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The Illusion of Technique: A Search for Meaning in a Technological Civilization
Search for Meaning in a Technological Civilization ,Being, Freedom and the Shape of the Future
359 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1978
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313 people want to read
About the author
William Barrett
185 books86 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author by this name in the Goodreads database.
William Christopher Barrett (1913 – 1992) was a professor of philosophy at New York University from 1950 to 1979. Precociously, he began post-secondary studies at the City College of New York when 15 years old. He received his PhD at Columbia University. He was an editor of Partisan Review and later the literary critic of The Atlantic Monthly magazine. He was well-known for writing philosophical works for nonexperts. Perhaps the best known among these were Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy and The Illusion of Technique , which remain in print.
William Christopher Barrett (1913 – 1992) was a professor of philosophy at New York University from 1950 to 1979. Precociously, he began post-secondary studies at the City College of New York when 15 years old. He received his PhD at Columbia University. He was an editor of Partisan Review and later the literary critic of The Atlantic Monthly magazine. He was well-known for writing philosophical works for nonexperts. Perhaps the best known among these were Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy and The Illusion of Technique , which remain in print.
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September 20, 2015
Those book started off very strongly with a focus on mathematics and logic. It drifted into a discussion of ontology (Being) and then ended with a cold war vision of two possibilities for technology, USSR and USA. Unfortunately for Barrett, this amazing book is marred by an economic invisibility. He is on the right track, but the weakest part of the book is its second part, which affects the last part. Barrett seemed to want the second and first parts to coalesce into a third view so that we can critique the first view again. Being (through Heidigger and William James) was meant to define for us freedom -- and with this freedom we were meant to critique the rationality of technique.
What Barrett wanted was to find another point of view on human existence with which to critique the techno-rationality that the first section was meant to be exemplify. Unfortunately he was able to do this because transcendental philosophy is the basis from which this techno-rationality historically arose. He couldn't use it to critique itself. Marxism might have been able to provide a basis to inflect a different point of view with a different set of values than techno-rationality except for the fact that Marxism arose as a response to the same state apparatus that helped centralize techno-rationality in the first place.
What Barrett realized was that mathematics and logic have the same aesthetics used to form social control (as with Behavioralism) but he was able to connect their formulation with transcendental philosophy, ontology and the economic rise of the state.
I do like his direction, although his research is incomplete. What this book eventually suffers from is a lack of energy in which the last section is woefully truncated due to his lack of connection. In a major way, Barrett needs to show us how we are chained before he is able to point the way we are free. Without an analysis that would involve corporations, economics, consumerism and present day politics, his last section lacks the punch needed to explicate freedom.
Only when Barrett is able to define freedom will he be able to show us how technique is an illusion.
I believe his attempt solidify human existence on the basis on ontology in order to debunk techno-rationality was the primary failure of his book... you really can't use ontology that way because ontology is the grandfather for this rationality.
If anything this book of its time (1978) shows a philosopher who tried to do philosophy with respect to his tradition, but failed. The tools at his disposal are weak; dated. If anything this work shows us that at 1978 if philosophy were to have an impact it would need to reinvent its toolbox, which it is still in the process of doing so.
What Barrett wanted was to find another point of view on human existence with which to critique the techno-rationality that the first section was meant to be exemplify. Unfortunately he was able to do this because transcendental philosophy is the basis from which this techno-rationality historically arose. He couldn't use it to critique itself. Marxism might have been able to provide a basis to inflect a different point of view with a different set of values than techno-rationality except for the fact that Marxism arose as a response to the same state apparatus that helped centralize techno-rationality in the first place.
What Barrett realized was that mathematics and logic have the same aesthetics used to form social control (as with Behavioralism) but he was able to connect their formulation with transcendental philosophy, ontology and the economic rise of the state.
I do like his direction, although his research is incomplete. What this book eventually suffers from is a lack of energy in which the last section is woefully truncated due to his lack of connection. In a major way, Barrett needs to show us how we are chained before he is able to point the way we are free. Without an analysis that would involve corporations, economics, consumerism and present day politics, his last section lacks the punch needed to explicate freedom.
Only when Barrett is able to define freedom will he be able to show us how technique is an illusion.
I believe his attempt solidify human existence on the basis on ontology in order to debunk techno-rationality was the primary failure of his book... you really can't use ontology that way because ontology is the grandfather for this rationality.
If anything this book of its time (1978) shows a philosopher who tried to do philosophy with respect to his tradition, but failed. The tools at his disposal are weak; dated. If anything this work shows us that at 1978 if philosophy were to have an impact it would need to reinvent its toolbox, which it is still in the process of doing so.
June 3, 2017
A beautifully written book - which seems to have something to do with freedom and technology - about the modern struggle against nihilism. Although I really had no idea what Barrett was talking about half the time, I was compelled by his intellectual energy and imagination to continue reading.
It makes me wonder: what has happend to existentialism since the late 1970s (when Barrett wrote this book)? Have contemporary intellectuals solved the old problems posed by existentialism, or have they side-stepped them?
It makes me wonder: what has happend to existentialism since the late 1970s (when Barrett wrote this book)? Have contemporary intellectuals solved the old problems posed by existentialism, or have they side-stepped them?
October 19, 2024
A “SKETCH TOWARD A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY” IN THE 20TH CENTURY
William Christopher Barrett (1913–1992) was a professor of philosophy at New York University from 1950 to 1979.
He wrote in the Prologue to this 1978 book, “…I was already embarked upon a study of contemporary philosophy that sought some overview of its subject without the fragmentation into schools that usually occurs. A survey proved temperamentally impossible. Indeed, as I proceeded, I found myself lopping off more and more extraneous material. The twentieth century has a definite shape, intellectually speaking, which we seem to perceive quite clearly at times; yet we are still in the midst of it, and our vision of this shape must be partial and uncertain. More disturbing still, the pattern we discern, the significant shapes that seem to have been taken here and there, could all be reversed by the events of the next two decades and the possible collapse of a civilization that these events might bring with them.
"What I aspire to here, then, is can be no more than a sketch toward a history of philosophy in our century. And the story, I decided, could be told better in terms of certain representative figures to whom I feel particularly attracted.” (Pg. xvi-xvii)
He points out, “The fundamental premise of [Alfred North] Whitehead’s philosophy runs counter to the logic he had coauthored with [Bertrand] Russell. Whitehead holds an organic view of the universe… In the logic of Principia [Mathematica], however, all connectives are ‘extensional’---they link facts externally… Whitehead never turned back to make any detailed critique of his work with Russell…
One exception, a single paragraph in a late essay, ‘Mathematics and the Good’ [included in the collection 'The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead' in 'The Library of Living Philosophers,' pg. 671-672] is a devastating comment on the Rule of Types, which Russell had introduced into the work. The rule is a practical crutch, Whitehead observes, adopted only to make the system work. But in its actual operation this rule would make arithmetic actually unworkable! Since this rule was distinctly Russell’s contribution, Whitehead may be paying off old scores.” (Pg. 16)
He argues about logic, “The premises have already pictured the facts the conclusion would state. The conclusion adds no further information that is not already there. The distribution of facts within the universe is exactly what it was before and after we apply our law of logic. Hence the logical truth tells us nothing about the world… some serious questions occur about Wittgenstein’s own sweeping talk of ‘the logical structure of the world.’… The distribution of facts within the world is exactly what it is before and after we have applied our logical law. We only managed to come out with a different verbal statement at the end.” (Pg. 46-47)
He observes, “Humankind, conscious of its death, must also bear the burden of this mystery. Is it too great, amid out other anxieties, for us to carry? It makes us feel more homeless within the world than any animal can be. Yet is it altogether a burden? Is it not rather a gift too? It is given to us and to no other animal to stand within the mystery. It claims us as its own and we are at home there where no other animal can be. Tonight the stars shine overhead like old and reliable friends. This cosmos is ours to the degree that we are still able to be enthralled by its stupendous presence.” (Pg. 171)
He notes, “Suppose… we have arrived safely at the point where we have in our hands the powers of genetic manipulation. What then do we do with them? What kind of life do we foster? What human traits do we see, to engender? The first section of this book suggested by technique by itself cannot determine a philosophy; accordingly, the powers of genetic manipulation, were they all at our disposal, would no provide the wisdom for using them. That must come from another kind of thinking, for which a technical civilization might have become incompetent through sheer lack of practice.” (Pg. 233-234)
He points out, “It makes a great deal of difference, practically speaking, if we do believe in freedom. We are more likely to improve our character if we believe that the power to do so lies in the exertion of our will. Determinism, if really followed in practice, would tend to close off the will toward such striving. Thus it is to our practical advantage to believe that we are free beings, and our subjective decision in the matter does have objective consequences in our life. Faith in freedom produces future facts that confirm it---at least in its practical efficacy if not its ultimate metaphysical truth.” (Pg. 282)
He suggests, “The mystic is not a purveyor of new information at all. Why should he seek to multiply the items of the Many for a people who have lost sight of the One? He does not bring forward any new beliefs about particular occult matters of fact. He is simply a witness to Being, and its mystery, within which he seeks continuous to stand.” (Pg. 319)
He says in the Epilogue, “Twenty years ago, in a book in collaboration with the late D.T. Suzuki, I played a small part in introducing Zen to this country, and I have not always been happy with the results. American youth acquired another vocabulary to throw around. The ‘mindlessness’ that Zen recommended was pursued by the young in haze of marijuana and drugs. They forgot, if they ever learned, the prosaic and magnificent saying of the sage Hui-Neng: ‘The Tao is your ordinary mind.’ In recent years, I have let myself forget all about Zen, and probably have been nearer to its spirit. Stick to your ordinary mind, reader, and forget the tabs. Find your own rocks and trees.
Barrett’s often illuminating commentaries make this far more than a simple “survey of 20th century philosophy.” Although nearly 50 years old, it is still well worth reading for anyone studying philosophy.
William Christopher Barrett (1913–1992) was a professor of philosophy at New York University from 1950 to 1979.
He wrote in the Prologue to this 1978 book, “…I was already embarked upon a study of contemporary philosophy that sought some overview of its subject without the fragmentation into schools that usually occurs. A survey proved temperamentally impossible. Indeed, as I proceeded, I found myself lopping off more and more extraneous material. The twentieth century has a definite shape, intellectually speaking, which we seem to perceive quite clearly at times; yet we are still in the midst of it, and our vision of this shape must be partial and uncertain. More disturbing still, the pattern we discern, the significant shapes that seem to have been taken here and there, could all be reversed by the events of the next two decades and the possible collapse of a civilization that these events might bring with them.
"What I aspire to here, then, is can be no more than a sketch toward a history of philosophy in our century. And the story, I decided, could be told better in terms of certain representative figures to whom I feel particularly attracted.” (Pg. xvi-xvii)
He points out, “The fundamental premise of [Alfred North] Whitehead’s philosophy runs counter to the logic he had coauthored with [Bertrand] Russell. Whitehead holds an organic view of the universe… In the logic of Principia [Mathematica], however, all connectives are ‘extensional’---they link facts externally… Whitehead never turned back to make any detailed critique of his work with Russell…
One exception, a single paragraph in a late essay, ‘Mathematics and the Good’ [included in the collection 'The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead' in 'The Library of Living Philosophers,' pg. 671-672] is a devastating comment on the Rule of Types, which Russell had introduced into the work. The rule is a practical crutch, Whitehead observes, adopted only to make the system work. But in its actual operation this rule would make arithmetic actually unworkable! Since this rule was distinctly Russell’s contribution, Whitehead may be paying off old scores.” (Pg. 16)
He argues about logic, “The premises have already pictured the facts the conclusion would state. The conclusion adds no further information that is not already there. The distribution of facts within the universe is exactly what it was before and after we apply our law of logic. Hence the logical truth tells us nothing about the world… some serious questions occur about Wittgenstein’s own sweeping talk of ‘the logical structure of the world.’… The distribution of facts within the world is exactly what it is before and after we have applied our logical law. We only managed to come out with a different verbal statement at the end.” (Pg. 46-47)
He observes, “Humankind, conscious of its death, must also bear the burden of this mystery. Is it too great, amid out other anxieties, for us to carry? It makes us feel more homeless within the world than any animal can be. Yet is it altogether a burden? Is it not rather a gift too? It is given to us and to no other animal to stand within the mystery. It claims us as its own and we are at home there where no other animal can be. Tonight the stars shine overhead like old and reliable friends. This cosmos is ours to the degree that we are still able to be enthralled by its stupendous presence.” (Pg. 171)
He notes, “Suppose… we have arrived safely at the point where we have in our hands the powers of genetic manipulation. What then do we do with them? What kind of life do we foster? What human traits do we see, to engender? The first section of this book suggested by technique by itself cannot determine a philosophy; accordingly, the powers of genetic manipulation, were they all at our disposal, would no provide the wisdom for using them. That must come from another kind of thinking, for which a technical civilization might have become incompetent through sheer lack of practice.” (Pg. 233-234)
He points out, “It makes a great deal of difference, practically speaking, if we do believe in freedom. We are more likely to improve our character if we believe that the power to do so lies in the exertion of our will. Determinism, if really followed in practice, would tend to close off the will toward such striving. Thus it is to our practical advantage to believe that we are free beings, and our subjective decision in the matter does have objective consequences in our life. Faith in freedom produces future facts that confirm it---at least in its practical efficacy if not its ultimate metaphysical truth.” (Pg. 282)
He suggests, “The mystic is not a purveyor of new information at all. Why should he seek to multiply the items of the Many for a people who have lost sight of the One? He does not bring forward any new beliefs about particular occult matters of fact. He is simply a witness to Being, and its mystery, within which he seeks continuous to stand.” (Pg. 319)
He says in the Epilogue, “Twenty years ago, in a book in collaboration with the late D.T. Suzuki, I played a small part in introducing Zen to this country, and I have not always been happy with the results. American youth acquired another vocabulary to throw around. The ‘mindlessness’ that Zen recommended was pursued by the young in haze of marijuana and drugs. They forgot, if they ever learned, the prosaic and magnificent saying of the sage Hui-Neng: ‘The Tao is your ordinary mind.’ In recent years, I have let myself forget all about Zen, and probably have been nearer to its spirit. Stick to your ordinary mind, reader, and forget the tabs. Find your own rocks and trees.
Barrett’s often illuminating commentaries make this far more than a simple “survey of 20th century philosophy.” Although nearly 50 years old, it is still well worth reading for anyone studying philosophy.
Want to read
January 10, 2025Recommended by Kreeft in SOCRATES'S CHILDREN.
January 20, 2008
Readable secondary book about philosophy by the author of Irrational Man.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews