Social Statics; Or, the Conditions Essential to Happiness Specified

by Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was an English philosopher; prominent classical liberal political theorist; and sociological theorist of the Victorian era. Spencer developed an all-embracing conception of evolution as the progressive development of the physical world, biological organisms, the human mind, and human culture and societies. He is best known for coining the phrase, "survival of the fittest, " which he did in Principles of Biology (1864). He worked as a civil engineer during the railway boom of the late 1830s, while also devoting much of his time to writing for provincial journals that were nonconformist in their religion and radical in their politics. From 1848 to 1853 he served as sub-editor on the free-trade journal The Economist during which time he published his first book, Social Statics (1851). Spencer's second book the Principles of Psychology, published in 1855 explored a physiological basis for psychology. Despite Spencer's early struggles to establish himself as a writer, by the 1870s he had become the most famous philosopher of the age. Amongst his other works are: First Principles of a New System of Philosophy (1862), The Data of Ethics (1879) and Essays on Education and Kindred Subjects (1911).

Genres: Philosophy, Sociology, Anthropology, Nonfiction

488 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1851

About the author

Herbert Spencer was an English philosopher, biologist, anthropologist, sociologist, and prominent classical liberal political theorist of the Victorian era.

Spencer developed an all-embracing conception of evolution as the progressive development of the physical world, biological organisms, the human mind, and human culture and societies. He was "an enthusiastic exponent of evolution" and even "wrote about evolution before Darwin did." As a polymath, he contributed to a wide range of subjects, including ethics, religion, anthropology, economics, political theory, philosophy, literature, biology, sociology, and psychology. During his lifetime he achieved tremendous authority, mainly in English-speaking academia. "The only other English philosopher to have achieved anything like such widespread popularity was Bertrand Russell, and that was in the 20th century." Spencer was "the single most famous European intellectual in the closing decades of the nineteenth century" but his influence declined sharply after 1900; "Who now reads Spencer?" asked Talcott Parsons in 1937.

Spencer is best known for coining the expression "survival of the fittest", which he did in Principles of Biology (1864), after reading Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species. This term strongly suggests natural selection, yet as Spencer extended evolution into realms of sociology and ethics, he also made use of Lamarckism.

Reviews

[Nick · Rating 5 out of 5]

A classic libertarian manifesto based in ethics which is only matched in its breadth by Murray Rothbard’s Ethics of Liberty which references Social Statics as an inspiration.

Herbert Spencer proposes a single maxim of ethics and justice, the law of equal liberty: one may do as one pleases with oneself so long as everybody else has the same right, even if this leads to pain as the result of adaptation of ones will to the physical and social environment. The derivation of the law comes from moral sense theory and a critique of utilitarianism a la Jeremy Bentham where it is the greatest free exercise of means for individuals pursuing ends rather than what is most expedient for a majority measuring units of pleasure to pain which is the criteria of happiness. Happiness is obtained by the pursuit of ends and since everybody is different, the greater the individual liberty of action means the greater ability to pursue and obtain happiness by ones abilities as limited by the equal liberty of others. The sacrifice of an individual’s liberty of acting for another’s good can only be the diminishing of the means of obtaining happiness. That all being the result of the will of the creator (or nature) means that all have an equal claim to their own abilities to pursue happiness, which is better secured by the granting of such liberty to everybody on the basis of reciprocity, including women and children according to their abilities. Spencer later developed an agnostic evolutionary philosophy but mostly kept his political views.

Such reasoning led Spencer to two conclusions he later distanced himself from, the common right to the use of the earth and the right to ignore the state. The former position was to the consternation of Henry George, though Spencer’s derivation of the right did not include labor establishing property as Locke argued but the community first establishing property and then making it private. Spencer seemed to move away from the position due to his later antipathy towards the welfare state and socialist movements which used such arguments. The right to ignore the state chapter was removed entirely for reasons I’m not sure of, but the merits of it rely on individuals being able to opt out of services and living independently since the right is purely negative not an obligation on others.

[Otto Lehto · Rating 5 out of 5]

This sublime book contains the skeleton key to human progress. Although it errs in a few fundamentals - as you would expect of a pioneering revolutionary work of science - it gets more right than wrong. Where it is true it is dazzlingly true. Where it utters only partial truths it does so in interesting ways. And where it errs it errs in justifiable and remediable ways. In short, there is no reason to ignore this book. To allow the vultures of history to have the last laugh and to ignore this book would be to commit grievous self-harm. Social statics may not have the last word on everything but it has the NEXT word on many things. It contains a blueprint for social progress that feels astonishingly contemporary. Our current social science needs to study it to correct its theoretical shortcomings. Our future science of ethical progress needs to be based on it.

Spencer combines an evolutionary explanation of the social value of individual freedom with an evolutionary explanation of the value of central government authority and of universal ethical sympathy. The fundamental insight of Spencer is that human happiness depends on the successful and unhindered exercise of our faculties. We have certain natural powers and capabilities and our desire is to exercise them. To the extent that we live in the brutish state, where we are in perpetual conflict with the environment and with each other, we must see other human beings as obstacles to the achievement of our aims. But to the extent that we become socialized, i.e. to the extent that we are successfully adapted to social life, we begin to derive happiness from living in accordance with social sympathies. We recognize our own claims as reflected in the like claims of others. And we recognize the value of social cooperation that harmonizes conflicting human interests in allowing each individual to achieve the maximal satisfaction of their happiness. We recognize the value of social networks, market relationships and social associations that make us capable of infinitely increasing our individuality by increasing the diversity of social combinatory complexity. We recognize, in short, the necessity of the law of equal freedom in achieving our happiness.

I believe that Spencer's ethical and sociological doctrine is right in its core emphasis on "equal freedom". And I believe that this core doctrine is well argued and presented in the book. However, it will be wise also to acknowledge two of the book's biggest shortcomings. I will argue that these are not as fatal as many people assume; and they are mostly remediable. These are: 1) His minimal conception of the state and his system of uncompromising libertarianism. 2) His Lamarckian conception of evolution and its sketchy relation to the harsh discipline of adaptation.

Firstly, Social Statistics is easy to dismiss as an outdated expression of a free market era that cannot be replicated since we have progressed as a species to recognize the value of the welfare state. There is some truth to this worry. Few people today would want to roll back the involvement in the state so far as Spencer did, e.g. to undo the public education of children or public sanitation. He was a libertarian whose faith in markets and voluntary association bordered on the religious. And not just bordered. In his most Mohammedan mood, he even argues that the "law of equal freedom" (the foundation of his entire system) was a command of "Divine Will" to which we owe our complete submission. In the face of it this seems to suggest a dogmatic attitude that is wholly incorrigible. We may differ with him on the fundamental extent of permissible legislation.

However, the "law of equal freedom" is a flexible theory. It is an abstract theory of social adaptation that can be, well, ADAPTED to serve various purposes. It can be used to criticize right wing schemes as well as left wing schemes. It can be appropriated and interpreted in different ways as the social circumstances allow. His particular conception of the minimal state is malleable to various practicable modifications. First of all, it explicitly leaves room for "left libertarian" welfare state policies such as Georgist land redistribution. Secondly, it may even leave room for non-libertarian refinements in due course. Although he wavers on this point, the logic of his argument seems to necessitate a humility in the face of our ignorance. Even if Spencer himself was convinced that the minimal state was the ultimate expression of the law of equal freedom this depends on various auxiliary assumptions that can be endlessly debated. At the same time, the theory is not open to unconstrained interpretation. On the contrary, it restricts the space of allowed ethical discourse by grounding values in natural facts. Although this move is controversial in its objective approach (to say the least!), it does not contradict the subjective and conventional side of social values (as explained by Hume). Spencer explains how the conventional side of ethics emerges from objective natural causes. I believe that even Hume would have been reluctantly satisfied with his chain of reasoning. Thus, the central double argument of Spencer's theory - that individual freedom is the prerequisite of happiness and that the law of equal freedom is the prerequisite of social flourishing - remains a solid foundation for a new ethics of social progress.

Secondly, many critics dismiss his particular version of evolutionary theory and its normative dimension. It seems impossible for us to fully share Spencer's faith in the perfectibility of human emotions and habits. After all, he was a pre-Darwinian evolutionary thinker who ultimately failed to understand the central mechanism that determines the evolution of emotions and habits: natural selection, not Lamarckianism. This fallacy commits him to embracing an unduly harsh regime of social discipline based on the conviction that people's emotions were malleable to perfection. He therefore argued, especially in his opposition to the poor laws, that imposing a harsh discipline - via markets, social norms, and government action - was the only way to improve humanity. We now know that Lamarckian processes operate on the level of ideas (memes) but not biology (genes) and that the imposition of emotional discipline does not shape human beings to perfection.

In response to the accusation of outdated and nasty Lamarckianism: 1) Lamarckianism is far from outdated. It might have seemed like that a few decades ago but it is no longer so. Evolutionary thinkers today would agree with Spencer that social evolution operates on a combination of Darwinian and Lamarckian principles. The survival of the fittest culls the unfit and the inheritance of acquired characteristics shapes social norms and habits on top of that. 2) Even our human psychology and emotions can be shaped on the level of biological evolution. We do not need to assume widespread epigenetic effects to recognize that human biological evolution is far from finished and often much more rapid than people actually understand. This will be doubly true as soon as people start implementing active gene editing technologies on themselves and their offspring, i.e. as soon as the shaping of human genome will become a normalized habit. In a few decades, human enhancement will continue Spencer's dream of the perfection of humanity. So, in sum, although Spencer slightly overstated the capacity of human biology of undertaking emotional and psychological mutations towards the perfection of social instincts, the combination of really existing Lamarckian processes (such as the inheritance of acquired habits, social norms, technologies, memes, and ethical attitudes) and the availability of soon-to-exist transhumanist technologies (such as gene editing technologies and other biomedical human enhancement technologies) means that Spencer's vision of spontaneous adaptation is still relevant.

It would be easy to dismiss Spencer as a relic of the 19th century. This would be a mistake. Although a child of the 19th century in its faith in social progress and free markets, Social Statics exemplifies a synergistic scientific paradigm that is in high demand in today's academic environment. It showcases an application of rigorous evolutionary logic to the social sciences. Social Statics constitutes a groundbreaking attempt at explaining man's place in the cosmic order that stands next to Spinoza's Ethics and Aristotle's Politics as one of the most penetrating naturalistic books ever written. As exemplified by Social Statics and the rest of his voluminous output, Spencer's "synthetic philosophy" combines natural science, social science, and philosophy in a way that exemplifies the best type of "interdisciplinary" research and "consilience" (E.O. Wilson).

Spencer was NOT a blind apologist for "Social Darwinism" but a revolutionary thinker, a humanist and a social progressive who saw the global society as a "superorganism" worth preserving and cultivating. He pioneered a holistic and interdisciplinary type of evolutionary science that feels right at home in contemporary "complex systems" thinking. He extolled the systemic power of human progress in refining our habits and norms to social life. He championed the causes of women, the enslaved, the racially discriminated, the colonized, the poor, and children. He paved the way for transhumanist experimentation and flashed, before our eyes, the spectre of infinite progress. He even entertained the necessity of an endless fluidity of gender expression. He was way ahead of his time here. Our future fate is heterogeneous if we do not completely destroy ourselves.

So, Spencer is not a dusty museum exhibit. He is not a dead relic of the 19th century. Nor is he strictly speaking "contemporary". He is a thinker of the future signalling to us from the past. In a few hundred years, as our social reality morphs closer and closer to the vision of Utopian perfection described in Social Statics (to the extent that the law of equal freedom is entrenched in institutional practice) Herbert Spencer will perhaps be posthumously remembered as the first 22nd-23rd century thinker.

[Vahid Askarpour · Rating 4 out of 5]

هربرت اسپنسر، متفکر جامع‌الاطراف بریتانیایی و یکی از شاخص‌ترین چهره‌های انگلوساکسون در سده‌ی نوزدهم بود. او بود که با مطالعه‌ی چارلز داروین، عبارت «بقای اصلح» را وضع کرد و آن را به ایده‌ی فرگشت داروینی افزود. برداشت او از نظر داروین این بود که رقابت میان اعضای یک نوع جانوری از یک‌طرف، و رقابت میان انواع جانوری متفاوت در یک محیط مشخص از طرف دیگر، مهمترین عامل فرگشت و دگرگونی حیات و صورت‌های آن روی کره‌ی زمین است. با اینکه داروین از عبارت «بقای اصلح» خوشش آمد و آن را در رسالات جدیدترش بکار برد، اما برداشت اسپنسر چیزی نبود که با اصل نظر داروین جور باشد. داروین انطباق با محیط را مبنای فرگشت می‌دانست و آن رقابتی که در نظر داشت، در واقع رقابت میان فردِ زنده و محیط زندگی او بود. افراد زنده، خواه متعلق به یک نوع جانوری یا عضو انواع مختلف آن، در رقابت با چالش‌ها و فشارهای محیطی بارها با یکدیگر تعاون و هم‌دستی، هم‌زیستی و مشارکت کرده‌اند و چنگال‌های طبیعت، آنقدرها هم که اسپنسر در ذهن خود پرورش می‌داد، آمیخته و آغشته به خون نبوده و نیست.
اما این تنها نقطه‌ی انحرافِ اسپنسر از نظرهای داروینی نبود. او فرگشت داروینی را که امری زیستی به حساب می‌آمد تا عرصه‌های فرهنگ و اخلاق هم بسط داد و اینجا هم روی شخص داروین اثر مستقیم گذاشت. اسپنسر معتقد بود که فرگشت از یک نقطه‌ی پست و متوحشانه و عمیقاً بربری آغاز می‌شود و تا یک کمالِ از پیش مقدر ادامه می‌یابد که مهمترین شاخصه‌های آن را کرامت اخلاقی و آزادی مطلق فردی شکل می‌دهد. این غایت‌مندیِ مسیر فرگشت و تقدیرِ پیشینیِ مستتر در آن، چیزی نبود که داروین بدان نظر کرده یا پذیرفته باشد و تماماً با آرای لامارک هماهنگ بود. اسپنسر معتقد بود که فرگشت زمانی به نقطه‌ی اوجِ تعالی خود می‌رسد که موجودات بتوانند از بند «احتیاجات پست تنانه» رها شوند و آزادی اخلاقی و فردی خویش را فراچنگ آورند. این امر تنها در نوعِ بشر و به واسطه‌ی فرهنگ و آموزه‌های اخلاقیِ آن امکان‌پذیر است. بنابراین، انسان از اساس تاج آفرینش و هدف خلقت است.
اما انسانِ اسپنسر هم، درست مثل الگویی که در مورد فرگشت حیات در نظر دارد، از یک نقطه‌ی متوحش و پست آغاز می‌شود. انسانِ به تعبیر او بدوی، هیچ بویی از «همدردی و وفاق» ندارد و مطلقاً خویشتن‌دار نیست. او وفاق و خویشتن‌داری را دو اصل پایه‌ای در فرگشت اخلاقِ انسان به شمار می‌آورد و برای همین تصویری که از آدم بدوی (ساواژ) ترسیم می‌کند، یک موجود خودمدار و خودخواه و خودشیفته است که حاضر است بابت منافع زودگذر و تنانه‌ی خویش (خواب و خوراک و جفت‌گیری) همه‌ی همنوعان خود را بدّرد و انگشت‌هایش همیشه آغشته به خون دیگران است. آدم بدوی در اسارتِ احتیاجات طبیعت می‌ماند و برای همین نمی‌تواند «تابع» چیزهایی باشد که «خیرِ جمعی» را به بار می‌آورند. به نظر او مقدّر است که چنین اجتماعاتی توسط اجتماعاتی با درجه‌ی بالاتر کمال، یعنی برخوردار از وفاق و خویشتن‌داری بیشتر، که به طور طبیعی «متمدن‌تر» هستند، از میان رفته و منقرض شوند. این شکل از انقراض برای او امری «طبیعی» و مطابق با اصول و قوانین فرگشت بود.
شکل‌گیریِ جامعه در نظر اسپنسر دقیقاً با تکامل اخلاق همراستا است. وضع بدوی به خاطر آنکه افرادِ آن خودمدار و خشونت‌طلب هستند، امکان ایجاد «جامعه» را فراهم نمی‌کند، درحالیکه تکامل اخلاقی انسان به مرور موجب می‌شود تا انسان نسبت به حقوق خویش آگاهی یابد و از طریق وفاق و همدردی، حقوق دیگران را نیز همچون حقوق خودش در نظر آورد و بکوشد تا خودش و دیگران در فضایی هرچه آزادتر زندگی کنند. علت فرگشت حکومت هم در اجتماعات انسانی به نظر اسپنسر همین است؛ اینکه یک نهاد اجتماعی عهده‌دار حفاظت از آزادی‌های فردی اعضای یک جامعه باشد و از آنها در مقابل خشونت قبایلِ بدوی‌تر مراقبت کند. از نظر او فرگشتِ حکومت چنین اتفاق می‌افتد که ابتدا حاکمان موقت، در مقاطع بحرانی به داد اعضای جامعه‌ی خود می‌رسند، بعد همانها نخستین مونارکی‌ها را شکل می‌دهند و همچون داریوش [کذا] مالک افراد جامعه‌ی خود می‌شوند و در نهایت، با فرگشت رو به کمال اخلاق و وفاق در جوامع انسانی، حاکم‌بودن یک حق توأم با مسئولیت به شمار می‌آید که امکان آن به شکل برابر برای همه‌ی اعضای جامعه به وجود خواهد آمد. اما حکومت در جریان فرگشت روبه‌کمال انسان تنها تا نقطه‌ای تداوم می‌یابد که همه‌ی انسان‌های یک جامعه به کمال در وفاق، خویشتن‌داری و آزادی فردی دست‌یابند. از آنجا به بعد ارگانِ حکومت به امری غیرضروری تبدیل خواهد شد و در صورت عدم وجود دشمنان خارجی و قبایل بربر، آن جوامع کامل می‌توانند وارد وضعیت «آن‌آرکی» (بی‌حکومتی) شوند و از نهایت «شادمانی» (که در نظر اسپنسر غایت حیات است) بهره‌مند شوند.
چارلز داروین تحت تأثیر همین آموزه‌ها بود که در رساله‌ی «هبوط آدم» خویش، فرگشت اخلاقی روبه‌کمال را به عنوان غایت فرهنگ به شمار می‌آورد و بیان می‌کند که فرهنگ می‌تواند جنبه‌هایی از فرگشت زیستی را به حالت تعلیق یا تعطیل درآورد.
کتاب «ایستایی اجتماعی» که در اصل رساله‌ای درباب وضع و شرح حقوق مدرن آدمی در یک جامعه‌ی شاد محسوب می‌شود، یکی از مهمترین آثار بریتانیای سده‌ی نوزدهم به شمار می‌آید و منبع اصلی ظهور طبقه‌ای از فعالان سیاسی-اجتماعی در سپهر انگلیسی‌زبان است که امروز آنها را «لیبرال کلاسیک» می‌شناسیم. روایت‌های ذهنی اسپنسر درباره‌ی اجتماعات و گروه‌های انسانیِ غیرغربی (که آنها را در سلسله‌مراتب بدوی-بودن جای می‌دهد)، همراستا با «تکامل‌گرایی» رایج در سده‌ی نوزدهم است و امروز می‌دانیم که بخش عمده‌ی آن ذهنیات هم عمیقاً نادرست و وارونه؛ برای مثال همین نکته‌ی ساده که اجتماعات بدوی از همه‌ی شاخصه‌های اخلاقی و وفاق و خویشتن‌داری به همان اندازه برخوردارند که اسپنسر آنها را به آدم مدرن نسبت می‌داد و چه بسا از حیات فردگرایانه‌ی آزادتری نسبت به کارمندِ بانک ساکن طبقه‌ی وسط لندن بهره‌مند هستند. از طرفی او فرگشت داروینی را یا نفهمید، یا از اساس وارونه فهمید و در کل آنچه از فرگشت در اختیار گذاشت به معنای دقیق کلمه یک سوءبرداشت بود! هرچند به‌شکلی متناقض‌نما توانست با آراء خویش حتی از داروینِ پابه‌سن‌گذاشته نیز در برخی جهات «داروین‌زدایی» کند و چارچوب‌های فکری شخص او را هم به انحراف بکشاند. همچنین نوع کمال‌گرایی اسپنسری بیش از آنکه رنگ و بویی علمی-تجربی داشته باشد، عمیقاً کهنه و الهیاتی است. اما دو آرمان در کل اندیشه‌های او وجود دارد که جریان‌های لیبرال و نولیبرال کنونی هنوز هم همان‌ها را سرمشق و سرلوحه‌ی فعالیت‌های خویش قرار می‌دهند: اول، حرکت به سوی جامعه‌ی کاملاً فردمحور و بی‌طبقه؛ دوم، از میان بردن و خشکاندن ریشه‌های هرگونه حکومت و نهادهای حکومتی و حرکت به سوی آن-آرکیِ شادمانِ آینده که در آن همه‌ی افراد، آزادانه شهروندان یک جهانِ بی‌مرز و بدون پرچم باشند. بااین‌حال، اسپنسر و ایستایی اجتماعی او را در سده‌ی بیست‌ویکم جور دیگری باید خواند.

[Mike · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of my top five non-fiction books. I discovered it in a footnote of Murray Rothbard's, either in "The Ethics of Liberty" or "For a New Liberty," I can't remember which. No wonder he called it the greatest libertarian book ever written. It is important to get a reprint of the first edition that includes the chapter called "The Right to Ignore the State." This book is of average length--300-400 pages--but the clarity of writing (Of which Spencer is a true artist) and the depth of thought make the pages turn quickly. I managed to complete this in just a few days, wanting to do nothing else. A truly important and excellent book. Unfortunately, "Who today reads Spencer?" is an enduring question with a clear-cut answer: no one. But you should! It is no wonder that Spencer was the most famous and influential philosopher (polymath, really) of his day. I highly recommend this to you.

[Joseph Madison · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting, and even progressive at times. Although Spencer ultimately (and unsurprisingly due to his social position) defends the privileged and their positions in society.

[Kevin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Spencer's position is quintessentially liberal (small "l" classical liberal). He starts by defending the idea that the "law of equal freedom" is a supreme idea - that perfection means getting to the point where each can use their faculties to obtain happiness without diminishing others' like freedom. I find this part of the book extraordinarily weak for two reasons: while I am a fan of (something like) the law of equal freedom, I think it is too vague to call a "Divine Will", and also, it very much ignores the role of externalities and luck in our everyday lives. (Spencer talks as if, when we are left free to act as we'd like, nature rewards us or punishes us in proportion to what we deserve, which overlooks the many situations where our "reward or punishment" hinges on luck, not dessert, factors.)

Much of the rest of the book is application of the law of equal freedom to concrete situations. This is the section I liked best, and found Spencer to be quite the compassionate liberal, not the 'survival of the fittest' champion of dog-eat-dog we hear so much about. He passionately defends the rights of women and children from restrictions on liberty (his educational thought is actually quite similar to William Godwin), defends freedom of religion, property rights, etc. Where he stumbles a bit is on a seemingly inconsistent defense of a socialistic land policty (everyone has equal entitlement to land, so government owns it and we lease it at their pleasure) and intellectual property (we can own ideas). Really, though, the same argument he uses to suggest that restricting access to land via property rights could quite easily be used against restricting rights to ideas (after all, if we all have a right to use land, don't we all have a right to discover ideas, even if someone else discovered them before us)?

Anyhow, I moderately liked this book. I'd be happier with it if it were free of the "Divine Will" mumbo jumbo. All in all, Spencer is a decent philosopher, but there are many inconsistencies and some of his arguments are a bit more rhetorical than substantive.

[Aaron Crofut · Rating 2 out of 5]

Meh, more interesting for what it's not. Going through high school, one gets the feeling this book calls for the annihilation of the weak, but really it is just the opposite. On some issues like race and women, he was ahead of his time. I think it is safe to classify this book as early libertarian, but apart from learning what it's not, I wouldn't recommend it. There are better books out there making the case for liberty. For starters, the book does not flow particularly well, so I found myself constantly fighting the urge to just put the book down, which I eventually did anyway. My biggest hangups with the content were the Divine Will justification and the supposed perfectibility of mankind. I don't believe in either, and they cause Spencer to have to justify inexpediency on morality, whereas I do not see morality as anything more than a form of rules society keeps precisely for the enjoyment of its members.

[Eric · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a book that, in my view, pretty much originated libertarian economic thought. I'm no expert on the subject though.

[Craig Bolton]

Social Statics by Herbert Spencer (1970)

[Michael Schearer · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book from an idea perspective, although it was difficult reading.