City Limits

by Paul E. Peterson

Winner of the 1981 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for the best book published in the United States on government, politics, or international affairs.

" City Limits radically reinterprets urban politics by deriving its dominant forces from the logic of the American federal structure. It is thereby able to explain some pervasive tendencies of urban political outcomes that are puzzling or scarcely noticed at all when cities are viewed as autonomous units, outside the federal framework. Professor Peterson's analysis is imaginativelyfor conceived and skillfully carried through. His beautifully finished volume will lastingly alter our understanding of urban affairs in America."—from the citation by the selection committee for the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award

Genres: Politics, Political Science, Nonfiction, Urban Studies, Academic, Grad School

284 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1981

Reviews

[Frank Stein · Rating 5 out of 5]

Although it opens with the usual poli-sci gobbeldygook, this book quickly asserts and ably defends some fascinating theories about the nature of urban politics in the American federalist system. While other writers like Dahl and Stone studied the American city as if it was an isolated city-state, Peterson shows that the ability of people to "vote with their feet" limits most urban politics to simple allocational issues, such as who gets hired and fired and which neighborhood has to suffer a new freeway.

He demonstrates and explains why urban taxes are so regressive, namely, that the "median voter," so celebrated by Anthony Downs and others, in most cities has a negative "benefit-tax" ratio, because services like police and welfare are mainly concerned with people at the bottom of the distribution. Therefore, to ameliroate the strain on the median voter, the city becomes predominatley concerned with retaining wealthy individuals who pay for the rest of society, and most city resources are aimed not at the median voter but at attracting and retaining the wealthier group that is always threatening to move. Larger political groupings without the "right of exit," such as the federal governmnet, can afford to be more progressive in taxation and more redistributionist in provisions. This explains why local taxes are 25% user fees and why 45% of state revenue comes from sales taxes, while the fed relies on circa 40% progressive income taxes, and it also explains why local taxes supply almost none of the funding for redistributionist policies.

This may seem kind of obvious, but Peterson draws all sorts of fascinating corrollaries from these insights, helping to explain everything from the failure of Johnson's "Creative Federalism" and Community Action Program, to the ultimately futile redistributionist policies of municipal unions (higher wages in a city with limited wiggle room usually lead to fewer workes and fairly constant total expenditures).

This book is almost as good as William Fischel's "The Homevoter Hypothesis" in explaining local politics and economics. I recommend it to anyone

[Dylan Groves · Rating 3 out of 5]

urban politics doesn't matter

[sheeya · Rating 3 out of 5]

def disagree with some of his arguments but a good read nonetheless for anyone interested in urban politics -- though i think you should pair it with other urban studies readings to get a more balanced perspective (bros very conservative)

[Ietrio · Rating 1 out of 5]

Here is a governmental bureaucrat who will bamboozle you into knowing why some bureaucrat in a far away state knows better than you what should be allowed to happen in your town.

[Opossum · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book really had me at times but it did become a bit disagreeable. Very important read though, would recommend to people who want to know more about urban politics.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 5 out of 5]

A terrific thought-provoking work. I am not sure that its key points are valid, but the work gets one to thinking about the limits of cities' power. The central point is pretty simple. Taxpayers will do a cost-benefit analysis of how their tax dollars are being used. If they see benefits to themselves of how their tax dollars are employed, they will stay. If they do not approve, they will vote with their feet and leave, thus reducing the community's tax base. The effect on local communities? They'll want to keep their tax base as happy as they can.

One implication? No redistributive policy, where the taxes of those who make up the major part of the tax base are used to assist those who have few resources. On the other hand, the tax base would be quite pleased to see their taxes used for purposes that they believe would benefit them.

In the end, cities' power is "limited" by the desire to please the tax base. Actual data for this thesis are somewhat mixed. Again, though, a very thought-provoking work. . . .

[Sarah Giammo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really powerful book that offers a thought provoking, foundational understanding of how cities function and the constraints by which they are limited.