut. Hume found a significant difference between descriptive statements (statements about what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (statements about what ought to be). He proposed that one cannot get from making descriptive statements to prescriptive. They are mutually exclusive domains, one not reducible to the other. The is–ought problem is also known as Hume's law or Hume's Guillotine if you like to dress up your philosophical constructs with a little dramatic zing.
SIDE NOTE: Sam Harris is claiming that science (typically descriptive) "aught" to get into the business of determining how humans "aught" to live. I personally 1000% agree. But a lot of smart people disagree. And the thing they always bring up is Hume's Guillotine. I think the point is moot because (a) there are ass loads of values imbedded in the practice of science. It's not a value neutral endeavor (see every postmodern critique ever written), and (b) clinical science practices develop prescriptive interventions all the time. Think randomized controlled trials (RCT) of pretty much any clinical intervention. Anyway, technically Harris is not violating Hume's law at all, because his work is explicitly predicated on a big fat AUGHT. e.g. If morality can be said to be concerned with "human well being". And if science (including the social sciences and real philosophy) is a good source for determining what is good and bad for people. And if science is a good way to evaluate and create new "best" practices (again, think medical/clinical science). Than science sure as fuck AUGHT to be actively involved in helping people figure out what they AUGHT and AUGHT NOT do to one another. If not science than what? Religion? Talk about epic fail jobs. (see the historical record of humanity). Go for it (religion) if you want (it's your life) but I prefer my sources to be a little more up to date than 2000 + years old. But I digress...........
EVOLUTIONARY ANTI-REALISM:
New wave evolutionary ethicists assert that the story of evolution demonstrates that there are no objective moral facts. In the same way that life (including brains and minds) emerged from an absolutely mindless process. Life and human values emerged from an absolutely value free process. Perhaps what is meant by this is that values are an emergent property of bodies and brain-minds, and as such have no objective reality in any other lower level of analysis. In other words, as far as we know, human beings are the source of human morality, human morality does not somehow exist "out there". This seems like a long, slow way of stating the utterly obvious. Not that there's anything wrong with that. The only reason humans have ever believed otherwise has to do with complete ignorance regarding the way nature works, some crazy ghost story shit, and a profoundly compelling (but nonetheless profoundly wrong) intuition that comes from God knows where, no pun intended.
The notion is akin to the idea that "mathematics models nature so well, Not because, as Pythagoreans thought, that Number is the magical "fundamental" element of the universe, but rather, because millions of smart people over thousands of years designed mathematics to model nature well. Inferior forms of mathematics doubtlessly emerged at some point, but were rejected or modified modeled to represent reality more effectively. People to this day have mystical notions about mathematics, but doesn't the latter proposal seem so much less far-fetched? The point is that human morality, in all its varieties, is probably a human made system, founded upon moral intuitions, which emerged in response to survival and reproductive pressures, which are at base value free.
METAETHICS:
Metaethics is the field that attempts to find the bridge between is and aught. Metaethics tries to discover what right and wrong have to do with, if anything, neurons, atoms, etc. In other words metaethics seeks to uncover the ultimate properties, or reality, of rightness and wrongness, badness and goodness.
MORAL RELATIVISM:
Moral relativism may be any of several philosophical positions concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different people and cultures. Descriptive moral relativism holds only that some people do in fact disagree about what is moral; meta-ethical moral relativism holds that in such disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong; and normative moral relativism holds that because nobody is right or wrong, we aught to tolerate the behavior of others even when we disagree about the morality of it. This is essentially the position that there are no (objectively speaking) moral "facts".
JESSE PRINZ:
The philosopher Jesse Prinz views moral goodness or badness as analogous to phenomena like funniness or disgustingness. To Prinz, morals are fundamentally feelings. i.e. morality has an emotional foundation. "Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology all suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing our emotions". Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it.
MORAL REALISM:
Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
• Ethical sentences express propositions.
• Some such propositions are true.
• Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.
This is essentially the position that there are (objectively speaking) moral "facts". Real events or behaviors that are WRONG or RIGHT, GOOD or BAD.
SAM HARRIS:
The Journalist and Neuroscientist Sam Harris argues that "Human well-being is not a random phenomenon. It depends on many factors—ranging from genetics and neurobiology to sociology and economics." He contends that humanity has reached a point in time when, thanks to scientific flourishing and inquiry, many sciences can "have an impact on the well-being of others".
Harris argues that it is time to promote a scientific approach to normative morality, rejecting the idea that religion determines what is good. He believes that once scientists begin proposing moral norms in papers, supernatural moral systems will join "astrology, witchcraft and Greek mythology on the scrapheap".
JONATHAN HAIDT:
According to Haidt;
• Moral judgments are mostly the products of quick, intuitive evaluations of scenarios with certain content.
• Moral reasoning is usually a largely post hoc phenomenon.
• People are, as Haidt says, "intuitive lawyers" whose reasoning usually seeks to vindicate the person's own intuition rather than openly assess the case from an impartial point of view.
Although it he is not covered in this book, I have to urge readers to investigate Jonathan Haidt's Moral Intuition Theory. It's a lamp in the darkness. A hammer in a room full of funhouse mirrors.
No exaggeration, this book has spellbindingly thought provoking high moments. Even if you have previously gone over all the material covered in the book i.e. even if you already "know" all this stuff, the author Scott M. James does an amazing job of curating the material and leading you through the historical arguments - step by step - and (at least in my case) eliciting juicy, fun, engaging new insights and questions. I know, I know, that's what good philosophers do, but this guy does it real good! And this subject is plump! So that's all I'm sayin. That being said.......
WARNING: the first (excruciatingly long) section deals with "prisoners dilemma" games in (excruciating) detail. Not that there's anything wrong with that. Its actually quite fascinating. Just be forewarned, all you perspective readers. This book starts out dry and academic. It's probably not going to be 100% interesting reading if you're not seriously interested in evolutionary psychology and philosophy and or behavioral economics. Just in case all of that that was not somehow evident based on the title and cover of the book. But if you are one of those evolutionary ethics nerds (you know who you are-R-U-1-im-1-2), or if you have a serious interest in evolutionary psychology and philosophy, and you're willing to do a bit of work, than get this book cuz this book can get it.
The book is a well crafted, carefully considered overview of the field of evolutionary ethics. I think parts of the book are in need of revision, because (frankly speaking) I think Jonathan Haidt's more recent 2012 work on moral intuition (The Righteous Mind) sorta changes the evo-ethics game. Not completely, just sorta. For instance, many (if not all) of the historical arguments covered throughout the book presume that "moral thinking" (moral reasoning), rather than moral feeling (moral intuition) is the driver of moral behavior. This is an understandable assumption based on a powerful intuition, but Haidt's work on moral dumbfounding drives a big ol' wedge into it. Lets hear it for experimental moral psychology, yeah! Joshua Green's work (his book hasn't come out yet, but his research is cited all over the field) resuscitates moral reasoning. But in reaction to Haidt's work. i.e. you can't ignore Haidt any more.
Sam Harris's The Moral Landscape is another recent, important little treatise that sent a shockwave through the evo-neuro-ethics scene. This book (introduction To Evolutionary Ethics) came out before The Moral Landscape. But I believe Harris is also a game changer. He asks some seriously provocative and frankly confusing questions regarding the role of science and morality. The dude has BIG BALLS if nothing else, oh yeah, he's a frickin incredible writer too. The point being, this book could benefit from a revision in light of all the important new work that has recently emerged.
The book (you know, the one I'm supposed to be reviewing) begins by examining the debate about weather or not evolution played a role in human moral behavior. I personally find it difficult to seriously entertain opinions that evolution didn't/doesn't play at least some kind of a role in the development of human moral behavior. Patricia Churchland's recent book Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality does a pretty swell job of connecting the dots between neurobiology, evolutionary theory and moral behavior. At least for the harm/care foundation. Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind also does a pretty great (less technical but broader in scope ) job of the same.
If nothing in biology makes sense outside of an evolutionary framework (and it doesn't) than nothing about the human mind does either, as the human mind is an emergent property of the (quite biological) brain-body. I think few would seriously argue that the human moral apparatus is somehow not related to the human mind-brain-body in some significant sense. Or that humans are born without cognitive/behavioral biases. At this stage of the game. I think the burden of proof clearly lies on the part of those who think we are born "blank slates", or that there is a "ghost in the machine".
One of the interesting concepts covered in detail in the middle part of the book is Marc Hauser's poverty of moral stimulus theory (POMS). This theory builds on Chomsk's poverty of stimulus (POS) theory. POS asserts that language should be unlearnable by children, given the relatively limited data available to them during first language acquisition. Therefore, language acquisition must be supplemented with an innate linguistic cognitive module, what Chomsky called the language acquisition device (LAD). Analogously, Hauser posits a similar cognitive module for learning moral behavior. NOTE: In 2011, Harvard university found Hauser guilty of scientific misconduct (i.e. he was bullshitting about his data, i.e. he was making shit up and calling it Harvard) and he resigned shortly there after. That kind of makes it hard to put too much stock in to his ideas right? That being said I still think POMS is an interesting little theory, and the book covers it in great detail, and I like that.
Critics of Hauser counter that moral behavior is a result of cultural evolution (memes) as opposed to biological evolution (genes), a claim that Jonathan Haidt's moral intuitionist theory pretty much vanquishes. Not by dismissing one or the other, but by incorporating both (nature and nurture). You can dismiss Hauser as a cheater, but you can't legitimately dismiss his work via the old postmodernist tactic of flippantly labeling everything a social construct. Nice try, but seriously, fuck off real quick! Besides, that is so 90's. Any way, where were we? Oh yeah, the book review.
The second half of the book begins with a wonderful overview of the common misinterpretations of evolution via natural selection, including: The Great Chain of Being: which posits that all evolutionary history has had a direction (towards perfection), ultimately building up to the pinnacle of creation (you guessed it) human beings. And, Social Darwinism; the theory that individuals or groups achieve advantage over others as the result of self evident genetic or biological superiority. Tautology anyone? I have to admit, I have never heard anyone destroy these straw men quite so effectively as Mr James. I can't do it justice here, so I'll just say that it is brilliant, and fun, and urge you to read it for your self.
From there, the author does an equally tremendous job of clarifying the perils of the is–ought problem as first articulated by David Hume. For those of you not familiar with this ol' chestnut. Hume found a significant difference between descriptive statements (statements about what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (statements about what ought to be). He proposed that one cannot get from making descriptive statements to prescriptive. They are mutually exclusive domains, one not reducible to the other. The is–ought problem is also known as Hume's law or Hume's Guillotine if you like to dress up your philosophical constructs with a little dramatic zing.
SIDE NOTE: Sam Harris is claiming that science (typically descriptive) "aught" to get into the business of determining how humans "aught" to live. I personally 1000% agree. But a lot of smart people disagree. And the thing they always bring up is Hume's Guillotine. I think the point is moot because (a) there are ass loads of values imbedded in the practice of science. It's not a value neutral endeavor (see every postmodern critique ever written), and (b) clinical science practices develop prescriptive interventions all the time. Think randomized controlled trials (RCT) of pretty much any clinical intervention. Anyway, technically Harris is not violating Hume's law at all, because his work is explicitly predicated on a big fat AUGHT. e.g. If morality can be said to be concerned with "human well being". And if science (including the social sciences and real philosophy) is a good source for determining what is good and bad for people. And if science is a good way to evaluate and create new "best" practices (again, think medical/clinical science). Than science sure as fuck AUGHT to be actively involved in helping people figure out what they AUGHT and AUGHT NOT do to one another. If not science than what? Religion? Talk about epic fail jobs. (see the historical record of humanity). Go for it (religion) if you want (it's your life) but I prefer my sources to be a little more up to date than 2000 + years old. But I digress...........
EVOLUTIONARY ANTI-REALISM:
New wave evolutionary ethicists assert that the story of evolution demonstrates that there are no objective moral facts. In the same way that life (including brains and minds) emerged from an absolutely mindless process. Life and human values emerged from an absolutely value free process. Perhaps what is meant by this is that values are an emergent property of bodies and brain-minds, and as such have no objective reality in any other lower level of analysis. In other words, as far as we know, human beings are the source of human morality, human morality does not somehow exist "out there". This seems like a long, slow way of stating the utterly obvious. Not that there's anything wrong with that. The only reason humans have ever believed otherwise has to do with complete ignorance regarding the way nature works, some crazy ghost story shit, and a profoundly compelling (but nonetheless profoundly wrong) intuition that comes from God knows where, no pun intended.
The notion is akin to the idea that "mathematics models nature so well, Not because, as Pythagoreans thought, that Number is the magical "fundamental" element of the universe, but rather, because millions of smart people over thousands of years designed mathematics to model nature well. Inferior forms of mathematics doubtlessly emerged at some point, but were rejected or modified modeled to represent reality more effectively. People to this day have mystical notions about mathematics, but doesn't the latter proposal seem so much less far-fetched? The point is that human morality, in all its varieties, is probably a human made system, founded upon moral intuitions, which emerged in response to survival and reproductive pressures, which are at base value free.
METAETHICS:
Metaethics is the field that attempts to find the bridge between is and aught. Metaethics tries to discover what right and wrong have to do with, if anything, neurons, atoms, etc. In other words metaethics seeks to uncover the ultimate properties, or reality, of rightness and wrongness, badness and goodness.
MORAL RELATIVISM:
Moral relativism may be any of several philosophical positions concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different people and cultures. Descriptive moral relativism holds only that some people do in fact disagree about what is moral; meta-ethical moral relativism holds that in such disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong; and normative moral relativism holds that because nobody is right or wrong, we aught to tolerate the behavior of others even when we disagree about the morality of it. This is essentially the position that there are no (objectively speaking) moral "facts".
JESSE PRINZ:
The philosopher Jesse Prinz views moral goodness or badness as analogous to phenomena like funniness or disgustingness. To Prinz, morals are fundamentally feelings. i.e. morality has an emotional foundation. "Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology all suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing our emotions". Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it.
MORAL REALISM:
Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
• Ethical sentences express propositions.
• Some such propositions are true.
• Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.
This is essentially the position that there are (objectively speaking) moral "facts". Real events or behaviors that are WRONG or RIGHT, GOOD or BAD.
SAM HARRIS:
The Journalist and Neuroscientist Sam Harris argues that "Human well-being is not a random phenomenon. It depends on many factors—ranging from genetics and neurobiology to sociology and economics." He contends that humanity has reached a point in time when, thanks to scientific flourishing and inquiry, many sciences can "have an impact on the well-being of others".
Harris argues that it is time to promote a scientific approach to normative morality, rejecting the idea that religion determines what is good. He believes that once scientists begin proposing moral norms in papers, supernatural moral systems will join "astrology, witchcraft and Greek mythology on the scrapheap".
JONATHAN HAIDT:
According to Haidt;
• Moral judgments are mostly the products of quick, intuitive evaluations of scenarios with certain content.
• Moral reasoning is usually a largely post hoc phenomenon.
• People are, as Haidt says, "intuitive lawyers" whose reasoning usually seeks to vindicate the person's own intuition rather than openly assess the case from an impartial point of view.
Although it he is not covered in this book, I have to urge readers to investigate Jonathan Haidt's Moral Intuition Theory. It's a lamp in the darkness. A hammer in a room full of funhouse mirrors.
September 21, 2020
2020.09.10–2020.09.19
Contents
James SM (2010) (09:58) Introduction To Evolutionary Ethics, An
Dedication
Introduction: A Philosopher and a Biologist Walk into a Bar ...
Part I: From “Selfish Genes” to Moral Beings: Moral Psychology after Darwin
01. Natural Selection and Human Nature
• The Basic Story
• Some Common Misunderstandings
• Mother Nature as Tinkerer
• Evolutionary Psychology and Human Nature
• An Evolved Mental Tool-Box
• Some (More) Common Misunderstandings
• • Conflating adaptation and adaptiveness
• • Conflating explanation and justification
• • Misunderstanding the scope of evolutionary explanations
• • Succumbing to the temptation of genetic determinism
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
02. The (Earliest) Roots of Right
• Together We Stand?
• Inclusive Fitness and the “Gene's-Eye” Point of View
• Love Thy Neighbor – But Love Thy Family First
• False Positives and Core Systems
• A Quick Note on “Altruism”
• Reciprocal Altruism
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
03. The Caveman's Conscience: The Evolution of Human Morality
• What Makes Moral Creatures Moral
• The Evolution of Morality
• Explaining the Nature of Moral Judgments
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
04. Just Deserts
• The Ultimatum Game
• The Public Goods Game
• Winners Don't Punish
• The Benefits of Guilt
• A Lamb among Lions?
• An Explanation for All of Morality?
• Universal Morality or Universal Reason?
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
05. The Science of Virtue and Vice
• Distress Test
• Mind-Reading
• “Them's the Rules”
• Moral Innateness and the Linguistic Analogy
• Switchboards, Biases, and Affective Resonances
• Non-Nativist Doubts
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
Part II: From “What Is” to “What Ought To Be”: Moral Philosophy after Darwin
06. Social Harmony: The Good, the Bad, and the Biologically Ugly
• From the Great Chain of Being, to the Tree of Life, to Morality
• Uprooting the Tree of Life
• Further Reading
07. Hume's Law
• Deductively Valid Arguments
• You Can't Get Out What You Don't Put In
• “Of the Last Consequence”
• Blocking the Move from Might to Right
• Darwinism and Preserving the Human Species
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
08. Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy
• The Open Question Test
• Failing the Open Question Test: Desiring to Desire
• Failing the Open Question Test: Spencer
• Failing the Open Question Test: Wilson
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
09. Rethinking Moore and Hume
• Some Preliminary Doubts about the Open Question Test
• What Things Mean vs. What Things Are
• Implications for Social Darwinism
• Forays across the Is/Ought Gap: Searle
• Forays across the Is/Ought Gap: Rachels
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
10. Evolutionary Anti-Realism: Early Efforts
• This Is Your Brain on God
• Preliminaries
• Wilson
• The Argument from Idiosyncrasy
• The Argument from Redundancy
• Causation, Justification, and … a Rotting Corpse
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
11. Contemporary Evolutionary Anti-Realism
• Napoleon Pills
• A Darwinian Dilemma
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
12. Options for the Evolutionary Realist
• Option 1: Learning Right from Wrong
• Option 2: Response Dependency
• Option 3: Virtue Ethics Naturalized
• Option 4: Moral Constructivism
• Objections to the Realist Options
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
Notes
References
Index
Contents
James SM (2010) (09:58) Introduction To Evolutionary Ethics, An
Dedication
Introduction: A Philosopher and a Biologist Walk into a Bar ...
Part I: From “Selfish Genes” to Moral Beings: Moral Psychology after Darwin
01. Natural Selection and Human Nature
• The Basic Story
• Some Common Misunderstandings
• Mother Nature as Tinkerer
• Evolutionary Psychology and Human Nature
• An Evolved Mental Tool-Box
• Some (More) Common Misunderstandings
• • Conflating adaptation and adaptiveness
• • Conflating explanation and justification
• • Misunderstanding the scope of evolutionary explanations
• • Succumbing to the temptation of genetic determinism
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
02. The (Earliest) Roots of Right
• Together We Stand?
• Inclusive Fitness and the “Gene's-Eye” Point of View
• Love Thy Neighbor – But Love Thy Family First
• False Positives and Core Systems
• A Quick Note on “Altruism”
• Reciprocal Altruism
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
03. The Caveman's Conscience: The Evolution of Human Morality
• What Makes Moral Creatures Moral
• The Evolution of Morality
• Explaining the Nature of Moral Judgments
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
04. Just Deserts
• The Ultimatum Game
• The Public Goods Game
• Winners Don't Punish
• The Benefits of Guilt
• A Lamb among Lions?
• An Explanation for All of Morality?
• Universal Morality or Universal Reason?
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
05. The Science of Virtue and Vice
• Distress Test
• Mind-Reading
• “Them's the Rules”
• Moral Innateness and the Linguistic Analogy
• Switchboards, Biases, and Affective Resonances
• Non-Nativist Doubts
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
Part II: From “What Is” to “What Ought To Be”: Moral Philosophy after Darwin
06. Social Harmony: The Good, the Bad, and the Biologically Ugly
• From the Great Chain of Being, to the Tree of Life, to Morality
• Uprooting the Tree of Life
• Further Reading
07. Hume's Law
• Deductively Valid Arguments
• You Can't Get Out What You Don't Put In
• “Of the Last Consequence”
• Blocking the Move from Might to Right
• Darwinism and Preserving the Human Species
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
08. Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy
• The Open Question Test
• Failing the Open Question Test: Desiring to Desire
• Failing the Open Question Test: Spencer
• Failing the Open Question Test: Wilson
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
09. Rethinking Moore and Hume
• Some Preliminary Doubts about the Open Question Test
• What Things Mean vs. What Things Are
• Implications for Social Darwinism
• Forays across the Is/Ought Gap: Searle
• Forays across the Is/Ought Gap: Rachels
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
10. Evolutionary Anti-Realism: Early Efforts
• This Is Your Brain on God
• Preliminaries
• Wilson
• The Argument from Idiosyncrasy
• The Argument from Redundancy
• Causation, Justification, and … a Rotting Corpse
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
11. Contemporary Evolutionary Anti-Realism
• Napoleon Pills
• A Darwinian Dilemma
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
12. Options for the Evolutionary Realist
• Option 1: Learning Right from Wrong
• Option 2: Response Dependency
• Option 3: Virtue Ethics Naturalized
• Option 4: Moral Constructivism
• Objections to the Realist Options
• Conclusion
• Further Reading
Notes
References
Index
June 10, 2013
Very clear and well written introduction to the field of evolutionary ethics. This is not an easy read but it is also not overly technical. I appreciated James' inclusion of the major theories as well as objections, including objections to his own theory. He does not interact with any theories or criticisms by religious philosophers. One is struck by the difficulty of developing a moral realist position (that there are objective moral facts) based solely on naturalism.
May 15, 2017
It was all right, and I was into the concept of response dependence, but it outran its own ambition toward the end when it veered too hard out of evolutionary biology and into Platonian vaguery about what constitutes objective morality. I liked the earlier bits about right and wrong being adaptive responses that encouraged social harmony and those who would free-ride and withhold the tit after receiving the tat would be spurned right out of the gene pool. Now that's an ethical system I can get behind.
October 23, 2017
A well-written book, but for some reason I have lost interest in the topic midway. I may get back to it later in life. For now, I recommend it as a clear introduction to the subject. 4/5 stars.
August 18, 2019
interesting but it didn't really grab me
March 30, 2018
The first half of the book summarizes findings in evolutionary psychology related to human morality and moral feeling. This book is inadequate for this purpose, and I think readers would be better left to the original materials, most of which are better written and oddly engaging. However, the second half of the book only addresses questions of philosophical interpretation and the author handles these questions well. The author lays out the arguments for and against evolutionary realism, evolutionary anti-realism, naturalistic virtue ethics, and many of their variations and fallacies. Despite initially not liking this book or its direction, it lives up to its title. It is a book I will refer back to and may read again.
July 22, 2014
I didn't really like the first half of the book. It mostly covered evolutionary psychology topics from other books I already listened to such as Dawkins, Wilson, Pinker and de Waal. I didn't mind the authors take on the topic, but it was just mostly review for me.
The book came alive in the second half. The author jumped into some serious Philosophy discussion such as Hume's law coupled with the natural fallacy. They would say, the natural doesn't intersect with the moral (is doesn't give ought). But the author makes some good points about how evolution can bridge the two gap between the two. I didn't pretend to understand everything the author said, but it did open my eyes (ears, since I listened) to the possibility. The book talks a lot about something called the evolutionary anti-realist position. I didn't fully understand it while listening to it. I looked it up on google and now I know why I didn't understand it while listening. It's pretty complicated stuff for the non-philosopher student like me to fully understand.
A non-philosopher student like me can follow the narrative and get useful stuff from the book. I do recommend the book, but note it can be a tough read. It will probably whet your appetite for the next book that comes out on audbile on this same topic.
The book came alive in the second half. The author jumped into some serious Philosophy discussion such as Hume's law coupled with the natural fallacy. They would say, the natural doesn't intersect with the moral (is doesn't give ought). But the author makes some good points about how evolution can bridge the two gap between the two. I didn't pretend to understand everything the author said, but it did open my eyes (ears, since I listened) to the possibility. The book talks a lot about something called the evolutionary anti-realist position. I didn't fully understand it while listening to it. I looked it up on google and now I know why I didn't understand it while listening. It's pretty complicated stuff for the non-philosopher student like me to fully understand.
A non-philosopher student like me can follow the narrative and get useful stuff from the book. I do recommend the book, but note it can be a tough read. It will probably whet your appetite for the next book that comes out on audbile on this same topic.
November 5, 2016
Book discusses how/if evolution could explain our moral intuitions. Nothing particular new, but an overview of the various positions that philosophers hold, with the typical word games and polemics... though the basic questions are interesting and important, it did not seem that the current discussions add much to it.
I think that actual answers for will not come from philosophy, but from biology/psychology. Sadly, evolutionary psychology can be used to create plausible explanations for just about anything (and its opposite); it'll take some time to reign it in.
Anyway, book is about philosophy, not biology, and it does a decent job.
I think that actual answers for will not come from philosophy, but from biology/psychology. Sadly, evolutionary psychology can be used to create plausible explanations for just about anything (and its opposite); it'll take some time to reign it in.
Anyway, book is about philosophy, not biology, and it does a decent job.
October 13, 2016
Describes some interesting problems to think about but doesn't really explain anything, posit anything or make any predictions and I just can't stand the goofy writing style. It doesn't have to be as dry as an encyclopedic entry but please, you sound like a stoner. I guess it's OK for an introduction but it's not a glowing endorsement of the field as anything remotely useful or enlightening.
October 20, 2017
Somewhat can be derived from The Selfish Gene, but still very good. Explains the ethics and "goodness" in realistic evolutionary economic terms.
September 10, 2012
Brilliant book! Loved every chapter!
Want to read
May 25, 2015Tubel
July 22, 2022
A very readable introduction to a fascinating branch of philosophy. I've read it twice now, its breadth is admirable.
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