Read this yonks ago, but never got around to reviewing it, actually had to reread bits of it recently to remind myself.
My edition is the 2007 volume, so it covers the 7/7 bombings but obviously came out before Osama Bin Laden's assassination, the Arab Spring, it's arguable failure, continued conflict in Afghanistan and
Iraq and more recent violence in Boston and Woolwich. Nonetheless the book is still highly relevant.
Burke's central premise is that perceiving al-Qaeda as a "gang of evil doers" - a group with a single leader, a hierarchical structure, a disciplined cadre of international networks and sleeper cells is to fail to understand the nature and causes of what is less an organisation as an ideology. In failing to understand this the West will continue to fail to effectively address radicalised Islam. The closest al-Qaeda came to that, what might loosely me the called the Bin-Laden network, only existed and effectively operated between 1996 and 2001; and even in this sense is better compared to a wealthy university handing out grants - a sort of venture capital firm of Jihad. That is something worth remembering when you read this morning's headlines about al-Qaeda capturing Fallujah (actually ISIS).
The false al-Qaeda label is easier to grasp, makes better news, and continues to be used by repressive regimes (and democracies) to take off the gloves to suppress local Muslim communities and breach privacy and personal freedoms.
Burke looks broadly at the the nature of Islamic radicalism, tracing its path from colonialism, Arab nationalism and the post cold war environment. He argues that al-Qaeda's extreme form of Wahhabis Islam - millenarian, violent, nihilistic and mythic, can be seen as a reaction to the failure of Political Islamism to address key issues of social justice within Islamic society. It is the doctrine of Islam under threat.
Inevitably much of the book does focus on Bin Laden's rise to notoriety, from duteous anti-soviet Mujahideen financier to icon of evil or hero to martyrdom . Particularly interesting are some of the Wests failed attempts at suppression that simply drove his rise to success. The Clinton administration's cynical (on the back of the Lewinsky scandal), poorly conceived response to the US embassy bombings of 1998 (Kenya and Tanzania) is notable. The subsequent cruise missile attacks (Operation Infinite Reach) were key in raising Bin Laden's status from a dubious,rich-boy, minor player in radicalised Islam to a credible figure. Burke analyses the difficult initial relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and highlights their remarkable ideological differences. "The Shiek" with a vision of global jihad and an end-of-days struggle with the Kufr, the Mullahs parochial, neo-traditionalist and seeking a rural idyll. The Taliban had in fact struck a deal with Saudi Intelligence to hand Bin Laden to them, and remarkably, banned opium production in an effort to seek recognition by the west in the Afghan civil war period. By the UN imposing sanctions on Afghanistan in 1999(against the advice of it's own drug agency) they effectively pushed the disparate parties together.
It's a incredibly detailed and well researched book. Burke's conclusion is that the mainstream appeal of al-Qaeda as doctorine is that it relates to personal experience and offers an action to theory. Effectively that the autonomous nature of the doctrine is that you are in al-Qaeda if you say so. Sadly the book will be relevant for a very long time for the same reason.