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Erich Von Manstein: Hitler's Master Strategist
A selection of the Military Book Club
To many close students of World War II, von Manstein is already considered to be the greatest commander of the war, if not the entire 20th century. He devised the plan that conquered France in 1940, then led an infantry corps in that campaign; at the head of a panzer corps he reached the gates of Leningrad in 1941, then took command of 11th Army and conquered Sevastopol and the Crimea. After destroying another Soviet army in the north, he was given command of the ad hoc Army Group Don to retrieve the German calamity at Stalingrad, whereupon he launched a counteroffensive that, against all odds, restored the German front. Afterward he commanded Army Group South, nearly crushing the Soviets at Kursk, and then skillfully resisted their relentless attacks, as he traded territory for coherence in the East.
Though an undoubtedly brilliant military leader—whose achievements, considering the forces at his disposal, cast those of Patton, Rommel, MacArthur, and Montgomery in the pale—surprisingly little is known about Manstein himself, save for his own memoir and the accolades of his contemporaries. In this book we finally have a full portrait of the man, including his campaigns, and an analysis of what precisely kept a genius such as Manstein harnessed to such a dark cause.
A great military figure, but a man who lacked a razor-sharp political sense, Manstein was very much representative of the Germano-Prussian military caste of his time. Though Hitler was uneasy about the influence he had gained throughout the German Army, Manstein ultimately declined to join any clandestine plots against his Führer, believing they would simply cause chaos, the one thing he abhorred. Even though he constantly opposed Hitler on operational details, he considered it a point of loyalty to simply stand with the German state, in whatever form.
It is thus through Manstein foremost that the attitudes of other high-ranking officers who fought during the Second World War, particularly on the Eastern Front, can be illuminated. Manstein sought only to serve Germany and was a military man, not a politician. Though not bereft of personal opinions, his primary allegiances were, first, to Deutschland, and second, to the soldiers under his command, who had been committed against an enemy many times their strength. With his grasp of strategy, tactics, and combined arms technology, he proved more than worthy of their confidence. This book is a must-read for all those who wish to understand Germany’s primary effort in World War II, as well as its greatest commander.
Table of Contents
Introduction
I. From the Imperial Army to the Reichswehr
II. The Army of the Third Reich
III. Manstein and the March to War
IV. The Polish “Laboratory”
V. The Manstein Plan
VI. Disgrace and a Dramatic Turn of Events
VII. The Incomplete Victory of the Sickle Cut
VIII. Between Two Campaigns
IX. The Conquest of the Crimea
X. The Wehrmacht and the Genocidal War in Russia
XI. Manstein, the Eleventh Army in the Crimea, and the Final Solution
XII. The Winds of The Stalingrad Tragedy
XIII. From Retreat to Backlash
XIV. Clash of The Battle of Kursk
XV. Manstein and the Military Resistance to Hitler
XVI. The Legend of an “Honorable and Upright” Wehrmacht
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
To many close students of World War II, von Manstein is already considered to be the greatest commander of the war, if not the entire 20th century. He devised the plan that conquered France in 1940, then led an infantry corps in that campaign; at the head of a panzer corps he reached the gates of Leningrad in 1941, then took command of 11th Army and conquered Sevastopol and the Crimea. After destroying another Soviet army in the north, he was given command of the ad hoc Army Group Don to retrieve the German calamity at Stalingrad, whereupon he launched a counteroffensive that, against all odds, restored the German front. Afterward he commanded Army Group South, nearly crushing the Soviets at Kursk, and then skillfully resisted their relentless attacks, as he traded territory for coherence in the East.
Though an undoubtedly brilliant military leader—whose achievements, considering the forces at his disposal, cast those of Patton, Rommel, MacArthur, and Montgomery in the pale—surprisingly little is known about Manstein himself, save for his own memoir and the accolades of his contemporaries. In this book we finally have a full portrait of the man, including his campaigns, and an analysis of what precisely kept a genius such as Manstein harnessed to such a dark cause.
A great military figure, but a man who lacked a razor-sharp political sense, Manstein was very much representative of the Germano-Prussian military caste of his time. Though Hitler was uneasy about the influence he had gained throughout the German Army, Manstein ultimately declined to join any clandestine plots against his Führer, believing they would simply cause chaos, the one thing he abhorred. Even though he constantly opposed Hitler on operational details, he considered it a point of loyalty to simply stand with the German state, in whatever form.
It is thus through Manstein foremost that the attitudes of other high-ranking officers who fought during the Second World War, particularly on the Eastern Front, can be illuminated. Manstein sought only to serve Germany and was a military man, not a politician. Though not bereft of personal opinions, his primary allegiances were, first, to Deutschland, and second, to the soldiers under his command, who had been committed against an enemy many times their strength. With his grasp of strategy, tactics, and combined arms technology, he proved more than worthy of their confidence. This book is a must-read for all those who wish to understand Germany’s primary effort in World War II, as well as its greatest commander.
Table of Contents
Introduction
I. From the Imperial Army to the Reichswehr
II. The Army of the Third Reich
III. Manstein and the March to War
IV. The Polish “Laboratory”
V. The Manstein Plan
VI. Disgrace and a Dramatic Turn of Events
VII. The Incomplete Victory of the Sickle Cut
VIII. Between Two Campaigns
IX. The Conquest of the Crimea
X. The Wehrmacht and the Genocidal War in Russia
XI. Manstein, the Eleventh Army in the Crimea, and the Final Solution
XII. The Winds of The Stalingrad Tragedy
XIII. From Retreat to Backlash
XIV. Clash of The Battle of Kursk
XV. Manstein and the Military Resistance to Hitler
XVI. The Legend of an “Honorable and Upright” Wehrmacht
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
528 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
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139 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
June 10, 2012
"The German generals of this war were the best-finished product of their profession - anywhere. They could have been better if their outlook had been wider and their understanding deeper. But if they had become philosophers they would have ceased to be soldiers." - Liddell Hart.
General Erich Von Manstein was a typical man working within the zeitgeist of his time and culture. The world he lived is utterly alien to us, almost 80 years after the era started. However, parallels can be made to any culture across history. This book is primarily a case study in management, first and foremost. Luckily for us all, it's a study in bad management. Was it not for Hitler poor leadership, general's like Von Manstein would have lead the Germans to victory.
In a way, I can identify with Von Manstein in regards to dealing with poor leadership. Our current American culture has evolved into something similar, I fear. Von Manstein was an excellent tactician, highly intelligent, and utterly blind to matters beyond his ambition, yet the war crimes her permitted were allowed because he was simply following the current norms of the time. This is similar to the same way many current managers blindly follow the rules of their own culture. There is never a concern for anything beyond advancement. I believe there is a lesson her to be learned.
As for Von Manstein, part of this was in response to the norms of his own culture. One of the more interesting aspects of this work is how it ties in centuries of cultural norms and heritage that created the German state. Political doctrines of the past still dominated the culture, and racial stereotypes were created to confer a since of superiority by those who existence was based on those beliefs.
The German culture at that time was of an extreme conservative nature. While it was most certainly a socialist system, it has almost no relation to modern European socialist government that are based upon a more liberal notion. The lack of social balance in Germany at the time really is the cause of both the empires' rise and eventual fall. During stressful times, it's far easier for people to return to comforting norms, and that is exactly what happened after the First World War and during the following depression. And this is where the book provides yet another valuable lesson.
During difficult times, many find it easy to fall into the same traps Germany fell into. The war on the Eastern Front was driven by a since of racial superiority. The Slav people were considered less than human, and the Bolshevik way of thinking alien and, therefore, evil. To put that into perspective, modern day America is experiencing a similar backlash towards Latinos, Liberals, Muslims, etc. Examining this book shows how this path can lead to ruin, as the Wehrmacht eventually found out. The military believed that their racial superiority would lead to swift victory, and the treatment of prisoners was inhumane following capture. These German beliefs lead them to severely understate the Soviet threat, and the following occupation of East Germany was, unfortunately, deserved.
However, this is not a denunciation of conservative ideology. Indeed, it was a conservative leaning group of the military lead the resistance against Hitler. What really needs to be learned is how a balance between ideologies must be struck, lest the ideals of one be pulled to far towards the fringe. Ecologies have always been about balance, and a human civilization is no different. Different ideologies developed biologically over the existence of human history because they each offer advantages for the culture and species as a whole. The opening quote captures the essence of this concept, I believe. The German military and culture had lost balance. As excellent of a fighting force as the Wehrmacht was, it was doomed to failure because it lacked key perspectives. As for Von Manstein, the book best described his as being "The most uncomfortable general of the devil." Somewhere in him, he knew this to be true, though his upbringing would never allow him to develop this self insight.
General Erich Von Manstein was a typical man working within the zeitgeist of his time and culture. The world he lived is utterly alien to us, almost 80 years after the era started. However, parallels can be made to any culture across history. This book is primarily a case study in management, first and foremost. Luckily for us all, it's a study in bad management. Was it not for Hitler poor leadership, general's like Von Manstein would have lead the Germans to victory.
In a way, I can identify with Von Manstein in regards to dealing with poor leadership. Our current American culture has evolved into something similar, I fear. Von Manstein was an excellent tactician, highly intelligent, and utterly blind to matters beyond his ambition, yet the war crimes her permitted were allowed because he was simply following the current norms of the time. This is similar to the same way many current managers blindly follow the rules of their own culture. There is never a concern for anything beyond advancement. I believe there is a lesson her to be learned.
As for Von Manstein, part of this was in response to the norms of his own culture. One of the more interesting aspects of this work is how it ties in centuries of cultural norms and heritage that created the German state. Political doctrines of the past still dominated the culture, and racial stereotypes were created to confer a since of superiority by those who existence was based on those beliefs.
The German culture at that time was of an extreme conservative nature. While it was most certainly a socialist system, it has almost no relation to modern European socialist government that are based upon a more liberal notion. The lack of social balance in Germany at the time really is the cause of both the empires' rise and eventual fall. During stressful times, it's far easier for people to return to comforting norms, and that is exactly what happened after the First World War and during the following depression. And this is where the book provides yet another valuable lesson.
During difficult times, many find it easy to fall into the same traps Germany fell into. The war on the Eastern Front was driven by a since of racial superiority. The Slav people were considered less than human, and the Bolshevik way of thinking alien and, therefore, evil. To put that into perspective, modern day America is experiencing a similar backlash towards Latinos, Liberals, Muslims, etc. Examining this book shows how this path can lead to ruin, as the Wehrmacht eventually found out. The military believed that their racial superiority would lead to swift victory, and the treatment of prisoners was inhumane following capture. These German beliefs lead them to severely understate the Soviet threat, and the following occupation of East Germany was, unfortunately, deserved.
However, this is not a denunciation of conservative ideology. Indeed, it was a conservative leaning group of the military lead the resistance against Hitler. What really needs to be learned is how a balance between ideologies must be struck, lest the ideals of one be pulled to far towards the fringe. Ecologies have always been about balance, and a human civilization is no different. Different ideologies developed biologically over the existence of human history because they each offer advantages for the culture and species as a whole. The opening quote captures the essence of this concept, I believe. The German military and culture had lost balance. As excellent of a fighting force as the Wehrmacht was, it was doomed to failure because it lacked key perspectives. As for Von Manstein, the book best described his as being "The most uncomfortable general of the devil." Somewhere in him, he knew this to be true, though his upbringing would never allow him to develop this self insight.
February 17, 2012
This book.... I don't know how many times I almost gave up the reading. In the end I'm glad I pushed through. Benoit Lemay provides some very interesting insights to von Manstein's personality through the general's relationships with others in the Nazi party, the OKW, the OKH and the various General Staff and Commands which he was a member. This part of the book I would rate at 4 stars.
Mixed into Lemay's examination of von Manstein the man were accounts of his tremendous strategic exploits on the battlefield. The coverage of the battles is sparsely covered as the battles themselves are not the focus of the book. Battle coverage / discussion I would rate at 3 stars.
So what was it that made me want to give up reading? Lemay mixes into the dialog a discussion of war crimes von Manstein was accused. Lemay covers these topics in three distinct periods. The first is the beginning of the war in Poland and France. Almost every single accusation made by Lemay is an opinion not backed up with any citation, footnote, etc. It was reading these sections early in the book which made me almost put the book down.
The second period covered war crime accusations during the time von Manstein was the commanding general of the 11th Army in the Crimea. The documentation in this section is much better and can see a legal case being made with this evidence, which is covered at the end of the book where von Manstein's trial is reviewed.
The last period reviews the Wehrmacht’s retreat from the USSR and the coverage switches back to a lot of opinion stated by Lemay mixed with some fact. The bottom line is Lemay states there is so much war crime evidence against von Manstein, but presents very little of this in the book except were noted above. If there truly is so much evidence available this topic should be addressed in its own book and not mixed in with a study of his relationships and military exploits. The portions of the book covering the war crime accusations against von Manstein I give 2 stars.
Mixed into Lemay's examination of von Manstein the man were accounts of his tremendous strategic exploits on the battlefield. The coverage of the battles is sparsely covered as the battles themselves are not the focus of the book. Battle coverage / discussion I would rate at 3 stars.
So what was it that made me want to give up reading? Lemay mixes into the dialog a discussion of war crimes von Manstein was accused. Lemay covers these topics in three distinct periods. The first is the beginning of the war in Poland and France. Almost every single accusation made by Lemay is an opinion not backed up with any citation, footnote, etc. It was reading these sections early in the book which made me almost put the book down.
The second period covered war crime accusations during the time von Manstein was the commanding general of the 11th Army in the Crimea. The documentation in this section is much better and can see a legal case being made with this evidence, which is covered at the end of the book where von Manstein's trial is reviewed.
The last period reviews the Wehrmacht’s retreat from the USSR and the coverage switches back to a lot of opinion stated by Lemay mixed with some fact. The bottom line is Lemay states there is so much war crime evidence against von Manstein, but presents very little of this in the book except were noted above. If there truly is so much evidence available this topic should be addressed in its own book and not mixed in with a study of his relationships and military exploits. The portions of the book covering the war crime accusations against von Manstein I give 2 stars.
July 11, 2024
Kindle Edition
At times just a tad redundant, but necessary
After the debacle and annihilation of Jena-Auerstadt in 1806, the Prussian Army under the tutelage of Scharnhorst created the conditions for what we now know as the principal duties, responsibilities, and training of a general staff. Not to mention the historical miracle for the Prussians a scant 6 years later.
For large scale combat operations there are any number of venerate general officers in the British, French, German and American Armies. For the American Army, the German General Staff and many of its WW II Officers – Rommel, Kesselring, Guderian, Blumentritt, Warlimont, von Rundstedt, and von Manstein were and are highly influential in the American Army’s training, doctrine and development after WW II, it became more prominent during the Cold War and the US Army Euro-centric perspective and focus are still prominent in doctrine and thinking today.
I am a retired soldier and straddle the time of the Cold War, Gulf War I and the GWOT – for me that was Afghanistan. As a developing young soldier, the US Army always used the German Army experience in training and development. The infamous Auftragstaktic, or Mission Command type order, with a large inference to operating with initiative and to disobey an order if you could still achieve the Commanders intent by doing so is not just steeped in tradition, it is a paramount requirement still today. The history of Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, Rommel, Kesselring Guderian and von Manstein still reign supreme in the US Military.
The author of this book debates the question as to whether von Manstein was truly the author of the Sickle Cut Plan - Sichelschnitt – a term coined by Churchill about the time of the Dunkirk evacuation. After the war, Liddell Hart wrote that Manstein was the ablest of all the German generals. Keegan, David Irving Albert Seaton and even many German officers would also give Manstein high acclaim. Manstein's influence and reputation went far and wide
Despite Manstein's strategic genius and planning abilities for every major operation conducted by the OKW and OKH, Manstein was guilty of crimes against humanity and the author presents hard primary and secondary evidence to reflect this. More interesting, was the fact that BG Taylor, American prosecutor, sent a memorandum in 1947, titled the Generals Memorandum, to the British alleging enough evidence to prosecute. The British Army, the American Army, and British and American Diplomats felt that by now it was more important to rebuild Germany than it was to continue more public trials. Manstein would eventually appear before Court and was sentenced in 1949 and then released in 1953. He was then asked by the newly established German government to help rebuild the German Army.
Manstein may have been a genius and his assistance in rebuilding the German Army may have been extremely helpful, but all this pales in comparison with the knowledge that he was unequivocally aware of the SS, SD, and Einsatzgruppen activities in his Area of Operations.
Pundits and detractors will tell us that if the British and Americans had not provided top cover for many Nazi officers and scientists, our success in the Space and Cold War might have been discussed as a counterfactual. The atrocities committed were beyond scope, imagination and pale, and the realpolitik that drove the decisions to benefit from the knowledge and experience of men that justified actions without moral code will be debated for another 100 years.
At times just a tad redundant, but necessary
After the debacle and annihilation of Jena-Auerstadt in 1806, the Prussian Army under the tutelage of Scharnhorst created the conditions for what we now know as the principal duties, responsibilities, and training of a general staff. Not to mention the historical miracle for the Prussians a scant 6 years later.
For large scale combat operations there are any number of venerate general officers in the British, French, German and American Armies. For the American Army, the German General Staff and many of its WW II Officers – Rommel, Kesselring, Guderian, Blumentritt, Warlimont, von Rundstedt, and von Manstein were and are highly influential in the American Army’s training, doctrine and development after WW II, it became more prominent during the Cold War and the US Army Euro-centric perspective and focus are still prominent in doctrine and thinking today.
I am a retired soldier and straddle the time of the Cold War, Gulf War I and the GWOT – for me that was Afghanistan. As a developing young soldier, the US Army always used the German Army experience in training and development. The infamous Auftragstaktic, or Mission Command type order, with a large inference to operating with initiative and to disobey an order if you could still achieve the Commanders intent by doing so is not just steeped in tradition, it is a paramount requirement still today. The history of Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, Rommel, Kesselring Guderian and von Manstein still reign supreme in the US Military.
The author of this book debates the question as to whether von Manstein was truly the author of the Sickle Cut Plan - Sichelschnitt – a term coined by Churchill about the time of the Dunkirk evacuation. After the war, Liddell Hart wrote that Manstein was the ablest of all the German generals. Keegan, David Irving Albert Seaton and even many German officers would also give Manstein high acclaim. Manstein's influence and reputation went far and wide
Despite Manstein's strategic genius and planning abilities for every major operation conducted by the OKW and OKH, Manstein was guilty of crimes against humanity and the author presents hard primary and secondary evidence to reflect this. More interesting, was the fact that BG Taylor, American prosecutor, sent a memorandum in 1947, titled the Generals Memorandum, to the British alleging enough evidence to prosecute. The British Army, the American Army, and British and American Diplomats felt that by now it was more important to rebuild Germany than it was to continue more public trials. Manstein would eventually appear before Court and was sentenced in 1949 and then released in 1953. He was then asked by the newly established German government to help rebuild the German Army.
Manstein may have been a genius and his assistance in rebuilding the German Army may have been extremely helpful, but all this pales in comparison with the knowledge that he was unequivocally aware of the SS, SD, and Einsatzgruppen activities in his Area of Operations.
Pundits and detractors will tell us that if the British and Americans had not provided top cover for many Nazi officers and scientists, our success in the Space and Cold War might have been discussed as a counterfactual. The atrocities committed were beyond scope, imagination and pale, and the realpolitik that drove the decisions to benefit from the knowledge and experience of men that justified actions without moral code will be debated for another 100 years.
February 12, 2023
A myth busting book about one of Germany’s foremost operational artists in World War II. The author sets out from the beginning of the book to dismantle the myth of an “honorable” Wehrmacht by demonstrating their awareness of, and participation in, Nazi crimes. In this book the author highlights Manstein’s skill as an operational artist while highlighting his tolerance and at times complicity in Nazi crimes. This book will be most interesting to those with a deep interest in WWII and those who wish to understand why the German military supported Hitler till the bitter end of the war.
A few of the more important highlights below:
- Author notes obedience, loyalty, and a sense of duty as Manstein’s principal virtues and noted that Manstein sought restrict his focus to military matters in service of politics
- German generals remained committed to the concept of “decisive battle” and thus were unprepared and unable to achieve strategic outcomes through protracted conflict
- Manstein was a man of quick decisions who relied on his intuition rather than any methodical or systematic thought process
- During 1942-43 winter battles Manstein demonstrated qualities of military genius - energy, determination, audacity, foresight, and acceptance of risk
- As war is a continuation of politics by other means “political factors are more important than military factors. Germany’s mistake was to believe that military success could solve its political problems”
- Highlights Manstein’s critical role post-war in advancing the myth of Hitler as principally responsible for starting and losing the war and a German military free of guilt in Nazi war crimes.
A few of the more important highlights below:
- Author notes obedience, loyalty, and a sense of duty as Manstein’s principal virtues and noted that Manstein sought restrict his focus to military matters in service of politics
- German generals remained committed to the concept of “decisive battle” and thus were unprepared and unable to achieve strategic outcomes through protracted conflict
- Manstein was a man of quick decisions who relied on his intuition rather than any methodical or systematic thought process
- During 1942-43 winter battles Manstein demonstrated qualities of military genius - energy, determination, audacity, foresight, and acceptance of risk
- As war is a continuation of politics by other means “political factors are more important than military factors. Germany’s mistake was to believe that military success could solve its political problems”
- Highlights Manstein’s critical role post-war in advancing the myth of Hitler as principally responsible for starting and losing the war and a German military free of guilt in Nazi war crimes.
November 17, 2024
Insightful view into Manstein, if the conclusions drawn are accurate, which overall I believe them to be. Before I had bought into the Manstein myth, about an apolitical brilliant strategist and best Wehrmacht general of WW2. While I believe the latter is undoubtedly true, the “apolitical” part is a fallacy. Manstein was clearly aware of war crimes in his areas of responsibility, and through a combination of complicity and avoidance, conspired with a criminal Nazi regime to prolong the war and the crimes committed therein. Clearly the “I was busy and did not know” and “I was just following orders” excuses do not acquit him of moral responsibilities. It’s a complex issue, and the book promotes sober debate around it.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
November 4, 2017
A decent enough book, but Lemay has a tendency to ramble and repeat things and stray from the main topic of von Manstein's performance and culpability by focusing on a lot of non-Manstein related things. Still a very good breakdown of the celebrated field marshal, warts and all.
September 23, 2023
Very good book, Benoit Lemay does a great job comparing Manstein's record with the archives vs Manstein's memoirs. I highly recommend this book if interesting in understanding Manstein and his actions during WW2.
July 14, 2012
This book was an amazing and penetrating analysis of Manstein's career, and a damning indictment of his complicity in the war crimes committed by the Wehrmacht during WWII. While also covering, with a reasonable grasp of the strategic issues, Manstein's military commands & decisions, Lemay does not mince words about the more sordid side of his career.
I had for a long time bought into a myth about the separation of army and party/state with regards to the Holocaust and other reprehensible actions carried out by the Nazis -- sure, the army was naively complicit, but mostly because they were so fixed on their holy grail of being "apolitical". This book demolishes that myth, and shows how Manstein was one of the primary authors and guiding organizers of it. Lemay makes the point that the German Army of the 20s and early 30s did not submit itself to Hitler -- it allied with him. Or in other words, Hitler did not create an anti-Semitic warrior caste intent on world domination: it already existed. And it was precisely because their worldviews and prejudices were already in harmony BEFORE Hitler became Chancellor that the partnership was so easily forged.
A main component of that mythology is that while the army swept forward, the einsatzgruppen moved in behind them to begin exterminating the Jews and other undesirables, and that the army commanders were (willfully or otherwise) ignorant of what was going on behind the lines. This is far from the truth, and Lemay is at pains particularly during Manstein's command in the Crimea to point out how closely (and enthusiastically) the two organizations cooperated. Particularly striking was some quoted testimony by one of the party officials involved, who said categorically that without the logistical (and even personnel, occasionally) support that Manstein and others like him happily provided, the extermination work would not have succeeded on anywhere near the scale that it did.
I would personally have liked to see a little more military discussion and less on the war crimes...but that's a minor nitpick, and perhaps the heavyhandedness in exposing the latter was necessary to counter decades of mythbuilding around the "chivalrous" legend of the Wehrmacht. In either case it does not alter the underlying fact, which is this :
I have been reading with fascination anything I could get my hands on about WWII since I was in third grade, almost twenty years ago. And nothing I have ever read has so completely overturned an opinion I had about a facet of that war as this book has.
I had for a long time bought into a myth about the separation of army and party/state with regards to the Holocaust and other reprehensible actions carried out by the Nazis -- sure, the army was naively complicit, but mostly because they were so fixed on their holy grail of being "apolitical". This book demolishes that myth, and shows how Manstein was one of the primary authors and guiding organizers of it. Lemay makes the point that the German Army of the 20s and early 30s did not submit itself to Hitler -- it allied with him. Or in other words, Hitler did not create an anti-Semitic warrior caste intent on world domination: it already existed. And it was precisely because their worldviews and prejudices were already in harmony BEFORE Hitler became Chancellor that the partnership was so easily forged.
A main component of that mythology is that while the army swept forward, the einsatzgruppen moved in behind them to begin exterminating the Jews and other undesirables, and that the army commanders were (willfully or otherwise) ignorant of what was going on behind the lines. This is far from the truth, and Lemay is at pains particularly during Manstein's command in the Crimea to point out how closely (and enthusiastically) the two organizations cooperated. Particularly striking was some quoted testimony by one of the party officials involved, who said categorically that without the logistical (and even personnel, occasionally) support that Manstein and others like him happily provided, the extermination work would not have succeeded on anywhere near the scale that it did.
I would personally have liked to see a little more military discussion and less on the war crimes...but that's a minor nitpick, and perhaps the heavyhandedness in exposing the latter was necessary to counter decades of mythbuilding around the "chivalrous" legend of the Wehrmacht. In either case it does not alter the underlying fact, which is this :
I have been reading with fascination anything I could get my hands on about WWII since I was in third grade, almost twenty years ago. And nothing I have ever read has so completely overturned an opinion I had about a facet of that war as this book has.
September 24, 2011
I purchased this book because I don't have a lot of resources or knowledge about the Eastern Front. I got it as a History Book Club monthly recommendation. It is a decent overview of Manstein's military career. Manstein was a knowledgable, talented soldier. I learned a lot from it. It does have a lot of information even if much of it was drawn from secondary sources. It served its purpose. My favorite part of the book was actually before Manstein moved to the Eastern Front, but I did learn more about the east.
My issues with the book are based on the insistence by the author and the repeated assertions that Manstein was complicit in the war crimes committed by the National Socialist Party. An entire chapter is devoted to the Wehrmacht's participation and Manstein's role, but it creeps into the entire book. I don't doubt that Manstein had more knowledge about what was going on than he later claimed. It would be impossible for him not to know. I just didn't need to keep getting beat over the head about it with so many incidents, anecdotal stories, and statistics. The author kept pointing it out over and over, and it got tedious. I would have liked to see brief mentions of activities that Manstein denied and evidence to the contrary. Then let it go and get back to the story. Much of what the author claims is speculation, anyway.
I also found the book dragged at times. The writing was a bit stilted, and it took months for me to finish this book. I generally read books relatively fast, but I sometimes had to lay it aside and read something more interesting. I did manage to finish it, and I found it educational. It was just a bit boring, and there's no reason for World War II to be boring. That might be because of the previous issue I mentioned or because it contains a lot of details without a lot of narrative. It reads a little like a textbook. As mentioned in a previous review, there is almost no mention of Manstein's personal life. A bit of that might have helped offset the textbook feel.
I recommend the book to expand someone's knowledge base about the Eastern Front, but not for a "sit down and enjoy it" read. It's not a horrible book, but it wasn't as good as I'd hoped. It'll go on my shelf with my other WW-II books, but I don't think I'll be reading it cover to cover again.
My issues with the book are based on the insistence by the author and the repeated assertions that Manstein was complicit in the war crimes committed by the National Socialist Party. An entire chapter is devoted to the Wehrmacht's participation and Manstein's role, but it creeps into the entire book. I don't doubt that Manstein had more knowledge about what was going on than he later claimed. It would be impossible for him not to know. I just didn't need to keep getting beat over the head about it with so many incidents, anecdotal stories, and statistics. The author kept pointing it out over and over, and it got tedious. I would have liked to see brief mentions of activities that Manstein denied and evidence to the contrary. Then let it go and get back to the story. Much of what the author claims is speculation, anyway.
I also found the book dragged at times. The writing was a bit stilted, and it took months for me to finish this book. I generally read books relatively fast, but I sometimes had to lay it aside and read something more interesting. I did manage to finish it, and I found it educational. It was just a bit boring, and there's no reason for World War II to be boring. That might be because of the previous issue I mentioned or because it contains a lot of details without a lot of narrative. It reads a little like a textbook. As mentioned in a previous review, there is almost no mention of Manstein's personal life. A bit of that might have helped offset the textbook feel.
I recommend the book to expand someone's knowledge base about the Eastern Front, but not for a "sit down and enjoy it" read. It's not a horrible book, but it wasn't as good as I'd hoped. It'll go on my shelf with my other WW-II books, but I don't think I'll be reading it cover to cover again.
December 12, 2020
A masterful presentation of Von Manstein very underrated as oppose to Rommel
September 21, 2010
A well researched and well written book. My only real concern with this was the amount of grammatical and glaring editing mistakes that take away from an overall interesting read.
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