One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict

by Benny Morris

A renowned historian eludes the pitfalls of partisanship and tackles one of the world’s most perplexing and divisive issues

“What is so striking about Morris’s work as a historian is that it does not flatter anyone’s prejudices, least of all his own,” David Remnick remarked in a New Yorker article that coincided with the publication of Benny Morris’s 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. With the same commitment to objectivity that has consistently characterized his approach, Morris now turns his attention to the present-day legacy of the events of 1948 and the concrete options for the future of Palestine and Israel.

The book scrutinizes the history of the goals of the Palestinian national movement and the Zionist movement, then considers the various one- and two-state proposals made by different streams within the two movements. It also looks at the willingness or unwillingness of each movement to find an accommodation based on compromise. Morris assesses the viability and practicality of proposed solutions in the light of complicated and acrimonious realities. Throughout his groundbreaking career, Morris has reshaped understanding of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Here, once again, he arrives at a new way of thinking about the discord, injecting a ray of hope in a region where it is most sorely needed.

Genres: History, Politics, Israel, Middle East, Nonfiction, Judaism

256 pages, Paperback

Published March 23, 2010

About the author

Benny Morris is professor of history in the Middle East Studies department of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in the city of Be'er Sheva, Israel. He is a key member of the group of Israeli historians known as the "New Historians".

Reviews

[Sleepless Dreamer · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you ever want to see what it looks like when an Israeli leftist loses hope in the peace process, read this book (or talk to me).

In more seriousness, if you've ever read news about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and don't understand why it is such a challenge to solve, read this book. In lucid and clear writing (and only 200 pages!), Morris describes the history of the one-state and two-state solution and explains why both are destined for failure. He does this by looking at the nationalism and the different history of each movement.

Morris is somewhat accepted among both Palestinians and Israelis as the conflict's historian, especially for 1948. I intend to read his historical books but before that, I found myself finishing this book as light bedtime reading (most political science thing I've said today). This book does a great job of being both easy to read but also history-based and educational.

There is an emphasis on pre-1948. I appreciated this since I think many on both camps tend to brush it aside. I don't think we're capable of understanding 1948, 1967, or even 2021 without properly understanding the early 1900s. Morris really lingers on how Israeli and Palestinian nationality developed and how their historical trajectory has been shaped by each other and by world powers.

I also liked that Morris shows how messy everything is. There is not one Zionist movement nor is there one Palestinian movement. There have always been many many voices, calling for many different aspirations. This pinpoints how both people have various tensions among themselves which in turn shapes their relationship with each other.

Before I write what I learned from this book, I do have two points of criticism:

1. In the last few pages, Morris suggests an idea that is, quite frankly, ridiculous. Morris claims that it is unlikely that a Palestinian government will be stable. Therefore, Israel and Jordan should work together instead. Jordan gets the West Bank and East Jerusalem and basically builds a Jordanian-Palestinian state.

This is a lovely solution except for the little issue of Palestinians never accepting it. This doesn't satisfy the Palestinian wishes of self determination and the land. In fact, it basically gives them nothing- no state, no right of return of 1948, no capital in Jerusalem. Amman is not nearly as cool as Haifa.

I also do not see Jordan accepting this. Morris claims Jordan is stable enough in order to be able to accept the Palestinian refugees and cease the Palestinian expansionist desire but does not do much to base this claim, other than compliment Jordan's army. In fact, I doubt it as many Jordanians also hold that Palestine belongs to Palestinians (being an Israeli like, guys, I also wanna be part of the bilad al sham sibling vibes, pls). So why would Jordan take an active and central role in destroying Palestinian aspirations?

Moreover, this doesn't fully solve the settlements. Where will the border with Jordan cross? Will some Israeli citizens get to become Jordanian citizens or how many people will be evicted for this cause? East Jerusalem is also a prickly issue. Those of us who know the city know that there's no such thing as East and West Jerusalem. There's West Jerusalem and then there's a mishmash of neighborhoods, some Jewish, some Palestinian. There is no real place for a border, especially if we're going for full separation. All in all, this idea doesn't seem fully fleshed out or practical.

2. Morris doesn't really tackle the federation plan. His counter-argument to federation plans is that they require Israel and Palestine to work together. This isn't convincing as every solution requires cooperation. The question is about the framework of cooperation. Two independent states can easily slip into a brutal war. One state will slip into civil war without strong cooperation. A federation, with strong political institutions and enough mutual good will, can reign in the extremists. Heck, Israel alone does a decent job of controlling Jewish and Palestinian extremists. If the centrists on either side support a federation, we're golden.

The challenge of a federation is that if it ends catastrophically, Israel will go down with it. This isn't a risk that Israelis will take easily. However, this also shouldn't deter us from a federation. In fact, this should inspire us to do a good job, to act carefully and cautiously. Historically, Israel has been good at avoiding civil wars. We do have the capability to build with the Palestinians stable institutions, to solve the conflict once and for all by building a just framework for all.

Now, I don't blame Morris for his pessimism. I imagine it must have been incredibly hard to watch the Israeli left fail. The second intifada coupled with the consistent failure of peace plans killed the Israeli peace camp. Leftists preached that the two state solution would lead to peace only to have Palestinians reject them at every turn. How can you believe Palestinians are capable partners for peace when they send thousands to explode in public spaces, killing hundreds of Israeli civilians? In Morris' words "I don't see the suicide bombings as isolated acts. They express the deep will of the Palestinian people. That is what the majority of the Palestinians want."

This is our challenge as Israeli leftists. It is being realistic but never ever quitting on the process. There simply is no other acceptable way. If our choices are between a genocide, an apartheid, ethnic cleansing or a blind belief in diplomacy, I will chose diplomacy, even if some on the other side support suicide bombings, even if all the cards are stacked against it, even if diplomacy has had nothing to show for itself here, even if I'm so frustrated by this.

So here are some things I learned from this book:

Morris argues that Zionism, the Jewish self determination, has changed throughout the years. Early Zionists dreamed of a lot of land- stretching throughout the British Mandate entirely (modern day Jordan). However, the Holocaust coupled with Arab animosity made the Jews change their demands. They wanted a state immediately, however small. Saving Jews from being murdered in Europe took priority, obviously.

This has remained fairly stable. Israelis nowadays are still open to giving up land for the prospect of peace. We prioritize our self determination, the Jewish statehood, over some land. Leaving Gaza and Sinai wasn't necessarily easy but it was done. More can be done, in theory.

I'm always excited to learn more about the early Zionists. Right now, Zionism is so connected with a Jewish state and it's cool to realize that this wasn't how it started. If the British had managed this region better, if the Arab Revolt hadn't happened, maybe we could have been living together in one shared country and we'd never know a Jewish state. Jewish nationalism seemed to shift towards statehood as a result of the civic tensions of 1920-1940.

Meanwhile, Palestinian nationalism, according to Morris, has stayed mostly the same. Back in the early 1900s, Palestinians vehemently held that Palestine belongs only to them, that Jews are foreign colonizers with no relation to the land. They refused the idea of Jewish sovereignty on any part of the land. Fast forward to nowadays and this is still often the case. When pressed, Palestinian leaders will speak of two states but they also tend to obscure it in ways that become clear that the two states are not their true intention. "From the river to the sea", as is said.

This creates a challenge. Allegedly, Palestinians claim that they would be happy with a state that includes Jews. However, Jews have a hard time trusting them. With so many failing Arab countries, there is an inherent Israeli fear of being a minority in an Arab country. Moreover, the desire for self determination is so strong that it seems immovable.

Morris is coming at this from a very Israeli stance. We need to speak honestly and put it on the table: Israelis will never give up on Jewish sovereignty. Palestinians will never give up on land unity. The national identity of both are built on this. If pushed, we can pretend to agree, sign some papers, get more Nobel peace prizes but the people of either side will not accept it fully.

So in some ways, we're playing a centuries long game of who will give up first. Will Palestinians give up on their rights to all the land between the river to the sea? Will Israelis give up on their right to one Jewish state?

Now, I don't know who will break first. Both people often seem to feel that time is in their favor and that we're playing this game for the long run. Palestinians often hold that international pressure coupled with resistance will make Israel fold (often citing colonialist struggles or the Crusader states). Some Israelis think that Palestinians will eventually suffer their way into accepting Israel, that materialist dreams will trump national ones. Both are willing to wait until the other side yields. There are arguments to be made for each side (Israel seems to be losing public support but gaining in diplomacy, time is not in the favor of Palestinian refugees but it is also not in the favor of ethnic states). Maybe we can do this for another 50 years, another 100 years. Maybe more.

This stalemate is expressed diligently in Morris' work. The tenacity of nationalism, the vastly different perceptions of land and self determination, the way either solution doesn't fully work. It is no wonder that Morris ends on a bitter note.

To conclude, this is an excellent read. This is Morris after the second intifada so he is more Zionist and less in a peacebuilding mood but it's still well researched and worth a read. I think this is a good book for beginners as well because it'll give a strong background.


What I'm Taking With Me
- This might be my last review that fully focuses on Israel-Palestine for a while. I need a break cause I think I'm getting worn out. Like ugh, every day there's something new here and I'm starting to become concerned my interest in this isn't coming from a healthy place and is harming my mental health (read: there's only so many times you can hear people casually discuss ethnically cleansing you)

-And Jews were desperate in the 1940s- they would have taken any plan that allowed immigration. I find myself wondering if desperation breeds political compromise or stubbornness.

- Brit Shalom will always have my heart, I love them for their clear sight and optimism.

- A friend from abroad asked me after the May war when the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians start and I was genuinely speechless, like how do you explain that there are no negotiations, there used to be negotiations about starting negotiations but now we don't even have that. But hey, at least the Netherlands have a peace process envoy here so guess that's something?

-And the one thing that I think both Israelis and Palestinians need to accept is that no solution can happen when the other side feels cheated. You can't solve this through coercion. Addressing the damage done to each other is a moral obligation and a necessary step.



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I'm a little jealous of Palestinians for only having one word for themselves. Like, Palestinian is the national group, the nationality and the ethnicity. Meanwhile, Israelis are here like: Zionism is the nationalism, Jewish is the ethnicity, nation group (and religion), Israeli is the nationality but each of these terms are connected.

Really, it's no wonder people are confused, we've created a tangle of terminology that allows people to identify in a way that is genuinely misleading. I blame the Torah for having so many words for the land.

Review to come, I need to stop procrastinating and start writing my essay which very surprisingly is about how one state solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are dumb.

[Elliot Ratzman · Rating 2 out of 5]

An Israeli historian whose earlier work dispelled falsehoods about the origins of the Palestinian refugees in 1948, Morris’ scholarship is still widely considered sound; his political instincts lately are less nuanced. This book is a challenge to the “one state” or binational solution to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. He shows that both the Zionist and Palestinian elites wanted a one-state solution, but without the other group. Brit Shalom and other small Jewish groups who advocated binationalism are dismissed as well-meaning, but marginal/deluded liberals. Morris is a man of documents and weighs them as indisputable proof of Arab perfidy and hypocrisy. His first and final chpts, less history than polemic, are full of ouchy mistakes. His caricature of “Arabs” is beyond bigoted, blaming Israeli-Arabs for being arrested and causing more traffic deaths—proof they don’t respect life! Since no Palestinian state is viable, some arrangement with Jordan seems to be, for him, the only option.

[Barry Levy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent overview of Israel-Palestine conflict - and the realities. Marks some revision - and pragmatism - by a previous revisionist. Contends there is a third way solution: the Palestinians throwing their lot in with Jordan. A good and true solution, considering nearly half Jordanians are Palestinians, and Jordan used to have governorship over the West Bank. But not one the Hashemite Kingdom will easily heel to, especially considering a loss of power, and the reality of the thousands of Palestinians killed in the Palestinian uprising (in Jordan) of 1970-71. Definitely worth a read.

[Howard Jaeckel · Rating 5 out of 5]

There was a time when Israeli historian Benny Morris was a darling of the left. The most prominent of the Israeli "New Historians," he had written a seminal work exploding the Zionist myth that the 700,000 Palestinians who became refugees during the first Arab-Israeli war fled the country of their own accord or at the urging of their leaders. Relying on IDF archives, Morris showed that in many cases Palestinians were expelled pursuant to the orders of IDF commanders, who feared their villages would otherwise become bases for rear-guard actions against Israeli forces. Even worse, in the view of many Israelis, Morris' book exposed atrocities committed by some Jewish units, including massacres and rapes, that were hardly consistent with the "purity of arms" on which the IDF prided itself.

And as an additional element adding luster to his left-wing cachet, Morris had been jailed for refusing to serve in the occupied territories during the first Palestinian uprising in 1987.

Despite this impressive liberal pedigree, nobody would today accuse Benny Morris of being a man of the left. In a remarkable 2004 interview with Haaretz, Morris said that the 1948 expulsions of Arabs were necessary for military reasons and that the Jewish state could not have come into being without them. More surprising still, he suggested that David Ben Gurion failed to finish the job of "ethnic cleansing," and that doing so would have avoided much suffering for all concerned and stabilized the State of Israel for generations. And while he said that further expulsions of Arabs under present conditions would be neither moral nor realistic, he could envision "apocalyptic" circumstances in which such action might be justified by a threat to Israel's survival.

What accounts for the startling distance that Benny Morris has travelled since the former paratrooper went to jail to protest what the Arabs call "the occupation"? Quite simply, the Palestinians' unyielding irredentism and rejection of any compromise with Jewish sovereignty in any part of the Holy Land. That implacable position, maintained throughout the century-long Arab-Israeli conflict (though at times dressed up to be more palatable to "gullible Westerners," as Morris calls them) has caused Morris to despair of the "two-state solution" so ardently and endlessly pursued by a long line of American diplomats. Morris' disillusion with a "peace process" that he and most Israelis originally greeted with so much hope is emblematic of why the Israeli left has suffered such a precipitous decline.

The scales began to fall from Morris' eyes when Yasser Arafat summarily rejected, without counter-offer, the sweeping proposals for a "two-state solution" made to him in September and December of 2000, first by Ehud Barak and then, in sweetened form, by Bill Clinton. Arafat's rejection was followed in short order by the outbreak of a far more lethal intifada, which ultimately caused the deaths of more than 1,000 Israelis in suicide bombings and other attacks. Whether or not this eruption of terrorism was actually planned and ordered by Arafat, it is certain that neither he nor any other Palestinian leader did anything to discourage it.

The swiftly unravelling "peace process" caused Morris to undertake a more rigorous analysis of the sincerity of the Palestinians' professed readiness to live together with Israel. "One State, Two States" is the result, and it should be read by anyone inclined to blame Israel for failing to achieve peace with the Palestinians. Only those with prejudices too entrenched and visceral to allow for reexamination are likely to come away without realizing that the real "obstacle to peace" is not Israeli settlements in the West Bank - Israel has previously dismantled settlements in both Sinai and the Gaza Strip - but the Palestinians' adamant rejection of any Jewish state in what they consider to be Muslim lands, wherever its borders might be drawn.

As Morris recounts, in the early days of the Zionist movement, both Jews and Arabs viewed themselves as solely entitled to all of the Holy Land. Further, Zionist leaders were not beyond toying with the idea of the voluntary or involuntary "transfer" of Arabs from areas to be made part of the Jewish State. Over time, however, mainstream Zionists came to realize that a portion of Mandatory Palestine was all they could realistically hope for. Thus, over the opposition of the rightwing Revisionists, Zionist leaders accepted the partition plans proposed in 1937 by the British Peel Commission, and by the U.N.'s November 1947 partition resolution, though both awarded the Jews far less than the "Land of Israel" that some thought had been given them by God.

The maximalist position of the Arabs, however, did not undergo a similar evolution. Xenophobic and nativist to a degree that would put today's American opponents of immigration to shame, the Arabs rejected any Jewish immigration to a land to which the Jews, too, had an ancient religious and historical connection. Their land was, they believed, being "stolen" by the Jews, although any Jewish settlements established on land previously owned by Arabs had been duly purchased. As for the Holocaust, that was none of their concern; the Jewish genocide had been perpetrated by Europeans, they said, and should not be paid for by the Arabs.

For the Arabs, the idea of allocating any part of Palestine, no matter how tiny, to a Jewish homeland was insupportable heresy. Thus, almost immediately following adoption of the U.N. Partition Resolution on November 29, 1947, local Arab irregulars began attacking Jewish settlements and murdering Jewish civilians. Months of inter-communal fighting followed, and it was in this period the IDF's expulsion of the residents of Arab communities began. Then, as soon as the British Mandate expired and a Jewish state was declared, Israel was invaded by the regular armies of five Arab countries. The Jews prevailed in the fighting, and an armistice that left them in control of more territory than they were awarded by the Partition Resolution went into effect on February 24, 1949.

But the Arabs' decisive military defeats in 1948-49 and in the 1956 Sinai campaign did not disabuse them of their determination to destroy Israel militarily. Rejecting any co-existence with Israel, Egypt's Abdul Gamal Nasser in June 1967 closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping (which threatened the country's economic strangulation) and massed troops in the Sinai Peninsula, threatening an invasion that he said would result in "the eradication of Israel." The rhetoric of Ahmed Shukairy, the predecessor of Yasser Arafat as head of the PLO, was even more explicitly genocidal: "We shall destroy Israel and its inhabitants and as for the survivors - if there are any - the boats are ready to deport them."

The Arabs' plans for the citizens of Israel were, of course, frustrated when their armies were routed by the IDF. But Egypt and Syria tried again with a surprise attack on the holiest day on the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur, in 1973. They achieved some initial successes that appeared to threaten Israel's survival, but once again Israel's forced emerged clearly victorious.

It was not until more than a decade after a fourth major Arab-Israeli war - Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which sent Yasser Arafat and the PLO fleeing to Tunisia from their bases in that country - that the Palestinians appeared to have had enough. In a letter from Yasser Arafat to Yitzhak Rabin, the PLO purported to recognize Israel's right "to exist in peace and security," and pledged to amend the provisions of the Palestinian National Covenant that called for Israel's destruction. That was the beginning of what some still persist in calling the "peace process."

But as Morris recounts in convincing and copious detail, the Palestinians' never intended their recognition of "Israel" to mean acceptance of the country as a Jewish state. Quoting at length from foundational Palestinian documents and speeches in Arabic, Morris shows that the Palestinian leadership told its people that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza was only an interim stage from which to carry on the campaign to bring an end to Israel as it now exists. Whether they would accomplish that goal by "armed struggle," or by swamping the "Zionist entity" with millions of descendants of the 1948 refugees exercising a "right of return" to a land in which they had never set foot, the unchanging objective was the same - not "two states for two peoples," but one state, dominated by Palestinian Muslims.

That is why both Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas rejected, without counterproposal, Israeli offers of a Palestinian state in Gaza and almost all of the West Bank, with its capital in East Jerusalem. It is why no Palestinian leader has ever been willing to renounce, or even compromise, on the "right of return," or to acknowledge that a two-state settlement would constitute a final resolution of their claims. And it is why, despite constant pressure from the United States and Israel, the Palestinian National Covenant was never amended to recognize Israel's right to exist, as Arafat had promised Yitzhak Rabin.

Palestinian rejectionism was again on florid display only a few weeks ago in a speech delivered by Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, to the PLO Central Council. Among other incendiary remarks, Abbas proclaimed that the Zionist movement "constitutes a colonialist enterprise that has nothing to do with Judaism"; that even during the Holocaust, European Jews did not want to emigrate to Palestine (ignoring that Britain's draconian restrictions on Jewish immigration were imposed in response to Arab demands); and that the expulsion of 700,000 Jews from Arab countries after the establishment of Israel resulted from Zionist deals with Arab politicians to force the Jews to emigrate. A more mendacious and offensive denial of any legitimacy of the Jewish presence in Palestine can scarcely be imagined. And this from a supposed "moderate" who has been called the best interlocutor that Israel is likely to have.

Although the subtitle of Morris' book is "Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict," his only suggestion in this regard involves a Palestinian confederation with Jordan. While this indeed seems like the best possible outcome, one wonders how Jordan could be convinced to take responsibility for the radically discontent and revolutionary populations in Gaza and the West Bank.

For the present it seems that the best Israel can do is manage the conflict - periodically "cutting the grass" to keep Hamas and other terrorists in check - while trying to encourage development of the Palestinian economy. The outlook is bleak but, in the Hebrew phrase, ein breirah -- there is no alternative.



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[Luigi Scorzato · Rating 5 out of 5]

It completely changed my mind about the Israel-Palestinian conflict. I was very naive before. I realized the complexity afterwords. Unfortunately, most of the people outside the region are still as naive as I was.

Although this is not said in the book, it convinced me that we are all part of that conflict, which is the old big conflict between the 'western' and the 'arab' world. We all must help to solve that conflict, or it will eventually hit us. And the first step is to stop being naive.

[Derek · Rating 3 out of 5]

Is an objective account of this situation possible? If so, Morris' book is not it. Should you choose to read One State, Two States, expect an informed but slanted assessment, something on the order of an extended op-ed column.

[Gubly]

Please. Read this book on weed!

[Mike]

this book is not nearly as even-handed as others may portray it. In the end, Morris disproportionately mentions every incident of major Arab violence while (ahem) leaving out the parallel incidents of Israeli violence... At the end of the book he writes some pretty borderline if not completely racist things about Arabs and claims it is their eternal hate for Jews that will prevent a two-state solution from ever working... he portrays Jews as completely open-minded and does not blame any corresponding hatred of Arabs for any problems making a two-state solution work.. which to me seems absolutely ridiculous to point the finger at either side to say that only one side's hatred of the other will prevent peace from being realized.

[Adam · Rating 2 out of 5]

Benny Morris is a competent historian, but an incompetent political observer. The book draws on his wealth of knowledge of the history of the region, but he omits inconvenient facts, draws poorly thought-out conclusions, and often descends into the gutter. Some examples:

- He says that a Palestinian state would surely be undemocratic because Arabs have no history of democracy, while ignoring the fact that pre-1948 Zionists - both the leadership and the people - were overwhelmingly from non-democratic states (primarily, Eastern Europe).

- He predicts Hamas suicide bombings in Europe and the US. That was 16 years ago; we're still waiting.

- He attacks Palestinians for wanting no Jewish settlements in a Palestinian state, without asking if any of those settlers would be willing to live under Palestinian rule as equals (a sea change from how they live now). And he accuses them of hypocrisy because they object to brand new, illegal settlements while being fine with (centuries old, pre-Zionist) Arab villages in Israel.

- He points to Christians leaving the West Bank in disproportionate numbers as proof that they're fleeing Muslim persecution, without asking whether it might be because they're sick of living under occupation and it's easier for them to leave for the West.

- He continually attacks Palestinians for allegedly invoking the specter of transfer of Jews out of Israel (in a one-state solution), while glossing over the fact that transfer is exactly what happened to Palestinians when Israel was created. But somehow, one side's hypothetical ethnic cleansing is a bigger concern than the other side's actual ethnic cleansing.

- He talks about the right of return throughout as if it were just a means of destroying Israel's Jewishness, without ever considering the fact that maybe the refugees want to go home simply because they want to go home. Not everything is about you, Benny.

- He refers to the separation wall as being purely for security purposes in preparation for a future Palestinian state, while ignoring the crystal-clear stance of then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon against any such state.

- He lambastes Arafat for "rejecting" Barak's proposals at Camp David. As Morris notes, negotiations in fact continued until the following year. He also consigns to a footnote the fact the proposed "state" wouldn't even have control of its airspace or electromagnetic spectrum (i.e., telecommunication).

- He takes at face value the maps that Dennis Ross claims reflect the (unwritten) Israeli proposals at Camp David, without asking whether those maps are in fact accurate. He simply ignores the most comprehensive work on that summit, Clayton Swisher's The Truth About Camp David.

- He points to the position held by Haj al-Amin Hussein (the "Grand Mufti") as evidence of his importance in the Palestinian movement, without mentioning that the grandiose-sounding office was an invention of the British and that they appointed him to it (and maintained him in it).

- He worries about the expansionist tendencies of a hypothetical Palestinian state. I don't even know what to say about this one except that irony is clearly not dead.

The book invokes every bigoted stereotype there is about Arabs and Muslims. They're violent, liars, totalitarians, criminally-minded, don't value human life, always plotting, etc. A Jewish state without Arabs is impossible because Jewish moral values wouldn't allow it (from the man who literally wrote the book on the nakba!), whereas an Arab state without Jews is impossible only because the world wouldn't allow it (but those Arabs would love to do it). Muslims can't live with non-Muslims, they must kill or convert them (where did the Mizrahi Jews who went to Israel come from? Why weren't they killed or converted centuries ago?). Muslims in non-Muslims countries always seek to achieve "majority and mastery" (really? That's happening in, say, India? Or the US and Canada? Or Russia? Or any other place with a Muslim minority?). Morris didn't have a single positive thing to say about Arabs or Muslims anywhere in the book and one gets the sense that he wishes they'd all just disappear from the earth. The closest he comes to a compliment is to commend Hamas for being so forthright in their desire to destroy Israel.

In short, this book is worth reading but only as a window into the mindset of the sort of person that Morris has become, which unfortunately reflects the worldview of a lot of people. It shouldn't be read by anyone who isn't equipped to see through the cheap and lazy propaganda with which this work is riddled.

[Justin KM · Rating 4 out of 5]

When someone (Morris) is detested by segments of the left and right, that’s always a credibility-booster in my eyes. It’s typically only through good faith attempts at objectivity that that comes to pass.

Which is not to say the book is without point of view or dispassionately written – quite the opposite in fact. Which makes for a more invigorating read…but if you’re totally new to this terrain, maybe go read some Finkelstein, or if you’re feeling really trashy, watch some Al-Jazeera/Vox/Guardian/etc., to put this work in perspective.

Probably one of the most valuable parts of the book is Morris’ recounting of all the unprovoked Arab attacks upon and massacres of Jews, as well as political opposition to their presence (petitions to the Ottomans and British), in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Really gives the lie to the progressive fairy tale that Arabs and Jews were just getting along wonderfully until those dastardly colonizers came along and screwed everything up.

I was hoping for deeper analysis of the wars, especially their inceptions, since those were such key flashpoints where much territory was won and lost. They are oddly brushed by…yet you get pages and pages on minority/extremist ideological currents that are interesting but ultimately historically unimportant.

I’m not sure I agree with other reviewers the book lacks an ending. He goes into medium depth on his Jordanian solution, and if you followed the arguments throughout, it should be obvious what the merits of that plan are. The tone of the book is fairly clear…after a lifetime of studying the conflict, that Morris can’t point to a compelling path to peace isn’t a sad comment on his failure to accrue wisdom – it’s a testament to his cynicism and the impossible nature of the problem.

[Ali Jon Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

I love Morris’s style, which cuts through the nonsense spouted by both sides of the conflict. The book covers the history since 1948, the repeated failures of any peace process and offers an explanation of why peace will never be achievable unless there is a radical and unforeseeable shift in culture. It is quite a pessimistic read. It does suggest one possible solution, that Jordan take on the burden of Palestine again, but gives so little space to this idea and the problems with it, I have to assume it was tacked on as an afterthought.

I have two criticisms. Firstly, the book spends quite some time arguing against other commentator's takes - takes I have to admit I have never heard and care little about debunking. Perhaps people who read more widely about the conflict are exposed to them more? Secondly, I find him to be quite unsympathetic to the Palestinians peace demands. It's true that they gave up the chance for a deal that is infinitely more generous than anything they are likely to receive today, but it's also worth considering that the peace deal they were offered in the 90s would not have resulted in a sovereign palestinian state, rather a statelet forever reliant on Israel for security, forever on the precipice of another Israeli occupation. I can't accept his reasoning that this shows the palestinians didn't want peace, just a chance to reconquer israel. But I'm sure other readers will come to their own conclusions.

[Wendelle]

detailed history of laborious contentions over the proper nature of the state of Israel/ Palestine. Should it be one state of 'binational' coexistence? two states? a cantonization system? 40% of land for one side? All such permutations of geographical division had been tossed around since 1948 and are recorded in this book. I found the account to be slightly kinder to Israel (or perhaps Israel is objectively more conciliatory than the Arabs?). There are times when the author dismisses Arab offers of concession to be insincere, perhaps they were? For instance, he says their persuasions to the British to limit Jewish settlement because of consequences for both Muslim and Christian Arabs were only calculated words and not real concern over Christian Arab fate. He also repeatedly insists that the Arabs 'want all of Palestine' and only quieten their demands for a one-state majority-Muslim-Arab state due to awareness of international sentiment against such a proposition. Even reputable Fatah leader Arafat is depicted to be duplicitous, offering an olive branch of recognition to Israelis with one hand and reassuring Muslim Arab audiences of continued drive towards one-state Palestine with the other. If such are indeed the majority Arab intent then it is a sad state of affairs for both Arabs and Israeli Jews.

[Rivka · Rating 3 out of 5]

I benefited from chapters 1 and 2 by learning more about the history of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism starting from the late 19th century. It gives perspective into how we have gotten into this mess. The maps in front were very helpful.

Chapter 3 is where it starts going off the rails, where the author moves away from historical facts into his own opinion. There isn't much proof backing up some of his claims or their context. It just reads as the cynical rant of an Israeli who has given up all hope for the future. I mean, that's understandable, but there's no reason for it to be published.

For example, he "proves" that Palestinian Muslims place less value on human life and the rule of secular law by reporting statistics on Jewish/Palestinian crime. Yes, Palestinians proportionally commit more crimes in every category, including lethal road traffic violations. But there's no exploration into why this is the case, only his reflexive and biased interpretation.

Also, he rejects various solutions as impossible, yet his OWN solution regarding a joint West Bank-Gaza-Jordan state, as he admits himself, is just as far-fetched and laughable. It's also tacked on as an undeveloped afterthought in the last few pages of the book.

Off to find a nice, feel-good novel to lower my blood pressure.

[Roa'a · Rating 1 out of 5]

I can't take anything this guy says seriously because he clearly even justify genocide of the Palestinians in support of Israel:
1. “[Benny] Morris claims that Ben-Gurion’s ‘terrible mistake in 1948’ was that he didn’t ‘complete the job’ and expel ‘one hundred percent’ of the Palestinian Arabs; that Israeli Palestinians now constitute an ‘existential danger’ and a ‘time bomb’; and that ideally ‘the Arabs will leave’ – exactly how he doesn’t say except that ‘this will become a strategic problem for the security forces’. ”
2.“The Palestinians, according to Morris, are ‘a sick, psychotic people’. They refuse to acknowledge that ‘Jews have a just claim to Palestine’ and that ‘Zionism was/is a just enterprise’. Yet, Morris further states that this ‘just claim’ couldn’t be redeemed and this ‘just enterprise’ realized without expelling the Palestinian Arabs: ‘a removing of a population was needed. Without a population expulsion, a Jewish state would not have been established.’ Such an ‘inevitable’ expulsion wasn’t, however, ‘morally defective. … I morally accept the erection of the Jewish state.”

Excerpts From: Norman Finkelstein. “Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict.”

[john lambert · Rating 2 out of 5]

Yes, another book on Israel. At first I had hopes for this one because it is clearly written. However, the majority of the book lists all the back and forth (one state or two) among both the Israelis and the Arabs. In other words, I admit it, I skimmed, a lot. But what was I to do with page after page of unpronounceable names saying one thing and then another?

The bottom line is that the Israel-Arab issue is not going away in a long time, if ever. As Negib Azoury (who really is one of 100s in the book) said way back in 1905. "The two movements are destined to fight each other continually until one of them wins."

Still, even skimming, it was interesting to see how the different groups, within the Zionist and Arab nationalist movements, held pretty much to their initial plans or hopes or dreams--they don't want to have much to do with one another.

OUCH...

[Michael Pellegrino · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lots to learn about the history

Although it mostly reads like someone taking notes from historical sources, this is a comprehensive account of the history from those of us who want to better understand what is currently happening in Israel-Palestine. There are no solutions but given the nature of everything that has happened since the fall of the Ottoman Empire it isn’t surprising. If anything, this summary underscores to me why religion is one of the most dangerous ideologies ever created.

[Sean Macfee · Rating 3 out of 5]

While well written and, for the most part, properly researched, I was constantly disappointed by the author’s clear prejudice. The generalization of Arabs made reading this difficult at times. Credit where credit is due, this book at it's best does offer some nuance on the two-state solution. Would be interested in how Morris could rebuke what Israel is doing present day as anything but a genocide.

[Aviv Kotek · Rating 3 out of 5]

A quick summary of the conflict, Benny morris supplies an easy reading book.
Couldn't find anything which is different than any other conflict books - his ideas on how to resolve the conflict weren't anything 'special' or 'new'. As an historical point of view - this book is not bad.

[Dawson · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good book on the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict. There were small moments of bias in favor of the Isrealis but nothing more than a few sentences and it did not distract from the ideas of the book. It was a very good book and I enjoyed reading it.

[Rob Squires · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fair-minded historical analysis coupled with some thoughts at the end on future possibilities.

[Idoshapira]

Clear, interesting and depressing.

[Waed Naser]

Very biased against the Palestinian! I couldn’t take anything he says.

[Michele Pitta · Rating 2 out of 5]

Totalmente sesgado a favor de Israel

[Forrest · Rating 5 out of 5]

A critical book for anyone (especially westerners) hoping to understand the complexities of Israeli-Arab conflict.

[Yaffah]

Read this book for a extra curricular course i took during my master in History.

[Stephen Heiner · Rating 4 out of 5]

2024 video book review: https://youtu.be/xlOIRzr0qsw
2025 review: https://youtu.be/HUa-e7OQjtQ

Benny Morris is complicated.

He's written some of the definitive history of 1948, making clear that Palestinians were expelled from their homes not because "six armies invaded" or "their leaders told them to go" but through a deliberate and clear strategy of forces that would later become the IDF. He even went to jail for refusing to serve in the Occupied Territories during the first Intifada.

But he's also said that these expulsions were "necessary" for the creation of the Jewish State of Israel and that David Ben-Gurion "did not finish" this necessary "ethnic cleansing."

That said, he does manage to mostly put aside his personal views when he writes history. I say "mostly," because he has an irritating habit of calling anyone who disagrees with him a liar. He also dismisses the non-Jewish, non-Muslim peoples of the area as "politically irrelevant." (p. 24) But it's worth overcoming this artifact of his in order to get to what he has to say. You will also have to overcome this howler early on in the text:

"[T]he United States ...is only marginally influential with regard to Israeli policies on the basic issues." (p. 13)

LOL

In this short, easy-to-read text, Morris doesn't just tackle the problem of the two-state solution, which many analysts, including Gideon Levy, Ilan Pappe, and Rashid Khalidi, consider to be effectively dead, but he also refuses to imagine a one-state solution, for very good reasons that he cogently outlines.. Hence his effectively science-fiction solution at the end of the book, while winning awards for creativity, fails to win any awards for credulity.

This situation is complicated and will only be resolved by those with willpower and patience. On both sides.

"[B]y 2020 the total population between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean will reach 15.5 million, with only 6.4 million of them being Jews and most of the rest, 8.8 million, being Arab, creating a binational reality, albeit with a substantial Arab majority." (p. 7-8)

(quoting Tony Judt) "The depressing truth is that Israel is bad for the Jews." (p. 9)

"[T]he proportion of Christians among Palestine's Arabs has been declining steadily since 1947, when they were close to 10 percent of the population." (p. 24)

"Put simply, the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement, from inception, and ever since, has consistently regarded Palestine as innately, completely, inalienably, and legitimately 'Arab' and Muslim and has aspired to establish in it a sovereign state under its rule covering all of the country's territory." (p. 30)

"And as Zionists, they took it as self-evident that the Land of Israel belonged to the Jews and to no one else." (p. 37)

(quoting Magnes in 1920) "The Jewish people cannot suffer injustice to be done to others even as a compensation for injustice [over the centuries] done to them." (p. 51)

"A Jewish state with an Arab majority was generally regarded as inconceivable, and a Jewish state with even a very large Arab minority — say, a 55 to 45 percent ratio — was seen as highly problematic, not to say unviable." (p. 65)

(in regards to the Six Day War) "[T]riggering powerful expansionist and messianic urges in teh Israeli public, especially on the right and among religious nationalists." (p. 81)

"Hence, Palestinian spokesmen regularly invoked slogans like democracy, majority will, and one man, one vote — catchphrases and norms that, in fact, were completely alien to their history and social and political ethos and mindset." (p. 90)

"[J]ewish 'distress' in Europe should not be solved at the expense of Palestinian Arabs." (p. 104)

(from a letter from King Saud to President Truman) "The Arabs have definitely decided to oppose [the] establishment of a Jewish state...Even if it is supposed that the Jews will succeed in gaining support...by their oppressive and tyrannous means and their money, such a state must perish in a short time. The Arab will isolate such a state from the world and will lay siege until it dies by famine...Its end will be the same as that of [the] Crusader states." (p. 109)

"Indeed, at one point Arafat denied that there had ever been a Temple Mount in Jerusalem." (p. 138)

(quoting the Peel Commission report) "About 1M Arabs are in strife, open or latent , with some 400,000 Jews. There is no common ground between them. The Arab community is predominantly Asiatic in character, the Jewish community predominantly European. They differ in religion and in language. Their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct, are as incompatible as their national aspirations." (p. 178)

[KautharAlMaskari · Rating 2 out of 5]

Stereotypical

[hoffnarr · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book came as a disappointment. I read it immediately after completing an incredibly well written and balanced history of the 1948 war by the same author. By contrast, this work was far more of a polemic. It begins with a summary of new supporters of the one state solution, beginning with the famous essay by Tony Judt and following up with dismissive critiques of several other supporters.

What follows is an occasional summary of Israeli-Palestinian relations, with an emphasis on showing how horrifying the "one state" solution proposed by Palestinians is and how deceptive their calls for a secular single state are. He also portrays as completely marginal and radical the few figures on both the Israeli and Palestinian side who actually hope for an equal and democratic single state.

While I was willing to be persuaded by his more pragmatic arguments, I found myself increasingly revolting at his dismissiveness and myopic analyses that never addresses some of the core arguments in support of the single state (or binational as he calls it) proposals that have gained favor in recent years. The argument seemed to lose focus gradually, get more sloppy, and his final proposed solution: having Palestinian territories become part of Jordan etc. not as terribly helpful or realistic.

[Billie Pritchett · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gosh, it's been a while since I read Benny Morris's One State, Two States so I don't exactly have the appropriate perspective to comment on it, but I'll try anyway. Basically, Morris argues that there is no real solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict short of having the Palestinians be absorbed into Jordan. Morris seems especially angry in the book, by the way, that Palestinians have rejected peace proposals every time they've been on the table. Those who are sympathetic with the Palestinian position have argued that every proposal that the Palestinians have received has been crummy and would not truly grant the Palestinians a complete, contiguous nation-state. I'm no expert about this, but this seems to be the nature of the debate.

[Steve · Rating 3 out of 5]

Richard of our study group suggested we read and discusss.
My friends were much more taken by this "essay" than I was taken by it.
12/16 of book on "one state" and an excellant discussion of the history and background and debunking.
12/16 of book on "two state" and the difficulty/impossibilty of it.
2/16 of book on a third idea, one involving Jordan.
Oh yeah, the same Jordan that just said if Israel says that outloud, they'll recall ambassadors.
I must thank Richard for having us read Morris's essay and to let me see a strong historical base for the facts and the magnitude of the problem, not to mention that Palestineans won't go for any two state configuration.