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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough
Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of What kind of (or "how much") physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible?
The book's starting point is the "supervenience" argument (sometimes called the "exclusion" argument), which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation.
Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost.
According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough.
The book's starting point is the "supervenience" argument (sometimes called the "exclusion" argument), which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation.
Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost.
According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough.
200 pages, Hardcover
First published March 7, 2005
18 people are currently reading
201 people want to read
About the author
Jaegwon Kim
23 books55 followersJaegwon Kim (born 1934 in Daegu, Korea (now in South Korea)) is a Korean-born American philosopher currently working at Brown University. He is best known for his work on mental causation and the mind-body problem. Key themes in his work include: a rejection of Cartesian metaphysics, the limitations of strict psychophysical identity, supervenience, and the individuation of events. Kim's work on these and other contemporary metaphysical and epistemological issues is well-represented by the papers collected in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (1993).
Kim's philosophical work focuses on the areas of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, action theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science.
Kim's philosophical work focuses on the areas of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, action theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
May 14, 2009
Sort of dry at times, but very thorough regardless of its overall brevity. I think Kim makes a convincing case for the overall aims of physicalism throughout the book but his conclusion ("...or something near enough") really isn't much different from that of anti-reductionists like Chalmers, though he reaches it in about a 1/3 of the pages of Chalmers book The Conscious Mind. He provides a solid refutation of substance dualism but this was something I'd already seen done many times before, so it felt a little more like watching a cool but familiar parlor trick rather than riding along on an exciting philosophical journey. He also has an very cogent and important section on the nature of reductionism generally.
On the whole this makes for an excellent addition to the ever-growing body of work on what many philosophers and scientists are referring to as the greatest mystery left to tackle (at the present): the ins and outs of why and how we have any conscious experience at all.
On the whole this makes for an excellent addition to the ever-growing body of work on what many philosophers and scientists are referring to as the greatest mystery left to tackle (at the present): the ins and outs of why and how we have any conscious experience at all.
January 24, 2008
Kim is an elegant writer who can deftly stake out deep and complicated metaphysical positions without becoming inaccessible to the reader. The thrust of the book is essentially this: we can make sense of reducing the mental to the physical in all cases except for "qualia" (i.e. subjective experience or the "aboutness" of experience).
The chapter entitled "An Argument Against Immaterial Minds" is worth the price of the book alone.
May 20, 2009
"The position is, as we might say, a slightly defective physicalism--physicalism manque but not by much. I believe that this is as much physicalism as we can have, and that there is no credible alternative to physicalism as a general worldview. Physicalism is not the whole truth, but it is the truth near enough, and near enough should be good enough."
Jaegwon Kim's account of a functionally-reducing physicalist approach to the philosophy of mind is, for the most part, clear, thoughtful, and relatively accessible, but it faces two problems.
First, his treatment of substance dualism is simplistic, shallow, and disingenuous. He mischaracterizes the dualist view, and his 'argument' essentially boils down to, "I have a hard time picturing how this would work, so let's just agree that it doesn't."
Not only is this rather sloppy, it contradicts one of Kim's own assertions: He acknowledges that his own system leaves many questions unanswered (see the quote above), and he says that insoluble problems by themselves are not sufficient reason to reject a system. Yet he rejects dualism precisely because he thinks it leaves insoluble problems. So which is it? (For what it's worth, I don't think dualism's problems are nearly as insurmountable as he makes them out to be.)
Which brings me to my second problem with the book, namely that Kim wants to have it both ways. He admits that physicalism isn't the whole story, but denies that any genuine nonphysical entities exist. He says that his physicalism is "near enough" to the truth, but it's not clear what that really means. He says that "near enough should be good enough," but good enough for what? By whose measure?
For those who are determined to reject substance dualism, Kim's account may well be the best that can be done. But those looking for a less limited, more open-minded approach may be better off looking elsewhere.
Jaegwon Kim's account of a functionally-reducing physicalist approach to the philosophy of mind is, for the most part, clear, thoughtful, and relatively accessible, but it faces two problems.
First, his treatment of substance dualism is simplistic, shallow, and disingenuous. He mischaracterizes the dualist view, and his 'argument' essentially boils down to, "I have a hard time picturing how this would work, so let's just agree that it doesn't."
Not only is this rather sloppy, it contradicts one of Kim's own assertions: He acknowledges that his own system leaves many questions unanswered (see the quote above), and he says that insoluble problems by themselves are not sufficient reason to reject a system. Yet he rejects dualism precisely because he thinks it leaves insoluble problems. So which is it? (For what it's worth, I don't think dualism's problems are nearly as insurmountable as he makes them out to be.)
Which brings me to my second problem with the book, namely that Kim wants to have it both ways. He admits that physicalism isn't the whole story, but denies that any genuine nonphysical entities exist. He says that his physicalism is "near enough" to the truth, but it's not clear what that really means. He says that "near enough should be good enough," but good enough for what? By whose measure?
For those who are determined to reject substance dualism, Kim's account may well be the best that can be done. But those looking for a less limited, more open-minded approach may be better off looking elsewhere.
May 6, 2020
Jaegwon Kim tries to find a feasible theory of mind which can be explained by physics and science. As a physicalist, he chooses a specific form of functional explanations that facilitate realizability. It is the three-step process:
1) We identify functional (causal) realization of a mental phenomenon M
2) We identify physical realizer P of the phenomenon M (i.e. type-C fibre for pain)
3) We formulate a functional explanation on the bases of 1) and 2) that aims to bridge the gap between mental and physical. Therefore, we have functionally reduced the level M to the level P
That is a different approach, that still utilizes a "folk" functional explanation that is contrasted with purely non-functional and physical explanations based on Kripkean identities that are in fashion these days (i.e. pain = fibre-C activity, consciousness = pyramidal cell activity). Kripkean identities do not explain why there is such relation, but claim that there's all to it; there is nothing else to be explained here at all and any attempt to do so is "wrong-headed".
Why does Kim say that what he offers is Physicalism "near enough?". The thesis is that we cannot functionally reduce phenomenal qualities like the feeling of pain or experience of red. In other words, it retains qualia as something non-explainable in physical terms. He then follows Chalmers in his separation while making use of functional explanations that explain, but do not reduce qualitative phenomena to physical properties.
1) We identify functional (causal) realization of a mental phenomenon M
2) We identify physical realizer P of the phenomenon M (i.e. type-C fibre for pain)
3) We formulate a functional explanation on the bases of 1) and 2) that aims to bridge the gap between mental and physical. Therefore, we have functionally reduced the level M to the level P
That is a different approach, that still utilizes a "folk" functional explanation that is contrasted with purely non-functional and physical explanations based on Kripkean identities that are in fashion these days (i.e. pain = fibre-C activity, consciousness = pyramidal cell activity). Kripkean identities do not explain why there is such relation, but claim that there's all to it; there is nothing else to be explained here at all and any attempt to do so is "wrong-headed".
Why does Kim say that what he offers is Physicalism "near enough?". The thesis is that we cannot functionally reduce phenomenal qualities like the feeling of pain or experience of red. In other words, it retains qualia as something non-explainable in physical terms. He then follows Chalmers in his separation while making use of functional explanations that explain, but do not reduce qualitative phenomena to physical properties.
January 27, 2014
I am not a philosopher, but with some help and clarifications from Kim's more basic book (Philosophy of Mind) I was able to follow the discussion and understand the arguments.
Kim has an impressive ability to be very clear, methodical and precise when analyzing the work of other philosophers or presenting his own arguments. It is a refreshing change and very welcome, especially after reading too many vague and messy books and articles. This book's deceptive appearance of simplicity is a good indication of Kim's clarity of thought, deep understanding and probably years of distilling ideas to their current form. It is what metaphysics should be and what science desperately needs.
Personally, I've been interested mostly in Kim's discussion of reduction (identity and functional), but I am sure that I'll get back for more details on mental causation. After all, arguments for mental causation and functional reduction are all Kim needed for his incredible achievement: setting all but a small part of qualia in the physical world.
Kim has an impressive ability to be very clear, methodical and precise when analyzing the work of other philosophers or presenting his own arguments. It is a refreshing change and very welcome, especially after reading too many vague and messy books and articles. This book's deceptive appearance of simplicity is a good indication of Kim's clarity of thought, deep understanding and probably years of distilling ideas to their current form. It is what metaphysics should be and what science desperately needs.
Personally, I've been interested mostly in Kim's discussion of reduction (identity and functional), but I am sure that I'll get back for more details on mental causation. After all, arguments for mental causation and functional reduction are all Kim needed for his incredible achievement: setting all but a small part of qualia in the physical world.
March 15, 2019
Chapter 3 “The Rejection of Immaterial Minds: A Causal Argument” of this book was a reading suggested in “A Dialog on Consciousness” by Torin Alter and Robert J. Howell. I only read chapter 3 and found it to be a good explanation of the causation problem for nonphysical souls.
July 30, 2018
for reference
May 4, 2013
Kim is always a great writer. The "or something near enough" in the title is due to Kim's conclusion that phenomenal states (qualia) are irreducible, epiphenomenal states, which form the "mental residue" of the universe. Now, how in the world you get phenomenal consciousness from arranging bits of matter throughout the course of evolution remains a mystery for the physicalist. And if qualia cannot be reduced to physics and chemistry, then the origin of phenomenal consciousness cannot be answered by science. I wonder what other type of explanation there is for how you get mind from matter. Hmm, I wonder...
July 22, 2016
Having been a student of consciousness and the philosophy of mind, Jaegwon's book on physicalism has really opened up my mind in terms of the physicalist view of consciousness.
Jaegwon is quite good at giving the reader a concise history of the views of the philosophy of mind (in my opinion), but I should note, you SHOULD be really somewhat familiar with the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.
Not to spoil Jaegwon's point on physicalism, he does go over the-then contemporary views of consciences in detail and 'tries' to debunk their views. As a (now) property dualist, does bring up some notable views in favour of physicalism.
Jaegwon is quite good at giving the reader a concise history of the views of the philosophy of mind (in my opinion), but I should note, you SHOULD be really somewhat familiar with the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.
Not to spoil Jaegwon's point on physicalism, he does go over the-then contemporary views of consciences in detail and 'tries' to debunk their views. As a (now) property dualist, does bring up some notable views in favour of physicalism.
January 29, 2013
This book is great, and quite funny. A good insight about the content could be the explanation of 'Ontology of the world':
"...the content of the world is wholly exhausted by matter. Material things are all the things that there are; there is nothing inside the spacetime world that isn't material, and of course there is nothing outside it either. The spacetime world is the whole world, and material things, bits of matter and complex structures made up of bits of matter, are its only inhabitants."
Just beautiful.
"...the content of the world is wholly exhausted by matter. Material things are all the things that there are; there is nothing inside the spacetime world that isn't material, and of course there is nothing outside it either. The spacetime world is the whole world, and material things, bits of matter and complex structures made up of bits of matter, are its only inhabitants."
Just beautiful.
Want to read
January 3, 2011This is a topic I'm interested in, and this book was recommended by some philosophy prof/grad student I discovered on YouTube, as a good place to start...will report back later...Merry Christmas to me!
I've put this one on hold, as the Intro to Philosophical Logic is proving to be quite enough to occupy my attention...will review when I return!
I've put this one on hold, as the Intro to Philosophical Logic is proving to be quite enough to occupy my attention...will review when I return!
February 22, 2012
or something not near enough...
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews