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Military Innovation in the Interwar Period
This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the seven major military powers. This volume of comparative essays investigates how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explains much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II.
444 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1996
91 people are currently reading
775 people want to read
About the author
Williamson Murray
94 books50 followersWilliamson "Wick" Murray was an American historian and author. He authored numerous works on history and strategic studies, and served as an editor on other projects extensively. He was professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University from 2012 until his death.
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
January 8, 2018
A collection of essays on military development by Japan, the US, the UK, and Germany before the second world war. Each essay will do case studies of three of the four nations (for example, they don't detail amphibious assault innovation by Germany... since there wasn't much). This is likely best read for individual essays, rather than as a group, as they tend to run together a bit. The several authors have a tendency toward overlap. It's also worth noting that many of these essays focus more on the doctrinal innovation rather than the technological innovations (which are often treated as a matter of fact). There's heavy emphasis on working groups, budget-strapped annual drills, and conflicts between planning committees. This is all valid, but it's worth saying that it doesn't exactly fly off the page.
So why did I read this? It's less about the book itself, and more about how long it's been on my shelf. In 2015, I was moved to a new office in the operations section of the 13th CSSB at Fort Lewis. Due to a recent reorganization, there were few people in that office space, and I really felt like I was in the proverbial back corner of the battalion. As I cleaned out the detritus of my many predecessors, I found this book stuffed inside a cabinet.
Now the book has some, limited, notoriety for its recurring place on official Army Reading Lists. I always found the concept of a military book club interesting, so I recognized the title. I love my edition because it has plenty of highlights on the first chapter, then nothing for the rest of the book, a certain sign that someone's boss made them read this book and talk about it, but then everyone gave up partway through.
Anyway, I felt bad for the book, sitting ignored at the bottom of a cabinet in a half-empty battalion headquarters. So I took it home, saying that I would do it the honor of reading it, then bring it back.
Of course, I didn't actually do that. It followed me to Virginia (back on the to-read shelf), then got packed up again and followed me to Iowa. I felt moved to end its journey this week, and I fully understand why its previous owner stopped highlighting after the first chapter. And it has since reclaimed its rightful spot, sitting in the back corner of a forgotten cabinet in a little-traversed corner of a military building. And when I leave, it will remain, and wait for one of my successors to crack it open and wonder why only the first chapter has highlights.
So why did I read this? It's less about the book itself, and more about how long it's been on my shelf. In 2015, I was moved to a new office in the operations section of the 13th CSSB at Fort Lewis. Due to a recent reorganization, there were few people in that office space, and I really felt like I was in the proverbial back corner of the battalion. As I cleaned out the detritus of my many predecessors, I found this book stuffed inside a cabinet.
Now the book has some, limited, notoriety for its recurring place on official Army Reading Lists. I always found the concept of a military book club interesting, so I recognized the title. I love my edition because it has plenty of highlights on the first chapter, then nothing for the rest of the book, a certain sign that someone's boss made them read this book and talk about it, but then everyone gave up partway through.
Anyway, I felt bad for the book, sitting ignored at the bottom of a cabinet in a half-empty battalion headquarters. So I took it home, saying that I would do it the honor of reading it, then bring it back.
Of course, I didn't actually do that. It followed me to Virginia (back on the to-read shelf), then got packed up again and followed me to Iowa. I felt moved to end its journey this week, and I fully understand why its previous owner stopped highlighting after the first chapter. And it has since reclaimed its rightful spot, sitting in the back corner of a forgotten cabinet in a little-traversed corner of a military building. And when I leave, it will remain, and wait for one of my successors to crack it open and wonder why only the first chapter has highlights.
February 16, 2019
Well worth the read for anyone interested on the whys the various military powers followed the path that they took on military technology that they between WW1 and WW2. There are ten chapters and an introduction. Three of the chapters cover the general information about the innovations in the past, patterns of innovations, and how peacetime effects innovations. The remaining seven chapters are dedicated to one specific field of innovations by looking at three different major powers. These chapters cover the following: tanks, amphibious warfare, strategic bombing, close air support, aircraft carriers, submarines, and finally, radio and radar.
August 3, 2010
Anyone concerned about military innovation, and with an historical turn of mind, should read this insightful book. It discusses the successes and failures in Britain, the US, Germany, the USSR, Japan, and France of various kinds of innovation between World Wars I and II: in armored warfare, close air support, strategic bombing, radar, amphibious warfare, and other areas. It provides many lessons for the present, when another transformation in warfare seems to be underway. Notably, it concludes that innovation succeeds when it is based on thorough and fact-based analysis of recent history and on continuous experimentation in maneuvers and exercises, when the bureaucracy provides a career path for the innovators to rise to high rank while developing their ideas, when new technology is combined with the approprite new operational methods, and when a driving strategic need provides an incentive. It was published in 1996, before the Global War on Terror changed everything for the US military, but we can see the lessons being learned again. The Army's recently-cancelled Future Combat System was perhaps innovative overreach like that of the strategic bombing enthusiasts in Britain and America between the wars, who ignored actual history and were convinced that bombers could do things that they could not. On the other hand, innovation has met operational need to produce a revolution based on unmanned aircraft, after a history of false starts going back to the 1970s.
December 4, 2017
This collection of essays examines seven crucial areas of innovation that shaped how and why the Second World War was fought differently than the First. Looking past uninspiring answers that focus too closely on changing technology, these writers show that it was more often doctrinal changes that shaped the changing nature of war in the Interwar period. The improving quality of weapons, ammunition, and materials were important, but were not drastically altering in their own right. What set apart the new technology were thinkers, both civilian and in uniform, that on a conceptual level understood the potential of what was in their hands. With this imaginative groundwork, they outlined or planted the seeds for operational and personnel advances that would increase military efficiency and capability during the war.
The seven areas covered in the case studies are armored warfare, amphibious assault, strategic bombing, tactical airpower, submarine warfare, naval aviation, and technical advances such as radar and electric warfare. The essays examine the technical advances, and the bureaucratic and political situations that either inhibited or encouraged innovation. They mostly then show how thinking was transformed into warfighting practices. Some articles are more persuasive, easier to follow, and better written than others, and the more theoretical and big-picture essays at the end are hit and miss, but overall this was an interesting and thought-provoking collection.
The seven areas covered in the case studies are armored warfare, amphibious assault, strategic bombing, tactical airpower, submarine warfare, naval aviation, and technical advances such as radar and electric warfare. The essays examine the technical advances, and the bureaucratic and political situations that either inhibited or encouraged innovation. They mostly then show how thinking was transformed into warfighting practices. Some articles are more persuasive, easier to follow, and better written than others, and the more theoretical and big-picture essays at the end are hit and miss, but overall this was an interesting and thought-provoking collection.
May 9, 2025
Fascinating exploration of innovation during the inter-war period (1920s-30s), focused on seven specific areas - armor (combined mobile warfare especially as constituted by the German blitzkrieg in WWII), amphibious warfare, strategic bombing, close air support, carrier aviation, submarine, and electromagnetic advances - radar in all its various iterations. The factors that affect successful application of innovative technologies and concepts generally have little or nothing to do with the technologies and concepts, but are far more dependent upon matters of institutional culture, senior officer receptivity, preconceived biases and beliefs, ingrained assumptions, established doctrines and ideologies. Plus, successful implementation is almost always more a an organizational system approach rather than a narrow response to a purely technological advance, and thus uniquely dependent upon the vision and foresight of both those rare senior officers in positions of influential authority as well as the experience and measured acceptance by the subordinate practitioners and users trying it all out along the way.
It is compelling reading – successful and comprehensive innovations such as the creation and implementation of British fighter command system of air defense by Hugh Dowding that incorporated technological advancements in fighter aircraft, radar detection, intelligence and system command, communication and control. Contrast that successful, and timely, innovation advance with the deplorable US torpedo failures, denied and ignored by the Navy bureaucracy that designed and developed the torpedo who spent years, at countless costs in blood and failed war efforts, denying the very existence of a problem. Strategic bombing is another example or the problems and failures that accrue to insistent reliance upon untested doctrine, favored assumptions that support predetermined results, and ulterior motives. The Army Air Corps made strategic bombing its sole focus because it believed strategic bombing offered the rationale for an independent air force. On the other hand, the RAF – an independent air force – saw strategic bombing as its priority and foundational doctrine in order to maintain its independence. The reasoning, and results, have been flawed – to say the least.
The authors conclude with a compelling discourse on the nature of innovation and its implementation, susceptibility to military culture, institutional bias, inter-service rivalry, political priorities and the tendency to do what has worked in the past. There are excellent lessons, and cautionary tales, for our current generation of war planners, defense R&D, and operational practitioners.
It is compelling reading – successful and comprehensive innovations such as the creation and implementation of British fighter command system of air defense by Hugh Dowding that incorporated technological advancements in fighter aircraft, radar detection, intelligence and system command, communication and control. Contrast that successful, and timely, innovation advance with the deplorable US torpedo failures, denied and ignored by the Navy bureaucracy that designed and developed the torpedo who spent years, at countless costs in blood and failed war efforts, denying the very existence of a problem. Strategic bombing is another example or the problems and failures that accrue to insistent reliance upon untested doctrine, favored assumptions that support predetermined results, and ulterior motives. The Army Air Corps made strategic bombing its sole focus because it believed strategic bombing offered the rationale for an independent air force. On the other hand, the RAF – an independent air force – saw strategic bombing as its priority and foundational doctrine in order to maintain its independence. The reasoning, and results, have been flawed – to say the least.
The authors conclude with a compelling discourse on the nature of innovation and its implementation, susceptibility to military culture, institutional bias, inter-service rivalry, political priorities and the tendency to do what has worked in the past. There are excellent lessons, and cautionary tales, for our current generation of war planners, defense R&D, and operational practitioners.
March 7, 2020
A great book for anyone with a particular interest in the history of innovations military technology and how those innovations drive evolutions in strategy. It also has some profound insights into the role of military culture on an organizations ability to foresee and adapt to changes in technology and circumstances. The sources alone are interesting both for researchers and anyone who wants a history of military history (there seemed to be several proto-net assessments). It would probably be too specialized and academic to be of interest to a casual reader. This book is as, if not more, relevant today (in the era of looming great power competition) than when it was written in the late 1990s (in the after glow of the Cold War). It should be mandatory reading in intermediate and senior level PMEs.
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February 25, 2022Highly detailed and focused analyses of every major military issue and how and why the Western nations involved in WWII either innovated or failed to innovate effectively after the Great War. It is fairly sense reading, but very insightful for someone who already has a decent baseline understanding of the nations and militaries involved. Many cautionary tales for us to learn from.
July 23, 2018
I tell you, I can't read this book enough times.
December 14, 2022
Good analysis and breakdown of the facts of the military decline during this period.
December 19, 2022
A very dry read. I’ve been trying to work through it for months with barely success.
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April 11, 2013Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet’s Military Innovation in the Interwar Period is an edited collection of chapters on the response by the military institutions of major world powers to technological and tactical innovations over a twenty year period between the world wars. The multinational comparative collection is comprised of a brief introduction written by Murray and Millet, followed by ten topical chapters – armored warfare, amphibious warfare, strategic bombing, close air support, airpower at sea, submarine warfare, radar, innovation in historical context, patterns of innovation, and peacetime military innovation. Editors Murray and Millet are joined by airpower historian Richard R. Muller, British naval historian Geoffrey Till, German military historian Holger H. Herwig, German political historian Alan Beyerchen, and airpower historian Barry Watts. It is notable that Murray, Millet, and Beyerchen served together on the history faculty at Ohio State University, and that Muller received his Ph.D. in military history from the same institution.
Murray and Millet impress a few points upon the reader: that innovation between the wars was significant, though the successes were uneven; that innovations even within the same fields varied from nation to nation; that innovations “represented fundamental, basic changes in the context within war takes place;” and that deriving an understanding of how the factors which appear to encourage innovation – whether doctrinal or technological – are more significant than deriving “lessons learned.”
Murray and Millet’s book is myopic in places. Little attention is paid to the Soviet Union throughout. On the surface, this may seem fair, as Stalin’s political purges of the Red Army effectively extinguished innovation for a period before the Second World War, a point Murray observes in his chapter contextualizing innovation. Nonetheless, Soviet armor is not considered beyond Murray’s mention of German attendance at the Kazan tank school between 1929-1933. This blind spot may also be attributable, in part, to the editors’s direction that authors “compare and contrast the different experiences of three or more national military institutions.” Predictably, the stars are the United States, Germany, Japan, and Britain.
Harold Winton found the organization of the book to be a major weak point. Winton notes that the chapters are repetitive in their focus on the strategic context, particularly as the same national military institutions are featured again and again. Moreover, the final three chapters re-dredge the same material, and Winton points in particular to the chapter co-authored by Watts and Murray, which rehashes the airpower at sea chapter written by Geoffrey Till, “apparently because they disagreed with Till’s analysis.”
The volume likewise might have incorporated a chapter on industrial innovation. Here, too, attention to the Soviet Union would have been worthwhile, particularly the forced industrialization undertaken following the Russian Civil War. David Sorenson likewise raised the question of whether innovation was “limited or aided by depression-era financial constraints.”
The book shows its age most in final chapter, in which Watts and Murray consider future implications of these innovations, observing that “the potential for civilian or outside leadership to impose a new vision of future war on a reluctant military service whose heart remains committed to existing ways of fighting is, at best, limited.” Five years after the book’s initial publication, the United States was attacked by terrorists and began to fight two large, asymmetric wars. The book received its twenty-first reprinting in 2009, but the editors have not added an epilogue which might contextualize the developments therein considered with those of more recent vintage. This has the effect of freezing the book in the mid-1990s peace bubble, even as American involvement in territorial, ethnic, and religious wars in the former Yugoslavia (and Russian involvement in Chechnya) pointed toward a world of expanded asymmetric conflict.
Murray and Millet impress a few points upon the reader: that innovation between the wars was significant, though the successes were uneven; that innovations even within the same fields varied from nation to nation; that innovations “represented fundamental, basic changes in the context within war takes place;” and that deriving an understanding of how the factors which appear to encourage innovation – whether doctrinal or technological – are more significant than deriving “lessons learned.”
Murray and Millet’s book is myopic in places. Little attention is paid to the Soviet Union throughout. On the surface, this may seem fair, as Stalin’s political purges of the Red Army effectively extinguished innovation for a period before the Second World War, a point Murray observes in his chapter contextualizing innovation. Nonetheless, Soviet armor is not considered beyond Murray’s mention of German attendance at the Kazan tank school between 1929-1933. This blind spot may also be attributable, in part, to the editors’s direction that authors “compare and contrast the different experiences of three or more national military institutions.” Predictably, the stars are the United States, Germany, Japan, and Britain.
Harold Winton found the organization of the book to be a major weak point. Winton notes that the chapters are repetitive in their focus on the strategic context, particularly as the same national military institutions are featured again and again. Moreover, the final three chapters re-dredge the same material, and Winton points in particular to the chapter co-authored by Watts and Murray, which rehashes the airpower at sea chapter written by Geoffrey Till, “apparently because they disagreed with Till’s analysis.”
The volume likewise might have incorporated a chapter on industrial innovation. Here, too, attention to the Soviet Union would have been worthwhile, particularly the forced industrialization undertaken following the Russian Civil War. David Sorenson likewise raised the question of whether innovation was “limited or aided by depression-era financial constraints.”
The book shows its age most in final chapter, in which Watts and Murray consider future implications of these innovations, observing that “the potential for civilian or outside leadership to impose a new vision of future war on a reluctant military service whose heart remains committed to existing ways of fighting is, at best, limited.” Five years after the book’s initial publication, the United States was attacked by terrorists and began to fight two large, asymmetric wars. The book received its twenty-first reprinting in 2009, but the editors have not added an epilogue which might contextualize the developments therein considered with those of more recent vintage. This has the effect of freezing the book in the mid-1990s peace bubble, even as American involvement in territorial, ethnic, and religious wars in the former Yugoslavia (and Russian involvement in Chechnya) pointed toward a world of expanded asymmetric conflict.
May 1, 2016
This is one of a number of books of essays that Williamson Murray and Allan Millett have edited, each taking a comparative look at military innovation or effectiveness during the first half of the twentieth century. As with the previous books, this volume comprises a series of essays by experts, focusing on specific aspects of the topic, which are then brought together by several essays seeking to synthesise more general lessons from the various case studies.
This volume considers the interwar period, focusing on a number of key areas of military innovation (including the devlopment of armoured warfare, strategic bombing, aircraft acrriers, and radio / radar technology), with each essay considering the responses to the given topic from a number of different countries.
The volume has great strengths as a thematic exploration of the issues, and the comparative approach adopted allows the different routes taken by individual countries to be highlighted and considered more readily than the more usual single country monograph. Perhaps inevitably, the individual essays can be a little superficial and may be overly dependent on a handful of relevant previous studies.
While recognising the vital importance of contingency (history never does repeat itself), Murray and Millett draw out some valuable themes affecting military innovation:
* The need for there to be a clear vision of the future, which can both guide and drive innovation;
* The need for the vision to be connected to operational realities, in order to avoid the risk of practicalities being ignored;
* The need for the core bureaucracy of the armed forces to accept the proposed innovation, securing senior support, funding, and protection of the proponents of change;and
* The need for processes and attitudes that promote the rigorous testing of new visions and their development into practical systems, connecting doctrine, kit, and organisation, based on evidence.
In summary, an excellent introduction to many of the issues and a good starting point for deeper investigation into the specific case study topics.
This volume considers the interwar period, focusing on a number of key areas of military innovation (including the devlopment of armoured warfare, strategic bombing, aircraft acrriers, and radio / radar technology), with each essay considering the responses to the given topic from a number of different countries.
The volume has great strengths as a thematic exploration of the issues, and the comparative approach adopted allows the different routes taken by individual countries to be highlighted and considered more readily than the more usual single country monograph. Perhaps inevitably, the individual essays can be a little superficial and may be overly dependent on a handful of relevant previous studies.
While recognising the vital importance of contingency (history never does repeat itself), Murray and Millett draw out some valuable themes affecting military innovation:
* The need for there to be a clear vision of the future, which can both guide and drive innovation;
* The need for the vision to be connected to operational realities, in order to avoid the risk of practicalities being ignored;
* The need for the core bureaucracy of the armed forces to accept the proposed innovation, securing senior support, funding, and protection of the proponents of change;and
* The need for processes and attitudes that promote the rigorous testing of new visions and their development into practical systems, connecting doctrine, kit, and organisation, based on evidence.
In summary, an excellent introduction to many of the issues and a good starting point for deeper investigation into the specific case study topics.
February 23, 2013
Found this to be a vital resource for understanding context of U.S. Navy "Code Breaking" & fast fleet oiler/tanker UNderway REPlenishment (UNREP) innovations ...
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period - Page 426 -
http://books.google.com/books?isbn=05...
Williamson R. Murray, Allan R. Millett - 1998 - History
Williamson R. Murray, Allan R. Millett ...
Ernst, 160,272 Ultra code-breaking program, 295, 297, 348
Air Support Board, 186 Air War Plans Division, 107, 126-27, ...
Military Book Reviews–Help! « Jacqui Murray
http://jacquimurray.net/2011/08/05/mi...
Aug 5, 2011 – Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 ....
Millett & Murray, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Murray ...
Effective Military Innovation: Technological and Organizational - DTIC
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/...
by R Marling - 2002 - Cited by 2 - Related articles
The subject of military innovation is very popular in the United States military today.
Cryptography, code breaking, steganography ...
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES - DTIC
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/...
by GJ Nardi - 2009 - Cited by 1 - Related articles
lessons from the past and theories for military innovation, Army leadership can gain .....
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 303.
have the potential to characterize a large break from the past
and not just an incremental shift ...
A Conceptual Framework for Innovation in Capability Development
by JJ Garstka - Cited by 1 - Related articles
5 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation in the. Interwar Period .....
computer-enabled codebreaking, ballistic missiles, stealth technology,
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period - Page 426 -
http://books.google.com/books?isbn=05...
Williamson R. Murray, Allan R. Millett - 1998 - History
Williamson R. Murray, Allan R. Millett ...
Ernst, 160,272 Ultra code-breaking program, 295, 297, 348
Air Support Board, 186 Air War Plans Division, 107, 126-27, ...
Military Book Reviews–Help! « Jacqui Murray
http://jacquimurray.net/2011/08/05/mi...
Aug 5, 2011 – Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 ....
Millett & Murray, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Murray ...
Effective Military Innovation: Technological and Organizational - DTIC
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/...
by R Marling - 2002 - Cited by 2 - Related articles
The subject of military innovation is very popular in the United States military today.
Cryptography, code breaking, steganography ...
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES - DTIC
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/...
by GJ Nardi - 2009 - Cited by 1 - Related articles
lessons from the past and theories for military innovation, Army leadership can gain .....
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 303.
have the potential to characterize a large break from the past
and not just an incremental shift ...
A Conceptual Framework for Innovation in Capability Development
by JJ Garstka - Cited by 1 - Related articles
5 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation in the. Interwar Period .....
computer-enabled codebreaking, ballistic missiles, stealth technology,
April 15, 2016
This was overall an excellent book on the process and origin of military innovation between the world wars. One of the strengths of this work is that it covers different nationalities and services in a way that shows a common thread through different types of innovation. The strongest chapter was on armored warfare, and the chapters on the development of amphibious warfare, close air support and carrier aviation were all almost as compelling. A significant insight drawn by the authors was the attempt by French and British leaders to repress objective analyses of their forces’ performance in World War I and in ongoing trials of new doctrine and technology. This also led to the marginalization of critics such as Basil Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller, which led to both England and France being intellectually unprepared at the beginning of World War II. Germany fostered innovation and the personalities behind innovative doctrine. This book fulfilled its stated purpose “to provide insights into the nature of the processes involved in major innovation and change… and to highlight those factors that encourage success as well as those that inhibit innovation.” (p. 3)
May 12, 2015
This was an interesting book. It discusses various technological advances between WWI and WWII. I read it in regard to a paper I was writing on aircraft carriers, so that was more the chapter I focused on, but I did skim through other sections of the book. It was very detailed, but it was also dry in parts. At some point, I will finish reading the other sections of the book; I never finished it because it became due at the library where I checked it out and somebody else was waiting for it.
June 19, 2011
The case studies were easier to read than the analysis chapters.
September 1, 2019
Dense but entertaining and thought provoking.
Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews