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The Confederate War: How Popular Will, Nationalism, and Military Strategy Could Not Stave Off Defeat
If one is to believe contemporary historians, the South never had a chance. Many allege that the Confederacy lost the Civil War because of internal division or civilian disaffection; others point to flawed military strategy or ambivalence over slavery. But, argues distinguished historian Gary Gallagher , we should not ask why the Confederacy collapsed so soon but rather how it lasted so long. In The Confederate War he reexamines the Confederate experience through the actions and words of the people who lived it to show how the home front responded to the war, endured great hardships, and assembled armies that fought with tremendous spirit and determination. Gallagher’s portrait highlights a powerful sense of Confederate patriotism and unity in the face of a determined adversary. Drawing on letters, diaries, and newspapers of the day, he shows that Southerners held not only an unflagging belief in their way of life, which sustained them to the bitter end, but also a widespread expectation of victory and a strong popular will closely attuned to military events. In fact, the army’s “offensive-defensive” strategy came remarkably close to triumph, claims Gallagher―in contrast to the many historians who believe that a more purely defensive strategy or a guerrilla resistance could have won the war for the South. To understand why the South lost, Gallagher says we need look no further than the war after a long struggle that brought enormous loss of life and property, Southerners finally realized that they had been beaten on the battlefield. Gallagher’s interpretation of the Confederates and their cause boldly challenges current historical thinking and invites readers to reconsider their own conceptions of the American Civil War.
272 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 1997
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About the author
Gary W. Gallagher
108 books98 followersGary W. Gallagher, the John L. Nau III Professor of History at the University of Virginia, is the author or editor of many books in the field of Civil War history, including The Confederate War; Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know about the Civil War; and The Union War.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 37 reviews
May 8, 2012
Gary Gallagher’s The Confederate War, is a short book filled with provocative questions. He gets things rolling quickly, calling into question, on page 5, a ridiculous statement by Shelby Foote, sainted media darling (and historian!) from Ken Burns’ epic series on the Civil War. Foote’s statement: “I think the North fought that war with one hand behind its back.” That’s a remarkably stupid statement regarding a war that left so many dead and wounded, even more so when one considers the percentage of the population that was lost.
Those numbers were horrible for both sides, but when one looks at the vastly outmanned South, it’s simply stunning that they were able to fight for so long. According to Gallagher, the Confederacy mobilized 750,000 to 850,000 men, which represented 75 to 85% (by itself an amazing number of participation) of its draft-age white male population. 258,000 of those men would die, and another 200,000 were wounded. In other words, the casualty rate for the Confederate forces was between 37 and 39% (as opposed to the Union’s 17.5%). I’m no expert, but I can’t think of any country in modern times suffering those kinds of casualty rates.
The book goes into areas of Popular Will, Nationalism, and Military Strategy, which I suppose are all areas for current debate. Basically, Gallagher sees plenty of evidence (often shown through letters from the period) for a strong will to win, a sense of Nationhood, and an aggressive military strategy that sought to destroy the Union armies. All of this unfolds nicely (accompanied by some wonderful weave work when quoting from the letters), with Gallagher calling into question a number of current historical assumptions about the South. My one complaint is that the book is too short. It’s more of jumping off place than an actual full history of a time, people and place.
Those numbers were horrible for both sides, but when one looks at the vastly outmanned South, it’s simply stunning that they were able to fight for so long. According to Gallagher, the Confederacy mobilized 750,000 to 850,000 men, which represented 75 to 85% (by itself an amazing number of participation) of its draft-age white male population. 258,000 of those men would die, and another 200,000 were wounded. In other words, the casualty rate for the Confederate forces was between 37 and 39% (as opposed to the Union’s 17.5%). I’m no expert, but I can’t think of any country in modern times suffering those kinds of casualty rates.
The book goes into areas of Popular Will, Nationalism, and Military Strategy, which I suppose are all areas for current debate. Basically, Gallagher sees plenty of evidence (often shown through letters from the period) for a strong will to win, a sense of Nationhood, and an aggressive military strategy that sought to destroy the Union armies. All of this unfolds nicely (accompanied by some wonderful weave work when quoting from the letters), with Gallagher calling into question a number of current historical assumptions about the South. My one complaint is that the book is too short. It’s more of jumping off place than an actual full history of a time, people and place.
February 4, 2019
This is a short book that looks at the Civil War through the eyes of the Confederate States. Gary W. Gallagher discusses the Confederate side of the war in four specific areas: popular will, nationalism, military strategy, and their ultimate defeat. His basic thesis is to understand why the people of the Confederate States continued to fight after losing so many men on the battlefield and why they ended in defeat after winning so many battles in the beginning years of the war.
Gallagher had several thoughts on why the Confederacy ultimately lost. It seemed that he felt that, at least from a military perspective, the army was not properly organized and should have spent more effort on guerrilla warfare. Where I'm not sure I completely agree, Gallagher certainly brings up many thought-provoking points and give the reader a look at life during the Civil War from the Confederate viewpoint.
Gallagher had several thoughts on why the Confederacy ultimately lost. It seemed that he felt that, at least from a military perspective, the army was not properly organized and should have spent more effort on guerrilla warfare. Where I'm not sure I completely agree, Gallagher certainly brings up many thought-provoking points and give the reader a look at life during the Civil War from the Confederate viewpoint.
May 30, 2009
Professor Gallagher offers perhaps the most balanced approach yet written on the subject in his discussion of why and how the Confederacy persisted for four years. Though far from a Lost Cause adherent (indeed, a scholar on its history and its flaws), Gallagher shifts attention from the tempting notion that the Southern states unraveled from within, to the correct root cause of the South's demise - unequivocal defeat on the battlefield. A master of Confederate historiography, the author clearly establishes that Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia became the premier national institution as the war progressed. His explication of Southern reasons for prosecuting the war dovetail nicely with James McPherson's approach in For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), and it is no wonder that McPherson cites Gallagher favorably in his recent work, This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Gallagher's Confederate War should and certainly will remain one of the most important and influential books on the history of the Southern Confederacy.
July 6, 2013
Here is the last paragraph in Gallagher's book:
It defies modern understanding that any people--especially one in which nonslaveholding yeomen formed a solid majority--would pour energy and resources into a fight profoundly tainted by the institution of slavery. Yet the Confederate people did so. Until historians can explain more fully why they did, the story of the Civil War will remain woefully incomplete.
"The Confederate War" goes a long way in explaining the Southern population's attachment to their Confederate nation. Fed by a strong nationalism that survived the worst military defeats, they believed the South was the true heir to the Revolution; that R. E. Lee was to Lincoln as Washington was to George III. Gallagher convinced me that many Confederates saw their nation as a nation and were as committed to it as the Northern people were to the Union.
BUT (you knew that was coming, right) a nation built on the "cornerstone of slavery" (Alexander Stephens, CSA Vice President) was "profoundly tainted" by that peculiar institution. When one of the universal fears of the Southerners was that the slaves would rise up in rebellion and one of the goals of the CSA was to maintain its slave-based aristocracy, one would hope that the author would at least make a passing reference to the utter immorality of slavery. To say that the Confederate nation was sustained by its religion and that this same religion gave God's blessing to slavery and would preserve and protect the Confederate states calls for someone to speak the truth.
Hey, Professor Gallagher, slavery was not only wrong, but immoral. I'm happy to read any book giving the true state of affairs in the Confederate South, but please acknowledge the anti-Enlightenment view of natural right which the slaveholders held and please, please say that slavery was a "tainted" system each time you discuss the Southerners determination to cling to it.
It defies modern understanding that any people--especially one in which nonslaveholding yeomen formed a solid majority--would pour energy and resources into a fight profoundly tainted by the institution of slavery. Yet the Confederate people did so. Until historians can explain more fully why they did, the story of the Civil War will remain woefully incomplete.
"The Confederate War" goes a long way in explaining the Southern population's attachment to their Confederate nation. Fed by a strong nationalism that survived the worst military defeats, they believed the South was the true heir to the Revolution; that R. E. Lee was to Lincoln as Washington was to George III. Gallagher convinced me that many Confederates saw their nation as a nation and were as committed to it as the Northern people were to the Union.
BUT (you knew that was coming, right) a nation built on the "cornerstone of slavery" (Alexander Stephens, CSA Vice President) was "profoundly tainted" by that peculiar institution. When one of the universal fears of the Southerners was that the slaves would rise up in rebellion and one of the goals of the CSA was to maintain its slave-based aristocracy, one would hope that the author would at least make a passing reference to the utter immorality of slavery. To say that the Confederate nation was sustained by its religion and that this same religion gave God's blessing to slavery and would preserve and protect the Confederate states calls for someone to speak the truth.
Hey, Professor Gallagher, slavery was not only wrong, but immoral. I'm happy to read any book giving the true state of affairs in the Confederate South, but please acknowledge the anti-Enlightenment view of natural right which the slaveholders held and please, please say that slavery was a "tainted" system each time you discuss the Southerners determination to cling to it.
July 10, 2018
This is a book written to show that there was a great deal of nationalism within the Confederacy. It also tries to show that other historians who argue that the South lost the war due to failing morale are wrong. I guess I can buy some of this. However, I’d like to see a study on how the Confederacy’s failing government and economy affected morale. I would think that massive inflation, for example, had some effect on morale. Gallagher will have to do better than citing a couple of letters waxing poetic about the writer’s “country” (the CSA.) to support his argument.
Gallagher writes little about slavery in this book. Slavery was the cause of the war. If there was Southern nationalistic feeling in the South as Gallagher asserts, the focal point of that feeling was slavery and white supremacy.
If anything, this book shows how backwards, outdated thinking of the Southern citizenry might have lost the war. This outdated thinking for Gallagher is Southern nationalism. Unfortunately, this type of Southern nationalism is still prevalent in the present and it was outdated in the 1860’s. I agree that Southern nationalism existed. I’m not convinced that it extended the war in any way as Gallagher argues. I am a believer that the war lasted as long as it did due to the incompetence of Union military leadership.
Gallagher writes little about slavery in this book. Slavery was the cause of the war. If there was Southern nationalistic feeling in the South as Gallagher asserts, the focal point of that feeling was slavery and white supremacy.
If anything, this book shows how backwards, outdated thinking of the Southern citizenry might have lost the war. This outdated thinking for Gallagher is Southern nationalism. Unfortunately, this type of Southern nationalism is still prevalent in the present and it was outdated in the 1860’s. I agree that Southern nationalism existed. I’m not convinced that it extended the war in any way as Gallagher argues. I am a believer that the war lasted as long as it did due to the incompetence of Union military leadership.
November 10, 2018
Based on a series of lectures, this short book makes short points. Firstly, The war did not give birth to Southern nationalism, but it did mightily reenforce it, especially among the officer corps. Second, going guerilla was never an option for Lee, no matter how much today's historians may argue. Contemporaries better understood the symbiotism between Nationalism and regular battlefield victories, to the point where in 1864 a minority contemplated sacrificing the peculiar institution if it meant the preservation of Confederate independence.
January 17, 2012
Noted Civil War historian Gary Gallagher takes on some of the common perceptions of the Civil War in this thoughtful historiography, "The Confederate War". He contends that Civil War historians look at the conflict by working backwards from Lee's surrender at Appomattox, and by examining why the South was defeated. Gallagher takes on the issue in a different way, looking at the conflict from beginning to end and detailing how the Confederacy was able to last so long in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds.
Gallagher begins by looking at the previous works of other historians and sets forth his own hypotheses in three areas: popular will, nationalism, and military strategy. In the first, he looks at the widespread belief that the South lost the will to fight. Most historians contend that this occurred in the summer of 1863 after the dual defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Gallagher disagrees, and gives ample evidence that the South was still in favor of continuing the war. He even claims that, if anything, the South became more determined as the war stretched into '64 and '65. To prove his point, Gallagher looks at desertion rates and attacks the widely held theory that the Army of Northern Virginia was disintegrating during the Petersburg campaign. He argues that desertions occurred because soldiers were worried about the safety of their families in the face of the Union advance into Virginia, not because they were losing faith in the cause. He also contends that many soldiers actually returned to the front lines after ensuring the safety of their families.
As the war continued, and as the Confederacy became more desperate for troops, the idea of gradual emancipation was raised, even by such notables as Robert E. Lee. Gallagher uses this to show that the South was willing to do anything necessary to win the war; they were even willing to give up their basic social structure: slavery, in order to become an independent nation. At this point Gallagher brings up the idea of nationalism, and contends that civilians of the South felt a strong national identity. Furthermore, that sense of nationalism is due in large part to the Army of Northern Virginia and it's charismatic General Lee. Gallagher makes a strong case throughout the book that the Confederate people saw the army as the figurehead of the South.
Finally, Gallagher tackles military strategy. Historians often make the case that the Confederacy should have changed it's military strategy by waging a defensive campaign and by adopting guerilla warfare. Gallagher argues that these are flawed ideas, and this is the strongest portion of the book. Neither of these strategies would have been successful because they both lack inspiration. By waging a defensive war, the South would not have received the benefits of the morale boosts provided by Lee's army after victories like Chancellorsville and Fredricksburg. Gallagher uses Lee's first campaign as an example. During the Seven Days, he was nicknamed "King of Spades" because of his insistence on digging earthworks. During this time morale flagged in the South because Lee was waging a defensive campaign. Thereafter, he employed an aggressive offensive strategy which was mostly successful until Ulysses S. Grant took command in 1864.
Gallagher uses a similar argument to contend that a guerilla war would not have produced a Confederate victory. He goes through a long list of problems with this theory. Most importantly, there would be no massive army like Lee's to look up to, which would cause morale problems amongst the civilians of the South. A guerilla war would have caused problems with slavery and would have required ceding some territory to the Union because the very nature of a guerilla war is that it is fought against an occupying force. Also, the professional military would have been alienated and there would be almost no chance that the Confederacy would be recognized, much less supported, by European nations.
In summary, this book looks at some of the most common perceptions of the Confederacy which have been in place throughout this century and refutes them. However, Gallagher encounters the same problem of the historians that he is refuting, in that he is still generalizing. Of course he can find letters from the common Southerner that speak of "our country", but there are plenty of letters that support the opposite theory. Because of this, there will always be disagreements about what was in the hearts and minds of Southerners during the war. The strong point of this book is when Gallagher shows that Lee's army was the rallying point and figurehead for the Southern cause and that they followed the best strategy possible by more often than not taking the fight to the enemy, rather than letting the enemy come to them. In the end, the book once again shows just how important Lee and his army were to the Confederacy, and demonstrates that without his leadership and the inspiring effect he had on the populace, the war would certainly have ended much sooner.
Gallagher begins by looking at the previous works of other historians and sets forth his own hypotheses in three areas: popular will, nationalism, and military strategy. In the first, he looks at the widespread belief that the South lost the will to fight. Most historians contend that this occurred in the summer of 1863 after the dual defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Gallagher disagrees, and gives ample evidence that the South was still in favor of continuing the war. He even claims that, if anything, the South became more determined as the war stretched into '64 and '65. To prove his point, Gallagher looks at desertion rates and attacks the widely held theory that the Army of Northern Virginia was disintegrating during the Petersburg campaign. He argues that desertions occurred because soldiers were worried about the safety of their families in the face of the Union advance into Virginia, not because they were losing faith in the cause. He also contends that many soldiers actually returned to the front lines after ensuring the safety of their families.
As the war continued, and as the Confederacy became more desperate for troops, the idea of gradual emancipation was raised, even by such notables as Robert E. Lee. Gallagher uses this to show that the South was willing to do anything necessary to win the war; they were even willing to give up their basic social structure: slavery, in order to become an independent nation. At this point Gallagher brings up the idea of nationalism, and contends that civilians of the South felt a strong national identity. Furthermore, that sense of nationalism is due in large part to the Army of Northern Virginia and it's charismatic General Lee. Gallagher makes a strong case throughout the book that the Confederate people saw the army as the figurehead of the South.
Finally, Gallagher tackles military strategy. Historians often make the case that the Confederacy should have changed it's military strategy by waging a defensive campaign and by adopting guerilla warfare. Gallagher argues that these are flawed ideas, and this is the strongest portion of the book. Neither of these strategies would have been successful because they both lack inspiration. By waging a defensive war, the South would not have received the benefits of the morale boosts provided by Lee's army after victories like Chancellorsville and Fredricksburg. Gallagher uses Lee's first campaign as an example. During the Seven Days, he was nicknamed "King of Spades" because of his insistence on digging earthworks. During this time morale flagged in the South because Lee was waging a defensive campaign. Thereafter, he employed an aggressive offensive strategy which was mostly successful until Ulysses S. Grant took command in 1864.
Gallagher uses a similar argument to contend that a guerilla war would not have produced a Confederate victory. He goes through a long list of problems with this theory. Most importantly, there would be no massive army like Lee's to look up to, which would cause morale problems amongst the civilians of the South. A guerilla war would have caused problems with slavery and would have required ceding some territory to the Union because the very nature of a guerilla war is that it is fought against an occupying force. Also, the professional military would have been alienated and there would be almost no chance that the Confederacy would be recognized, much less supported, by European nations.
In summary, this book looks at some of the most common perceptions of the Confederacy which have been in place throughout this century and refutes them. However, Gallagher encounters the same problem of the historians that he is refuting, in that he is still generalizing. Of course he can find letters from the common Southerner that speak of "our country", but there are plenty of letters that support the opposite theory. Because of this, there will always be disagreements about what was in the hearts and minds of Southerners during the war. The strong point of this book is when Gallagher shows that Lee's army was the rallying point and figurehead for the Southern cause and that they followed the best strategy possible by more often than not taking the fight to the enemy, rather than letting the enemy come to them. In the end, the book once again shows just how important Lee and his army were to the Confederacy, and demonstrates that without his leadership and the inspiring effect he had on the populace, the war would certainly have ended much sooner.
April 16, 2019
Very to the point of why the south fought for so long and how the more agressive tactics of Lee were the Confederacy's only hope of success. Wonderful book, 172 reading pages.
November 18, 2023
i may have enjoyed this book a lot more if i didn't have to read it for class, but then again i may never have read it. gallagher's arguments in this book are really interesting, but challenging to get through when you read the whole book in less than 24 hours. overall, i am not a historian i am just a person who enjoys the casual learn so i cannot speak from a historian's perspective. i thought it was interesting but not fascinating.
July 12, 2011
At only 170 pages this book read more like a thesis paper. Some very interesting statistical data and arguments offered to rebut other historians who claim the South lost the war because of a lack of unity and effort, but he spent as much time explaining their arguments and ultimately did not offer enough in his own behalf. Oddly, he even half-acknowledges this in his closing chapter where he notes that future historians should further explore the ideas he raises.
June 12, 2013
The Confederate War, by examining the American Civil War in a context that does not assume the loss of the Confederacy, destabilizes the historiography of the Confederate South in order to get at historical truths that explain why nationalism persisted for a defeated half-nation. Unfortunately, Gallagher spends most of the book punching holes in the arguments of other historians, instead of laying out his own arguments, and the writing style can be inscrutable. Meh.
July 17, 2018
While using some interesting resources, the author tends to overemphasize the significance of the subjective testimony of Confederate partisans when objective evidence is quite in disagreement with his overall premise that the Confederacy maintained a high level of morale and belief in victory until the end. The measure of the loss of morale was told by the high numbers of deserters, rampant inflation, utter lack of international support, number domestic riots, and political stagnation. The evidence is clear that the Confederacy was defeated internally as well as by Union armies. Even if sticking to the subjective evidence the author favors, he noticeably omits discussion of the vast amounts of letters from wives and mothers begging men in the army to desert. Rather, it appears the author stretched his sources (again, extremely subjective and partisan) to disguise his support for some altered version of the disproven “lost cause” excuse of Confederate defeat. It is a shame that this theory, which lacks any credibility when considered with any objectivity, continues to limp along.
February 9, 2024
Gallagher challenges some common ideas about why the Confederacy lost the Civil War. He argues that the Confederacy did enjoy mass support and despite having pockets of disunion, did indeed create a sense of nation.
Admittedly I haven’t read a ton on why the South lost in recent years, so I’m not sure if his view is common or not. This book was written in the 1990s, so there’s been a lot of scholarship since then. Anecdotally I will say what I have read seems to imply historians still view the Confederacy as disjointed and falling apart at the seams in many ways.
A good, short read that examines military strategy, nationalism and popular support to explain why the Confederacy failed *despite* benefitting from all the trappings of a nation, including mass support, a military strategy that could have worked had they had better generals, and nationalistic ideology.
Admittedly I haven’t read a ton on why the South lost in recent years, so I’m not sure if his view is common or not. This book was written in the 1990s, so there’s been a lot of scholarship since then. Anecdotally I will say what I have read seems to imply historians still view the Confederacy as disjointed and falling apart at the seams in many ways.
A good, short read that examines military strategy, nationalism and popular support to explain why the Confederacy failed *despite* benefitting from all the trappings of a nation, including mass support, a military strategy that could have worked had they had better generals, and nationalistic ideology.
October 17, 2022
Gallagher, perhaps America's leading Civil War historian, examines the most common academic theories of why the Confederacy was doomed to lose, especially that its citizens lacked the "will" to fight, whether those citizens were the usual white slaveholding men or some other group like women, upcountry unionists or yeoman farmers.
Then, Gallagher shows how those theories are all incorrect. In fact, Confederates could have won the war at several points when their victories threatened northern civilian morale, mostly because northern will to fight was limited, while southern will only got stronger as the suffering of southern whites increased. Only the surrender of Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia spelled the end of Confederate hopes for independence.
Then, Gallagher shows how those theories are all incorrect. In fact, Confederates could have won the war at several points when their victories threatened northern civilian morale, mostly because northern will to fight was limited, while southern will only got stronger as the suffering of southern whites increased. Only the surrender of Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia spelled the end of Confederate hopes for independence.
August 11, 2022
The entire book is Gallagher taking the North's popular historical positions on the civil war and ripping them apart with the words and facts of Southerners. It breaks down the main historical arguments and treats each as it's own subject. Unfortunately when it comes to the end he doesn't attempt to draw any satisfactory conclusion. Gallagher does have significant notes. That said periodically he refers to an author and how said author treated a subject, and he doesn't footnote it so the reader is at a loss for the book. Overall, I would recommend reading this book.
September 3, 2020
Gary W. Gallagher's "The Confederate War" is a brief discussion of why the Southern Confederacy lost the American Civil War in three extended essays on popular will, nationalism, and military strategy. Like many contemporary historians, Gallagher focuses to a great extent on willpower (or lack thereof) without really examining the deeper causes for the South's loss of willpower: quite simply, the South was beaten, badly, and it just took four years for the extent of their defeat to sink in.
October 19, 2021
This book, I’m on the fence about. I like the points made and I think it is an interesting read with educational merit. However, I think in terms of writing it is poor. The ideas behind it are great, but the physical English does not do it justice. It took a lot for me to get through the entire thing.
January 9, 2023
I learned so much from this book! No matter how much you think you know about the civil war, I guarantee you will learn more. Most importantly, you will learn to look at what you know from a different perspective and you will gain a more comprehensive understanding of such an important time in American History. The many personal accounts of war-time events help make it an easy read.
March 29, 2023
One of the coolest books written about the American Civil War. No eyerolling play by play battlefield movements here. Just good old fashioned cultural history and motivations told from a non-apologist perspective. Really cool read. Essential for all students of Early American History.
November 15, 2017
another book for school finished! dropping them like flies this week. ;)
March 19, 2024
Good historiographical review.
July 10, 2025
Very useful. You can’t say why the north won without saying why the south lost
May 23, 2013
In The Confederate War Gary Gallagher offers a reappraisal of the course of the Civil War. Disputing a trend in the works of dominant Civil War era historians such as James McPherson, Eric Foner and Richard Beringer which focuses on internal tensions within Confederate society, Gallagher argues that Confederate citizens were remarkably united and bore extraordinary wartime sacrifices. He claims that rather than crumbling from within, the Confederacy was unable to prevail in its bid for independence despite a strong popular will among its citizens. He asserts that historians discussing the Confederate States of America are reluctant, perhaps understandably, to recognize the kind of genuine nationalism which would legitimize the Confederate independence struggle. Methodologically, the turn toward a social approach has overemphasized tensions on the home front while ignoring the importance of military events.
Instead of viewing issues of Confederate morale in a vacuum, he compares it with the hardships endured by the white population of the North during the Civil War and the white population generally during the Revolutionary War. In terms of material privation, military service and war casualties the C.S.A. suffered more deeply, yet carried the war on through four years. Gallagher deals with the much cited Confederate desertion statistics by pointing out that the aggregate total creates an illusion. Desertion spiked in 1862 as those who entered the Confederate military at the beginning of the war, and were unfit or unwilling, left service; it spiked again at the end of 1864 and beginning of 1865 as advancing Union armies imperiled the families of soldiers.
Gallagher’s first point leads to an obvious question – if Confederate morale was so high why did the Confederacy disintegrate following General Lee’s surrender? He answers this question by positing that the Army of Northern Virginia had become the focal point of Confederate national spirit. As the war progressed and the western front yielded a steady cycle of stalemate and defeat, the dramatic victories of the Army of Northern Virginia captured the heart of the civilian population, giving them a sense of hope and accomplishment. Lee’s defensive victories, but more importantly his willingness to take the offensive in Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the flare with which he wrung victory after victory from his foes despite being outnumbered, accorded with the manner in which the public’s imagination expected a heroic war should be fought and stoked their determination to bear any burden. This thesis deals neatly with the rapid surrender and absence of guerilla resistance which followed on the heels of Lee’s defeat. In shock that Lee and the A.N.V. had proved unable to perform the miracles expected of them, the symbol of resistance and the will to resist perished together.
Instead of viewing issues of Confederate morale in a vacuum, he compares it with the hardships endured by the white population of the North during the Civil War and the white population generally during the Revolutionary War. In terms of material privation, military service and war casualties the C.S.A. suffered more deeply, yet carried the war on through four years. Gallagher deals with the much cited Confederate desertion statistics by pointing out that the aggregate total creates an illusion. Desertion spiked in 1862 as those who entered the Confederate military at the beginning of the war, and were unfit or unwilling, left service; it spiked again at the end of 1864 and beginning of 1865 as advancing Union armies imperiled the families of soldiers.
Gallagher’s first point leads to an obvious question – if Confederate morale was so high why did the Confederacy disintegrate following General Lee’s surrender? He answers this question by positing that the Army of Northern Virginia had become the focal point of Confederate national spirit. As the war progressed and the western front yielded a steady cycle of stalemate and defeat, the dramatic victories of the Army of Northern Virginia captured the heart of the civilian population, giving them a sense of hope and accomplishment. Lee’s defensive victories, but more importantly his willingness to take the offensive in Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the flare with which he wrung victory after victory from his foes despite being outnumbered, accorded with the manner in which the public’s imagination expected a heroic war should be fought and stoked their determination to bear any burden. This thesis deals neatly with the rapid surrender and absence of guerilla resistance which followed on the heels of Lee’s defeat. In shock that Lee and the A.N.V. had proved unable to perform the miracles expected of them, the symbol of resistance and the will to resist perished together.
October 10, 2014
With the historiography of Civil War leaning toward its interpretation as the Confederacy's lack of unity and common sense of nationalism as a key to its failure and loss to Union forces, Gallagher seeks to cultivate sources that demonstrate this was not the case. He warns against working backward from the fact that they lost to explain how they came to be there. Instead, he looks at what Confederate soldiers had to say themselves about "the Confederacy" and "their country." While at times it seems like he is another historian emphasizing certain sources and neglecting others, he does succeed in revealing in the fact that at least rhetorically, many Confederate soldiers and Southerners thought of themselves as a united Confederacy of states with a distinct culture and nation they were fighting for in opposition to the corrupted society and union of the north. Although they were no longer the "United States of America," there is evidence that they thought of themselves as the true inheritors and defenders of "the American" traditions and legacies set in motion by the Founding Fathers: including the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution (though they drafted their own Constitution to emphasize the centrality of slavery to their way of life and society).
While any history written to make the Confederates seem more [self-]justified in their cause might seem distasteful for seemingly glorifying a decidedly unjust cause--defending the institution of slavery--it is in fact not what Gallagher does, and his scholarship is more nuanced and clear in its aims of setting the ideology and perception straight. It is not about glorifying the Confederacy but demonstrating what they took glory in, and one of those things was the Confederate States of America--their nation untied in rebellion and committed to their particular way of life.
While any history written to make the Confederates seem more [self-]justified in their cause might seem distasteful for seemingly glorifying a decidedly unjust cause--defending the institution of slavery--it is in fact not what Gallagher does, and his scholarship is more nuanced and clear in its aims of setting the ideology and perception straight. It is not about glorifying the Confederacy but demonstrating what they took glory in, and one of those things was the Confederate States of America--their nation untied in rebellion and committed to their particular way of life.
September 30, 2014
Gallagher's book is a fine response to the list of historians who assert that the Confederacy failed because its people were not willing to make the necessary sacrifices to obtain independence. He details the opposing arguments very well, and uses good primary sources and sound reasoning to refute them. Gallagher does spend a lot of time outlining the arguments of his opposition - some critics say too much so, but that strengthens the usefulness of the book.
One of things that I like most about this work is that Gallagher proves the worth of studying military history, and he demonstrates that military and social history inform and relate to each other. This stands in stark contrast to the recent trends in historical circles that denigrate the study of military history as useless as compared to social and political history. General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was the centerpiece of the Confederate bid for independence, and the General and his army were the most important institution in the new nation - more than the government itself. Those on the home front - both men and women - recognized this fact. The attempts by most modern historians to second guess the Confederacy's offensive/defensive strategy are soundly repulsed (this is especially true of those who believe that a guerilla war would have gained southern independence).
I agree with Professor James McPherson's assessment that this book is among the best interpretations of the Civil War. If you are looking for an explanation of why the Confederacy lost the Civil War even though their strategy was sound, this book is a good place to start.
One of things that I like most about this work is that Gallagher proves the worth of studying military history, and he demonstrates that military and social history inform and relate to each other. This stands in stark contrast to the recent trends in historical circles that denigrate the study of military history as useless as compared to social and political history. General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was the centerpiece of the Confederate bid for independence, and the General and his army were the most important institution in the new nation - more than the government itself. Those on the home front - both men and women - recognized this fact. The attempts by most modern historians to second guess the Confederacy's offensive/defensive strategy are soundly repulsed (this is especially true of those who believe that a guerilla war would have gained southern independence).
I agree with Professor James McPherson's assessment that this book is among the best interpretations of the Civil War. If you are looking for an explanation of why the Confederacy lost the Civil War even though their strategy was sound, this book is a good place to start.
June 7, 2007
gallagher disputes the theory that confederates lost the war because of a lack of will to fight and, in turn, praises that confederate spirit. i find after reading all of his citations, various letters to and from home and the battlefields, that the confederate soldiers didn't really know what they were fighting for, and every reason is jam-packed with empty rhetoric about "this great nation." gallagher follows this opnion when he calls into question the legitimacy of the confederacy AS A NATION, and he aptly notes that only by virtue of its military, could the confederate states have resembled anything. and look at how that turned out...
yet the book doesn't fail to strike home with htis southern girl, and i cringe when i admit, that after reading all these words on the civil war in the past ouple years, something in me still roots for the confederacy and all its empty rhetoric.
yet the book doesn't fail to strike home with htis southern girl, and i cringe when i admit, that after reading all these words on the civil war in the past ouple years, something in me still roots for the confederacy and all its empty rhetoric.
August 23, 2014
I'm sure that Civil War enthusiast will love this book, but I just could not get into it. I felt like Gallagher was too disorganized; and he spent so much time arguing against other historians that I'm not sure I know what his own beliefs and opinions are - except for that he disagrees with almost every other historian other than himself. His book gave the illusion that he was going to answer the "why did the south lose the war" question, and then he just ended with "there is no way to really know what happened." Which in any historical event there is no way to know what really happened because we weren't there. But we can still talk about it and try coming up with something from different angles. Don't waste my tame gathering up all this "evidence" and then ending with no conclusion. I sold this book back to my University bookstore the moment I could.
October 15, 2015
Books written and/or edited by Cary W. Gallagher tend to be fascinating and thought provoking studies of various aspects of the American Civil War. This particular book focused on the motivating factors that allowed the average Confederate citizen to wage and support a difficult war for four years. The author questions some common theories that Northern victory was "predetermined" and that the eventual defeat of the CSA was due, in large part, to the lack of support for the Jefferson Davis government and the yeoman's lack of support to the slave-holder class. The book's footnotes seem to demonstrate a heavy reliance on the views of James McPherson whose book, Battle Cry of Freedom, is. in my opinion, the best single volume history of the Civil War. I consider myself an "armchair student" of the Civil War and this book was written for people like me!
October 9, 2015
Convincingly argues that--contrary to the revisionist views of some modern historians--that the Confederate war effort was broadly and fervently supported throughout the war by southern whites, regardless of social class; that a strong Confederate nationalism developed early and grew throughout the war among southern whites (and indeed continued for generations after 1865); and, the Confederate War strategy was the most rational one that could have been adopted, given its need for foreign recognition and the fundamental requirement to maintain 4 million people in slavery. Nevertheless, none of these could stave off a crushing defeat to a numerically and logistically superior Federal Army once it was commanded by capable leaders such as Grant and Sherman. The author also demonstrates that no other Confederate general was nearly as capable as Lee, and he could not win the war alone.
November 6, 2013
Gallagher brings sound reasoning back to Civil War history. This book should be read with the equally worthy THE UNION WAR by the same author. Gallagher debunks a great deal of revisionist history about the war by showing the strength of southern commitment to the struggle, southern patriotism focused on Lee and his army, and the merits and even the requirements of the military strategy Davis and Lee adopted during the war. Given the tendency to find more and more exotic explanations for and about the southern war for independence and its complete failure, Gallagher's approach brings us back to the central arguments and examines them in detail.
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