Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan

by J. Samuel Walker

In this concise account of why America used atomic bombs against Japan in 1945, J. Samuel Walker analyzes the reasons behind President Truman's most controversial decision. Delineating what was known and not known by American leaders at the time, Walker evaluates the roles of U.S.-Soviet relations and of American domestic politics. In this new edition, Walker takes into account recent scholarship on the topic, including new information on the Japanese decision to surrender. He has also revised the book to place more emphasis on the effect of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in convincing the emperor and his advisers to quit the war. Rising above an often polemical debate, Walker presents an accessible synthesis of previous work and an important, original contribution to our understanding of the events that ushered in the atomic age.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, War, World War II, Politics, American History, Japan

160 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1997

Reviews

[Tobi ﾄﾋﾞ · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was very well written, but also painfully American. If you read this book alone, you’d probably get the impression that the only people victim to the Japanese were Americans, the only people fighting the Japanese were Americans, and American scientists and governors built the atomic bomb alone (to save the rest of the world).

I found this really disappointing, because, more than anything, it underplays how many million people (mostly non-Americans) were tortured and killed under Japanese rule, making it seem like the Japanese needed to be stopped, in one way or another, almost entirely because Americans were being harmed. Because they were bombing American ships. And because they were kidnapping and enslaving American soldiers.

As if, if Japan hadn’t started a war across the pacific, they would’ve been practically innocent and left alone. If America hadn’t intervened, nobody would’ve.

Unfortunately this is quite a common theme written by Americans who seem to forget the rest of the world has humans in it too

This book is definitely better read as the end of World War Two in America, not for the world, and definitely not as a book about Japan or Japanese history.

3.5. It’s very well written otherwise and until I realised that they weren’t going to talk about anything beyond so American-centric that I was going to give this 5 stars. I rounded it to 4 stars for this reason

[Phishy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Historian J. Samuel Walker does an excellent job of presenting the historiography behind the traditionalist and revisionist viewpoints in regards to the use of atomic bombs against Japan. I appreciate that he has historical empathy, considers both sides, and contends that both arguments have their flaws and excellent points. I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to understand the Truman administration’s decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan by J. Samuel Walker is a great survey of the literature and opinions about the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to bring the war to an end. The author analyzes the reasons behind President Truman's most controversial decision by studying what was known and not known by American leaders at the time including the roles of U.S.-Soviet relations and of American domestic politics. He includes new information on the Japanese decision to surrender. This decision is still considered controversial today by some people. Did dropping the bombs actually save lives in the end; lives that would have been lost in a full-blown invasion. The author also revised the book to place more emphasis on the effect of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in convincing the emperor and his advisers to quit the war. I found this book to be fair and balanced in presenting the various arguments for and against using this terrible new weapon: what if it didn't work! Many facts are presented that are used to justify using or not using the bomb. Well-written and thought-provoking.

[Jeremy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read this book in college for a Cold War course, and reread it recently ahead of my new position. Thoughtful history that considers the global landscape and Truman’s thinking in the months leading up to the decision to drop the bomb.

[Mark Crawford · Rating 5 out of 5]

After visiting Hiroshima a couple of weeks ago, I decided on my return to Canada to read this wonderfully concise and balanced "post-revisionist" history of the decision to use the A-Bomb. So in the light of all the evidence, was the bomb necessary? " The answer is yes... and no. Yes the bomb was necessary, in combination with the Soviet attack on Manchuria, to end the war at the earliest possible moment. And yes, the bomb was necessary to save the lives of American troops, perhaps numbering in the several thousands. But no, the bomb was probably not necessary to end the war within a fairly short time without an invasion of Japan. And no, the bomb was not necessary to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of American troops." --j. Samuel Walker, "Prompt and Utter Destruction", p.97. The best guess is that the war would have been over by November or December 1945, by which time the Japanese Supreme Council (even the hardliners) would have realized that the best chance for the survival of the Imperial system lay with capitulating to the Americans, rather than with a Japan divided between Soviet and American occupiers. But Truman might have had trouble politically explaining why another 3,000-10,000 American boys had to die after billions had been spent on developing the bomb and a successful test had been conducted in the desert.

As for the Japanese ruling elite, they were too divided to come up with a clear position on surrender terms. They had barely absorbed the truth of Hiroshima on August 6-7 (which further inclined the Emperor to sue for peace on the one condition that the imperial system be retained) when the Soviets (who they had hoped would broker peace out of gratitude for Japanese neutrality during German invasion) declared war on Japan August 8; a meeting of Supreme Council was scheduled for August 9 and the Nagasaki bomb was dropped. Japan offered to surrender on August 10 on the condition that Emperor be allowed to stay, but American response to that condition was also equivocal (i.e. "the form of government of Japan shall , in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people"--does that mean the Emperor can stay or not?) which meant surrender was delayed until August 15.

The Americans had intercepted messages back on July 13 suggesting that the Emperor wanted to end the war quickly, so did the Japanese leadership need to be "nudged' with two a-bomb blasts killing 200,000 mostly civilian people? "Important information about Japan's weakness and growing popular discontent among the Japanese did not surface until after the war and was not available to Truman before Hiroshima."--p.90.

The great value of this book is that it destroys the Great Myth that Truman was faced with a binary choice between using the a-bomb and being bogged down in a ghastly invasion that would have killed a quarter million Americans and another million or so Japanese. It does so without putting another myth in its place: that the decision to hasten the end of the war by using the atomic bomb was anything but a very difficult decision. It was not done simply to curb the Soviet influence, although that certainly was a factor. Concern for Japanese civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki should have been greater in Tokyo, as well as in Washington. Another thing to take away is how the Japanese decision-making model during the War paralyzed and impeded diplomatic solutions, with a vacillating Emperor finally coming down decisively in favour of the Peace faction only after the Illusion of Soviet assistance had disappeared and two cities had been wiped out with a terrible new technology.

[Barbara · Rating 4 out of 5]

After a trip to Japan and Hiroshima, I'd heard many opinions about the decision to drop the bomb; and I wanted to explore the grounds for "necessity." This book was perfect: clear, well-written, well-documented, and short. It went right to the heart of debunking the myths of necessity that came afterwards. As the author says, however, no one can ever know what the real decision-making process was and hindsight (in this case) isn't even 20/20.

[Rachel Siska · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you want to know what historians have uncovered about the various reasons behind the use of the atomic bomb, read this book. I thought Walker did an excellent job informing the reader about the history of this event. It also was pretty quick paced, so it kept my interest for most of the book even though I had to read it for a class.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Truman decides to drop the big one. The war is over.

[Derek · Rating 2 out of 5]

Decent introduction to the topic, and to the historiographic record. The wishy-washy moral equivocation of the author really holds it back from being a genuinely good read, however.

[Chris Esposo · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very short book on the determinants of Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb in the waning days of World War 2. The prevailing, or widely distributed/accepted narrative is that Truman’s decision hinged on a Department of War estimate that the invasion of the main islands of Japan would yield anywhere from a few hundred thousand to a million US casualties, and another one and half million Japanese casualties, and that given the realities of those forecasts, Truman opted a “demonstration of strength” to the Japanese, by destroying two of their cities to induce capitulation. J Samuel Walker disputes these notions, and does so somewhat convincingly, though I’m unsure how this really sheds much light on the decision itself and what Truman really thought about the decision.

The most compelling data that Walker presents is documentary evidence which demonstrates no Department of War forecast to the effect of the one told in the ‘folklore’ tale for Truman’s decision making was ever provided to the President. In fact, apparently, the Department of War did have forecasts, but they were only reported piecemeal and were not a full sum accounting of what the forecasted fatalities/casualties could be. Specifically, there were answers by the principals in the military staff that suggested casualties may be equivalent to previous/current campaigns (i.e. Okinawa say), and that if you were to take those rates and aggregate them with respect to the surface area of the main Japanese islands, you could provide a sort of linear forecast to what the total cost might be for the invasion. Yet, it’s unclear whether Truman contemplated these statements much in his decision making.

In fact, the book doesn’t really conclude much, if anything at any point in the text. Which as a reader who expected that to be delivered at the conclusion of the book, to be frustrating. What we know definitively, according to Walker is that the decision was not predicated on casualty forecasts, and that analyst from the Department of War had probably concluded that Japanese ability (or will) to fight would be sapped “very shortly” from the time that the President and his military staff were chewing on the decision, so it is unlikely Truman (or his staff) would have thought deploying the device would the “crux” move to end the conflict.

In fact, there was much discussion among Truman’s staff (and himself) on what assurance should/could be provided to the Japanese Imperial institution to possibly deliver a cessation of hostilities. Here, there were feelers put out by both sides, though ultimately, those came to naught as neither side wanted to signal that they were willing to “give” anything in fear that the other side would interpret that as providing them with more leverage than they would be willing to accept in the negotiations. In this way, the ‘fog of war’ in terms of the diplomatic channels that made information opaque seems to have resulted in a kind of “Prisoner’s Dilemma” scenario, where the ‘rational’ choice was mutual continuation of belligerence.

Overall, the book wasn’t a bad read, just not a very satisfying one given the inconclusive nature of the study. It is well written, and it is definitely a worthy topic for those interested in nuclear strategy, the history of world war 2, diplomatic history, or just general knowledge. Conditional Recommendation.

[Ashley Roeder · Rating 4 out of 5]

Prompt and Utter Destruction offers a concise and balanced account of one of the most debated decisions of the 20th century: the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Rather than retelling the familiar triumphalist or revisionist narratives, Walker carefully weighs the evidence, presenting the complexity of Truman’s choice within the context of military necessity, diplomatic strategy, and moral controversy.

I enjoyed this book because it tells a different story than the one often repeated. Walker avoids simplistic judgments and instead shows how multiple factors: ending the war quickly, saving American lives, intimidating the Soviet Union, and sheer momentum in the Manhattan Project, intersected in Truman’s ultimate decision. The book is accessible, tightly written, and thought-provoking, making it a valuable read for anyone interested in World War II, the dawn of the nuclear age, or the difficult realities of wartime leadership.

[Ash · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this for my coursework and whilst many of the points Walker puts forward is convincing , he fails to be conclusive and effectively communicate his stance on the necessity of the atomic bomb at times. His view that the atomic bombs was not the only alternative to end the war without an invasion is convincing, and aligns itself with the consensus of most contemporary historians. However, his view that the atomic bombs were primarily considered by Truman and policymakers to serve its purpose for solely military reasons is less convincing as evidence suggests that political reasons in regards to the Soviet Union was much considered as well.
🤓

[Rachel Moon · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a MUST read for anyone interested in learning more about the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a college professor, I used this to teach one of my history classes. It's a short yet the most comprehensive examination of the atomic bombings that I've seen thus far.

[Alex Giroux · Rating 4 out of 5]

Concise analysis of the events leading up to the decision to drop the Bomb, debunks many notions still held today about why it was dropped. Reframes the argument and allows the reader to make a call based on the new ideas presented.

[Lucas Mendes · Rating 3 out of 5]

Just read the wikipedia, this has too much talking

[em sky-walker · Rating 2 out of 5]

Honestly it’s a decent summary, but it just wasn’t my cup of tea.

[Michelle · Rating 3 out of 5]

An even-handed take on the ethics of dropping a-bombs on Japan that allows the reader to draw their own conclusion.

[Efi Miller · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5 stars, good information just kind of boring

[Braxton Schieler · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thorough, interesting, understandable and balanced look at one of the most consequential events in US history.

[Ashley Owens · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great read! Very informative and succinct and reminded me of how much I dislike Truman.

[Maia Matson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Informative but unfortunately not conclusive. Walker provides all the evidence but does not provide a conclusion to the morality of the decision to drop the atomic bomb.

[0n-thee-wiree]

I wish it wouldve mentioned the camps full of Japanese American citizens in America, this book is just quite western centric, read for IB history

[Arianne X · Rating 5 out of 5]

A Policy Choice, Not an Inventible Outcome

The historical legend has it that the U.S. was faced with a hard choice when it came to ending the war with Japan, viz., invasion of the home islands at the cost hundreds of thousands of American causalities or use of the atomic bomb. This ostensible dilemma was really a false dichotomy that made the use of the bomb seem inevitable. Faced with this so-called choice, an invasion and a prolonged war with mass casualties versus use of the bomb gives the impression that there was really no choice. In reality, the mass casualty predictions were an after the fact rationalization for use of the bomb.

In August of 1945, Japan was a thoroughly defeated and broken nation, it was in no position to threaten the U.S., its allies or its interests. Japan was isolated and broken and its defeat was a foregone conclusion. The Japanese navy and air force had already been utterly destroyed. The Allied naval blockade of Japan left the country and its economy devastated. Rather than using the bomb, why couldn’t the U.S. continue with the blockade of Japan to force it into surrender? Though this option would save lives by avoiding an invasion and prevent horror by avoiding use of the bomb, it would take time and time was what the U.S. did not have. The real reason why the bomb was used on Japan was to prevent the Soviet Union from entering the war with an invasion of Manchuria as a U.S. ally to fight the Japanese. Top U.S. officials agreed that Soviet entry into the war was not desirable and a prolonger war would make a Soviet invasion inevitable.

With the Soviet Union entrenched in Eastern Europe and the Cold War starting, the U.S. did not want the same in the East Asia. The genuine hard choice was that of ending the war early with the use of a horrifying new weapon or ending the war with the use of a blockade which would take time an allow for a Soviet invasion of China. The use of the bomb came with the added benefit of providing a powerful demonstration of American strength and power to the Soviet Union and act as a deterrence to future Soviet expansion plans. The bomb was not needed to prevent 500,000 -1,000,000 U.S. casualties. Prompt and utter destruction was not the result of historical forces, deterministic causal antecedents or the investable course of events, it was a policy choice.

[Steve Barney · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good balanced view of the use of the atomic bombs to end the fight with Japan in World War 2. Was it really needed? If so, was it to eliminate the need for an invasion and save hundreds of thousands of lives (as claimed mostly after the fact), or to increase our political power in negotiations with Stalin? Was it really needed to end the war earlier? Would Japan have capitulated without it (almost as early anyway)? If we would have modified the unconditional surrender language to allow the emperor to remain in power (which we eventually did anyway), would that alone help end the war without the use of the bomb? Or would that, and Russia declaring war and invading Manchuria have caused the Japanese to surrender without using the bomb? All scenarios are weighed by J. Samuel Walker.

[Tanya Phillips · Rating 5 out of 5]

Had to read this book for a class in college, but I highly enjoyed it. It goes through the atmosphere during WWII and the government situation. There are many interesting things about this book, but the one thing I really remember is Truman and how he wasn't told anything, which makes he rise to presidency, after Roosevelts death, interesting. This book boarders on pleasure reading and study, but was a great read for me. Plus it has a bunch of quotes and facts surrounding the war situation and presidential situation.

[Josh Liller · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am writing a term paper on the atomic bomb and I ordered this book without realizing how short it was. For a short summary (just over 100 pages) on the issue, it accomplishes its goal. But while efficient, the brevity is quite limiting and the author does attempt to really break any new ground. Probably useful in a college classroom setting, but otherwise you're better off reading something bigger and better like Richard Frank's "Downfall".

[Chris Langer · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was assigned to read this for a class discussion. All in all an interesting, comprehensive read about the decision to use the atomic bombs on Japan in 1945. It also helps that it was a rather quick read. Would certainly recommend it to those interested in the subject.

[Bryan Palafox · Rating 5 out of 5]

Every American should read this book. Too many people have not been exposed to the real reason why the Atomic Bombs were dropped on Japan and are still under the impression that it was a black and white decision between dropping the bombs and invading the Japanese mainland.

[Rae · Rating 3 out of 5]

A pretty straightforward look at the reasons for dropping the bombs on Japan.

[Katie · Rating 4 out of 5]

In my opinion, the best book that I have read about the use of the atomic bomb.