The book by Ian Kershaw covers in detail Hitler’s childhood, his youth in Linz, Vienna, and Munich, his military service as a dispatch runner during WWI, and all the twists of his unusual political career until 1936.
The narrative ends with Hitler’s order to send troops to the Rhineland (the remilitarization of the Rhineland). On the international scene, this act was viewed as a bold decision by the German Reich’s leader who had forced the world, especially the major western democracies of Britain and France, to accept the fait accompli.
By taking this action, not only did Hitler annihilate the remnants of the Versailles treaty, but he also gained unprecedented popularity at home.
Recent economic difficulties could thereby be forgotten, at least for a time, increasing disaffection with corrupted party functionaries assuaged, the mood of the population reinvigorated.
After German troops had entered the Rhineland zone, the majority of Germans acclaimed the ‘national leader’ whom they saw, or rather whom the omnipresent propaganda portrayed, as the sole architect of this deed, which for many amounted to a long-awaited ‘national rebirth’.
As the author notes, Germany was finally conquered.
Thus, the first round initiated by Hitler’s ambitious plans came to its end. A large-scale tragedy was already beginning to unfold.
However, the said Rhineland episode was only one of the ‘triumphs’ attributed to Hitler that helped forge the Führer myth which had initially been set into motion by his admirers within the National Socialist Party.
Hitler ended up becoming the foremost believer in his own cult and his own infallibility. His egomania, which had characterized the man from his youth, reached an enormous level. As we know, hubris usually leads to the downfall of those it possesses.
One of the main themes the book deals with concerns Hitler’s accession to supreme power.
How come a sophisticated state with an educated population became a tool in the hands of a fanatical man with primitive ideas?
The author underlines that there was no inevitability nor predetermination about Hitler, a mere beerhall demagogue and “head of what was for years no more than a party on the lunatic fringe of politics,” becoming the Führer of the nation.
A complex and unique combination of factors was required to make it possible. Several elements had to converge in order for Hitler to achieve untrammeled power over the nation. Had one of those elements been different, Hitler would likely have remained a ‘nobody’, an upstart political adventurer, who, like others before him, disappeared from the political firmament as quickly as he emerged on it.
On several occasions, Hitler had been close to finishing his political career. Even his ill-fated appointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg could, it seems, have been avoided without difficulty.
I will try to highlight some of the factors that contributed to bringing Hitler, a Viennese artistic drop-out and unlucky organizer of the putsch in Munich, to the heights of power.
Wounded national pride after the debacle of WWI, a sense of being treated unjustly by the world, a series of economic crises, fear of Bolshevism, and the desire of the German elites (political, military, industrial) to replace ‘weak’, from their point of view, democratic government with a ‘strong’ authoritarian one intermingled and created an atmosphere in which a Hitler became a real possibility.
Perhaps, the last factor concerning the grave miscalculations of the power elites and their contempt for democracy played a crucial role. Those who by their social standing were supposed to be defending the Weimar Republic were consistently working on ruining it.
In a sense, the forces on the conservative Right had paved the way for Hitler. They greatly underrated the man - his ambitions and the danger he represented.
In fact, contrary to what the Nazi ideologues had so readily proclaimed, there was no ‘taking of power’ nor ‘triumph of the will’. The power over the nation was in a certain way given to Hitler, the dynamic leader of the National Socialist Party, by the Right-wing elites.
Some of the conservatives dreamed of the restoration of the monarchy. Others favored an authoritarian government not dependent on elections. Almost all of them wanted Germany to free herself from the shackles of the Versailles treaty, humiliating for the country’s honor and burdensome for its people. Unfortunately, Hitler happened to become the ‘right’ man at the ‘right’ time in the ‘right’ place.
Nevertheless, Hitler could skillfully manipulate the conservative nationalistic elites and prompt them to do what he wanted them to do. Not mentioning this point would be unfair to Hitler’s political instinct.
The army had expected to turn Hitler into their tool, but exactly the opposite occurred.
The danger of Hitler was, it seems, underrated by the Left-wing parties as well, but, unlike the conservatives, they had not been responsible for bringing him to power.
At best, the Right-wing conservatives showed connivance for Hitler’s style of tackling problems. At worst, they directly played into his hands.
Many aspects of Hitler’s ‘program’ that hit home - such as the necessity to return Germany to its previous glory and build a strong government without having to seek the approval of parliament - would have been on the agenda of any German nationalist party had they gained power.
What distinguished Hitler from other politicians of the extreme Right was the image of a man, dynamic and capable of getting stuff done, that he and his supporters managed to convey.
If Hitler and his party fed on socio-economic problems, the first years of the Third Reich, too, saw the signs of social unrest in German society. People felt increasingly tired by the violent behavior of the Nazi activists (street pogroms, random beatings, and killings), but Hitler was spared the consequences of this disaffection. Such brutal actions kept being attributed to others.
A few words about Hitler’s personality.
He detested any formal routine and avoided submitting himself to regular working hours. Ministers would have to wait before obtaining the opportunity to discuss urgent affairs with Hitler. Such aloofness, or “the type of dilettante lifestyle”, as Kershaw calls it, helped stress his special standing. Goebbels and Göring were among the few of Hitler's henchmen who enjoyed easy access to their leader.
Hitler gobbled up newspapers, especially those containing the most vitriolic anti-Semitic attacks, ideas of ‘racial purity’ and social-Darwinism (life is a constant struggle, "either-or" principle, etc.).
When reading books, Hitler would look for the confirmation of his prejudices and preconceptions. Thus, he sought passages that would shore up his anti-Marxism and his hatred of Jews. Both obsessions became somewhat interrelated in his mind and, along with the idea of ‘living-space’ in the East for the German people, formed his ‘world-view’ reeking of the emotions of hatred.
Anything that contradicted Hitler’s preconceived ideas seems to have remained foreign to him.
Hitler could hesitate and elude taking serious decisions (for example, this attitude revealed itself at the time of the “Röhm affair”), but once he decided something, he would act promptly and not tolerate objections.
His almost religious belief in his destiny, only reinforced with the first foreign-policy successes of the Third Reich, ultimately made him even more prone to risky decisions.
Opinionated as he was, Hitler could adapt to the circumstances, at least before becoming a full-fledged dictator. He restrained himself from the attacks on the Jews when addressing the assembly of businessmen in Hamburg. They would not have favored primitive anti-Semitic rhetoric.
Hitler’s sole talent was propaganda, and he seems to have known it. He was able to scent propaganda opportunities and fully exploit them to his own benefit. Everything worked if it could bring him closer to his main goal and obsession - power.
For Hitler, “the battleground was, from the outset, the state itself.”
The ‘racial’ ideas on which he expanded in his speeches and articles (crude concepts that assumed their legal form as the infamous Nuremberg Laws) would likely have been regarded by many as preposterous had the social climate in Germany been different.
To sum up, this partial biography of Adolf Hitler is balanced and well-researched.
However, in my opinion, it would have benefited from some pruning and, perhaps, certain restructuring. The book gets repetitive too often. Frequent rewordings of the same theses make otherwise accessible work inordinately long.
For example, the author duly explains that only the complex interplay between many factors, unique for Germany, made Hitler possible. He repeats the explanation after several pages and continues doing it afterward, hammering into the reader the same thoughts and ideas.