Japan experienced unparalleled economic growth in the decades immediately after WWII. The ways and means of the “Japanese Miracle” have been hotly contested between free market and Marxist economists and historians. Chalmers Johnson plowed a middle ground by arguing for the importance of the “developmental state” in engineering Japan’s resurgence after the war’s devastation. He draws a distinction between the planned economy of a communist state, like the Soviet Union, and the planning that went on in Japan. In Johnson’s terminology, the Soviets were “plan ideological,” while the Japanese were “plan rational.” He further elaborated that Western capitalist economies were “market rational” states. Central to Johnson’s thesis is the complex role of government bureaucracies in Japan and the delicate co-dependencies with the Diet and strategic business and industry. Of particular importance to Johnson, is the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), where he gained first-time access to primary sources that bolster his claims. Japanese bureaucracies executed the goals of the developmental state through a strategy of administrative guidance. Though perplexing to Westerners, Johnson argues that there is nothing mysterious about the strategy, “It refers to the authority of the government, contained in laws establishing the ministries, to issue directives, requests, warnings, suggestions, and encouragements to enterprises.” (265)
Japanese bureaucracies are perceived to be above politics, but their policy decisions allocated resources to generate “high-speed growth,” were ratified by the Diet, and implemented by the private sector. The bureaucratic system traces its origins back to the samurai system of feudal Japan. In many respects, Japanese bureaucrats are modern day samurai warriors and are esteemed as such by the culture. Johnson enumerates other cultural traits that are unique to the Japanese culture that make replicating the “Japanese Miracle” elsewhere unlikely.