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Uses of Pessimism and the Danger of False Hope
Roger Scruton proposes that the greatest harm and havoc has been wrought on the world by those who have presented themselves as optimists and idealists, whether of the left or of the right.
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2010
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1449 people want to read
About the author
Roger Scruton
140 books1,352 followersSir Roger Scruton was a writer and philosopher who has published more than forty books in philosophy, aesthetics and politics. He was a fellow of the British Academy and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature. He taught in both England and America and was a Visiting Professor at Department of Philosophy and Fellow of Blackfriars Hall, Oxford, he was also a Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington D.C.
In 2015 he published two books, The Disappeared and later in the autumn, Fools Frauds and Firebrands. Fools Frauds and Firebrands is an update of Thinkers of the New Left published, to widespread outrage, in 1986. It includes new chapters covering Lacan, Deleuze and Badiou and some timely thoughts about the historians and social thinkers who led British intellectuals up the garden path during the last decades, including Eric Hobsbawm and Ralph Miliband.
In 2016 he again published two books, Confessions of A Heretic (a collection of essays) and The Ring of Truth, about Wagner’s Ring cycle, which was widely and favourably reviewed. In 2017 he published On Human Nature (Princeton University Press), which was again widely reviewed, and contains a distillation of his philosophy. He also published a response to Brexit, Where We Are (Bloomsbury).
In 2015 he published two books, The Disappeared and later in the autumn, Fools Frauds and Firebrands. Fools Frauds and Firebrands is an update of Thinkers of the New Left published, to widespread outrage, in 1986. It includes new chapters covering Lacan, Deleuze and Badiou and some timely thoughts about the historians and social thinkers who led British intellectuals up the garden path during the last decades, including Eric Hobsbawm and Ralph Miliband.
In 2016 he again published two books, Confessions of A Heretic (a collection of essays) and The Ring of Truth, about Wagner’s Ring cycle, which was widely and favourably reviewed. In 2017 he published On Human Nature (Princeton University Press), which was again widely reviewed, and contains a distillation of his philosophy. He also published a response to Brexit, Where We Are (Bloomsbury).
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January 14, 2020
”The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of passionate intensity.”
These lines from W.B. Yeats’s poem The Second Coming pretty well summarize the point Roger Scruton makes in his intriguing book The Uses of Pessimism and the Danger of False Hope, although in my reading Yeats’s lines are not as unambiguous as they seem to be in Scruton’s own – but then poetry is like Humpty Dumpty’s approach to etymology or the promises of politicians in that it means whatever you choose it to mean.
The title The Uses of Pessimism may certainly sound a little bit odd to us because wouldn’t we tend to regard optimism as a more humane and life-affirming attitude than its opposite? At first sight, we might all agree but then we should remember that Scruton does not propagate a misanthropic and grumpy pessimism negating life as such. Instead he touts what I would call a cheerful scepticism with regard to the pompous promises of our age that imply a complete malleability of humankind and society as such and inevitably end up in a destructively unrelenting and unfeeling feasibility mania. In that light, Scruton is on the same team with Hannah Arendt, who saw the road to totalitarianism in everything that negates the essence of humanity and that presumptuously wants to create a new kind of society in which conflict, imperfection and frustration would be unknown, forgetting that the constraints leading to these imperfections are often the very sources from which life derives its fullness and human beings their freedom and individuality.
Scruton relies on Kant’s dictum that freedom is not present where man is able to do whatever he wants but where he is aware of the responsibility his decisions impose on him. In Scruton’s view, however, enlightenment, for all its beneficial effects, has also unleashed a bunch of fallacies that make it possible for people to pursue an “I” ideology, which places themselves or a collective “I” at the centre of the world, holding the promise of re-creating the world in the image one would like it to appear, over the “we” attitude that regards compromise, the acceptance and careful reform of traditions and humility as the surest ways towards a better future. He deals with these fallacies in various chapters, which make the bulk of his book and which, once again, show Scruton as a keen observer and a keener analyst. Let me give you a quick overview on these fallacies, which, in Scruton’s eyes are dependent on each other:
The best case fallacy implies that any risk towards what is deemed a better future is worth taking, either because progress is bound to obtain victory, anyway, or because the brunt of responsibility and social costs incurred with these risks can be shifted towards other people, be they those labelled as opponents to change (and therefore reactionary) or be they members of future generations. The born free fallacy is based on Rousseau’s assumption of the individual’s absolute freedom and innocence in man’s natural state, an idea that, according to Scruton has already played irreparable havoc with the educational systems in western states. Scruton refutes this fallacy by confronting it with Kant’s idea of freedom that I summarized above. The utopian fallacy is more like a strategy employed by ruthless optimists: By leaving the ideal that society is going to achieve in a deliberately obscure fog – just consider Marx’s utterly naïve sketch of communist society –, those optimists can devote all their energy to denouncing what is in favour of what is to be, and they can justify any ugly measure and foray into democratic structures by pointing out how splendid the future will be – knowing, perhaps, that such a future will never exist. Paradoxically, utopian visions are seldom truly optimistic but rather cynical in that they negate the present without any compromise and even denounce those who try to make small improvements that will actually help real people, by saying that this will contribute to the continuation of a system that is utterly rotten. The zero-sum fallacy is particularly nasty: It is based on the short-sighted assumption that one individual’s gain is another individual’s loss, an assumption that runs counter to the wealth, security and quality of life which are offered by complex and civilized societies. The zero-sum fallacy allows the ruthless optimist to target his hatred and his envy on those who are actually successful and content in a world the utopian regards as an obstacle towards a better future. It is this kind of fallacy, by the way, that enables German FFF activists to deny old people their say in public affairs, on the grounds that they won’t be here for long, anyway, and that they are to be blamed for global warming. The planning fallacy depends on the misconception that complex things like societies or economic structures can actually be planned by those who are intelligent enough, whereas it is most certainly to be doubted that a system of countless interdependences can be successfully managed in a top-down manner. Scruton here advocates the wisdom of tradition and custom, provided it leaves enough space to genuine attempts at improving what goes wrong by means of compromise, modest risk-taking in a trial-and-error-way and careful reform. It is in this chapter that Scruton argues against the EU super-state which we have come to live under (I deliberately don’t say “in”), and whose ever-growing bureaucracy and tendency to curtail national legislation and sovereignty (which, at least, have the legitimation of elections and accountability) increasingly puts into question the European idea. I know that Scruton is a Brexiteer, and a very convincing and prolix one at that, but still, I must say that I found my own views largely mirrored in what he has to say. Let’s hurry on to the next fallacy, the moving spirit fallacy, in which Scruton criticizes the ruthless optimist’s tendency to claim knowledge of the so-called Zeitgeist and to insist that he is simply clinging to the hem of History’s cloak when heading towards Utopia. Scruton argues that the idea of Zeitgeist originally arose in the context of art and was an ex post way of looking at things, and that it is, indeed, a logical fallacy to transfer it into the realm of politics and morals and to use it a priori. One could, I think, simply quote Goethe and say, ”Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heißt, / Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist, / In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.“ Last, not least, there is the aggregation fallacy, which Scruton exemplifies with the help of the slogan of liberté, égalité, fraternité in that the French Revolution soon came to labour under the contradiction between creating equality and upholding liberty. The ruthless optimist is, like the perfect propagandist of Orwell’s 1984 state, able to promote two conflicting ideas at the same time but that is probably because he usually shies from defining his terms in understandable language.
Scruton also sketches the means with which ruthless optimists defend their fallacies as well as the power they have accumulated through them, and one of the most entertaining bits in this context is the scathing criticism of the emptiness and nonsensical quality the prose of people like Althusser, Derrida and others of that ilk evinces, probably as its only quality. It reminded me a bit of Schopenhauer’s diatribes against his favourite enemy Hegel.
I do not agree with everything Scruton says in his book – he should, for instance, have been a lot more critical on Enoch Powell –, and I also doubt whether the fallacies he describes at work are really, as he surmises, relicts of our tribal past (I’d rather see them as bad side effects of Enlightenment as such), but on the whole, Scruton has written a very convincing and also entertaining book. It is very deplorable that this intelligent and erudite man is fighting with cancer at the moment, and I sincerely hope that his reasonable voice will not be silenced too soon.
I would have liked to add some quotations to my summary but when reading the book, I was so hooked by its argument that I could not muster enough self-discipline to excerpt passages I found quoteworthy. Their number was legion, though.
________________________________________________
I am sorry to say that Roger Scruton died on Sunday, 12th January, aged 75, after half a year’s battle with cancer.
“If I must die,
I will encounter darkness as a bride,
And hug it in mine arms.”
These lines from W.B. Yeats’s poem The Second Coming pretty well summarize the point Roger Scruton makes in his intriguing book The Uses of Pessimism and the Danger of False Hope, although in my reading Yeats’s lines are not as unambiguous as they seem to be in Scruton’s own – but then poetry is like Humpty Dumpty’s approach to etymology or the promises of politicians in that it means whatever you choose it to mean.
The title The Uses of Pessimism may certainly sound a little bit odd to us because wouldn’t we tend to regard optimism as a more humane and life-affirming attitude than its opposite? At first sight, we might all agree but then we should remember that Scruton does not propagate a misanthropic and grumpy pessimism negating life as such. Instead he touts what I would call a cheerful scepticism with regard to the pompous promises of our age that imply a complete malleability of humankind and society as such and inevitably end up in a destructively unrelenting and unfeeling feasibility mania. In that light, Scruton is on the same team with Hannah Arendt, who saw the road to totalitarianism in everything that negates the essence of humanity and that presumptuously wants to create a new kind of society in which conflict, imperfection and frustration would be unknown, forgetting that the constraints leading to these imperfections are often the very sources from which life derives its fullness and human beings their freedom and individuality.
Scruton relies on Kant’s dictum that freedom is not present where man is able to do whatever he wants but where he is aware of the responsibility his decisions impose on him. In Scruton’s view, however, enlightenment, for all its beneficial effects, has also unleashed a bunch of fallacies that make it possible for people to pursue an “I” ideology, which places themselves or a collective “I” at the centre of the world, holding the promise of re-creating the world in the image one would like it to appear, over the “we” attitude that regards compromise, the acceptance and careful reform of traditions and humility as the surest ways towards a better future. He deals with these fallacies in various chapters, which make the bulk of his book and which, once again, show Scruton as a keen observer and a keener analyst. Let me give you a quick overview on these fallacies, which, in Scruton’s eyes are dependent on each other:
The best case fallacy implies that any risk towards what is deemed a better future is worth taking, either because progress is bound to obtain victory, anyway, or because the brunt of responsibility and social costs incurred with these risks can be shifted towards other people, be they those labelled as opponents to change (and therefore reactionary) or be they members of future generations. The born free fallacy is based on Rousseau’s assumption of the individual’s absolute freedom and innocence in man’s natural state, an idea that, according to Scruton has already played irreparable havoc with the educational systems in western states. Scruton refutes this fallacy by confronting it with Kant’s idea of freedom that I summarized above. The utopian fallacy is more like a strategy employed by ruthless optimists: By leaving the ideal that society is going to achieve in a deliberately obscure fog – just consider Marx’s utterly naïve sketch of communist society –, those optimists can devote all their energy to denouncing what is in favour of what is to be, and they can justify any ugly measure and foray into democratic structures by pointing out how splendid the future will be – knowing, perhaps, that such a future will never exist. Paradoxically, utopian visions are seldom truly optimistic but rather cynical in that they negate the present without any compromise and even denounce those who try to make small improvements that will actually help real people, by saying that this will contribute to the continuation of a system that is utterly rotten. The zero-sum fallacy is particularly nasty: It is based on the short-sighted assumption that one individual’s gain is another individual’s loss, an assumption that runs counter to the wealth, security and quality of life which are offered by complex and civilized societies. The zero-sum fallacy allows the ruthless optimist to target his hatred and his envy on those who are actually successful and content in a world the utopian regards as an obstacle towards a better future. It is this kind of fallacy, by the way, that enables German FFF activists to deny old people their say in public affairs, on the grounds that they won’t be here for long, anyway, and that they are to be blamed for global warming. The planning fallacy depends on the misconception that complex things like societies or economic structures can actually be planned by those who are intelligent enough, whereas it is most certainly to be doubted that a system of countless interdependences can be successfully managed in a top-down manner. Scruton here advocates the wisdom of tradition and custom, provided it leaves enough space to genuine attempts at improving what goes wrong by means of compromise, modest risk-taking in a trial-and-error-way and careful reform. It is in this chapter that Scruton argues against the EU super-state which we have come to live under (I deliberately don’t say “in”), and whose ever-growing bureaucracy and tendency to curtail national legislation and sovereignty (which, at least, have the legitimation of elections and accountability) increasingly puts into question the European idea. I know that Scruton is a Brexiteer, and a very convincing and prolix one at that, but still, I must say that I found my own views largely mirrored in what he has to say. Let’s hurry on to the next fallacy, the moving spirit fallacy, in which Scruton criticizes the ruthless optimist’s tendency to claim knowledge of the so-called Zeitgeist and to insist that he is simply clinging to the hem of History’s cloak when heading towards Utopia. Scruton argues that the idea of Zeitgeist originally arose in the context of art and was an ex post way of looking at things, and that it is, indeed, a logical fallacy to transfer it into the realm of politics and morals and to use it a priori. One could, I think, simply quote Goethe and say, ”Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heißt, / Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist, / In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.“ Last, not least, there is the aggregation fallacy, which Scruton exemplifies with the help of the slogan of liberté, égalité, fraternité in that the French Revolution soon came to labour under the contradiction between creating equality and upholding liberty. The ruthless optimist is, like the perfect propagandist of Orwell’s 1984 state, able to promote two conflicting ideas at the same time but that is probably because he usually shies from defining his terms in understandable language.
Scruton also sketches the means with which ruthless optimists defend their fallacies as well as the power they have accumulated through them, and one of the most entertaining bits in this context is the scathing criticism of the emptiness and nonsensical quality the prose of people like Althusser, Derrida and others of that ilk evinces, probably as its only quality. It reminded me a bit of Schopenhauer’s diatribes against his favourite enemy Hegel.
I do not agree with everything Scruton says in his book – he should, for instance, have been a lot more critical on Enoch Powell –, and I also doubt whether the fallacies he describes at work are really, as he surmises, relicts of our tribal past (I’d rather see them as bad side effects of Enlightenment as such), but on the whole, Scruton has written a very convincing and also entertaining book. It is very deplorable that this intelligent and erudite man is fighting with cancer at the moment, and I sincerely hope that his reasonable voice will not be silenced too soon.
I would have liked to add some quotations to my summary but when reading the book, I was so hooked by its argument that I could not muster enough self-discipline to excerpt passages I found quoteworthy. Their number was legion, though.
________________________________________________
I am sorry to say that Roger Scruton died on Sunday, 12th January, aged 75, after half a year’s battle with cancer.
“If I must die,
I will encounter darkness as a bride,
And hug it in mine arms.”
December 22, 2014
You know that what you are reading is a conservative book when:
a) the text is very simple and clear, even though it conveys ideas about the most complex problems of human existence;
b) the author leaves your brain some room for interaction, either accepting your disagreement (by not making a case-closed argument out of every conclusion), or inducing you to complete the thought. And this is made straight clear, so you don't get manipulated;
c) every point is illustrated by a factual example, not only to prove it but to make it more understandable;
d) there is a lot of citations, but most of them are not arguments ab auctoritatem, I mean, they are not there to persuade you of something merely because somebody else, more important, said it: they’re there so it is clear it’s not an original thought (it is a fruit of conservatism!) and also to allow you to go and read it for yourself, so you get to know other authors - and the complete thought. They’re open doors to knowledge.
That is exactly what one concludes when finishes “The Uses of Pessimism”: it is not a systematic study of a determined subject – it is an open invitation for you to pursue information that, before reading it, you might think it was too complex or inaccessible.
And that is what conservatism is about: building up knowledge, aiming to find a final solution for each and every human problem, but knowing – pessimistically – that you will never grasp it entirely by yourself. Nor will anybody else.
a) the text is very simple and clear, even though it conveys ideas about the most complex problems of human existence;
b) the author leaves your brain some room for interaction, either accepting your disagreement (by not making a case-closed argument out of every conclusion), or inducing you to complete the thought. And this is made straight clear, so you don't get manipulated;
c) every point is illustrated by a factual example, not only to prove it but to make it more understandable;
d) there is a lot of citations, but most of them are not arguments ab auctoritatem, I mean, they are not there to persuade you of something merely because somebody else, more important, said it: they’re there so it is clear it’s not an original thought (it is a fruit of conservatism!) and also to allow you to go and read it for yourself, so you get to know other authors - and the complete thought. They’re open doors to knowledge.
That is exactly what one concludes when finishes “The Uses of Pessimism”: it is not a systematic study of a determined subject – it is an open invitation for you to pursue information that, before reading it, you might think it was too complex or inaccessible.
And that is what conservatism is about: building up knowledge, aiming to find a final solution for each and every human problem, but knowing – pessimistically – that you will never grasp it entirely by yourself. Nor will anybody else.
December 2, 2012
Scruton's defence of conservativism (which he here calls pessimism) is thoughtful and well-argued. It's a pity, though, that he all too often descends into tired leftie-bashing as if the last 20 years had never happened. All the usual suspects are rounded up and shot, but not once does it seem to occur to him that the modern-day Right can be every bit as utopian and ideology-driven as its left-wing counterparts. Indeed, the one time he mentions the financial disaster of 2008 he lays the blame at the door of... um... Jimmy Carter! It's a pity he couldn't muster a bit more intellectual honesty to go with undoubted philosophical ability and excellently-crafted prose.
July 28, 2022
Roger Scruton in his later years was subject to a terrible display of gotcha journalism. The New Statesman’s Deputy Editor took to social media to boast at having Scruton cancelled from his advisory role on housing aesthetics. The magazine was forced to issue a groveling apology for taking his statements out of context and it issued the full audio recording so the true intent could finally be revealed. A sad state of affairs that would surely augment the pessimism of anyone previously Panglossian.
I am a big reader of John Gray’s philosophy and this book is actually quite similar in tone. At times the author could be switched without noticing much difference in messaging. We are urged to question progress at every turn, lest the outcome leads to an even worse state of affairs. The type of pessimism may vary slightly with Scruton’s being of a more gentle and conservative brand.
In the preface he distances himself from the deep pessimism found with Arthur Schopenhauer. He cites the hubris of Prometheus, the stupidity of opening Pandora’s Box etc. Anyone who has read The Iliad should know that humans have no chance of predicting the future let alone controlling it.
He pessimistically asserts that none of the book’s intended targets are likely to adjust their positions as a result of reading it. Those said targets are mainly the scheming individuals who utilise unscrupulous optimism. In their hands hope “becomes a mechanism for turning problems into solutions and grief into exultation, without pausing to study the accumulated evidence of human nature, which tells us that the only improvement that lies within our control is the improvement of ourselves.”
A repeated theme throughout is that of the optimist “I” versus the pessimist “we”.
“In all emergencies, and all changes that abolish old routines, the optimists hope to turn things to their benefit. They are as likely to consult the past as a battalion fighting for its life in a city is likely to protect the monuments. They strive to be on the winning side, and to find the path into the future on which the light of ‘I’ stays shining.
The ‘we’ attitude, by contrast, is circumspect. It sees human decisions as situated, constrained by place, time and community; by custom, faith and law. It urges us not to throw ourselves always into the swim of things, but to stand aside and reflect. It emphasizes constraints and boundaries, and reminds us of human imperfection and of the fragility of real communities. Its decisions take account of other people and other times.”
Most chapters deal with a different type of optimistic fallacy. The Best Case Fallacy ignores the conservatism of expertise and tradition. Optimism to Scruton is the reckless gambling of the 2008 housing bubble and banking crisis. Sub-prime mortgages were issued and gambled on being repaid.
Living unsustainably and passing on debt to the future generations and gifting them a negative cipher is also a symptom of this type of thinking. Getting into debt has been made easier, declaring bankruptcy has been made easier and all of the above misunderstands human nature and our short term desires.
He extolls the pessimistic prophets. Religion can be a positive form of pessimism for Scruton although he sees Muhammad’s explanations for opposing moneylending to be nonsense. He accepts that a more scrupulous form of optimism could uphold a pragmatic sense of rootedness and locality.
A judicious pessimism conserves that which works unlike communism and blind revolutionary optimism. He opines that it is the later that is pushed by the activist radicals in the media and universities.
Scruton has a belief in freedom with constraints. Hegel asserted that without limits we can only become masters and slaves according to the survival of the fittest. Obedience and duties can offer some protection from this but Scruton only sees institutions such as education, mental health diagnosis and other systems being attacked and destabilised by the aforementioned intellectuals.
He finds it telling that The French Revolution is lionised by so many modern thinkers. The good times are always just around the corner once more heads have been chopped off in order to cement the revolution. Similarly with Mao’s “utopia”, a few million more necessary deaths will bring utopia closer.
Utopian fallacies such as communism and nazism are too often immune to refutation, not least because they don’t present any real, workable pathway to their final solutions. They often need to create an enemy group to victimise as a regular purifying ritual. He talks with mocking contempt of Marx’s belief that within his “scientific utopia” all will just fall into place and then the citizens will spend their days ‘hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, tending cattle in the evening and engaging in literary criticism after dinner’.
He refutes the zero sum fallacy and believes that nothing is improved by transferring resources to corrupt tyrannies. Nor is there any incentive to improve if continued bad performance sees the charity keep flowing in. As American citizens were largely content economically they were thus immune to the stirring up of resentments by The Frankfurt School. He wryly remarks how the strange cabal of anti-western groups brings together an uneasy alliance of homosexuals and those that would be the first to toss them off buildings if they had the numerical courage.
When addressing the planning fallacy Scruton takes relatively early (2008) aim at The European Union. Especially the unelected bureaucrats and their one size fits all policies that trample over the hard won traditions nation states. These traditions allowed a group to co-exist and believe in overarching processes. As such he believes the EU to be a poor example of subsidiarity given it disempowers and runs roughshod over the interests of the localised regions.
The next fallacy is that of the moving spirit, essentially bowing to eternal progress and ‘wholesale repudiation of the past.’ We are clearly making advances in knowledge in technology but can the same be said morally? What about in the arts? Assigning the designation of new eras sees a call for customs, values and practices to be shaken off. Art benefited from constraints, something he sees as sorely lacking in modern efforts.
Replacing classical architecture with ugly, brutalist buildings is accepted under modernism. Ultimately it is very profitable to demand that everything shifts and often for the worse.
Next to be debunked is the aggregation fallacy, the belief that conflicted notions such as liberty and equality can co-exist. He gives The French Revolution as an example, it used violent despotism in the name of upholding liberty. A liberal used to be someone who valued freedom but now it so often refers to someone who seeks to restrict freedoms by state mandate and institutions.
Other contradictions include group discrimination as a path to anti-discrimination, affirmative action over the right to free association etc. This “liberation” of the private sphere undoes the trust and sympathies that once bonded a society by constraints. He is pessimistic that such a society can hold itself together.
“Yet the ability of liberal reformers to ignore the signs of social decay, and to press on with the pursuit of their agenda, is not the least remarkable proof that they live in a world of false hopes.
Since the sixties Western countries have adopted policies in the matter of immigration that no person schooled in the elementary truths of pessimism would have endorsed. Anybody who has studied the fate of empires, and the difficulties of establishing territorial jurisdiction over communities that differ in religion, language and marital customs, knows that the task is all but impossible, and threatens constantly to break down in fragmentation, tribalism or civil war. Take the lid off multi-ethnic and multicultural empires — such as the Ottoman Empire or communist Yugoslavia — and bloodshed and destruction immediately ensue.”
The defences against the truth chapter references delusory beliefs in society. The examples given include supporting the breakup of the family unit when boyfriends and stepfathers statistically pose a much bigger threat to children than the biological father. The western CND campaign to disarm the military, often encouraged and assisted by enemy Soviets during the cold war was another.
Ressentiment is shown to that which is accessible and allows criticism so in the absence of Al Qaeda being interested in discussion the victims of 9/11 become “Little Eichmanns” who deserved their fate. Similarly as past anti-western citizens took aim at their own countries for criticism, Stalin countenanced no such forums in his communist state.
Roger takes a swipe at the purposely impenetrable gibberish and gobbledygook employed at universities, stating that: “The best way to create a left-wing orthodoxy in the academy is to fortify the leftist position with armoured nonsense: for then criticism becomes impossible.”
Finally he makes a defence of the villainised Enoch Powell. He shows how the ‘River of Blood’ reference was starved of its context (also “whip hand” is a secondary quote) and suggests that he has been vindicated by history.
“The Madrid and London bombings and the murder of Theo Van Gogh are viewed by many Europeans as a foretaste of things to come. It is now evident that, in the debate over immigration, in those last remaining days when it could still have made a difference, Enoch Powell was far nearer the truth than those who instantly drove him from office, and who ensured that the issue was henceforth to be discussed, if at all, only by way of condemning the ‘racism’ and ‘xenophobia’ of those who thought like Powell. As for the racism and xenophobia of the incomers, it was indiscernible to the liberal conscience, which has never been able to understand that liberalism is an unusual state of mind.”
All the fallacies and the unscrupulous optimism that they contain are then brought together within a highly speculative theory that posits them to all be evolutionary hangovers from when they served a positive purpose. Risk takers within the tribe were perhaps valued over the reflective etc.
He is no purveyor of the “Noble savage” myth and denigrates this lifestyle of the “I”. I feel he goes overboard in glorifying the “we” of modern civilisation and its unsustainable cities of waste products and demands for imports and constant growth.
Sometimes our evolutionary past speaks to instincts that remain healthy for us. We aren’t meant to be overwhelmed with thousands of humans around us in this mass society. As Dunbar’s number has shown we are best adapted to living within small groups. He concludes this chapter by stating optimists are counterintuitively the pessimistic ones, underrating as they do how wonderful modern humans are.
Which leads us to “Our Civil Present”, a plea to human exceptionalism, more city worship etc, but how are we to live with eight billion rapacious apes? The invention of agriculture has been described as our greatest mistake given it led to settlement and burgeoning families and subsequent requirements. He describes cities as secure and settled but they remain one broken link in the supply chain (food, oil, water etc) from collapse. The veneer of civilisation is thin indeed.
Elsewhere he points to the rationality of prejudice, drawing as it does on the collective wisdom of past generations.
“For Burke, the principal gift of tradition was the state of mind that he called ‘prejudice’, by which he meant a form of thought evolving from the pooled experiences of absent generations. Prejudice eschews abstract solutions and serves as a barrier against the illusion that we can make everything anew, according to some ideally rational plan. It is not irrational: on the contrary, it strikes a path towards collective reasonableness.”
Scruton might be a little optimistic himself in the city worship, he suggests they allow us to co-habit harmoniously but then immediately has to accept the enclaves that pose a threat. The city cannot survive a dose of the cohesive and tribal, where a God is first and foremost submitted to by a Brotherhood. He accepts that the interlinked lack of forgiveness and irony is incompatible to living alongside a society of co-operating individuals. Settlement is a reproach and to kill and die fighting the ‘Great Satan’ is angelic.
“The Pleistocene mindset of the Islamists is indifferent to public opinion, and has set itself the task — parallel to that adopted by the tiny band of Bolsheviks in 1917 — of entirely destroying the forms of settled government. It is drawn to terrorism not because of anything that could be achieved by it, but because terrorism is a refuge from settlement and a return to the all-commanding ‘T’. Terror is therefore not a tactic used to accomplish some negotiable goal. It is an end in itself and a source of exultation.”
Echoing Keats’ famous quote that “the best lack all conviction” Scruton bristles against the fallacies seen in the French Revolution, The Bolsheviks, Maoism and in the modern context, Islamism.
“The optimism of the Islamists, like that of the revolutionaries down the centuries, excuses every kind of destruction on the grounds of necessity and the long-term plan. It overlooks all the facts that make the long-term plan absurd and necessity a willed illusion. We should turn away from such comprehensive visions, and hold before our minds the image of human imperfection.”
The book finishes up with a short chapter in which the posthuman cyborg goals of transhumanists are surprisingly compared to the failings he identified in the Pleistocene ancestors . He wishes to prop us up as “settled, negotiating creatures” and gaze with ironic eyes on our flawed condition.
All in all this book offers great food for thought and is a very engaging read. I would recommend it as a primer on Scruton’s philosophy, touching as it does on all manner of topics that are key to his life’s work and message. A gentle pessimism pervades the entire oeuvre as he cautions us to be careful what we wish for.
I am a big reader of John Gray’s philosophy and this book is actually quite similar in tone. At times the author could be switched without noticing much difference in messaging. We are urged to question progress at every turn, lest the outcome leads to an even worse state of affairs. The type of pessimism may vary slightly with Scruton’s being of a more gentle and conservative brand.
In the preface he distances himself from the deep pessimism found with Arthur Schopenhauer. He cites the hubris of Prometheus, the stupidity of opening Pandora’s Box etc. Anyone who has read The Iliad should know that humans have no chance of predicting the future let alone controlling it.
He pessimistically asserts that none of the book’s intended targets are likely to adjust their positions as a result of reading it. Those said targets are mainly the scheming individuals who utilise unscrupulous optimism. In their hands hope “becomes a mechanism for turning problems into solutions and grief into exultation, without pausing to study the accumulated evidence of human nature, which tells us that the only improvement that lies within our control is the improvement of ourselves.”
A repeated theme throughout is that of the optimist “I” versus the pessimist “we”.
“In all emergencies, and all changes that abolish old routines, the optimists hope to turn things to their benefit. They are as likely to consult the past as a battalion fighting for its life in a city is likely to protect the monuments. They strive to be on the winning side, and to find the path into the future on which the light of ‘I’ stays shining.
The ‘we’ attitude, by contrast, is circumspect. It sees human decisions as situated, constrained by place, time and community; by custom, faith and law. It urges us not to throw ourselves always into the swim of things, but to stand aside and reflect. It emphasizes constraints and boundaries, and reminds us of human imperfection and of the fragility of real communities. Its decisions take account of other people and other times.”
Most chapters deal with a different type of optimistic fallacy. The Best Case Fallacy ignores the conservatism of expertise and tradition. Optimism to Scruton is the reckless gambling of the 2008 housing bubble and banking crisis. Sub-prime mortgages were issued and gambled on being repaid.
Living unsustainably and passing on debt to the future generations and gifting them a negative cipher is also a symptom of this type of thinking. Getting into debt has been made easier, declaring bankruptcy has been made easier and all of the above misunderstands human nature and our short term desires.
He extolls the pessimistic prophets. Religion can be a positive form of pessimism for Scruton although he sees Muhammad’s explanations for opposing moneylending to be nonsense. He accepts that a more scrupulous form of optimism could uphold a pragmatic sense of rootedness and locality.
A judicious pessimism conserves that which works unlike communism and blind revolutionary optimism. He opines that it is the later that is pushed by the activist radicals in the media and universities.
Scruton has a belief in freedom with constraints. Hegel asserted that without limits we can only become masters and slaves according to the survival of the fittest. Obedience and duties can offer some protection from this but Scruton only sees institutions such as education, mental health diagnosis and other systems being attacked and destabilised by the aforementioned intellectuals.
He finds it telling that The French Revolution is lionised by so many modern thinkers. The good times are always just around the corner once more heads have been chopped off in order to cement the revolution. Similarly with Mao’s “utopia”, a few million more necessary deaths will bring utopia closer.
Utopian fallacies such as communism and nazism are too often immune to refutation, not least because they don’t present any real, workable pathway to their final solutions. They often need to create an enemy group to victimise as a regular purifying ritual. He talks with mocking contempt of Marx’s belief that within his “scientific utopia” all will just fall into place and then the citizens will spend their days ‘hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, tending cattle in the evening and engaging in literary criticism after dinner’.
He refutes the zero sum fallacy and believes that nothing is improved by transferring resources to corrupt tyrannies. Nor is there any incentive to improve if continued bad performance sees the charity keep flowing in. As American citizens were largely content economically they were thus immune to the stirring up of resentments by The Frankfurt School. He wryly remarks how the strange cabal of anti-western groups brings together an uneasy alliance of homosexuals and those that would be the first to toss them off buildings if they had the numerical courage.
When addressing the planning fallacy Scruton takes relatively early (2008) aim at The European Union. Especially the unelected bureaucrats and their one size fits all policies that trample over the hard won traditions nation states. These traditions allowed a group to co-exist and believe in overarching processes. As such he believes the EU to be a poor example of subsidiarity given it disempowers and runs roughshod over the interests of the localised regions.
The next fallacy is that of the moving spirit, essentially bowing to eternal progress and ‘wholesale repudiation of the past.’ We are clearly making advances in knowledge in technology but can the same be said morally? What about in the arts? Assigning the designation of new eras sees a call for customs, values and practices to be shaken off. Art benefited from constraints, something he sees as sorely lacking in modern efforts.
Replacing classical architecture with ugly, brutalist buildings is accepted under modernism. Ultimately it is very profitable to demand that everything shifts and often for the worse.
Next to be debunked is the aggregation fallacy, the belief that conflicted notions such as liberty and equality can co-exist. He gives The French Revolution as an example, it used violent despotism in the name of upholding liberty. A liberal used to be someone who valued freedom but now it so often refers to someone who seeks to restrict freedoms by state mandate and institutions.
Other contradictions include group discrimination as a path to anti-discrimination, affirmative action over the right to free association etc. This “liberation” of the private sphere undoes the trust and sympathies that once bonded a society by constraints. He is pessimistic that such a society can hold itself together.
“Yet the ability of liberal reformers to ignore the signs of social decay, and to press on with the pursuit of their agenda, is not the least remarkable proof that they live in a world of false hopes.
Since the sixties Western countries have adopted policies in the matter of immigration that no person schooled in the elementary truths of pessimism would have endorsed. Anybody who has studied the fate of empires, and the difficulties of establishing territorial jurisdiction over communities that differ in religion, language and marital customs, knows that the task is all but impossible, and threatens constantly to break down in fragmentation, tribalism or civil war. Take the lid off multi-ethnic and multicultural empires — such as the Ottoman Empire or communist Yugoslavia — and bloodshed and destruction immediately ensue.”
The defences against the truth chapter references delusory beliefs in society. The examples given include supporting the breakup of the family unit when boyfriends and stepfathers statistically pose a much bigger threat to children than the biological father. The western CND campaign to disarm the military, often encouraged and assisted by enemy Soviets during the cold war was another.
Ressentiment is shown to that which is accessible and allows criticism so in the absence of Al Qaeda being interested in discussion the victims of 9/11 become “Little Eichmanns” who deserved their fate. Similarly as past anti-western citizens took aim at their own countries for criticism, Stalin countenanced no such forums in his communist state.
Roger takes a swipe at the purposely impenetrable gibberish and gobbledygook employed at universities, stating that: “The best way to create a left-wing orthodoxy in the academy is to fortify the leftist position with armoured nonsense: for then criticism becomes impossible.”
Finally he makes a defence of the villainised Enoch Powell. He shows how the ‘River of Blood’ reference was starved of its context (also “whip hand” is a secondary quote) and suggests that he has been vindicated by history.
“The Madrid and London bombings and the murder of Theo Van Gogh are viewed by many Europeans as a foretaste of things to come. It is now evident that, in the debate over immigration, in those last remaining days when it could still have made a difference, Enoch Powell was far nearer the truth than those who instantly drove him from office, and who ensured that the issue was henceforth to be discussed, if at all, only by way of condemning the ‘racism’ and ‘xenophobia’ of those who thought like Powell. As for the racism and xenophobia of the incomers, it was indiscernible to the liberal conscience, which has never been able to understand that liberalism is an unusual state of mind.”
All the fallacies and the unscrupulous optimism that they contain are then brought together within a highly speculative theory that posits them to all be evolutionary hangovers from when they served a positive purpose. Risk takers within the tribe were perhaps valued over the reflective etc.
He is no purveyor of the “Noble savage” myth and denigrates this lifestyle of the “I”. I feel he goes overboard in glorifying the “we” of modern civilisation and its unsustainable cities of waste products and demands for imports and constant growth.
Sometimes our evolutionary past speaks to instincts that remain healthy for us. We aren’t meant to be overwhelmed with thousands of humans around us in this mass society. As Dunbar’s number has shown we are best adapted to living within small groups. He concludes this chapter by stating optimists are counterintuitively the pessimistic ones, underrating as they do how wonderful modern humans are.
Which leads us to “Our Civil Present”, a plea to human exceptionalism, more city worship etc, but how are we to live with eight billion rapacious apes? The invention of agriculture has been described as our greatest mistake given it led to settlement and burgeoning families and subsequent requirements. He describes cities as secure and settled but they remain one broken link in the supply chain (food, oil, water etc) from collapse. The veneer of civilisation is thin indeed.
Elsewhere he points to the rationality of prejudice, drawing as it does on the collective wisdom of past generations.
“For Burke, the principal gift of tradition was the state of mind that he called ‘prejudice’, by which he meant a form of thought evolving from the pooled experiences of absent generations. Prejudice eschews abstract solutions and serves as a barrier against the illusion that we can make everything anew, according to some ideally rational plan. It is not irrational: on the contrary, it strikes a path towards collective reasonableness.”
Scruton might be a little optimistic himself in the city worship, he suggests they allow us to co-habit harmoniously but then immediately has to accept the enclaves that pose a threat. The city cannot survive a dose of the cohesive and tribal, where a God is first and foremost submitted to by a Brotherhood. He accepts that the interlinked lack of forgiveness and irony is incompatible to living alongside a society of co-operating individuals. Settlement is a reproach and to kill and die fighting the ‘Great Satan’ is angelic.
“The Pleistocene mindset of the Islamists is indifferent to public opinion, and has set itself the task — parallel to that adopted by the tiny band of Bolsheviks in 1917 — of entirely destroying the forms of settled government. It is drawn to terrorism not because of anything that could be achieved by it, but because terrorism is a refuge from settlement and a return to the all-commanding ‘T’. Terror is therefore not a tactic used to accomplish some negotiable goal. It is an end in itself and a source of exultation.”
Echoing Keats’ famous quote that “the best lack all conviction” Scruton bristles against the fallacies seen in the French Revolution, The Bolsheviks, Maoism and in the modern context, Islamism.
“The optimism of the Islamists, like that of the revolutionaries down the centuries, excuses every kind of destruction on the grounds of necessity and the long-term plan. It overlooks all the facts that make the long-term plan absurd and necessity a willed illusion. We should turn away from such comprehensive visions, and hold before our minds the image of human imperfection.”
The book finishes up with a short chapter in which the posthuman cyborg goals of transhumanists are surprisingly compared to the failings he identified in the Pleistocene ancestors . He wishes to prop us up as “settled, negotiating creatures” and gaze with ironic eyes on our flawed condition.
All in all this book offers great food for thought and is a very engaging read. I would recommend it as a primer on Scruton’s philosophy, touching as it does on all manner of topics that are key to his life’s work and message. A gentle pessimism pervades the entire oeuvre as he cautions us to be careful what we wish for.
April 3, 2022
Carte lui Roger Scruton este o critică adresată progresismului produs de-un optimism, numit de autor, fără scrupule ce atacă acea baza a civilizației autentice definite prin acel „noi” în virtutea căruia individul devine responsabil și totodată liber, căci acest „noi” este sursa moralei, a organizării societății conform unor tradiții — acel set de regului neplănuite, autoasumate, apărute prin practica moralei în vederea creării unor constrângeri în limita cărora cooperarea între necunocuți să permită beneficii tuturor. Pentru autor, aflat în sfera conservatorismului, progresismul mută centrul omului din acest „noi” într-un „eu” aflat permanent într-o goană de perfecționare. Egocentrismul este dominat de schimbare și perfecționare permanente și de depășire a obstacolelor naturale, creând o tensiune ce se simte drept o neliniște și-un sacrilegiu în timp ce, în contrast „noi” încearcă acomodarea cu lumea înconjurătoare recunoscând limitările umane în spiritul iubirii și al prieteniei, a negocierilor interumane într-un cadru de contrângeri nu al unor scopuri. Deci în această recunoștere a limitelor, egoul își transcende granița și se dedică afecțiunii sociale.
În lupta sa, progresimul văzut de Scruton are la bază o serie de erori. Chiar dacă nu sunt întrutotul de acord cu viziunea lui, expunerea lor aduce informații interesante. Progresismul lui Scruton mi se pare totuși un om de paie, adică o caricatură ușor de atacat a unei tendințe de schimbare reală a lumii prin experiment și nicidecum o negare a istoriei și a tradiției. A pune sub același impuls curentele totalitare istorice și această tendință pentru a-l trata pe cel din urmă la fel de aspru ca pe precedentele mi se pare o eroare. Această tendință de progresie graduală nu conduce la înstrăinarea omului de om și dezumanizare prin exacerbarea egoului așa cum comunismul și nazismul au produs prin urmarea unei utopii nebune conforme unui optimism fără scrupule. Optimismul fără scrupule este definit de Scruton ca o atitudine de negare a rațiunii în condițiile în care rațiunea ar dicta o reconsiderare a ideilor și faptelor; ignorarea efectelor nefaste ale actelor sale și chiar ignorarea că ar putea exista efecte nefaste l-ar putea determina pe acest optimist ca în momente de incertitudine să-și imagineze doar cel mai bun rezultat și să nu se gândească la scenarii negative care ar rezulta din deciziile luate, eșecurile fiind contabilizate în viitor de altcineva. Însă optimismul cu scrupule este mai rezervat în fața provocărilor. El îndeamnă pentru rezolvarea unei probleme la raportarea la experiența anterioară și la o autoritate care a dobândit cunoașterea anterior, iar când nu există așa ceva, atunci se bazează pe intuiție și inspirație care nu depășesc niciodată sfera responsabilității mai ales când își conștientizează constrângerile ce-i conectează de toți ceilalți și orice schimbare ar putea avea consecține imprevizibile. Pesimismul care trebuie să încununeze atitudinea aceasta optimistă aduce acea grijă față de ce se poate întâmpla rău și să decidem conștienți asupra riscurilor asumate moment în care avem o conștiință colectivă mai accentuată decât cea solitară.
Chiar dacă critica, cum am zis mai sus, este adresată unui om de paie și nu unei situații reale, progresismul de azi având în realitate tendința de a crea un „noi” mai amplu și nicidecum mai centrat pe sine, analiza de acolo este adeseori pertinentă și plină de substanță. Nu sunt de acord cu acest conservatorism, dar el trasează niște puncte de avertizare în drumul ăsta de dezvoltare a societății umane pe diverse trasee. Căci nicio tradiție nu s-a format peste noapte până la urmă, și fiecarea tradiție a fost o inovație care s-a păstrat în zestrea populară pentru că a fost eficientă. „Rămășițele bunului simț colectiv — zice Scruton— prezente în obiceiuri, în tradiție, în drept comun, în care soluțiile la nenumărate conflicte și dificultăți s-au sedimentat pentru a crea un sol fertil de precedente, ajung să nu mai însemne nimic în fața inovațiilor pe care nu le recomandă nimic altceva decât speranța și exaltarea susținătorilor. În felul acesta, eu îl scoate din joc pe noi fără drept de apel.” Dar nu asta s-a întâmplat și, de exemplu, cu creștinismul, sau cu islamul? Se poate presupune (greșit) că înainte de instaurarea acestor religii noi nu exista nicio tradiție și că ele au inițiat ordinea într-un haos. Creștinismul n-a fost oare o inovație care intervenea să suprascrie o tradiție romană sau greacă aflată pe un sol fertil de obiceiuri și tradiții, cu un drept comun amplu și binedefinit? N-a fost oare creștinismul o mișcare progresită pe care Scruton, dacă ar fi trăit atunci, dar de partea păgânității, n-ar fi considerat-o ca pe o impunere forțată recomandată doar de exaltarea și speranța noilor credincioși?
Într-adevară, trebuie și o doză amplă de pesimism în avântul acesta progresist, altfel putem cădea în capcanele cognitive ale sofismelor subliniate de Scruton, dar asta nu înseamnă să ne retragem într-o cetate de tradiții și stagnare. Optimismul acesta fără scrupule, sau optimismul utopic, nu este o caracteristică importantă a curentului general progresist deși în orice curent există extremiști ideologici, dar omenirea are impulsul de căuta noi și noi soluții de dezvoltare a vieții sale în ciuda oricăror impedimente naturale sau ideologice și fie că se gândesc la erorile viitoare și consecințele lor, fie că nu și idealizează tâmp și periculos, există un mecanism distribuit global care armonizează cât de cât excesele într-un echilibru instabil — probabil mâna invizibilă a cooperării, cum o numește autorul. „Lumea este, de fapt, un loc mult mai bun decât vor optimiștii să credem: și tocmai de aceea avem nevoie de pesimism.” Dacă optimismul ar însemna idealul totalitarist al mijlocului secolului XX, da, pesimismul ar fi o soluție.
În lupta sa, progresimul văzut de Scruton are la bază o serie de erori. Chiar dacă nu sunt întrutotul de acord cu viziunea lui, expunerea lor aduce informații interesante. Progresismul lui Scruton mi se pare totuși un om de paie, adică o caricatură ușor de atacat a unei tendințe de schimbare reală a lumii prin experiment și nicidecum o negare a istoriei și a tradiției. A pune sub același impuls curentele totalitare istorice și această tendință pentru a-l trata pe cel din urmă la fel de aspru ca pe precedentele mi se pare o eroare. Această tendință de progresie graduală nu conduce la înstrăinarea omului de om și dezumanizare prin exacerbarea egoului așa cum comunismul și nazismul au produs prin urmarea unei utopii nebune conforme unui optimism fără scrupule. Optimismul fără scrupule este definit de Scruton ca o atitudine de negare a rațiunii în condițiile în care rațiunea ar dicta o reconsiderare a ideilor și faptelor; ignorarea efectelor nefaste ale actelor sale și chiar ignorarea că ar putea exista efecte nefaste l-ar putea determina pe acest optimist ca în momente de incertitudine să-și imagineze doar cel mai bun rezultat și să nu se gândească la scenarii negative care ar rezulta din deciziile luate, eșecurile fiind contabilizate în viitor de altcineva. Însă optimismul cu scrupule este mai rezervat în fața provocărilor. El îndeamnă pentru rezolvarea unei probleme la raportarea la experiența anterioară și la o autoritate care a dobândit cunoașterea anterior, iar când nu există așa ceva, atunci se bazează pe intuiție și inspirație care nu depășesc niciodată sfera responsabilității mai ales când își conștientizează constrângerile ce-i conectează de toți ceilalți și orice schimbare ar putea avea consecține imprevizibile. Pesimismul care trebuie să încununeze atitudinea aceasta optimistă aduce acea grijă față de ce se poate întâmpla rău și să decidem conștienți asupra riscurilor asumate moment în care avem o conștiință colectivă mai accentuată decât cea solitară.
Chiar dacă critica, cum am zis mai sus, este adresată unui om de paie și nu unei situații reale, progresismul de azi având în realitate tendința de a crea un „noi” mai amplu și nicidecum mai centrat pe sine, analiza de acolo este adeseori pertinentă și plină de substanță. Nu sunt de acord cu acest conservatorism, dar el trasează niște puncte de avertizare în drumul ăsta de dezvoltare a societății umane pe diverse trasee. Căci nicio tradiție nu s-a format peste noapte până la urmă, și fiecarea tradiție a fost o inovație care s-a păstrat în zestrea populară pentru că a fost eficientă. „Rămășițele bunului simț colectiv — zice Scruton— prezente în obiceiuri, în tradiție, în drept comun, în care soluțiile la nenumărate conflicte și dificultăți s-au sedimentat pentru a crea un sol fertil de precedente, ajung să nu mai însemne nimic în fața inovațiilor pe care nu le recomandă nimic altceva decât speranța și exaltarea susținătorilor. În felul acesta, eu îl scoate din joc pe noi fără drept de apel.” Dar nu asta s-a întâmplat și, de exemplu, cu creștinismul, sau cu islamul? Se poate presupune (greșit) că înainte de instaurarea acestor religii noi nu exista nicio tradiție și că ele au inițiat ordinea într-un haos. Creștinismul n-a fost oare o inovație care intervenea să suprascrie o tradiție romană sau greacă aflată pe un sol fertil de obiceiuri și tradiții, cu un drept comun amplu și binedefinit? N-a fost oare creștinismul o mișcare progresită pe care Scruton, dacă ar fi trăit atunci, dar de partea păgânității, n-ar fi considerat-o ca pe o impunere forțată recomandată doar de exaltarea și speranța noilor credincioși?
Într-adevară, trebuie și o doză amplă de pesimism în avântul acesta progresist, altfel putem cădea în capcanele cognitive ale sofismelor subliniate de Scruton, dar asta nu înseamnă să ne retragem într-o cetate de tradiții și stagnare. Optimismul acesta fără scrupule, sau optimismul utopic, nu este o caracteristică importantă a curentului general progresist deși în orice curent există extremiști ideologici, dar omenirea are impulsul de căuta noi și noi soluții de dezvoltare a vieții sale în ciuda oricăror impedimente naturale sau ideologice și fie că se gândesc la erorile viitoare și consecințele lor, fie că nu și idealizează tâmp și periculos, există un mecanism distribuit global care armonizează cât de cât excesele într-un echilibru instabil — probabil mâna invizibilă a cooperării, cum o numește autorul. „Lumea este, de fapt, un loc mult mai bun decât vor optimiștii să credem: și tocmai de aceea avem nevoie de pesimism.” Dacă optimismul ar însemna idealul totalitarist al mijlocului secolului XX, da, pesimismul ar fi o soluție.
September 19, 2016
Excellently written. Scruton goes through the fallacies one by one - the myths of being born free, the best case, planning and more, showing each and every time why exactly these beliefs are not only wrong, but are misused to push an agenda where the individual, 'I' as Scruton refers to it, is steadily pushed forwards whilst society, and the things society may benefit from, 'we', are steadily degraded. Scruton excellently exemplifies this in the 'Born Free' fallacy chapter, where he demonstrates how our education system no longer aims to facilitate 'we' anymore, but after the Plowden Report of 1967, such things as discipline, respect of constraints, sacrifice are thrown away in the name of letting unbridled optimism reign free, that every child must be 'freed' from societal constraints as those philosophers like Rousseau put it, that they must never be taught such things, and that the government should subsidise those who have no interest in being educated when they have been raised in education to show no respect for what ever society gives them - for to sacrifice nothing to be free, and to not respect and accept customs, tradition and the rest which guarantees freedom's existence (in contrast, as Scruton shows in the chapter, by the French Revolution), is the exact way to receive no freedom in the slightest. Scruton demonstrates the ideas he derived from Hegel, for the need to have a way to not be dominated, which is what Rousseau's ideas would lead to (not happiness and brotherhood) is to uphold the institutions which have allowed the freedom to exist and to grow in peace rather than have to submit or die, as Scruton very eloquently and surprisingly simply explained in this book in the Born Free fallacy chapter.
It is these things that Scruton explains that come from 'unscrupulous optimism' that require dosages of 'cautious pessimism' as Scruton puts it. Scruton elaborates throughout that these fallacies, and these misunderstandings are pushed by those optimists who believe falsely in things which simply are not true or will never actually work (or in the case of Baby P, would not have mattered on the matter of social workers without a father present, as Scruton points out in the best chapter of the book, 'Defences Against The Truth'). Scruton debunks and does so without any censor - he is tactful, and certainly not crude, but does not shy from the truth. Having faith, hope and love (agape) is good, and to be cheerful is better than to be a comprehensive pessimist. But to be somebody who does not consider the worst case scenarios, who does not always apply pessimism to what he does, and says 'will be' instead of 'should be' - beware. For it is those people who are the educationists who ruined our educational system, fell for the Soviets CND plots, gleefully pushed for no constraints and allowed for the credit crunch ('Best Case fallacy') to occur due to shifting responsibility - this is what unscrupulous optimism will lead to.
Certainly a book to reread.
It is these things that Scruton explains that come from 'unscrupulous optimism' that require dosages of 'cautious pessimism' as Scruton puts it. Scruton elaborates throughout that these fallacies, and these misunderstandings are pushed by those optimists who believe falsely in things which simply are not true or will never actually work (or in the case of Baby P, would not have mattered on the matter of social workers without a father present, as Scruton points out in the best chapter of the book, 'Defences Against The Truth'). Scruton debunks and does so without any censor - he is tactful, and certainly not crude, but does not shy from the truth. Having faith, hope and love (agape) is good, and to be cheerful is better than to be a comprehensive pessimist. But to be somebody who does not consider the worst case scenarios, who does not always apply pessimism to what he does, and says 'will be' instead of 'should be' - beware. For it is those people who are the educationists who ruined our educational system, fell for the Soviets CND plots, gleefully pushed for no constraints and allowed for the credit crunch ('Best Case fallacy') to occur due to shifting responsibility - this is what unscrupulous optimism will lead to.
Certainly a book to reread.
June 26, 2021
In The Uses of Pessimism, Scruton argues about the danger that optimism can cause if it does not have some reasonable structure and leading thought. He mentioned several cases throughout history where optimism was the destructive power behind many so-called positive revolutions. Many of them had the naive proposition that all new is by default better and that tradition is often just a barrier that needs to be removed.
He doesn't propose pessimism in a nihilistic way, but the opposite, being sceptic before taking the action. That kind of hopeful scepticism is humble, sees pros and cons, looks for a better situation for society as a whole, not just for an individual. Above all, pessimism appreciates freedom. He describes freedom as something that isn't given, but it's earned on a hard way. At the same time, it's very fragile, and one needs to keep it and cherish it. In the book, he claims that freedom is only available when it has its boundaries. Scruton argues against the freedom that is taught in today's society, where freedom means to do whatever you want, and that never was the true purpose of freedom. Only when you respect the limits, can implement them in your life, then you can go beyond them, without being ignorant towards history and the people who nurtured it.
To summarize, it is worth reading, although I do not agree with some of his suggestions, it's still beautifully written, makes you want to read more and enjoy the thought process of a real intellectual.
He doesn't propose pessimism in a nihilistic way, but the opposite, being sceptic before taking the action. That kind of hopeful scepticism is humble, sees pros and cons, looks for a better situation for society as a whole, not just for an individual. Above all, pessimism appreciates freedom. He describes freedom as something that isn't given, but it's earned on a hard way. At the same time, it's very fragile, and one needs to keep it and cherish it. In the book, he claims that freedom is only available when it has its boundaries. Scruton argues against the freedom that is taught in today's society, where freedom means to do whatever you want, and that never was the true purpose of freedom. Only when you respect the limits, can implement them in your life, then you can go beyond them, without being ignorant towards history and the people who nurtured it.
To summarize, it is worth reading, although I do not agree with some of his suggestions, it's still beautifully written, makes you want to read more and enjoy the thought process of a real intellectual.
August 4, 2019
This book's readability is just right. It's not too easy read, as it's the case with those stupid pseudo psychological, sociological, pop-science books written to give a person reading those books an illusion that they're smart because they are reading them; and on the other hand it's not too hard to read and comprehend, as it's often the case with a lot of smartass philosophers.
The content of the book is also great. Scruton is debunking a whole belief system lying beneath the, as he calls it, unscrupulous optimism mentality.
Unscrupulous optimists were not only communists and fascists. Those are also today's nonchalant scientivists, climate catastrophists, messianic educational reformers and cool-hippy nerdy transhumanists.
The chapters of the books are divided in a form of characteristic fallacies those optimists have in common.
The most interesting part of the book is Scruton's subtle critique of Hegelian "fallacy of driven spirit".
It's about the notion that every moment in human history have it's own Zeitgeist, the spirit of the time. When someone internalizes the idea that every moment is the part of some bigger picture historical movement, the one tends to look at this time as somehow special and original. It's this notion of "historicistical superstition" that, in Scruton's opinion, drove the artists and intellectuals in 20th century to produce some of the stupidest and the most vulgar "art" peaces. They had that idea ingrained subconsciously in them, as they had this vision of the time they lived in as a function of spirit and Movement. If time is a function of Spirit and Movement, that same Time-Era has to produce its original art and ideas. Scruton believes that there's no such thing as a Zeitgeist, because all art made in the past is simply the function of continuity. If we believe in the Zeitgeist, we are forced to made our own rules and cut the ties with the past, meaning breaking the continuity chain. The result is known - vulgar, meaningless "art". It's the same with architecture and political movements.
All of the evils of totalitarian regimes, as well as the bad art and architecture - could have been avoided only if more people were a bit more of a pessimists, Scruton concludes.
This is only one of the chapters of the book, there are a lot more fallacies Scruton tries to debunk, but it would be too long and tedious to write it down here.
The content of the book is also great. Scruton is debunking a whole belief system lying beneath the, as he calls it, unscrupulous optimism mentality.
Unscrupulous optimists were not only communists and fascists. Those are also today's nonchalant scientivists, climate catastrophists, messianic educational reformers and cool-hippy nerdy transhumanists.
The chapters of the books are divided in a form of characteristic fallacies those optimists have in common.
The most interesting part of the book is Scruton's subtle critique of Hegelian "fallacy of driven spirit".
It's about the notion that every moment in human history have it's own Zeitgeist, the spirit of the time. When someone internalizes the idea that every moment is the part of some bigger picture historical movement, the one tends to look at this time as somehow special and original. It's this notion of "historicistical superstition" that, in Scruton's opinion, drove the artists and intellectuals in 20th century to produce some of the stupidest and the most vulgar "art" peaces. They had that idea ingrained subconsciously in them, as they had this vision of the time they lived in as a function of spirit and Movement. If time is a function of Spirit and Movement, that same Time-Era has to produce its original art and ideas. Scruton believes that there's no such thing as a Zeitgeist, because all art made in the past is simply the function of continuity. If we believe in the Zeitgeist, we are forced to made our own rules and cut the ties with the past, meaning breaking the continuity chain. The result is known - vulgar, meaningless "art". It's the same with architecture and political movements.
All of the evils of totalitarian regimes, as well as the bad art and architecture - could have been avoided only if more people were a bit more of a pessimists, Scruton concludes.
This is only one of the chapters of the book, there are a lot more fallacies Scruton tries to debunk, but it would be too long and tedious to write it down here.
May 9, 2021
I started reading this after I found it in a local bookshop in Budapest. Scruton lays out a number of arguments about why optimism about various projects is misguided, for instance, willingness to believe that we can aggregate different things, or the willingness to believe that we are blank slates. The book is very elegantly written and is vast in scope. It is a great read as a general conservative polemic, unfortunately, I feel like its flaw is in being overtly general, it reads more like an essay than a book.
There isn't much here for those who are well versed in the conservative tradition, instead, it seems to be a book for those who are on edge of sorts. It is a book about the way we use language, the way we form communities, and the way we evolve to be more than the sum of our parts.
I think this is a book to give a cynical teenager who is on their way to embracing nihilism or becoming your everyday pundit about politics. It's a sort of brake you can apply before they fall over the edge.
There isn't much here for those who are well versed in the conservative tradition, instead, it seems to be a book for those who are on edge of sorts. It is a book about the way we use language, the way we form communities, and the way we evolve to be more than the sum of our parts.
I think this is a book to give a cynical teenager who is on their way to embracing nihilism or becoming your everyday pundit about politics. It's a sort of brake you can apply before they fall over the edge.
March 7, 2024
Scrupulous optimists know that they live in a world of constraints, that altering these constraints is difficult and that the consequences of doing so are often unpredictable. They know that they can far more easily adjust themselves than the constraints under which they live, and that they should work on this continuously, not only for the sake of their own happiness and of those they love and who depend on them, but also for the sake of the ‘we’ attitude that respects the constants on which our values depend, and which does its best to preserve them.
This reminded me a good deal of The Arrogance of Humanism, as it cautioned a similarly humble and pragmatic approach to solving the various problems faced by modern humans.
April 9, 2016
A comparatively easy read compared to some of Scruton's more philosophical works. Here, Scruton identifies several "fallacies" that plague the unbridled optimist and then demonstrates how they can be corrected with a healthy dose of pessimism. You don't have to read between the line too much to realize the optimists have many similarities to big government progressives. Whether that's the intention or not, using pessimism in the way Scruton suggests will come easier for those with conservative disposition.
October 18, 2013
Very good. Scruton attacks the optimism of the Left, recommending a Burkean pessimism and caution.
July 31, 2016
Throughout the Goodreads review page, many have pointed out Scruton's conservative arguments. I agree, but I want to reiterate an important point that others also pointed out or implied. Namely, Scruton, indeed, holds conservative viewpoints. However, this does not equate with, e.g., the typical Trump supporter. Parse "conservative," and, I believe, one might understand Scruton's viewpoints better--his chief concern lies in conserving, conserving the relative political and social stability that we hold so dear.
I agree strongly with Scruton's emphasis to conserve this stability and freedom-par-rules, and I applaud his delineation of the fallacies rife in modern and recent discourses. However, I do think Scruton overlooked certain arguments that leave his arguments a little unsatisfactory. For example, the zero-sum fallacy: I agree wholeheartedly that many people incorrectly posit their failures to some other group that seems to enjoy success. However, Scruton does not entertain the option that social and economic relationships can indeed have a zero-sum nature! Take, for example, the "reaganomics" that gave tax cuts and special incentives to the extremely wealthy in hopes that the trickle down effect would follow. To an extent, the wealth did trickle down--thus this does not represent a pure zero-sum relationship--however the wealth did not trickle down enough and instead helped lead to the 2008 recession and bursting of the housing bubble.
I also agreed mostly with his explanation of the "born free fallacy," while disagreeing to the extent Scruton drew the argument. Scruton convincingly debunks assumptions that humans might achieve some sort of pure innocence and happiness if not for laws, regulations, societal influences, etc. What Scruton leaves out, especially in his expedient account of Althusser, lies in the fact that societal entities of socialization can (and do) indeed impose undesirable barriers. For example, for many years states banded gay marriage despite the seemingly baseless reasoning (if the state exists as separate from the Church, what explains the banning of gay marriage?). However, I do agree with Scruton that many of the Marxist thinkers went a little too far, justifying and supporting often bloody revolts for a utopian dream (e.g. Sartre's support of the Algerian war for independence).
Scruton, in the end, does seem to imply a modus operandi in which change could take place while leaving in tact the aspects of modern society that have taken us hundreds of years to earn: namely, altering our concentration to rest on the "we" instead of the "I." The "we" mentality, I think, encourages one to realize the interdependence of all not just in a society but, in fact, as humans and citizens of Earth. Furthermore, this "we" recognizes that the "I" does not know best. Rather, as Scruton practices with his regular use of citations, we should look to history and to others when questions arise instead of revolting, trying to tear down our (human's) cultural heritage. However, lest I imply that Scruton proposes a utopian vision, this shift to the "we" mentality must take place on the individual level--not on a top-down level.
I agree strongly with Scruton's emphasis to conserve this stability and freedom-par-rules, and I applaud his delineation of the fallacies rife in modern and recent discourses. However, I do think Scruton overlooked certain arguments that leave his arguments a little unsatisfactory. For example, the zero-sum fallacy: I agree wholeheartedly that many people incorrectly posit their failures to some other group that seems to enjoy success. However, Scruton does not entertain the option that social and economic relationships can indeed have a zero-sum nature! Take, for example, the "reaganomics" that gave tax cuts and special incentives to the extremely wealthy in hopes that the trickle down effect would follow. To an extent, the wealth did trickle down--thus this does not represent a pure zero-sum relationship--however the wealth did not trickle down enough and instead helped lead to the 2008 recession and bursting of the housing bubble.
I also agreed mostly with his explanation of the "born free fallacy," while disagreeing to the extent Scruton drew the argument. Scruton convincingly debunks assumptions that humans might achieve some sort of pure innocence and happiness if not for laws, regulations, societal influences, etc. What Scruton leaves out, especially in his expedient account of Althusser, lies in the fact that societal entities of socialization can (and do) indeed impose undesirable barriers. For example, for many years states banded gay marriage despite the seemingly baseless reasoning (if the state exists as separate from the Church, what explains the banning of gay marriage?). However, I do agree with Scruton that many of the Marxist thinkers went a little too far, justifying and supporting often bloody revolts for a utopian dream (e.g. Sartre's support of the Algerian war for independence).
Scruton, in the end, does seem to imply a modus operandi in which change could take place while leaving in tact the aspects of modern society that have taken us hundreds of years to earn: namely, altering our concentration to rest on the "we" instead of the "I." The "we" mentality, I think, encourages one to realize the interdependence of all not just in a society but, in fact, as humans and citizens of Earth. Furthermore, this "we" recognizes that the "I" does not know best. Rather, as Scruton practices with his regular use of citations, we should look to history and to others when questions arise instead of revolting, trying to tear down our (human's) cultural heritage. However, lest I imply that Scruton proposes a utopian vision, this shift to the "we" mentality must take place on the individual level--not on a top-down level.
January 4, 2023
A primeiríssima coisa que fiz assim que terminei esse livro foi voltar até a primeira página e reler tudo. Isso porque cada frase que Roger Scruton escreve é um grande ensinamento. A sensação que tive depois que li é que aprendi e entendi tantas questões que nunca havia parado para pensar sobre, eu não poderia deixar nada passar, e por isso a releitura.
A relação que Scruton faz com o pessimismo conservador, contra o otimismo sem escrúpulos do progressismo, nos ajuda entender o tipo de raciocínio das duas pontas políticas. Obviamente com tendência mais positivas conservadoras, afinal o próprio autor é um conservador - e por sua vez um verdadeiro pessimista. De qualquer modo, mesmo com otimismos pontuais por parte dos conservadores, ou pessimismo pontuais por parte de progressista, é possível notar que as suas visões de mundo são pautadas nesses dois aspectos.
Roger traz vários exemplos dos perigos do pensamento moderno que percebe o progresso sempre como algo positivo; o próprio termo progresso é utilizado como sinônimo de algo que se tornou melhor com o tempo. Tal falácia é um dos frutos dos pensamentos otimistas inescrupulosos.
O autor vai destrinchar cada falácia, perigo e as diferenças dos tipos de pensamento. Uma das leituras mais proveitosas que fiz esse ano, sem dúvidas!
A relação que Scruton faz com o pessimismo conservador, contra o otimismo sem escrúpulos do progressismo, nos ajuda entender o tipo de raciocínio das duas pontas políticas. Obviamente com tendência mais positivas conservadoras, afinal o próprio autor é um conservador - e por sua vez um verdadeiro pessimista. De qualquer modo, mesmo com otimismos pontuais por parte dos conservadores, ou pessimismo pontuais por parte de progressista, é possível notar que as suas visões de mundo são pautadas nesses dois aspectos.
Roger traz vários exemplos dos perigos do pensamento moderno que percebe o progresso sempre como algo positivo; o próprio termo progresso é utilizado como sinônimo de algo que se tornou melhor com o tempo. Tal falácia é um dos frutos dos pensamentos otimistas inescrupulosos.
O autor vai destrinchar cada falácia, perigo e as diferenças dos tipos de pensamento. Uma das leituras mais proveitosas que fiz esse ano, sem dúvidas!
November 27, 2015
Having been a hothead socialist in my salad days, I found myself nodding slowly & ruefully at so much in this work. Even if I'd been shaking my head instead, I'd have to have conceded that the man's prose deserves no lesser accolade than 'Olympian'.
There is a reason he evidently doesn't feel the need to 'get' any of all the Rive Gauche guff...
There is a reason he evidently doesn't feel the need to 'get' any of all the Rive Gauche guff...
July 2, 2018
"Quando l'irrazionalità trionfa, lo fa nel nome della ragione." (p. 7)
"La libertà intellettuale così come viene interpretata dagli ottimisti [è] la libertà di credere a qualsiasi cosa, a condizione che li faccia sentire meglio." (p. 9)
"La libertà intellettuale così come viene interpretata dagli ottimisti [è] la libertà di credere a qualsiasi cosa, a condizione che li faccia sentire meglio." (p. 9)
October 21, 2022
7.3/10. Scruton does well at dismantling the idealism of utopians, but doesn't succeed quite so well at arguing for his 'traditional pessimism'. His overall argument can be summed up as 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it.'
September 7, 2010
This one is going to be grand, I can feel it.
September 4, 2015
Pretty much sums up just about everything I believe about political wishful thinking run amok, but written in a clarity of style I can never hope to match.
June 13, 2022
My expectations were low but holy shit
X Philosophically sloppy on definitions and historical overviews
X Vulgar critique of Marxism that doesn't actually engage with any problems of Marxism
X superficial and shallow Euroscepticism that does not touch any of the substantial problems with the EU
X Weird rants about education not disciplining kids anymore due to some sort of educator's conspiracy
X irrational hate about transhumanists as if they were a major threat to society and not only a bunch of nerds
X Hilarious understanding of economics that makes Ayn Rand look like a serious scholar
I got this book because I was interested in Pessimism as a philosophical tradition, and while I was weary of Scruton for being a rightwing reactionary homophobe, I thought it's still worth engaging with his take on the tradition of Hume, Bayle, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Instead I got an unhinged rant about how teachers are evil, how the EU is like Stalin, and in an especially hilarious bit, a semi-justification of 9/11: due to one of the Islamic terrorist writing a piece on rejecting modernist architecture, the 9/11 attacks were "expressing a longstanding grudge against architectural modernism" embodied by the world trade centre - part of the blame for Islamic terrorism lies with architects according to Scruton. (p.144-145)
I wanted to end my rant by saying that it might be worth reading this book to understand the British Tory Elite's thinking, as Tory radicals like Hannan have engaged with Scruton extensively. But I can't even recommend it for that purpose, as it is also badly structured, poorly written and unengaging - being a big name in aesthetics apparently frees Scruton from editorial scrutiny.
I want my money back.
X Philosophically sloppy on definitions and historical overviews
X Vulgar critique of Marxism that doesn't actually engage with any problems of Marxism
X superficial and shallow Euroscepticism that does not touch any of the substantial problems with the EU
X Weird rants about education not disciplining kids anymore due to some sort of educator's conspiracy
X irrational hate about transhumanists as if they were a major threat to society and not only a bunch of nerds
X Hilarious understanding of economics that makes Ayn Rand look like a serious scholar
I got this book because I was interested in Pessimism as a philosophical tradition, and while I was weary of Scruton for being a rightwing reactionary homophobe, I thought it's still worth engaging with his take on the tradition of Hume, Bayle, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Instead I got an unhinged rant about how teachers are evil, how the EU is like Stalin, and in an especially hilarious bit, a semi-justification of 9/11: due to one of the Islamic terrorist writing a piece on rejecting modernist architecture, the 9/11 attacks were "expressing a longstanding grudge against architectural modernism" embodied by the world trade centre - part of the blame for Islamic terrorism lies with architects according to Scruton. (p.144-145)
I wanted to end my rant by saying that it might be worth reading this book to understand the British Tory Elite's thinking, as Tory radicals like Hannan have engaged with Scruton extensively. But I can't even recommend it for that purpose, as it is also badly structured, poorly written and unengaging - being a big name in aesthetics apparently frees Scruton from editorial scrutiny.
I want my money back.
January 11, 2026
A very sensible way of thinking is put forward here about how to navigate the world - incremental change and negotiation in good faith and with a sense of neighbourliness, never purely for its own sake, and kept grounded by healthy “doses” of pessimism.
My only hesitation stopping me giving it five stars is that the very sensible lessons and recommendations contained within are also applicable to sensible people on the centre-left as well as the right, but it’s written with a bit of an assumption that people of that persuasion wouldn’t be that interested in what it advocates - which I don’t think is the case.
Also appreciated the many references provided for further reading - the author is at pains not to take credit for ideas not originated by him and it gives a window for further study into the topics.
Well written - to be understood, rather than drowning the reader in indecipherable waffle.
My only hesitation stopping me giving it five stars is that the very sensible lessons and recommendations contained within are also applicable to sensible people on the centre-left as well as the right, but it’s written with a bit of an assumption that people of that persuasion wouldn’t be that interested in what it advocates - which I don’t think is the case.
Also appreciated the many references provided for further reading - the author is at pains not to take credit for ideas not originated by him and it gives a window for further study into the topics.
Well written - to be understood, rather than drowning the reader in indecipherable waffle.
June 25, 2023
Me being as optimistic as possible to own the conservatives >:D
August 3, 2025
Scruton is great at diagnosing, explaining and exposing the problems of leftism, but his solutions in the final chapters fell flat.
January 31, 2023
Goed geschreven en daardoor plezierig om te lezen. Helaas is 80% van het boek is te ongenuanceerd, maar als je je best doet kan je er nog wel wat van opsteken.
Read
June 19, 2013Roger Scruton has some odd notions about the Bible. He seems not to realize that the believer’s hope is in God and as a consequence is a bit down on Jeremiah; Jeremiah is a pessimist in ways Scruton does not want to be. But still Scruton wants to use pessimism. He uses pessimism to show how it helps to avoid seven fallacies that are in the world today. While Scruton is a bit screwy on his use of Scripture, the good news is that he uses Scripture very little in this book—mostly near the end.
What is good about this book is how he deploys pessimism to expose the fallacies.
#1 – The Best Case fallacy is a common one. You know how you are told to expect the best and plan for the worst? Well this is the fallacy where you expect the best and plan for the best and don’t think about the worst at all. What makes this one interesting is where Scruton finds it occurring.
#2 – The Born Free fallacy is the notion that freedom is about being without constraints. Natural is better; follow your heart. But we need customs, tradition, the gradual accretion of ways and means we call culture. Inhibitions allow us to live together in a civilized way. A certain pessimism, you see, about human abilities, human reason and human nature is in order.
#3 – The Utopian fallacy is easy to guess. What Scruton also delves into here a bit is why people can believe and proceed on the basis of such errors. How can people think things are perfectible? And yet they are still with us . . . after all the failed revolutions. Pessimism tells you this world is not going to be perfected and attempting final solutions only makes it worse.
#4 – The Zero Sum fallacy is the one in which people assume that if somebody gets ahead, they did it at the expense of somebody else. The Republicans jumped all over a statement betraying this fallacy during their recent convention. How does pessimism help here? Read the book.
#5 – The Planning fallacy is a harder one to get, but goes hand in hand with all the ones before it. It’s the idea that top-down management is the only way to make things work. Competing ideas only lead to confusion, people are led to believe. It favors oligarchy, you see. A bit of pessimism about anybody on a crusade is what is needed.
#6 The Moving Spirit fallacy is the idea that things are as they are now out of some inexpressible necessity to which all must bow. Get with the times, recognize the consensus, don’t object to what people think everybody is doing because such must be. Take this one to the Evangelicals—as well as the previous.
#7 The Aggregation fallacy he puts nicely when he explains that these people will tell you, if you like chocolate, ketchup and cherries that the best thing then is to combine all three. Or the old: what’s better than the sound of one accordion? The sound of two (which happens to be true, but think of it in terms of the chap who bought a fuel-efficient heater and cut his fuel consumption in half; the next day he went to the store to buy a second and save himself on fuel altogether). Scruton makes an accurate and snide remark about American palates and the combinations perpetrated by people here, but also about the French notion of combining liberty and equality, something even Americans may be persuaded to think about.
None of these fallacies have passed an expiration date, and having them explained and illustrated by Roger Scruton, it seems to me, will give you a certain clarity of perception which in the present condition is no small thing. It isn’t as cheerless as it sounds, actually: it is kind of an exposition of the underlying philosophy of Puddleglum, and can anybody who knows the arc of Puddleglum’s story fail to see the value of that? Next time I read The Silver Chair I’ll have to see how many of these fallacies are there exposed.
What is good about this book is how he deploys pessimism to expose the fallacies.
#1 – The Best Case fallacy is a common one. You know how you are told to expect the best and plan for the worst? Well this is the fallacy where you expect the best and plan for the best and don’t think about the worst at all. What makes this one interesting is where Scruton finds it occurring.
#2 – The Born Free fallacy is the notion that freedom is about being without constraints. Natural is better; follow your heart. But we need customs, tradition, the gradual accretion of ways and means we call culture. Inhibitions allow us to live together in a civilized way. A certain pessimism, you see, about human abilities, human reason and human nature is in order.
#3 – The Utopian fallacy is easy to guess. What Scruton also delves into here a bit is why people can believe and proceed on the basis of such errors. How can people think things are perfectible? And yet they are still with us . . . after all the failed revolutions. Pessimism tells you this world is not going to be perfected and attempting final solutions only makes it worse.
#4 – The Zero Sum fallacy is the one in which people assume that if somebody gets ahead, they did it at the expense of somebody else. The Republicans jumped all over a statement betraying this fallacy during their recent convention. How does pessimism help here? Read the book.
#5 – The Planning fallacy is a harder one to get, but goes hand in hand with all the ones before it. It’s the idea that top-down management is the only way to make things work. Competing ideas only lead to confusion, people are led to believe. It favors oligarchy, you see. A bit of pessimism about anybody on a crusade is what is needed.
#6 The Moving Spirit fallacy is the idea that things are as they are now out of some inexpressible necessity to which all must bow. Get with the times, recognize the consensus, don’t object to what people think everybody is doing because such must be. Take this one to the Evangelicals—as well as the previous.
#7 The Aggregation fallacy he puts nicely when he explains that these people will tell you, if you like chocolate, ketchup and cherries that the best thing then is to combine all three. Or the old: what’s better than the sound of one accordion? The sound of two (which happens to be true, but think of it in terms of the chap who bought a fuel-efficient heater and cut his fuel consumption in half; the next day he went to the store to buy a second and save himself on fuel altogether). Scruton makes an accurate and snide remark about American palates and the combinations perpetrated by people here, but also about the French notion of combining liberty and equality, something even Americans may be persuaded to think about.
None of these fallacies have passed an expiration date, and having them explained and illustrated by Roger Scruton, it seems to me, will give you a certain clarity of perception which in the present condition is no small thing. It isn’t as cheerless as it sounds, actually: it is kind of an exposition of the underlying philosophy of Puddleglum, and can anybody who knows the arc of Puddleglum’s story fail to see the value of that? Next time I read The Silver Chair I’ll have to see how many of these fallacies are there exposed.
August 8, 2011
Roger Scruton is a well-known conservative, and has a reputation as a "darling" of the right. His defenses of conservatism are powerful and thoughtful, with very interesting philosophical arguments. The book goes on exploring a number of fallacies that, in Scruton's opinion, explains why radical shifts from tradition are damaging for civil society.
The basic thesis and rhetorical element of the book are the 'I' versus the 'we' forms of behavior and its relation with freedom. This thesis, taken from Hegel and other philosophers, says basically that what makes human beings free are his interactions with the constrains of social institutions (government, religion, tradition, civility). He dismisses Rousseau's "mythe du bon sauvage" and argues that hunter gatherers were not really free men. This tribes were in a permanent state of war were compromise and dialogue didn't exist (the 'I' state). With the advent of the city-states men learn to compromise and all the constrains previously described slowly take place for the benefit of all (the 'we'). This is an interesting theses specially when explained in modern time when war requires a shift from the 'we' of bottom-up legislation and accountability to an 'I' of following the leader and top-bottom command as in our tribal past (Lincoln's suppression of Habeas corpus is an example).
The problem of the book lies in how the fallacies are applied. Some examples are obvious candidates; The Utopian Fallacy and the Soviet Union and the Third Reich (you can guess how this one works), or the Aggregation Fallacy and the Terror of the French Revolution, which says that it's impossible to aggregate liberté, égalité and fraternité (all good concepts that don't work together).
When the argument turns to gay marriage, Scruton falls in his own tramp. He accuses that gay marriage advocates use the onus shifting arguments: I want to change tradition and YOU have to prove that tradition is right. However, I clearly see here the Zero Sum Fallacy at work: gay marriage will "take away" something from traditional heterosexual marriage, he thinks.
In other instances, he just throws an opinion without really explaining it. Keynes is dismissed for his "in the long term, we are all dead" as a Best Case Fallacy. He mentions in a footnote that the state injection of money is only in emergency cases, but then fails to explain why the Keynessian theories are a case of this fallacy (to his favor, he talks about the indefinite borrowing, but I don't think this is really what Keynes theories teach). This goes on with a defense of completely unregulated markets where information on prices is organic. Any regulation will kill this "information database" (the Planning Fallacy). Of course he doesn't discuss monopolies or international corporation and how those, left unregulated, completely distort the market that he defends.
Another fallacious argumentation are his attacks on American intellectuals (Chomsky at al.) for exactly the same reasons that he defends the American system. America, he says, is a free society were dissent is part of the system and helps improve it from "below". But then, he attacks Chomsky exactly for that reason, he is critical of the system and policies in the US. Isn't that suppose to improve it, in Scruton's opinion? There are many other instances that can be found in the book (divorce, abortion, single moms families, equality in schools , etc).
In any case, the book is well written and has some very interesting insights on the mechanisms of civil society, but it's important to have in mind his political agenda (he dismissed second hand smoking throughout the book, just do some research on his relation with the tobacco industry).
The lack of index is very frustrating.
The basic thesis and rhetorical element of the book are the 'I' versus the 'we' forms of behavior and its relation with freedom. This thesis, taken from Hegel and other philosophers, says basically that what makes human beings free are his interactions with the constrains of social institutions (government, religion, tradition, civility). He dismisses Rousseau's "mythe du bon sauvage" and argues that hunter gatherers were not really free men. This tribes were in a permanent state of war were compromise and dialogue didn't exist (the 'I' state). With the advent of the city-states men learn to compromise and all the constrains previously described slowly take place for the benefit of all (the 'we'). This is an interesting theses specially when explained in modern time when war requires a shift from the 'we' of bottom-up legislation and accountability to an 'I' of following the leader and top-bottom command as in our tribal past (Lincoln's suppression of Habeas corpus is an example).
The problem of the book lies in how the fallacies are applied. Some examples are obvious candidates; The Utopian Fallacy and the Soviet Union and the Third Reich (you can guess how this one works), or the Aggregation Fallacy and the Terror of the French Revolution, which says that it's impossible to aggregate liberté, égalité and fraternité (all good concepts that don't work together).
When the argument turns to gay marriage, Scruton falls in his own tramp. He accuses that gay marriage advocates use the onus shifting arguments: I want to change tradition and YOU have to prove that tradition is right. However, I clearly see here the Zero Sum Fallacy at work: gay marriage will "take away" something from traditional heterosexual marriage, he thinks.
In other instances, he just throws an opinion without really explaining it. Keynes is dismissed for his "in the long term, we are all dead" as a Best Case Fallacy. He mentions in a footnote that the state injection of money is only in emergency cases, but then fails to explain why the Keynessian theories are a case of this fallacy (to his favor, he talks about the indefinite borrowing, but I don't think this is really what Keynes theories teach). This goes on with a defense of completely unregulated markets where information on prices is organic. Any regulation will kill this "information database" (the Planning Fallacy). Of course he doesn't discuss monopolies or international corporation and how those, left unregulated, completely distort the market that he defends.
Another fallacious argumentation are his attacks on American intellectuals (Chomsky at al.) for exactly the same reasons that he defends the American system. America, he says, is a free society were dissent is part of the system and helps improve it from "below". But then, he attacks Chomsky exactly for that reason, he is critical of the system and policies in the US. Isn't that suppose to improve it, in Scruton's opinion? There are many other instances that can be found in the book (divorce, abortion, single moms families, equality in schools , etc).
In any case, the book is well written and has some very interesting insights on the mechanisms of civil society, but it's important to have in mind his political agenda (he dismissed second hand smoking throughout the book, just do some research on his relation with the tobacco industry).
The lack of index is very frustrating.
October 5, 2022
Din când în când e necesar un gânditor cu G precum britanicul Roger Scruton care să aplice un croșeu de dreapta cărților de dezvoltare personală de două parale și falselor lor rețete de fericire și succes. Din acest punct de vedere (și nu numai), ultima sa carte tradusă la Editura Humanitas anul acesta - "Foloasele pesimismului și pericolele falsei speranțe" - este un real tur de forță.
Nu vă speriați! Contrar așteptărilor create de titlu, conținutul cărții nu este deloc unul demoralizant, dimpotrivă. Roger Scruton ne invită la moderație prin temperarea euforiilor, la pragmatism prin adecvarea la realitate. Cuvintele lui vorbesc de la sine:
"Pesimiștii totali, al căror pesimism sărăcește fața luminoasă a lumii, care nu se lasă înveseliți de nimic, nici măcar de perspectiva propriei dispariții finale, sunt personaje neatrăgătoare - atât pentru ei înșiși, cât și pentru cei din jur. Oamenii cu adevărat veseli, pe de altă parte, care iubesc viața și sunt recunoscători că au primit-o, au mare nevoie de pesimism, în doze suficient de mici pentru a fi digerabile, dar suficient de convingătoare pentru a semnala nebunia care îi înconjoară și care, altfel, le-ar otrăvi bucuriile."
Dar cartea nu se rezumă doar la acest aspect. Roger Scruton face o incursiune în istorie și economie și ne demonstrează, pe puncte, de ce gândirea utopică are întotdeauna efectul invers decât cel scontat. Pe gânditorii utopici el îi mai numește "optimiști fără scrupule" și afirmă că, oricât de nobilă ar fi viziunea lor, ei nu par să realizeze că drumul spre iad e pavat cu intenții bune. Astfel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau nu se gândea că ideile utopice din "Contractul social" vor fi pervertite de iacobini în teroarea ce a urmat Revoluției Franceze. De asemenea, Karl Marx, care își dorea o revoluție, nici în cele mai negre coșmaruri nu cred că și-ar fi imaginat cât de sângeroase aveau să fie revoluția și consecințele ei, așa cum știm din istoria comunismului. Și exemplele continuă.
De la Roger Scruton mai aflăm de ce nu ne naștem liberi, cum suntem tentați să credem, de ce sloganul "libertate, egalitate, fraternitate" e uneori un panou publicitar atrăgător în spatele căruia se ascut cuțite, cum Jean-Paul Sartre și alți intelectuali din generația lui făceau apologia Gulagului din cafenelele pariziene și cum o bună parte din elita academică actuală a Europei provine din foști studenți radicali (vedeți protestele studențești de la Paris din 1968) care, prin ideile expuse în tezele lor, au pretenția de deținători ai adevărului absolut, sunt, deci, impermeabili la critică și își construiesc din pseudo-limbajul lor științific "o armură de non-sens".
O carte deschizătoare de minți! De neratat!
Nu vă speriați! Contrar așteptărilor create de titlu, conținutul cărții nu este deloc unul demoralizant, dimpotrivă. Roger Scruton ne invită la moderație prin temperarea euforiilor, la pragmatism prin adecvarea la realitate. Cuvintele lui vorbesc de la sine:
"Pesimiștii totali, al căror pesimism sărăcește fața luminoasă a lumii, care nu se lasă înveseliți de nimic, nici măcar de perspectiva propriei dispariții finale, sunt personaje neatrăgătoare - atât pentru ei înșiși, cât și pentru cei din jur. Oamenii cu adevărat veseli, pe de altă parte, care iubesc viața și sunt recunoscători că au primit-o, au mare nevoie de pesimism, în doze suficient de mici pentru a fi digerabile, dar suficient de convingătoare pentru a semnala nebunia care îi înconjoară și care, altfel, le-ar otrăvi bucuriile."
Dar cartea nu se rezumă doar la acest aspect. Roger Scruton face o incursiune în istorie și economie și ne demonstrează, pe puncte, de ce gândirea utopică are întotdeauna efectul invers decât cel scontat. Pe gânditorii utopici el îi mai numește "optimiști fără scrupule" și afirmă că, oricât de nobilă ar fi viziunea lor, ei nu par să realizeze că drumul spre iad e pavat cu intenții bune. Astfel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau nu se gândea că ideile utopice din "Contractul social" vor fi pervertite de iacobini în teroarea ce a urmat Revoluției Franceze. De asemenea, Karl Marx, care își dorea o revoluție, nici în cele mai negre coșmaruri nu cred că și-ar fi imaginat cât de sângeroase aveau să fie revoluția și consecințele ei, așa cum știm din istoria comunismului. Și exemplele continuă.
De la Roger Scruton mai aflăm de ce nu ne naștem liberi, cum suntem tentați să credem, de ce sloganul "libertate, egalitate, fraternitate" e uneori un panou publicitar atrăgător în spatele căruia se ascut cuțite, cum Jean-Paul Sartre și alți intelectuali din generația lui făceau apologia Gulagului din cafenelele pariziene și cum o bună parte din elita academică actuală a Europei provine din foști studenți radicali (vedeți protestele studențești de la Paris din 1968) care, prin ideile expuse în tezele lor, au pretenția de deținători ai adevărului absolut, sunt, deci, impermeabili la critică și își construiesc din pseudo-limbajul lor științific "o armură de non-sens".
O carte deschizătoare de minți! De neratat!
August 1, 2016
Un libro malo. Roger Scruton confunde política y moral con ontología, por un lado, y pesimismo filosófico con escepticismo, por otro lado. Lo único que queda claro en este conjunto de ensayos mal articulados es la postura política del autor: es un conservador británico, un reaccionario dogmático. Cuando se refiere al uso saludable del pesimismo no alude a la depuración argumental. No se trata de separar argumentos fuertes de argumentos débiles que estén ocultando una toma de posición previa, subjetiva, arbitraria. Por el contrario, el uso del pesimismo contra el optimismo exagerado tiene para Scruton el propósito exclusivo de reforzar su toma de posición previa, su conservadurismo imperial, que pareciera distraerse en ocasiones por la seducción progresista del optimismo en algunas de sus variantes. Dice Scruton que no está de acuerdo con Schopenhauer por su pesimismo extremo. Un pesimismo moderado, en cambio, le parece correcto. Opino que una lectura schopenhaueriana del libro de Scruton podría sugerir que su pesimismo no es moderado sino selectivo. Depura de optimismo al conservadurismo distraído. Sin embargo, los beneficios que Scruton le atribuye al pesimismo no son propios del pesimismo sino del escepticismo. No es lo mismo priorizar lo negativo que poner en duda la firmeza de una afirmación. Si bien el escepticismo puede derivar tanto en el pesimismo como en el nihilismo, no son lo mismo el pesimismo y el escepticismo. El problema con este libro de Scruton es que le atribuye virtudes al pesimismo por su efecto moderador, por la lección de moral que para el autor transmiten, por la función de castigo que ejerce sobre las ovejas descarriadas. Si comprendiera que la depuración en sí misma viene del escepticismo y no del pesimismo, tendría un nuevo problema, una pesadilla: aplicar herramientas del escepticismo a la toma de posición previa de Scruton, su propio conservadurismo. Esa derivación sería el anti-libro de este libro de Scruton. En síntesis, opino que Usos del Pesimismo es un ensayo de propaganda, un compendio de moral para conservadores dogmáticos, un catecismo político de escasa elaboración filosófica. Su lectura, sin embargo, me parece interesante por los temas que plantea relacionados con el avance tecnológico, las falsas esperanzas de la psicología positiva, los fundamentalismos religiosos y las interpretaciones sesgadas de la historia antigua y contemporánea. Creo que conviene leer este libro junto con cualquier libro de Schopenhauer para lograr una discusión crítica, abierta, en lugar de un adoctrinamiento dogmático, cerrado.
January 17, 2018
I've never read a book by Scruton that I've not enjoyed. Mostly because he is something that is very rare today when reading about political philosophy- non-judgmental. Without needing to in any depth explain why such an attitude is harmful, I'll instead clearly testify to why it is beneficial. Scruton, in a very calm, well-structured and detailed manner explains in this book, what he views as being the source of the many ills that plagues the "progressive" movements of today.
And more importantly, offers remedies without being cynical or snide.
Instead of being a book reduced to "look how stupid my ideological opponents are!" he instead proceeds to in a way which seems inviting, not condemning, explain why the political left and their Utopian political narratives, are bound to fail from the start.
Scruton touches briefly upon several of the core issues which occupy the political left today without sacrificing clarity in his arguments, a skill which thoroughly marinates that which I have (so far) read from his work. And as a result, this makes the reader, even if they disagree- know clearly to what it is they might disagree.
So to conclude, I view this book as being crucial. Especially for you on the left side of the political spectrum. It's a crucial book for you who actually have the courage to challenge your political beliefs and want an introduction to the counter arguments against them presented in a non-judgmental and easily understandable text, by a man who I at least view as one of contemporary philosophy's most important conservative writers.
And more importantly, offers remedies without being cynical or snide.
Instead of being a book reduced to "look how stupid my ideological opponents are!" he instead proceeds to in a way which seems inviting, not condemning, explain why the political left and their Utopian political narratives, are bound to fail from the start.
Scruton touches briefly upon several of the core issues which occupy the political left today without sacrificing clarity in his arguments, a skill which thoroughly marinates that which I have (so far) read from his work. And as a result, this makes the reader, even if they disagree- know clearly to what it is they might disagree.
So to conclude, I view this book as being crucial. Especially for you on the left side of the political spectrum. It's a crucial book for you who actually have the courage to challenge your political beliefs and want an introduction to the counter arguments against them presented in a non-judgmental and easily understandable text, by a man who I at least view as one of contemporary philosophy's most important conservative writers.
August 13, 2018
While the book contains some well-argued segments, Scruton--like many conservative thinkers--fails to apply a rigorous, consistent, truly "philosophical" philosophy to his understanding of pessimism and political theory. Scruton's pessimism is actually only a pessimism about the current state of affairs; at its heart is actually an optimistic premise: that a human society, when it determines to uphold time-honored traditions, tends to work to preserve the betterment of that society's citizens. In short, for a book on pessimism, it is sadly optimistic. For all its supposed awareness of modern anthropological and biological theory, it fails to recognize the truly pessimistic realization that humans are, at heart, beastly, and that this often extends to the supposedly civic-minded human. Scruton is not a pessimist, but a disappointed optimist, and he has yet to discover that it is often the most damaging traditions that unfortunately prove most sustainable.
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