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Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement
Declared a terrorist menace yet elected to government in a free election, Hamas now stands as the most important Sunni Islamist group in the Middle East. How did Hamas grow to be so powerful? Who supports it? What is its future? This essential insight into Hamas answers these questions. Milton-Edwards and Farrell have between them spent decades researching and reporting from the heartlands of the Hamas movement and gained unrivalled access to the world of Islamic resistance and radical Islam in its potent Palestinian form. Drawing on their frontline experiences of recent events, their access to secret documents from the western intelligence community and interviews with leaders, militants, and commanders of Hamas' armed battalions, they reveal the full story of Hamas and the future of political Islam in the Middle East. Milton-Edwards and Farrell show Hamas to be a broad and thus more powerful regional phenomenon than previously thought, and by doing so contend that it is now time to rethink the war and the nature of Islam and its role in the Middle East. Beverley Milton-Edwards is Professor in the School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy at Queens University, Belfast. She is the author of books such as Contemporary Politics in the Middle East (2006) and The Israeli-Palestinian a People's War (2009). Prize-winning journalist Stephen Farrell is Foreign Correspondent for the New York Times and was previously Middle East correspondent for The Times .
340 pages, Paperback
First published April 26, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
January 8, 2013
Overall, this was a good book to learn about Hamas, its origins, its ideology, its source of popular support, its leaders, and their thinking. Given Hamas' powerful hold on many of the Palestinian people --- which I did not fully understand, I do understand better --- while not agreeing with this development.
The book shows that Hamas, contrary to the belief of many in the West, is more than just a terrorist organization, and, in that way, shares much more in common structurally with Hezbollah than it does with al-Qaeda. That may seem insignificant, but it is not. Hamas, prior to its seizure of power in Gaza in 2007, over decades grew from a minor charity and religious organization in the 1980s into a state within a state by the 2000s. It gained popular support by showing to many Palestinians that it could provide charity, medical care, financial assistance, youth activities, and much more effectively and efficiently --- in sharp contrast with Fatah, the Palestine's governing party, and the international community.
In that way, Hamas gained wide acceptance as the one group not corrupt, willing to fight for Palestinians, and able to get things done socioeconomically that no one else seemed to. Therein lies the source of Hamas' strength --- which the authors aptly detail.
This book does have some flaws. Perhaps in the effort to seem objective, they seemingly gave little credence to Israel's intelligence and battlefied reports on Hamas' terrorist activities and other actions in violation of international law. They obliquely discredit such Israeli reports with such things as "Israelis claim that..." and "The Israelis said that..." --- even though what the Israelis said or claimed has been verified through a variety of other sources --- actions such as use of human shields, deliberate targeting of Israeli civilians, and placement of Hamas military targets deliberately next to schools, hospitals, and mosques.
Another flaw in the book is that the authors ignore the most obvious question: "From where does Hamas get its funding" ---- which must surely run annually in at least the hundreds of millions of dollars or even billions. It is not coming from the indigenous population --- too impoverished. The authors lamely point to wealthy Gulf Arab donors, and then, after 2007, to Iran. But they never go into any specifics on exactly who or what entities in these nations are funding Hamas, and what their aims are in doing so.
Finally, another significant flaw is the book's final conclusion in the last chapter. The authors seem to take it for granted that Hamas cannot change, and, therefore, place no emphasis that Hamas must do so if it ever wants to serve better the aspirations of Palestinians. Instead, according to them, Israel and the rest of the international community has the burden of accomodating Hamas. For Israel, that is an untenable position --- Hamas denies Israel's right to exist so from that standpoint, how is Israel to be reasonably expected to deal with an organization that not only employs terrorism, but, from the beginning will not even concede its counterpart's own right to existence. If that is the case, what is the point of Israel even negotiating?
So not a good ending for the book -- which marred it. However, this is a good book for learning more about Hamas, its mendacious involvement in destroying the Mid East peace process, and the means by which it survives and operates.
The book shows that Hamas, contrary to the belief of many in the West, is more than just a terrorist organization, and, in that way, shares much more in common structurally with Hezbollah than it does with al-Qaeda. That may seem insignificant, but it is not. Hamas, prior to its seizure of power in Gaza in 2007, over decades grew from a minor charity and religious organization in the 1980s into a state within a state by the 2000s. It gained popular support by showing to many Palestinians that it could provide charity, medical care, financial assistance, youth activities, and much more effectively and efficiently --- in sharp contrast with Fatah, the Palestine's governing party, and the international community.
In that way, Hamas gained wide acceptance as the one group not corrupt, willing to fight for Palestinians, and able to get things done socioeconomically that no one else seemed to. Therein lies the source of Hamas' strength --- which the authors aptly detail.
This book does have some flaws. Perhaps in the effort to seem objective, they seemingly gave little credence to Israel's intelligence and battlefied reports on Hamas' terrorist activities and other actions in violation of international law. They obliquely discredit such Israeli reports with such things as "Israelis claim that..." and "The Israelis said that..." --- even though what the Israelis said or claimed has been verified through a variety of other sources --- actions such as use of human shields, deliberate targeting of Israeli civilians, and placement of Hamas military targets deliberately next to schools, hospitals, and mosques.
Another flaw in the book is that the authors ignore the most obvious question: "From where does Hamas get its funding" ---- which must surely run annually in at least the hundreds of millions of dollars or even billions. It is not coming from the indigenous population --- too impoverished. The authors lamely point to wealthy Gulf Arab donors, and then, after 2007, to Iran. But they never go into any specifics on exactly who or what entities in these nations are funding Hamas, and what their aims are in doing so.
Finally, another significant flaw is the book's final conclusion in the last chapter. The authors seem to take it for granted that Hamas cannot change, and, therefore, place no emphasis that Hamas must do so if it ever wants to serve better the aspirations of Palestinians. Instead, according to them, Israel and the rest of the international community has the burden of accomodating Hamas. For Israel, that is an untenable position --- Hamas denies Israel's right to exist so from that standpoint, how is Israel to be reasonably expected to deal with an organization that not only employs terrorism, but, from the beginning will not even concede its counterpart's own right to existence. If that is the case, what is the point of Israel even negotiating?
So not a good ending for the book -- which marred it. However, this is a good book for learning more about Hamas, its mendacious involvement in destroying the Mid East peace process, and the means by which it survives and operates.
November 22, 2023
Arguably the preeminent book on Hamas. Detailed unbiased scholarship.
My biggest takeaway? Taking a hard line against an enemy doesn't always harm the enemy. Sometimes, if you don't act strategically -- whether from domestic political pressures, a refusal to compromise, or even just that you refuse to swallow your pride -- it backfires.
Blowback point #1: This book specifies the many ways that Israel nurtured extremist Palestinian Islamic movements in order to undermine Fatah, its more moderate secular nationalist opponent that ran the Palestinian Authority. I know that can sound controversial, but it was never factually up for debate. This book provides the evidence.
Blowback point #2: Israel clearly "won" the Oslo peace process and subsequent negotiations. With the US's finger on the scale, it convinced Fatah's Arafat to recognize Israel's right to exist and to act as Israel's security sub-contractor in the territories. But Fatah lost popular support when it had nothing to show for its concessions besides expanded settlements and increased Israeli restrictions on Palestinian activity. The only major contender against it? Hamas -- which, of course, narrowly won Parliamentary elections in 2006 after Palestinians lost faith in Fatah's ability to achieve a political resolution.
Blowback point #3: Israel and the US took a hard line against funding the Hamas-led PA following the '06 elections. Israel held back Palestinian tax revenues. The US withheld funding and, perhaps more importantly, implemented stringent legislation barring dealings with terrorist organizations. As a result, any reputable source within the international financial system was terrified to offer humanitarian aid to the PA. Who's left? Other terrorist organizations, of course. As Sunni Muslims, Hamas had long been resistant to publicly capitalize on Shi'a Iran's longstanding offers of aid. Hamas had even doubled down on this in 2003 amid growing anti-Shi'a sentiment among Sunni Muslims following the post-2003 sectarian slaughter between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims in Iraq. But Hamas ran out of options when it lost its funding. And in its desperation, it finally turned to Iran for major financial and tactical support. A mere decade later, Iran's support for Hamas is one of the US's and Israel's most concerning global developments.
The list goes on. It’s a timely reminder of the unfortunate geopolitical reality that knee-jerk overreactions against Hamas don’t necessarily best achieve security for Israelis. This has happened before, Israel's response hasn't worked, and I see no signs of it changing.
Other notable points: How Hamas is a decentralized organization that historically flourishes even after Israel assassinates its leadership and removes military installations (as in '04, and as in '08). How Israel punished the moderate Fatah-led PA for not containing attacks wrought by rival Hamas, even after Fatah expended massive amounts of time, money, and (most importantly) popular political capital to do so. How Hamas was and is, first and foremost, a social group that has a separate military arm. How Hamas's election victory was not based on its rejectionist stance against Israel (which it played down during elections) but rather on the PLO's corruption, misguided campaign strategy, and inability to deliver social services or negotiate a settlement. How Hamas is a political Islamist group, as opposed to a Salafist-jihadist Islamist group, that's specifically concerned with establishing a Palestinian nation-state as opposed to a worldwide jihad against Western countries more broadly.
This was not an apologia for Hamas. It reads like a carefully written textbook and probably is one. At the very least, if it had a bias, I couldn't find it. Beverley Milton-Edwards is a respected academic and Stephen Farrell is a prize-winning journalist. Each has decades of experience in Gaza. Together, they conducted tens of interviews with Hamas operatives, including many high-ranking Hamas officials (including a few just months/weeks before they were assassinated). They also met with many high-ranking Fatah and Israeli leaders.
The cover sensationally portrays Hamas as a militant movement, but the book avoids the sensationalist rally cries that you often hear from leftists and neoconservatives, respectively. Instead, they restrained themselves to marshalling relevant facts and a broad spectrum of serious analysts' opinions. That's on balance probably a good thing, but -- and maybe I've just been reading too many Opinions pieces in the paper -- I left off wanting to know their own analyses and conclusions. They're also subject matter experts, after all.
4.0/5.
My biggest takeaway? Taking a hard line against an enemy doesn't always harm the enemy. Sometimes, if you don't act strategically -- whether from domestic political pressures, a refusal to compromise, or even just that you refuse to swallow your pride -- it backfires.
Blowback point #1: This book specifies the many ways that Israel nurtured extremist Palestinian Islamic movements in order to undermine Fatah, its more moderate secular nationalist opponent that ran the Palestinian Authority. I know that can sound controversial, but it was never factually up for debate. This book provides the evidence.
Blowback point #2: Israel clearly "won" the Oslo peace process and subsequent negotiations. With the US's finger on the scale, it convinced Fatah's Arafat to recognize Israel's right to exist and to act as Israel's security sub-contractor in the territories. But Fatah lost popular support when it had nothing to show for its concessions besides expanded settlements and increased Israeli restrictions on Palestinian activity. The only major contender against it? Hamas -- which, of course, narrowly won Parliamentary elections in 2006 after Palestinians lost faith in Fatah's ability to achieve a political resolution.
Blowback point #3: Israel and the US took a hard line against funding the Hamas-led PA following the '06 elections. Israel held back Palestinian tax revenues. The US withheld funding and, perhaps more importantly, implemented stringent legislation barring dealings with terrorist organizations. As a result, any reputable source within the international financial system was terrified to offer humanitarian aid to the PA. Who's left? Other terrorist organizations, of course. As Sunni Muslims, Hamas had long been resistant to publicly capitalize on Shi'a Iran's longstanding offers of aid. Hamas had even doubled down on this in 2003 amid growing anti-Shi'a sentiment among Sunni Muslims following the post-2003 sectarian slaughter between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims in Iraq. But Hamas ran out of options when it lost its funding. And in its desperation, it finally turned to Iran for major financial and tactical support. A mere decade later, Iran's support for Hamas is one of the US's and Israel's most concerning global developments.
The list goes on. It’s a timely reminder of the unfortunate geopolitical reality that knee-jerk overreactions against Hamas don’t necessarily best achieve security for Israelis. This has happened before, Israel's response hasn't worked, and I see no signs of it changing.
Other notable points: How Hamas is a decentralized organization that historically flourishes even after Israel assassinates its leadership and removes military installations (as in '04, and as in '08). How Israel punished the moderate Fatah-led PA for not containing attacks wrought by rival Hamas, even after Fatah expended massive amounts of time, money, and (most importantly) popular political capital to do so. How Hamas was and is, first and foremost, a social group that has a separate military arm. How Hamas's election victory was not based on its rejectionist stance against Israel (which it played down during elections) but rather on the PLO's corruption, misguided campaign strategy, and inability to deliver social services or negotiate a settlement. How Hamas is a political Islamist group, as opposed to a Salafist-jihadist Islamist group, that's specifically concerned with establishing a Palestinian nation-state as opposed to a worldwide jihad against Western countries more broadly.
This was not an apologia for Hamas. It reads like a carefully written textbook and probably is one. At the very least, if it had a bias, I couldn't find it. Beverley Milton-Edwards is a respected academic and Stephen Farrell is a prize-winning journalist. Each has decades of experience in Gaza. Together, they conducted tens of interviews with Hamas operatives, including many high-ranking Hamas officials (including a few just months/weeks before they were assassinated). They also met with many high-ranking Fatah and Israeli leaders.
The cover sensationally portrays Hamas as a militant movement, but the book avoids the sensationalist rally cries that you often hear from leftists and neoconservatives, respectively. Instead, they restrained themselves to marshalling relevant facts and a broad spectrum of serious analysts' opinions. That's on balance probably a good thing, but -- and maybe I've just been reading too many Opinions pieces in the paper -- I left off wanting to know their own analyses and conclusions. They're also subject matter experts, after all.
4.0/5.
December 30, 2018
This is a pathetically skewed hit job, and I'm sorry I wasted my money. It can only be described as a "hit job" and I wonder if the authors would be appreciative if Likud were described as a party of the "Jewish Resistance Movement." While it does contain much good factual information, it seems all from a "Western" ("Orientalist") point of view. If one wants to know about Hamas, I would most certainly refer them to Sara Roy's terrific works, most notably the expanded third edition of "The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development" (much more interesting than the title might lead one to think) and "Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector." Other good titles are Bjorn Brenner's "Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance" and Donald MacIntyre's "Gaza: Preparing For Dawn." I hope to be reviewing all of these in the near future.
September 5, 2021
I have finished reading “Hamas” by Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell.
The Hamas Covenant is very clear. It’s objective is indeed to wipe the State of Israel off the map, which in their interpretation would be recovering the land of all Palestinians. To abandon the former would compromise the latter.
Officially with Hamas there is no compromise, only the commitment to resistance against Israel.
Hamas grew out of the international Muslim Brotherhood network which emanated out of Egypt in the mid 20th century as a reaction to the failures of Arab Socialism under Egyptian President Nasser and his successors. At the time the dominant Palestinian resistance faction was Fatah (Arabic for “Conquest”), and many Fatah activists became members of the Muslim Brotherhood during exile in Egypt. At the time most of the Fatah activists left the Muslim Brotherhood to further resistance in the name of Fatah, at the time not many saw the Muslim Brotherhood’s cause as meaning much to the cause of founding a Palestinian state. Fatah went to war with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood’s offshoots in Palestine watched carefully.
It took a while for either Fatah or Israel to take the movement that became Hamas seriously. Hamas was formed in 1987 just at the start of the first Intifada, the first Palestinian mass rebellion against Israel. At first Hamas allowed Fatah to take centre stage in fighting Israel. Hamas’s priorities were to spread their version of Islam throughout Palestine first, then start a coordinated armed resistance against Israel. The former involved Hamas taking over Palestinian institutions such as universities as well as civil and professional organisations. Israeli Intelligence sought to not interfere in this at first, seeing Fatah as the main enemy the Israeli authorities largely stepped aside as these takeovers happened.
Hamas winning the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006 was in many ways both surprising and inevitable. Outmanoeuvred by Israel, corrupt and aging in it’s leadership, Fatah to many Palestinian’s was a busted flush. Because of this Hamas, who promised change and reform, seemed like a better alternative. Furthermore, Fatah’s involvement in the Oslo Accords, which many ordinary Palestinians felt did little to improve their difficult lives, compromised them in the eyes of potential voters. However, it was the armed takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 2007 that probably has the longest far-reaching consequences. Trapped behind Israel’s blockade and within Hamas’s conquered territory Gazans don’t have many easy alternatives at the moment. But after Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, far from turning their backs on Hamas, many Palestinians who were polled stuck by them seeing no choice but continued armed resistance. In many cases they saw the diminishing prospects of a two-state solution (due to the blockade, settlement building and occupation of the West Bank by Israel), as a reason for them to go for broke.
Overall, while I find this book tough reading I was impressed by the breadth of the research. The authors put in over 15 years of research into this subject. What was also interesting is the author’s efforts to highlight how many Palestinians were more liberal than western readers may assume, and they found the enforced social conservatism of Hamas stifling. This was also tough reading to note that the cycle of violence is continuing. I have a few final thoughts after reading it. I do not believe the blockade of Gaza is going to work against Hamas’s power. Nor is the Western cut-off of aid to Gaza. All this has done is encouraged Iran to step in. A final thought is to ponder that movements such as Hamas like to promote themselves as more of a united front than they are in reality. There is evidence that shows hardliners and pragmatists within Hamas. We keep sending messages out meant for the hardliners. Is there any harm in putting feelers out to the pragmatists?
This book is definitely overdue for a new edition.
The Hamas Covenant is very clear. It’s objective is indeed to wipe the State of Israel off the map, which in their interpretation would be recovering the land of all Palestinians. To abandon the former would compromise the latter.
Officially with Hamas there is no compromise, only the commitment to resistance against Israel.
Hamas grew out of the international Muslim Brotherhood network which emanated out of Egypt in the mid 20th century as a reaction to the failures of Arab Socialism under Egyptian President Nasser and his successors. At the time the dominant Palestinian resistance faction was Fatah (Arabic for “Conquest”), and many Fatah activists became members of the Muslim Brotherhood during exile in Egypt. At the time most of the Fatah activists left the Muslim Brotherhood to further resistance in the name of Fatah, at the time not many saw the Muslim Brotherhood’s cause as meaning much to the cause of founding a Palestinian state. Fatah went to war with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood’s offshoots in Palestine watched carefully.
It took a while for either Fatah or Israel to take the movement that became Hamas seriously. Hamas was formed in 1987 just at the start of the first Intifada, the first Palestinian mass rebellion against Israel. At first Hamas allowed Fatah to take centre stage in fighting Israel. Hamas’s priorities were to spread their version of Islam throughout Palestine first, then start a coordinated armed resistance against Israel. The former involved Hamas taking over Palestinian institutions such as universities as well as civil and professional organisations. Israeli Intelligence sought to not interfere in this at first, seeing Fatah as the main enemy the Israeli authorities largely stepped aside as these takeovers happened.
Hamas winning the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006 was in many ways both surprising and inevitable. Outmanoeuvred by Israel, corrupt and aging in it’s leadership, Fatah to many Palestinian’s was a busted flush. Because of this Hamas, who promised change and reform, seemed like a better alternative. Furthermore, Fatah’s involvement in the Oslo Accords, which many ordinary Palestinians felt did little to improve their difficult lives, compromised them in the eyes of potential voters. However, it was the armed takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 2007 that probably has the longest far-reaching consequences. Trapped behind Israel’s blockade and within Hamas’s conquered territory Gazans don’t have many easy alternatives at the moment. But after Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, far from turning their backs on Hamas, many Palestinians who were polled stuck by them seeing no choice but continued armed resistance. In many cases they saw the diminishing prospects of a two-state solution (due to the blockade, settlement building and occupation of the West Bank by Israel), as a reason for them to go for broke.
Overall, while I find this book tough reading I was impressed by the breadth of the research. The authors put in over 15 years of research into this subject. What was also interesting is the author’s efforts to highlight how many Palestinians were more liberal than western readers may assume, and they found the enforced social conservatism of Hamas stifling. This was also tough reading to note that the cycle of violence is continuing. I have a few final thoughts after reading it. I do not believe the blockade of Gaza is going to work against Hamas’s power. Nor is the Western cut-off of aid to Gaza. All this has done is encouraged Iran to step in. A final thought is to ponder that movements such as Hamas like to promote themselves as more of a united front than they are in reality. There is evidence that shows hardliners and pragmatists within Hamas. We keep sending messages out meant for the hardliners. Is there any harm in putting feelers out to the pragmatists?
This book is definitely overdue for a new edition.
November 9, 2014
This a readable comprehensive history of Hamas. I found that the authors missed one key factor in understanding Gaza, got one thing wrong on the history.
What the authors got wrong on the history is that Ariel Sharon's (p. 87) "walkabout in Jerusalem's Old City," was not the cause of the Second Intifada. The Second Intifada did not start immediately after. Shortly after Sharon's "walkabout," President Clinton, in an unrelated event, leaned very hard on Arafat and told him (Arafat) that Palestinians were losing the moral high ground, in world opinion, because of his (Arafat's) refusal to make a deal. At this point Arafat took action (Israeli Intelligence is correct in noting that this was not a spontaneous uprising. p. 88) to start the Second Intifada, believing (correctly) that there would be Palestinian causalities that would distract world opinion from Palestinian intransigence and create sympathy for Palestinian suffering. Of course it follows from this that those who respond positively to the cynical proclivity of Palestinian leaders to sacrifice their children are retarding progress towards a settlement. See p. 290 note.
What the authors missed is what will turn out to be the great issue of this century - water. The aquifer, under the Gaza Strip, is being overdrawn an the water level is falling. In the absence of fresh water pressure, the aquifer is being infiltrated by salt water. As miserable as things are in Gaza now, they will - in the absence of a settlement - get much worse.
I worked in the same group with a Palestinian, at Lockheed Missile and Space Company (LMSC) in the mid-1970s. I cannot remember his name. He had worked his way through college, carrying more than a full load, while working full time to support a wife and child. He was pretty explicit about the humiliation and resentment associated with Israeli control (check points, etc.) of the West Bank. See also note on p. 230.
Would it make sense for me to be a Mexican irredentist and launch a terrorist revanche to retake California from the people who stole it from us, after we stole from someone else? Probably not: It is time for Palestinians to take the best deal. That of course is just my thought: the early 2009 polling data, on p. 305 -306, makes it very clear that the majority of Palestinians do not agree.
Although is is hard to see how to get there, the authors are probably correct in asserting (p. 309) that "There is no solution without Hamas."
The eighty-sixth book I have finished this year.
Preface and Acknowledgements
p. vii. The Western world refused to accept Hamas's victory at the ballot box, and Hamas refused to bow to the international community's demands that it recognize Israel and renounce violence.
1 We Deal with Allah Directly
p. 4. The Hamas crest depicts crossed swords against the distinctive scimitar-shaped slice of land which includes all of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. (see also p. 230.)
Do you know where the name of the Gaza strip comes from? Ghazi (غازي, ġāzī) is an Arabic term originally referring to an individual who participates in Ghazw عزو, ġazw), meaning military expeditions or raiding; after the emergence of Islam, it took on new connotations of religious warfare.
from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghazi_(w...
The Gaza strip is named for people who were raiders long before they became Muslim.
2 The Path of al-Qassam
p. 19. This message is the key to Qassam's enduring appeal for later generations of Islamists - not the destination he reached, but the path he laid down, and the example of personal sacrifice - martyrdom -which he set in doing so,
p. 23. As absentee Arab landowners sold out to Jewish immigrants, poor Palestinian Arab villagers were being displaced and were pouring into cities such as Haifa.
3 Sowing
p. 33. It was half what the Arabs would have received had they accepted partition, and, in addition to losing half their allotted land, they had also lost half the Palestinian population: by the end of 1949 726,000 refugees had fled our been driven out.
p. 37. The enforced separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank - with Israel between them - meant that the path of Palestinian Islamism had a dual character.
p. 42. Even then, according to Segev, it was apparent that the Islamists in Gaza were exploiting the failings of the PLO.
p. 49. They even considered those who ate with their left had worthy of a beating, deeming it to be un-Islamic
4 The First Intifada
p. 55. Objectives (long-term) - reject negotiated solutions, break with the deviations of Camp David, reject proposals for autonomy, reject the idea of an international conference, . . . .
p. 57. This criticized the PLO for accepting UN resolutions 181, 242, and 338, which in effect accepted a two-state solution to the conflict with Israel and in so doing abandoned the goal still proposed by Hamas: liberating all of Palestine.
p. 63. The PLO, having chosen the wrong side during the war, was also losing its superpower patron with the collapse of the Soviet Union, so it had little choice but to go with he emerging international consensus on the need for a peace process.
p. 63. . . . reversing the position he had taken four years earlier when he told Shimon Peres that Israel's right to exist was on the table.
5 Oslo and 'Vain Endeavours'
p. 71. But, for once, Hamas was badly out of kilter with popular sentiment, which favoured peace settlement.
p. 80. Hamas claimed that it carried out bombings in revenge for Israeli attacks which killed Palestinian civilians, but it was also motivated by a determined to undermine negotiations between Israel and the PA
6 The Second Intifada
I could not disagree more with the p. 85 assertion that "The immediate events . . . are not in question." With the p. 88 acknowledgement that "Israeli intelligence officials argue that the Intifada was not spontaneous," the authors seem to falsify their won p. 85 claim. (see also p. 230 & 232.) The starting of the Second Intifada, days after the putative cause, was Arafat's decision to sacrifice young Palestinians to maintain sympathy for the Palestinian cause.
p. 101. From its birth as the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 through to the rocket-firing which provoked Israel's December 20018 military onslaught on Gaza, Hamas operated on a working assumption: when Palestine burns, its support grows.
7 The Qassam Brigades
p. 119. Leaflets and sermons declared the offences for which supposed offenders would be brought to justice, among them 'supporting peace with the enemy', 'doing business with the enemy', and seeking to poison our society with their filth and vices and drug and alcohol taking, lust parties and outings'. . . . To my knowledge Hamas killed more people than the Israelis during the First Intifada, at least in Gaza.
p. 125. Today few opportunities exist for unskilled or semi-skilled men, who have subsequently jointed the ever increasing network of Hamas's armed ranks.
p. 131. Indeed in 2009 the UN-ordered Goldstone Report into Israeli's military assault on Gaza also concluded that, in fact, the Hamas missiles launched indiscriminately at Israel constituted a war crime.
8 The Martyr Syndrome
p. 136. It was a classic piece of bravado fusing two elements central to the Palestinian underdog narrative: redefining military weakness as moral superiority and survival as victory. . . . in other words, the end of the state of Israel.
p. 139. . . . the promise to martyrs of seventy-two dark-eyed houriyaat (maidens of paradise) . . . a stereotype of Islamic fundamentalism . . . grounded in the perception oh some putative martyrs.
p. 146. The same month an opinion poll showed 68 percent of Palestinians supported suicide bombings, only slightly down from 74 percent six months earlier.
9 Harvesting
p. 167. After Hamas's victory n the 2006 election the international community set out to isolate the organization even further, until it renounced violence, recognized Israel and consented to abide by previous agreements signed by previous Palestinian leaders. 'The military wing of Hamas is proscribed in the UK as a terrorist organization: hey fire rockets at innocent civilians and put ordinary Palestinians in harm's way', a Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesperson said in mid-2009.
10 Women
p. 189. The propagation of the canard that women are weak and vulnerable to exploitation by Israel by seduction - ighraa in Arabic - provided Hamas with yet another rationalization to exert greater control.
p. 192. He applied the standard yardstick of 4.25 kg (150 oz) of gold for a dead man, and half that for a woman. . . . Although Yusra's death was unusual in its circumstances honor killings - including those allegedly carried out or sanctioned by Hamas 'enforcers' - are by no means rare. (see also p. 204)
Wow! That is right out of the trial of Orestes "The Eumenides." The crime of killing a woman is far less serious than the crime of killing a man.
While reading this book, I came across this from Amnesty International:
Afghanistan: Protect 10-year Old Rape Survivor from Honor Killing
Brishna, a 10-year old girl from Kunduz province in Afghanistan, was raped by a local mullah in May 2014. While she was recovering in the hospital, her family and community members threatened to kill her and “dump her in the river.”
http://act.amnestyusa.org/ea-action/a...
p. 202. She was even filmed with her youngest son before the suicide mission in which he died, telling him not to come back to her unless he was 'shaheed' (martyred).
11 A House Divided
p. 214. Hamas criticized the nationalists and the PLO . . . 'All Palestine is the right of the Muslim, past, present and future . . . No Palestinian has the right to give u the land soaked in the martyrs blood.
12 Bullet and Ballot
p. 230. - an assembly without power over its borders, sea, airspace, military or would-be capital, all of which are under Israel's control - . . . .
In the optimistic days of the mid-1990s, with the memories still fresh of Yasser Arafat, Bill Clinton and Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands on the White House lawn, . . . . (see also p. 85.)
p. 232. After the initiative failed it became an Israeli article of faith that Arafat turned down the best deal the Palestinians would ever be offered.
This is how the Second Intifada started. President Clinton warned Arafat that he would lose the moral high ground because of his rejection of this deal. The starting of the Second Intifada, days after the putative cause, was Arafat's decision to sacrifice young Palestinians to maintain sympathy for the Palestinian cause.
p. 233. In other words, Hamas went into politics to keep its guns, not to lay them down.
p. 240. Unlike the founding generation, the younger leaders who were emerging and rising through the ranks in Gaza and the West Bank had often not worked or studied abroad.
p. 242. Many veterans dragged their feet, unwilling to lose their sinecures.
p. 244. No Gazan who watched the demolition of Israeli settlements felt anything but a sense of victory at the destruction of outposts whose watchtowers, snipers and Israeli-only highways had blighted their lives for decades,
p. 248. . . . making no mention of its ultimate goal of eradicating Israel.
13 Hamastan
p. 261. Hamas inherited a lawless Gaza.
p. 263. That is not a recognition of Israel, and there is not acceptance of the two-state solution.
p. 276. Significantly, even though he was born in Lebanon and had never visited Palestine, he spoke Arabic with a Palestinian, not a Lebanese, accent, denoting how little the Palestinian refugee population has been diluted by, or absorbed into, Lebanese society.
p. 279. Hamas was manifestly better armed, better drilled and more organized than the PA' Fatah partisans in the security forces.
14 Inferno
p. 283. These secular, autocratic and sclerotic regimes feared that a strong Hamas would strengthen its Muslim Brotherhood cousins in their own countries, and wanted a Palestinian proxy to crush it.
p. 290. The Fatah Special Forces were the first ones to desert their positions. . . . One of the most dangerous legacies of the takeover was that Hamas demonstrated, time and again, its willingness to kill ion cold blood to get rid of its enemies. . . . But Hamas appeared to be gambling, as it has done consistently, on the likelihood that Palestinians would blame the country besieging them, not the government under siege.
p. 300. . . . that Hamas had broken the ceasefire, that Hamas was 'hiding' behind civilians, and that no country would accept rockets being fired into its territory.
p. 307. Even if Gaza is destroyed, Hamas still wins.
This story in The New York Times came up while I was reading "Hamas." Israelis and Palestinians cannot even agree on when daylight savings time starts?
For Israelis and Palestinians, Another Divide to Contend With: Time
By JODI RUDORENOCT. 28, 2014
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/world/midd...
What the authors got wrong on the history is that Ariel Sharon's (p. 87) "walkabout in Jerusalem's Old City," was not the cause of the Second Intifada. The Second Intifada did not start immediately after. Shortly after Sharon's "walkabout," President Clinton, in an unrelated event, leaned very hard on Arafat and told him (Arafat) that Palestinians were losing the moral high ground, in world opinion, because of his (Arafat's) refusal to make a deal. At this point Arafat took action (Israeli Intelligence is correct in noting that this was not a spontaneous uprising. p. 88) to start the Second Intifada, believing (correctly) that there would be Palestinian causalities that would distract world opinion from Palestinian intransigence and create sympathy for Palestinian suffering. Of course it follows from this that those who respond positively to the cynical proclivity of Palestinian leaders to sacrifice their children are retarding progress towards a settlement. See p. 290 note.
What the authors missed is what will turn out to be the great issue of this century - water. The aquifer, under the Gaza Strip, is being overdrawn an the water level is falling. In the absence of fresh water pressure, the aquifer is being infiltrated by salt water. As miserable as things are in Gaza now, they will - in the absence of a settlement - get much worse.
I worked in the same group with a Palestinian, at Lockheed Missile and Space Company (LMSC) in the mid-1970s. I cannot remember his name. He had worked his way through college, carrying more than a full load, while working full time to support a wife and child. He was pretty explicit about the humiliation and resentment associated with Israeli control (check points, etc.) of the West Bank. See also note on p. 230.
Would it make sense for me to be a Mexican irredentist and launch a terrorist revanche to retake California from the people who stole it from us, after we stole from someone else? Probably not: It is time for Palestinians to take the best deal. That of course is just my thought: the early 2009 polling data, on p. 305 -306, makes it very clear that the majority of Palestinians do not agree.
Although is is hard to see how to get there, the authors are probably correct in asserting (p. 309) that "There is no solution without Hamas."
The eighty-sixth book I have finished this year.
Preface and Acknowledgements
p. vii. The Western world refused to accept Hamas's victory at the ballot box, and Hamas refused to bow to the international community's demands that it recognize Israel and renounce violence.
1 We Deal with Allah Directly
p. 4. The Hamas crest depicts crossed swords against the distinctive scimitar-shaped slice of land which includes all of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. (see also p. 230.)
Do you know where the name of the Gaza strip comes from? Ghazi (غازي, ġāzī) is an Arabic term originally referring to an individual who participates in Ghazw عزو, ġazw), meaning military expeditions or raiding; after the emergence of Islam, it took on new connotations of religious warfare.
from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghazi_(w...
The Gaza strip is named for people who were raiders long before they became Muslim.
2 The Path of al-Qassam
p. 19. This message is the key to Qassam's enduring appeal for later generations of Islamists - not the destination he reached, but the path he laid down, and the example of personal sacrifice - martyrdom -which he set in doing so,
p. 23. As absentee Arab landowners sold out to Jewish immigrants, poor Palestinian Arab villagers were being displaced and were pouring into cities such as Haifa.
3 Sowing
p. 33. It was half what the Arabs would have received had they accepted partition, and, in addition to losing half their allotted land, they had also lost half the Palestinian population: by the end of 1949 726,000 refugees had fled our been driven out.
p. 37. The enforced separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank - with Israel between them - meant that the path of Palestinian Islamism had a dual character.
p. 42. Even then, according to Segev, it was apparent that the Islamists in Gaza were exploiting the failings of the PLO.
p. 49. They even considered those who ate with their left had worthy of a beating, deeming it to be un-Islamic
4 The First Intifada
p. 55. Objectives (long-term) - reject negotiated solutions, break with the deviations of Camp David, reject proposals for autonomy, reject the idea of an international conference, . . . .
p. 57. This criticized the PLO for accepting UN resolutions 181, 242, and 338, which in effect accepted a two-state solution to the conflict with Israel and in so doing abandoned the goal still proposed by Hamas: liberating all of Palestine.
p. 63. The PLO, having chosen the wrong side during the war, was also losing its superpower patron with the collapse of the Soviet Union, so it had little choice but to go with he emerging international consensus on the need for a peace process.
p. 63. . . . reversing the position he had taken four years earlier when he told Shimon Peres that Israel's right to exist was on the table.
5 Oslo and 'Vain Endeavours'
p. 71. But, for once, Hamas was badly out of kilter with popular sentiment, which favoured peace settlement.
p. 80. Hamas claimed that it carried out bombings in revenge for Israeli attacks which killed Palestinian civilians, but it was also motivated by a determined to undermine negotiations between Israel and the PA
6 The Second Intifada
I could not disagree more with the p. 85 assertion that "The immediate events . . . are not in question." With the p. 88 acknowledgement that "Israeli intelligence officials argue that the Intifada was not spontaneous," the authors seem to falsify their won p. 85 claim. (see also p. 230 & 232.) The starting of the Second Intifada, days after the putative cause, was Arafat's decision to sacrifice young Palestinians to maintain sympathy for the Palestinian cause.
p. 101. From its birth as the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 through to the rocket-firing which provoked Israel's December 20018 military onslaught on Gaza, Hamas operated on a working assumption: when Palestine burns, its support grows.
7 The Qassam Brigades
p. 119. Leaflets and sermons declared the offences for which supposed offenders would be brought to justice, among them 'supporting peace with the enemy', 'doing business with the enemy', and seeking to poison our society with their filth and vices and drug and alcohol taking, lust parties and outings'. . . . To my knowledge Hamas killed more people than the Israelis during the First Intifada, at least in Gaza.
p. 125. Today few opportunities exist for unskilled or semi-skilled men, who have subsequently jointed the ever increasing network of Hamas's armed ranks.
p. 131. Indeed in 2009 the UN-ordered Goldstone Report into Israeli's military assault on Gaza also concluded that, in fact, the Hamas missiles launched indiscriminately at Israel constituted a war crime.
8 The Martyr Syndrome
p. 136. It was a classic piece of bravado fusing two elements central to the Palestinian underdog narrative: redefining military weakness as moral superiority and survival as victory. . . . in other words, the end of the state of Israel.
p. 139. . . . the promise to martyrs of seventy-two dark-eyed houriyaat (maidens of paradise) . . . a stereotype of Islamic fundamentalism . . . grounded in the perception oh some putative martyrs.
p. 146. The same month an opinion poll showed 68 percent of Palestinians supported suicide bombings, only slightly down from 74 percent six months earlier.
9 Harvesting
p. 167. After Hamas's victory n the 2006 election the international community set out to isolate the organization even further, until it renounced violence, recognized Israel and consented to abide by previous agreements signed by previous Palestinian leaders. 'The military wing of Hamas is proscribed in the UK as a terrorist organization: hey fire rockets at innocent civilians and put ordinary Palestinians in harm's way', a Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesperson said in mid-2009.
10 Women
p. 189. The propagation of the canard that women are weak and vulnerable to exploitation by Israel by seduction - ighraa in Arabic - provided Hamas with yet another rationalization to exert greater control.
p. 192. He applied the standard yardstick of 4.25 kg (150 oz) of gold for a dead man, and half that for a woman. . . . Although Yusra's death was unusual in its circumstances honor killings - including those allegedly carried out or sanctioned by Hamas 'enforcers' - are by no means rare. (see also p. 204)
Wow! That is right out of the trial of Orestes "The Eumenides." The crime of killing a woman is far less serious than the crime of killing a man.
While reading this book, I came across this from Amnesty International:
Afghanistan: Protect 10-year Old Rape Survivor from Honor Killing
Brishna, a 10-year old girl from Kunduz province in Afghanistan, was raped by a local mullah in May 2014. While she was recovering in the hospital, her family and community members threatened to kill her and “dump her in the river.”
http://act.amnestyusa.org/ea-action/a...
p. 202. She was even filmed with her youngest son before the suicide mission in which he died, telling him not to come back to her unless he was 'shaheed' (martyred).
11 A House Divided
p. 214. Hamas criticized the nationalists and the PLO . . . 'All Palestine is the right of the Muslim, past, present and future . . . No Palestinian has the right to give u the land soaked in the martyrs blood.
12 Bullet and Ballot
p. 230. - an assembly without power over its borders, sea, airspace, military or would-be capital, all of which are under Israel's control - . . . .
In the optimistic days of the mid-1990s, with the memories still fresh of Yasser Arafat, Bill Clinton and Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands on the White House lawn, . . . . (see also p. 85.)
p. 232. After the initiative failed it became an Israeli article of faith that Arafat turned down the best deal the Palestinians would ever be offered.
This is how the Second Intifada started. President Clinton warned Arafat that he would lose the moral high ground because of his rejection of this deal. The starting of the Second Intifada, days after the putative cause, was Arafat's decision to sacrifice young Palestinians to maintain sympathy for the Palestinian cause.
p. 233. In other words, Hamas went into politics to keep its guns, not to lay them down.
p. 240. Unlike the founding generation, the younger leaders who were emerging and rising through the ranks in Gaza and the West Bank had often not worked or studied abroad.
p. 242. Many veterans dragged their feet, unwilling to lose their sinecures.
p. 244. No Gazan who watched the demolition of Israeli settlements felt anything but a sense of victory at the destruction of outposts whose watchtowers, snipers and Israeli-only highways had blighted their lives for decades,
p. 248. . . . making no mention of its ultimate goal of eradicating Israel.
13 Hamastan
p. 261. Hamas inherited a lawless Gaza.
p. 263. That is not a recognition of Israel, and there is not acceptance of the two-state solution.
p. 276. Significantly, even though he was born in Lebanon and had never visited Palestine, he spoke Arabic with a Palestinian, not a Lebanese, accent, denoting how little the Palestinian refugee population has been diluted by, or absorbed into, Lebanese society.
p. 279. Hamas was manifestly better armed, better drilled and more organized than the PA' Fatah partisans in the security forces.
14 Inferno
p. 283. These secular, autocratic and sclerotic regimes feared that a strong Hamas would strengthen its Muslim Brotherhood cousins in their own countries, and wanted a Palestinian proxy to crush it.
p. 290. The Fatah Special Forces were the first ones to desert their positions. . . . One of the most dangerous legacies of the takeover was that Hamas demonstrated, time and again, its willingness to kill ion cold blood to get rid of its enemies. . . . But Hamas appeared to be gambling, as it has done consistently, on the likelihood that Palestinians would blame the country besieging them, not the government under siege.
p. 300. . . . that Hamas had broken the ceasefire, that Hamas was 'hiding' behind civilians, and that no country would accept rockets being fired into its territory.
p. 307. Even if Gaza is destroyed, Hamas still wins.
This story in The New York Times came up while I was reading "Hamas." Israelis and Palestinians cannot even agree on when daylight savings time starts?
For Israelis and Palestinians, Another Divide to Contend With: Time
By JODI RUDORENOCT. 28, 2014
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/world/midd...
October 24, 2023
There is a lot to like for me in this book, as it collects hordes of historical information about Hamas and interweaves it with chronologies, international viewpoints, and issues of politics, social issues, and religion. Many people see Hamas as a violent terrorist organization and won't ever read this, which is sad. Hamas is a political, military, and fundamentalist religious reaction to Israel's land theft and continued ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people. Condemnation of their killings erases these two facts. If Israel had not stolen Palestinian land, murdered its people, and proceeded to build Settlements, all in direct and overt, unapologetic violation of international law, then Hamas would never have been needed to fight Israel's invasions, murders, assassinations, and oppression of the Palestinian people.
But...
This book does what most every book about freedom fighting groups does, and speaks from the side of the powerful oppressor, in this case Israel, first and foremost, and also the USofA, Israel's enabler, financier, and blind supporter. Too many times Milton-Edwards speaks of Hamas (and Fatah, the PLA, the PA, the various Brigades, etc.) in "seeming" or "supposedly" or "assumed to be" phraseology. As if what Hamas says and does requires an Israeli/US agreement for it to be honest, real, justified, or legitimate.
Not nearly enough of the book details how the USofA throttled Hamas after they won democratic elections in 2006 by withholding money and aid.
Not nearly enough of the book explains how Israel holds such an enormous amount of land, power, military force, and international support and how this affects any actions Hamas takes, making much of what they do a reaction, or at the very least the explanations for their actions is dominated by the Israeli POV and its militant Zionist rhetoric about "defending itself".
Hamas and its place in world history is mostly defined by anyone other than Hamas - Israel, the USofA, Western Europe, Egypt, the UN, the PLA, Fatah, other militant groups - and as long as world history is written by White christian Nationalists, its allies, and its puppets, not much will change in Occupied Palestine or the region that Western Civ calls, egotistically, the Middle East.
Hamas exist because of Israel's crimes. Never forget that.
But...
This book does what most every book about freedom fighting groups does, and speaks from the side of the powerful oppressor, in this case Israel, first and foremost, and also the USofA, Israel's enabler, financier, and blind supporter. Too many times Milton-Edwards speaks of Hamas (and Fatah, the PLA, the PA, the various Brigades, etc.) in "seeming" or "supposedly" or "assumed to be" phraseology. As if what Hamas says and does requires an Israeli/US agreement for it to be honest, real, justified, or legitimate.
Not nearly enough of the book details how the USofA throttled Hamas after they won democratic elections in 2006 by withholding money and aid.
Not nearly enough of the book explains how Israel holds such an enormous amount of land, power, military force, and international support and how this affects any actions Hamas takes, making much of what they do a reaction, or at the very least the explanations for their actions is dominated by the Israeli POV and its militant Zionist rhetoric about "defending itself".
Hamas and its place in world history is mostly defined by anyone other than Hamas - Israel, the USofA, Western Europe, Egypt, the UN, the PLA, Fatah, other militant groups - and as long as world history is written by White christian Nationalists, its allies, and its puppets, not much will change in Occupied Palestine or the region that Western Civ calls, egotistically, the Middle East.
Hamas exist because of Israel's crimes. Never forget that.
June 5, 2024
A VERY HELPFUL SURVEY OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
The authors wrote in the Preface to this 2020 book, “The purpose of this book, through hundreds of interviews conducted over three decades, is to present first-hand accounts of Hamas’s fighters, social activists, victims, political supporters and opponents, and by so doing to give a glimpse into how Hamas was born, grew and thrived in the mosques, casbahs and refugee camps of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem---the Palestinian Territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six Day War.” (Pg. vii)
They continue, “Hamas… is one of the most important Islamic organizations in the Middle East. Its Sunni credentials mean that it is admired by Islamic groups active in North Africa, the Levant, and Gulf, Asia and Europe. For them, Hamas’s brand of religious nationalism echoes their own political aspirations more than the worldwide jihad of Usama Bin Laden’s al Qaeda. Thus, it represents the increasing fusion of religion and politics among Muslims in the twenty-first century. But it also highlights the consequences for the West of refusing to acknowledge the role that such movements play in shaping and governing their societies and influencing their relationship with the regional and global order. Hamas has redefined the nature of national liberation struggles by inserting its own brand of lethal violence into the equation.” (Pg. viii-ix)
They explain, “there is another face of Hamas that the West rarely sees…. In these sinks of poverty Hamas’s non-military wings provide the food, medical services, clothing, books, schooling, orphanages, kindergartens, summer camps and other social services which are the bedrock of its success. Hamas was formally created in December 1987, but its creators—and their Islamist forerunners---had spent decades laying down this grass-roots network of benevolent charitable and social activities. It eventually grew into a shadow state which supplemented---and in many cases rivalled---the services provided by the official PA, the United Nations and humanitarian organizations.” (Pg. 5)
They observe, “Those Palestinians had come to believe that, after years of negotiations with Israel without any deal that would offer them hope of statehood and independence, there was little point in investing further political will in a process making their living conditions worse, not better. From the Palestinians’ perspective Hamas’s rivals… had nothing to show for their partnership in peace negotiations with Israel.” (Pg. 9)
They note, “When the PLO bowed to the inevitable and entered peace talks with Israel, Hamas reacted with fury. It condemned the PLO as traitors to the cause, opening up a public rift… Hamas leaders assailed the talks as ‘a heresy that will lead to the surrender of Muslim lands to Jews.’ When Palestinian negotiators returned to address public meetings and rallies, Hamas activities pelted them with stones and bottles and broke up the meetings.” (Pg. 66) They add, “Politically weakened, Hamas relied increasingly on its religious credentials to wage its jihad against Israel at a time when its secular counterparts in the Palestine Liberation Organization had embarked on peacemaking through negotiation. This reflected a divide within the Palestinian house that would have significant consequences in succeeding years.” (Pg. 84))
They state, “In recent times some Hamas leaders have made a virtue out of their differences with other radical Islamist groups as al-Qaeda, warning the West that to marginalize Hamas could provoke a radicalization in the Palestinian ranks and produce organizations far more dangerous than Hamas.” (Pg. 129)
They point out, “Hamas never publicly abandoned suicide bombing, but it did acknowledge that the tactic had outlived its usefulness and that the fight against Israel would be better served by developing its missile, rocket and mortar capacity. Israeli officials insisted that militant groups were still trying to carry out bombings, but that they were getting caught.” (Pg. 149)
They state, “One persistent of Hamas is that its social programmes come with an expensive price label: social order, the Hamas way. Aside from the repeated and well-documented reports of Islamist enforcers bullying women into conforming to Islamic behavior codes, Hamas and other Islamist organizations have curbed other social activities of which they disapprove.” (Pg. 171) They add, “Even after years of creeping Islamization there were at that time some public spaces where in places such as Gaza women still enjoyed greater freedom. But social pressure increased until those spaces became squeezed and then almost non-existent… The ubiquity of the hijab was achieved quickly, within a year or so of the creation of Hamas… Before long, bareheaded women were being stoned and abused in the street.” (Pg. 188-189)
They explain, “During the [2009] campaign Israel inflicted two major blows on the Hamas leadership… [but] it was by no means clear that the offensive immediately succeeded in turning Palestinians away from the Islamists in significant numbers. Once again Hamas was playing to the core conviction among many Palestinians that they can achieve more through arms and negotiations than through negotiations alone---a phenomenon explained by critics as an addiction to violence and by supporters as the only realistic way of squeezing concessions from a more powerful enemy.” (Pg. 302)
They conclude, “Many Israelis believe that Hamas can never be trusted to make peace and that its objective is to achieve the opposite: to foment holy war against the Jews and to expel them from Palestine. They continue to argue… that Hamas must be crushed. But, if Hamas is broken, will a more radical Islamist threat arise in its place?... Many secular Palestinians are also deeply suspicious of Hamas’s intentions, fearing that its agenda is to turn the Palestinian Territories into a Taliban-style fiefdom of Islamic fundamentalist rule… Hamas’s message is that it is now a fact on the ground in the Middle East, and must be acknowledged as such.” (Ph. 308-309)
This book will be of great interest to those wanting to know more about Hamas. (This book was written before the October 7th 2023 attacks on Israel, of course---after which they became much less eligible for 'sympathy.')
The authors wrote in the Preface to this 2020 book, “The purpose of this book, through hundreds of interviews conducted over three decades, is to present first-hand accounts of Hamas’s fighters, social activists, victims, political supporters and opponents, and by so doing to give a glimpse into how Hamas was born, grew and thrived in the mosques, casbahs and refugee camps of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem---the Palestinian Territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six Day War.” (Pg. vii)
They continue, “Hamas… is one of the most important Islamic organizations in the Middle East. Its Sunni credentials mean that it is admired by Islamic groups active in North Africa, the Levant, and Gulf, Asia and Europe. For them, Hamas’s brand of religious nationalism echoes their own political aspirations more than the worldwide jihad of Usama Bin Laden’s al Qaeda. Thus, it represents the increasing fusion of religion and politics among Muslims in the twenty-first century. But it also highlights the consequences for the West of refusing to acknowledge the role that such movements play in shaping and governing their societies and influencing their relationship with the regional and global order. Hamas has redefined the nature of national liberation struggles by inserting its own brand of lethal violence into the equation.” (Pg. viii-ix)
They explain, “there is another face of Hamas that the West rarely sees…. In these sinks of poverty Hamas’s non-military wings provide the food, medical services, clothing, books, schooling, orphanages, kindergartens, summer camps and other social services which are the bedrock of its success. Hamas was formally created in December 1987, but its creators—and their Islamist forerunners---had spent decades laying down this grass-roots network of benevolent charitable and social activities. It eventually grew into a shadow state which supplemented---and in many cases rivalled---the services provided by the official PA, the United Nations and humanitarian organizations.” (Pg. 5)
They observe, “Those Palestinians had come to believe that, after years of negotiations with Israel without any deal that would offer them hope of statehood and independence, there was little point in investing further political will in a process making their living conditions worse, not better. From the Palestinians’ perspective Hamas’s rivals… had nothing to show for their partnership in peace negotiations with Israel.” (Pg. 9)
They note, “When the PLO bowed to the inevitable and entered peace talks with Israel, Hamas reacted with fury. It condemned the PLO as traitors to the cause, opening up a public rift… Hamas leaders assailed the talks as ‘a heresy that will lead to the surrender of Muslim lands to Jews.’ When Palestinian negotiators returned to address public meetings and rallies, Hamas activities pelted them with stones and bottles and broke up the meetings.” (Pg. 66) They add, “Politically weakened, Hamas relied increasingly on its religious credentials to wage its jihad against Israel at a time when its secular counterparts in the Palestine Liberation Organization had embarked on peacemaking through negotiation. This reflected a divide within the Palestinian house that would have significant consequences in succeeding years.” (Pg. 84))
They state, “In recent times some Hamas leaders have made a virtue out of their differences with other radical Islamist groups as al-Qaeda, warning the West that to marginalize Hamas could provoke a radicalization in the Palestinian ranks and produce organizations far more dangerous than Hamas.” (Pg. 129)
They point out, “Hamas never publicly abandoned suicide bombing, but it did acknowledge that the tactic had outlived its usefulness and that the fight against Israel would be better served by developing its missile, rocket and mortar capacity. Israeli officials insisted that militant groups were still trying to carry out bombings, but that they were getting caught.” (Pg. 149)
They state, “One persistent of Hamas is that its social programmes come with an expensive price label: social order, the Hamas way. Aside from the repeated and well-documented reports of Islamist enforcers bullying women into conforming to Islamic behavior codes, Hamas and other Islamist organizations have curbed other social activities of which they disapprove.” (Pg. 171) They add, “Even after years of creeping Islamization there were at that time some public spaces where in places such as Gaza women still enjoyed greater freedom. But social pressure increased until those spaces became squeezed and then almost non-existent… The ubiquity of the hijab was achieved quickly, within a year or so of the creation of Hamas… Before long, bareheaded women were being stoned and abused in the street.” (Pg. 188-189)
They explain, “During the [2009] campaign Israel inflicted two major blows on the Hamas leadership… [but] it was by no means clear that the offensive immediately succeeded in turning Palestinians away from the Islamists in significant numbers. Once again Hamas was playing to the core conviction among many Palestinians that they can achieve more through arms and negotiations than through negotiations alone---a phenomenon explained by critics as an addiction to violence and by supporters as the only realistic way of squeezing concessions from a more powerful enemy.” (Pg. 302)
They conclude, “Many Israelis believe that Hamas can never be trusted to make peace and that its objective is to achieve the opposite: to foment holy war against the Jews and to expel them from Palestine. They continue to argue… that Hamas must be crushed. But, if Hamas is broken, will a more radical Islamist threat arise in its place?... Many secular Palestinians are also deeply suspicious of Hamas’s intentions, fearing that its agenda is to turn the Palestinian Territories into a Taliban-style fiefdom of Islamic fundamentalist rule… Hamas’s message is that it is now a fact on the ground in the Middle East, and must be acknowledged as such.” (Ph. 308-309)
This book will be of great interest to those wanting to know more about Hamas. (This book was written before the October 7th 2023 attacks on Israel, of course---after which they became much less eligible for 'sympathy.')
February 24, 2024
Excellent explanation of the complicated 75 year history of Arab Israeli tension as well as a clear and easily understood telling of facts leading to the current situation in Gaza. In spite of the challenges of understanding foreign names and locations, the authors cite many well known events in their narrative that give the sense of inevitability to the horrific current situation. This is a story that really is easier to understand by reviewing the past. This book helps to make the seemingly incomprehensible brutality almost reasonable. Hindsight definitely comes across as 20/20 in HAMAS.
May 18, 2024
Given the context of current events this book is a bit dated (printed in 2010). Given Milton-Edwards background as a political scientist I expected this book to focus more on the politics of Hamas, however the overall focus was on its history as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and its evolution into a militant and political group. One thing that the book makes obvious is how Hamas has wielded its influence to undermine a negotiated settlement with Israel and its chief opponents, Fatah, the Palestinian nationalist movement led by Yasser Arafat.
April 20, 2025
A well written book on the origins of Hamas and what brought about its creation. It details the Palestinian struggle from a journalist’s eye.
February 6, 2017
Amazing !!
July 30, 2011
Incredibly informative, brings to light much needed and neglected information.
December 27, 2013
Excellent overview of the roots, ideology and politics of the Islamic Resistance Movement.
February 6, 2014
Excellent overview of Hamas, and very objective.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews