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The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present
In a provocative book about American hegemony, Christopher Layne outlines his belief that U.S. foreign policy has been consistent in its aims for more than sixty years and that the current Bush administration clings to mid-twentieth-century tactics—to no good effect. What should the nation's grand strategy look like for the next several decades? The end of the cold war profoundly and permanently altered the international landscape, yet we have seen no parallel change in the aims and shape of U.S. foreign policy. The Peace of Illusions intervenes in the ongoing debate about American grand strategy and the costs and benefits of "American empire." Layne urges the desirability of a strategy he calls "offshore balancing": rather than wield power to dominate other states, the U.S. government should engage in diplomacy to balance large states against one another. The United States should intervene, Layne asserts, only when another state threatens, regionally or locally, to destroy the established balance. Drawing on extensive archival research, Layne traces the form and aims of U.S. foreign policy since 1940, examining alternatives foregone and identifying the strategic aims of different administrations. His offshore-balancing notion, if put into practice with the goal of extending the "American Century," would be a sea change in current strategy. Layne has much to say about present-day governmental decision making, which he examines from the perspectives of both international relations theory and American diplomatic history.
304 pages, Hardcover
First published March 24, 2006
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June 22, 2020
A modern classic of international relations theory. Worth asking, as the New Left Review did: Why is it that the most interesting academic critiques of US imperialism have come from the conservative camp?
Layne here captures the almost religious adherence to Wilsonian liberalism, an all consuming force in US foreign policy beginning in earnest during WW1, threading through policymaking in the present day, across both parties of the ruling class. In its rapacious pursuit of the Open Door (the book draws heavily from William Appleman Williams and Melvyn Leffler) the US has attempted to prevent becoming a garrison state, at the price of become a national security one (spot the difference), overstretched abroad to the detriment of domestic health while creating new threats and animosities in territories that no serious person could identify as posing significant security threats. Layne posits neoclassical realism as policy guidance, suggesting that nothing short of an intellectual revolution against State Department elites will stop the US’s insane and misguided pursuit of extra-regional hegemony.
Layne here captures the almost religious adherence to Wilsonian liberalism, an all consuming force in US foreign policy beginning in earnest during WW1, threading through policymaking in the present day, across both parties of the ruling class. In its rapacious pursuit of the Open Door (the book draws heavily from William Appleman Williams and Melvyn Leffler) the US has attempted to prevent becoming a garrison state, at the price of become a national security one (spot the difference), overstretched abroad to the detriment of domestic health while creating new threats and animosities in territories that no serious person could identify as posing significant security threats. Layne posits neoclassical realism as policy guidance, suggesting that nothing short of an intellectual revolution against State Department elites will stop the US’s insane and misguided pursuit of extra-regional hegemony.
October 5, 2024
There is a bit too much re-hashing that goes on--the book probably originated from a bunch of essays hastily cobbled together--but in all, he's got some great points about how the US's long insistence on clinging to Wilsonian liberalism in bullish pursuit of global hegemony is a debilitating, unnecessary, and unsustainable strategy.
Layne's advise for the great City On The Hill:
C-H-I-L-L. For its own sake and everyone else’s.
Then it should get out of Eurasia and focus on wielding its lusty power more locally (and keeping other powers in check by balancing them against each other) lest the empire soon collapse beneath its own economic and political excess (i.e., debt).
Layne's advise for the great City On The Hill:
C-H-I-L-L. For its own sake and everyone else’s.
Then it should get out of Eurasia and focus on wielding its lusty power more locally (and keeping other powers in check by balancing them against each other) lest the empire soon collapse beneath its own economic and political excess (i.e., debt).
April 4, 2025
Layne argues, contrary to what might be called the "liberal" account of US foreign policy over the last 100 years, that the US has pursued a goal of "extraregional/imperial hegemony" as compared to "regional hegemony" (correct), creating an international system underwritten by U.S. power and forcing conditions which make the globe open to U.S. economic penetration which is not sustainable in the long run (extremely correct)- hence why they should shift to a strategy of "off-shore balancing" instead *extremely incorrect buzzer noise*.
Funny how a conservative can get 99% of the way to an understanding of the fundamental issue, but without class analysis you stop short of the full picture. Still, it's a better critique than you would get from U.S. liberals. I know the not-so-old joke is about how every Trotskyist becomes a neoconservative in old age; maybe Layne is an example of a neoconservative who cycles back around to being a Trotskyist.
Funny how a conservative can get 99% of the way to an understanding of the fundamental issue, but without class analysis you stop short of the full picture. Still, it's a better critique than you would get from U.S. liberals. I know the not-so-old joke is about how every Trotskyist becomes a neoconservative in old age; maybe Layne is an example of a neoconservative who cycles back around to being a Trotskyist.
January 13, 2015
The most significant academic debate over US strategy in Asia at the moment is between the schools of ‘Deep Engagement’ who support the Obama/Clinton Pivot, and the ‘Offshore Balancers’ who don’t. That’s a simplification of course, but it gets to the nub of thinking about how the US should approach Asia.
The Peace of Illusions is a foundational text for the offshore balancing crowd. Written from a largely realist position, Layne offers a strong critique of the contradictory and hegemonic impulses of the United States towards Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He details how America has consistently sought to shape the rest of the world to be strong enough to stand apart from the Soviets and trade with America, but so weak it can’t meaningfully resist US authority.
This strategy has worked, Layne concedes. The US is the dominant power in most of the world, and in turn the American homeland is safe. Layne’s ‘extratregional hegemony’ theory explains some questions realists otherwise struggle with. Such as why there is such a continuity of US approach to Europe before WW2, during the War, during the Cold War and after the Cold War. And in turn why institutions like NATO have continued apace, as have the 750 plus US bases overseas continued (located in 38 countries).
Most thought these should have disappeared when the Soviet threat vanished, but Layne argues that this threat never was the real reason for their existence. Instead long standing liberal assumptions about the need for open markets overseas and fears that foreign hegemon's could destroy American liberty at home are the true origins of US grand strategy.
While the strategy has been successful, there have also been many costs. The US spends staggering sums of money on its military, finds itself committing significant troops and time to largely irrelevant conflicts worldwide, has perverted some of its sacred domestic institutions and it is increasingly the target of enmity and hatred by hundreds of millions worldwide. The question then is whether the US —can’t? /should? /must? — continue this successful but costly strategy in an Asia which is rapidly changing.
Advocates of the pivot say that to change would be to undo all the peace and stability of the past half-century. It would embolden potential adversaries like Russia or China while setting off the alarm bells of nationalism and arms racing amongst Japan, South Korea and everyone else. There’s certainly a compelling logic here. The only problem is that the changes they fear are already occurring. The pivot has neither deterred foes like China nor restrained friends like Japan. And instead of keeping the peace, the US risks being stuck in the middle and seen as increasingly weak and irrelevant.
While I increasingly find myself in the offshore balancing camp these days, this was not the classic text I was hoping for as an academic contribution. First, while he proclaims extraregional hegemony theory (and indeed the wider book) as a neo-classical realist contribution, I struggle to see how it fits such prescriptions.
Other than a preference for moderation and critique of liberalism he incorporates a wide variety of domestic, economic and ideational factors which have tended to be downplayed by realists. And it is only by ignoring realist ideas about hegemony that he can carve out the benevolent hegemon space that describes the US approach to Western Europe and Asia. That is, letting countries develop freely, while preventing any rising too high or too divergently.
At the same time, Layne’s desire for it to be a realist text forces him to defend realist touchstones such as balance of power, using dubiously broad interpretations in order to keep the faith (see p.145 on ‘soft’ and ‘opaque’ balancing for example).
I also struggled to get a clear sense of what a US pursuing offshore balancing might look like. Of course books such as these spend 20% on theory, 60% on historical case study and have about 10-20% left for discussing solutions. But still, there seemed little more than a general ‘be close but not too close’ guiding logic.
Thankfully on page 187 we get some clear suggestions such as leaving NATO, abandoning Taiwain, ending security agreements with South Korea and Japan — and one presumes Australia, though we fail to rate a mention— and doing so over a period of many years to help ensure the ‘proper’ form of inter-regional balancing emerges. Still, what the US would actually do, and what circumstances would compel its involvement are not covered in sufficient detail.In recent years other authors have since stepped in. Barry Posen’s ‘Restraint’ is a recent (2014) and significant addition to the offshore balancing literature and fills in some of the sketchlines provided by Layne.
This is an academic text, but for those interested in a serious critique of US policy towards Europe and the many contradictions within it, a policy which is now being pivoted into Asia, this is an important read. It is quite possible that in 2016 the US Presidential election will become a debate between advocates of deep engagement (led by Hillary Clinton) and those in support of offshore balancing (led by Rand Paul). Each side has genuine and substantive fears that the policy prescriptions of their opponents will lead to great power war in Asia. Which makes it hardly an academic issue wouldn’t you say?
The Peace of Illusions is a foundational text for the offshore balancing crowd. Written from a largely realist position, Layne offers a strong critique of the contradictory and hegemonic impulses of the United States towards Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He details how America has consistently sought to shape the rest of the world to be strong enough to stand apart from the Soviets and trade with America, but so weak it can’t meaningfully resist US authority.
This strategy has worked, Layne concedes. The US is the dominant power in most of the world, and in turn the American homeland is safe. Layne’s ‘extratregional hegemony’ theory explains some questions realists otherwise struggle with. Such as why there is such a continuity of US approach to Europe before WW2, during the War, during the Cold War and after the Cold War. And in turn why institutions like NATO have continued apace, as have the 750 plus US bases overseas continued (located in 38 countries).
Most thought these should have disappeared when the Soviet threat vanished, but Layne argues that this threat never was the real reason for their existence. Instead long standing liberal assumptions about the need for open markets overseas and fears that foreign hegemon's could destroy American liberty at home are the true origins of US grand strategy.
While the strategy has been successful, there have also been many costs. The US spends staggering sums of money on its military, finds itself committing significant troops and time to largely irrelevant conflicts worldwide, has perverted some of its sacred domestic institutions and it is increasingly the target of enmity and hatred by hundreds of millions worldwide. The question then is whether the US —can’t? /should? /must? — continue this successful but costly strategy in an Asia which is rapidly changing.
Advocates of the pivot say that to change would be to undo all the peace and stability of the past half-century. It would embolden potential adversaries like Russia or China while setting off the alarm bells of nationalism and arms racing amongst Japan, South Korea and everyone else. There’s certainly a compelling logic here. The only problem is that the changes they fear are already occurring. The pivot has neither deterred foes like China nor restrained friends like Japan. And instead of keeping the peace, the US risks being stuck in the middle and seen as increasingly weak and irrelevant.
While I increasingly find myself in the offshore balancing camp these days, this was not the classic text I was hoping for as an academic contribution. First, while he proclaims extraregional hegemony theory (and indeed the wider book) as a neo-classical realist contribution, I struggle to see how it fits such prescriptions.
Other than a preference for moderation and critique of liberalism he incorporates a wide variety of domestic, economic and ideational factors which have tended to be downplayed by realists. And it is only by ignoring realist ideas about hegemony that he can carve out the benevolent hegemon space that describes the US approach to Western Europe and Asia. That is, letting countries develop freely, while preventing any rising too high or too divergently.
At the same time, Layne’s desire for it to be a realist text forces him to defend realist touchstones such as balance of power, using dubiously broad interpretations in order to keep the faith (see p.145 on ‘soft’ and ‘opaque’ balancing for example).
I also struggled to get a clear sense of what a US pursuing offshore balancing might look like. Of course books such as these spend 20% on theory, 60% on historical case study and have about 10-20% left for discussing solutions. But still, there seemed little more than a general ‘be close but not too close’ guiding logic.
Thankfully on page 187 we get some clear suggestions such as leaving NATO, abandoning Taiwain, ending security agreements with South Korea and Japan — and one presumes Australia, though we fail to rate a mention— and doing so over a period of many years to help ensure the ‘proper’ form of inter-regional balancing emerges. Still, what the US would actually do, and what circumstances would compel its involvement are not covered in sufficient detail.In recent years other authors have since stepped in. Barry Posen’s ‘Restraint’ is a recent (2014) and significant addition to the offshore balancing literature and fills in some of the sketchlines provided by Layne.
This is an academic text, but for those interested in a serious critique of US policy towards Europe and the many contradictions within it, a policy which is now being pivoted into Asia, this is an important read. It is quite possible that in 2016 the US Presidential election will become a debate between advocates of deep engagement (led by Hillary Clinton) and those in support of offshore balancing (led by Rand Paul). Each side has genuine and substantive fears that the policy prescriptions of their opponents will lead to great power war in Asia. Which makes it hardly an academic issue wouldn’t you say?
September 26, 2024
An excellent book outlining the contours of American empire from a neoclassical realist perspective
January 22, 2015
This is a clear and forceful articulation of a viewpoint I completely disagree with. Layne rightly recounts how the United States consciously sought and successfully achieved great power and influence in the world, using liberal ideology to explain and justify itself. Layne thinks this is a bad thing; I think it is quite good. Layne thinks American power is inevitably bound to decline; I think that is an empirical question that could go either way. Layne thinks championing liberalism is intolerant, imperialistic, and wrong. I think that is true of all ideologies, among which liberalism is the least intolerant and imperialistic. Layne casually dismisses democratic peace theory; his explanatory footnotes are entirely unconvincing. Layne criticizes the U.S.'s pursuit of "milieu goals," i.e., the construction of a liberal world order, because he claims it is inherently open-ended and inevitably pulls the US into overstretch and needless wars. Again, this is an empirical question. It could do so, but it might not, depending on US policymakers' choices. Meanwhile, the maintenance of a liberal world order is an opportunity that the US would be foolish to pass up. Layne counsels a grand strategy of "offshore balancing" and restraint, which I think might become necessary but need not become our default choice unless and until we are forced to it.
There are other problems. Layne quotes from individual US policymakers, and then attributes their views to the US government as a whole, freely equating the motivations of individuals with the purpose of policy. That is a shallow representation of the policymaking process. Layne overstates his argument, saying that the US is seeking "extra regional hegemony." I think it's fair to say the US has sought great power and influence, but Layne stretches things when he claims the US has sought "predominance" and "hegemony." Among his worst errors is his repeated claim that the US has "stayed" in Europe since the end of the Cold War (thus supporting his argument that the US seeks hegemony there). In fact, the US has withdrawn something like 80 percent of its military forces from Europe since 1989. That is not the strategy of an aspiring hegemon.
There are other problems. Layne quotes from individual US policymakers, and then attributes their views to the US government as a whole, freely equating the motivations of individuals with the purpose of policy. That is a shallow representation of the policymaking process. Layne overstates his argument, saying that the US is seeking "extra regional hegemony." I think it's fair to say the US has sought great power and influence, but Layne stretches things when he claims the US has sought "predominance" and "hegemony." Among his worst errors is his repeated claim that the US has "stayed" in Europe since the end of the Cold War (thus supporting his argument that the US seeks hegemony there). In fact, the US has withdrawn something like 80 percent of its military forces from Europe since 1989. That is not the strategy of an aspiring hegemon.
February 24, 2009
Much of today's foreign policy literature has argued that George W Bush's administration represented a shift away from American tradition. This view has been challenged by a number of writers, including Andrew Bacevich and Chalmers Johnson, but Christopher Layne's study of American foreign policy The Peace of Illusions is one of the best yet.
He builds on the work of William Appleman Williams and particularly on his Open Door theory. That theory argues that, at least partially, US foreign policy has long focused on making the world safe for American capitalism. The security element of the argument is that if the world became anti-capitalist and Eurasia were a unified power, the United States would move to a garrison state and the American Republic would end.
Expanding on this argument, Layne says that the US has pursued a policy of hegemony, ensuring that no rival power, friendly or not, rises anywhere in the world. He points to efforts to contain Europe with NATO and to the treaties with Asian powers to maintain American dominance.
The argument of the book uses quite a bit of international relations theory, which may sound dry, but I found it succintly and clearly written. Add this to your books to read when thinking about new directions in American foreign policy.
He builds on the work of William Appleman Williams and particularly on his Open Door theory. That theory argues that, at least partially, US foreign policy has long focused on making the world safe for American capitalism. The security element of the argument is that if the world became anti-capitalist and Eurasia were a unified power, the United States would move to a garrison state and the American Republic would end.
Expanding on this argument, Layne says that the US has pursued a policy of hegemony, ensuring that no rival power, friendly or not, rises anywhere in the world. He points to efforts to contain Europe with NATO and to the treaties with Asian powers to maintain American dominance.
The argument of the book uses quite a bit of international relations theory, which may sound dry, but I found it succintly and clearly written. Add this to your books to read when thinking about new directions in American foreign policy.
December 6, 2008
An interesting attempt to use broad IR theory to account for the development in American foreign policy,this work is far stronger on its historical merits than its theoretical ones. Crucially, Layne, despite attempting to use a political science-frame work as the basis for analysis, has no variation on his independent or dependent variables! At the end of the book, I was left thinking that it was a nice historical account that could be plausible, but that we have no indication that his theory is actually explanatory.
March 17, 2013
A timely look at a different approach for American grand strategy. Even though it was written in the shadow of the Iraq War, it contains a way forward in foreign policy thinking relevant especially to debates over national security policy in an age of austerity/budget cuts.
Want to Read
August 12, 2009Does a pretty good job of making its point within about the first 30 pages. I tried to make it farther in than page 75, but I just couldn't bring myself to do it.
October 6, 2020
Re-read of a book assigned in college.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews