Though often tedious, this is a real feast for those interested in business or legal history.
Mann is great at relating a world of bankruptcy so different from our own its hard to imagine and at times even hard to explain. For one, until Pennsylvania enacted a temporary bankruptcy statute in 1785, there was really no such thing as "bankruptcy," where one's old debts were discharged. Before that there were a host of "insolvency" statutes, where debtors could be released from jail if they pledged their property or sometimes indentured themselves to their creditors, sometimes for up to seven years. "Gaol Delivery Statutes" and "Poor Debtors' Oaths" worked on similar principles for the impoverished insolvent, but none of these actually removed the old debts.
Of course in this time, jail was a common end for bankrupts, and, strangely, since the goal of jail was to force the debtor to offer up hidden assets or for his family to pay off the creditors, debtors were treated worse than the criminally imprisoned. The state provided them with no food or water or even a room in the jail to which they were confined. Everything had to be purchased with their ever-dwindling funds. Even wealthy debtors like William Morris sometimes had to live in the hallways and stairways until they could buy a room from the jail keepers (In the New Gaol jail in New York City, debtors even organized a constitutional system with judges, fines, and elected officers to keep order in their otherwise confused world). An even stranger imprisonment for debtors was the self-imposed kind. In the colonial era, civil summons could not be delivered to people in their homes, so many debtors would spend months or years "keeping close," locked up in their own houses against bailiffs waiting to serve process, except on Sundays, when they could go free without fear. Mann has some fun pointing out the obvious absurdities of some of these policies, which prevented debtors from working to recover and repay their debts.
Like many social legal histories, though, the book is larded down with innumerable individual cases that can become extremely tiring. The latter half of the book, when the political debates over bankruptcy become clear, has a clearer narrative. There, Mann shows that the passage of the first federal bankruptcy act, in 1800, was partially about expanding the number of Federalist judges in an accompanying act, who would have to administer all the new bankruptcy cases. Republicans were afraid that this would provide more patronage for Federalist politicians, and Virginia planters were afraid that federal bankruptcy would lead to distress sales of landed estates, which were protected under their state law. In any case, both the bankruptcy act and the judiciary act would be repealed when Jefferson and the Southern Republicans came into power. A permanent bankruptcy act wouldn't be put in place until 1898.
The book, written back in 2002, is dedicated to Elizabeth Warren, back before she was famous, and in the acknowledgements says it was partially inspired by her, who worked with Mann at Harvard Law at the time. The worst part of the book, however, is when he uses Warren to try to draw contemporary lessons from this history. The book actually shows that this colonial and early republican world of bankruptcy is almost impossibly distant from our own, and that's its most worthwhile contribution.