This book should be an easy triumph, since the author's first two volumes in his Keynes biography were unquestionably the most lucid and even-handed account of his profound life, and this book recounts Keynes at the very height of his power and influence. His "General Theory on Employment, Money, and Interest" had already begun to reshape the world of economics, and, as an advisor to the British Treasury, he basically planned Britain's financing of World War II. He also conducted the negotiations which lead to American financial support for Britain during the war and then to the whole global financial architecture after it, from Bretton Woods to the World Bank and the IMF. What could be more thrilling than seeing a genius reshaping the world to approximate the one he saw in his mind's eye?
Unfortunately, while the other books were tour de force of intellectual biography, in this Keynes's ideas are notably absent and seemingly irrelevant. The British version of this book was actually titled "Fighting for Britain," and that much more accurately sums up Keynes attitudes and efforts in this period. The author shows Keynes as a man with an singularly parochial spirit, admirable in its own way, based on his love for the social and political moderation of English life, which, as he saw it, steered between the Scylla and Charybdis of European totalitarianism and American materialism, and all his efforts here are really only attempts to preserve Britain's prominence and prosperity in the postwar world. This is thus more of an emotional than an intellectual look at the man. Keynes is continually shocked that Americans, and Britain's colonies, would not give all of their treasure to support Britain's role in the world, going so far as to present one "plan" for post-war reconstruction, which would fully fund Britain's imports during the war, as merely the "Justice" plan. Nonetheless, the author demonstrates that Britain's expenditures irretrievably weakened the once mighty empire, and that despite Keynes attempts to ask the Treasury to stop its "Lady Bountiful" attitude to war expenditures and to save some for afterwards, he knew, and he knew that the Americans knew, that Britain emerged from the war a damaged country.
The author does admirably document Keynes's efforts towards these ends, and is very fair in expressing the Americans and others reluctance to concede to Keyenes's demands. He does also point out the arch-hypocrisy of Harry Dexter White, the American equivalent of Keynes, who was during these years reporting to Russian agents and whose anti-British imperialism efforts were based not just on American interests but on his hopes that the Soviet Union would take a more prominent place in the postwar world. Nonetheless, the author spends a baffling amount of time on picayune details of negotiations between the two nations, including a shocking 60 pages on the post-war discussions with the US on forgiving Lend-Lease loans, which the author admits were soon made irrelevant due to the influx of money from the Marshall plan. This book does then provide a worthwhile conclusion to Skidelsky's trilogy, but I wish it was more in the mold of the exciting intellectual journeys that he demonstrated in his first two.