A History of Modern Experimental Psychology: From James And Wundt to Cognitive Science

by George Mandler

Modern psychology began with the adoption of experimental methods at the end of the nineteenth Wilhelm Wundt established the first formal laboratory in 1879; universities created independent chairs in psychology shortly thereafter; and William James published the landmark work Principles of Psychology in 1890. In A History of Modern Experimental Psychology, George Mandler traces the evolution of modern experimental and theoretical psychology from these beginnings to the "cognitive revolution" of the late twentieth century. Throughout, he emphasizes the social and cultural context, showing how different theoretical developments reflect the characteristics and values of the society in which they occurred. Thus, Gestalt psychology can be seen to mirror the changes in visual and intellectual culture at the turn of the century, behaviorism to embody the parochial and puritanical concerns of early twentieth-century America, and contemporary cognitive psychology as a product of the postwar revolution in information and communication.After discussing the meaning and history of the concept of mind, Mandler treats the history of the psychology of thought and memory from the late nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth, exploring, among other topics, the discovery of the unconscious, the destruction of psychology in Germany in the 1930s, and the relocation of the field's "center of gravity" to the United States. He then examines a more neglected part of the history of psychology--the emergence of a new and robust cognitive psychology under the umbrella of cognitive science.

Genres: Psychology, History, Nonfiction

287 pages, Hardcover

First published December 22, 2006

Reviews

[Chrissy · Rating 3 out of 5]

A competent history that could have seriously benefited from closer editing-- I can't count the typos on two hands, and some of the sentences were baffling in meaning. The organization, likewise, could have used some revising; especially toward the end, where the clear line of history diverges into multiple threads of cognitive science, Mandler jumps haphazardly around to focus on this or that random thread for a moment while ignoring entirely other influential ideas. In that sense the author's bias as a researcher himself comes through strongly and much to the detriment of the book's historical objectivity.

Despite its flaws, the book happily filled some gaps in my historical background, especially in terms of relating current theory back to various 18th and 19th century philosophers with whom I am only peripherally familiar. I'm intrigued by the idea of Hegelian spirals (that the same ideas are recycled over the course of a field's history, moving into slightly more complex realms with every revision) in psychology, and the author gave a compelling case for the notion in cognitive science. It makes me want to delve back into early cognitive theory some more, as I did when I read James last fall. It also struck home to me just how slowly science moves.

A favourite part of this book was the discussion of finalism, or the idea that psychology is quickly approaching ultimate solutions. It's an idea principally tied to burgeoning neuroscientific advances, and one that I believe is fatally flawed. So does George Mandler, and he gave a very coherent explanation, both historic and theoretic in nature, as to why. I thoroughly enjoyed reading that bit, alongside his related historical criticisms of reductionism. He makes the observation that reductionist concepts in hard sciences (i.e., molecular biology, nuclear physics) were preceded by the grounding of more broad and complex theories (i.e., genetic theory, atomic theory), and that we should therefore be skeptical of claims that reductionist neuroscience will explain psychology without first firmly establishing broader theories-- a movement that is still in process.

Overall, this book just made me so giddy about my field. All this rich history of brilliant minds, and I get to be a part of it. There is no greater motivator.

[Jonathan Hayden · Rating 5 out of 5]

A wonderful little history of psychology. It laid out the important aspects of experimental psychology without going off course.

[Nat]

This is an idiosyncratic, superficial history of psychology that aims to "discuss aspects of the history of psychology to show how various psychologies reflect the characteristics and values of the society in which they are embedded" (xvii). Sometimes the science obviously reflects social values, for example when the Nazis forced all of the best German psychologists into exile and replaced them with party hacks who promoted pro-regime, pseudo-scientific topics. The chapters dealing with the decline of German psychology during the 1930s are the most interesting, and provide a vivid warning of how a scientific community can be utterly destroyed by politics.

When the social effects are less drastic, the description of social forces influencing the development of psychological theory and practice is correspondingly less informative. Consider, for example, this profoundly uninformative statement about social conditions that contributed to the rise of behaviorism in the US:

"It may still be too early to determine which of the various strands that influenced the development of behaviorism was more important than any other. Suffice it to say that the movement itself was consistent with a number of old and new American cultural and social values" (101).

A significant portion of the more recent history involves simply reporting lists of psychologists who attended various conferences (e.g. p.196). This is extraordinarily boring reading.

There is one interesting detail that I'd like to record for future reference. The most interesting is the way that certain theoretical terms crept into the introspective reports of subjects in the early 1900s:

"Because subjects and experimenters were pretty much interchangeable in the Würzburg laboratories, the term Bsl (Bewusstseinslagen) found its way from the theoretical language into the protocol language of the introspecting subject. The infestation of the language of the subject with the theoretical concepts of the psychologist is beautifully illustrated in a 1906 article by August Messer. The abbreviation Bsl in Messer's protocols refers to the fact that his subjects, who were also his colleagues working on problems of thinking, actually used the word Bewusstseinslagen (states or dispositions of consciousness) in reporting the effects of a particular stimulus" (pp.81-82).

This "infestation" of introspective reports with theoretical terms is also rampant in contemporary philosophy, so it's useful to have an egregious example of it from another field to make the problem clear.

Anyway, more anecdotes like that would vastly improve this book. I wish it was more like Schwitzgebel's Perplexities of Consciousness (which is both philosophically sophisticated and contains a gripping set of examples).