Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present

by Yevgeny Primakov

Part memoir, part history, Russia and the Arabs reveals the past half-century in the Middle East from a viewpoint seldom seen by Westerners. Yevgeny Primakov, formerly the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister of Russia, exposes how key political events unfolded through the personal interactions and rivalries among notable leaders from Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin to Anwar Sadat and Saddam Hussein, whom he knew personally. He shows how the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars developed, exposes Russia’s previously unknown role in the 1991 Gulf War, and assesses Russia’s Middle East policies alongside those of other foreign players, including the United States. The author’s first-hand accounts of behind-the-scenes encounters and his insights into what really drove the region’s key events make Russia and the Arabs an essential read for everyone interested in world affairs.

Genres: History, Russia, Middle East, Politics, International Relations, Nonfiction

432 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2009

About the author

Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov was a Russian politician and diplomat who served as Prime Minister of Russia from 1998 to 1999. During his long career, he also served as Foreign Minister, Speaker of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, and chief of the intelligence service.

Reviews

[Hani Al-Kharaz]

هذا الكتاب صدرت طبعته الأولى باللغة الروسية في عام ٢٠٠٦ وتمت ترجمته ونشره باللغة الإنجليزية عام ٢٠٠٩، ولكنه الى الآن لم يترجم للأسف الى اللغة العربية! وهذا مؤسف جداً.

مؤلف الكتاب ليس بشخصية عادية فقد شغل منصب رئيس الوزراء ووزارة الخارجية في عهد يلتسين وقبلها رئيساً للاستخبارات الروسية، بعد أن عمل مراسلاً في الشرق الأوسط للصحيفة السوفييتة الشهيرة برافدا وهذا كله يعطي للكتاب اهمية بالغة.

يطرح الكتاب وجهة نظر روسية للصراع في الشرق الأوسط ويقدم تفاصيل لبعض خفايا المشهد السياسي. قال بريماكوف الكثير في الكتاب مما يحسن الوقوف عنده وتحليله والتعمق فيه، وحمل بشكل كبير على السياسات الأمريكية في الشرق الأوسط والصلف الإسرائيلي المسكوت عنه دولياً.

قد أعود في مواضع أخرى للحديث بشيء من التفصيل عن بعض ما تناوله بريماكوف في كتابه.

[Kym Robinson]

This is a book that one can put down and let linger for a time, it is well written and has interesting anecdotes and perspectives. Written by Yevgeny Primakov who was a journalist for the Soviet News Agency who then became a diplomat and eventually for a time was a Prime Minister. It does invite one to contemplate much of the contents. For those who have read about the Middle East and the Arab world, the information is usually fixated on the relativity to Israel or/and the West. The Arabs are usually outsiders or wealthy allies to be bought and invested in. Primakov is a man who with his life time of experiences in the region, had the best authority to write a book of this nature. He tells his side of the story as he saw it as an envoy of Moscow during the height of the Cold War.
Though it does come across auto-biographical at times, Primakov does not insert himself into events excessively none of the of the events are about himself. Instead he reports more as a journalist with a touch of historian’s pen. Perhaps this is the influence of his early PRAVDA days which saw him spending much of his formative years in the region. This also may disassociate himself with moments and policies that with retrospect seem less flattering. So, as a reporter riding the currents of history, Primakov allows himself a pass in his prose. Much of the lacking is likely due to a degree of decided redaction, which certainly harms this book as a comprehensive source.
The most interesting aspects of the book were in the earlier chapters which covered Arab nationalism. It addressed the often-claimed depiction of a powerful Moscow controlling and manipulating Arab regimes. This is the common theme when one reads contemporary pages and many general pieces on the era and region, that many of the Arab states were obedient and dependent proxies of Moscow. Primakov contradicts this message, especially regarding Nasser of Egypt who was not as socialist as he was painted, nor was he in Moscow’s favour as the Anglo-American view tainted him. He was after all an Arab nationalist.
Primakov explains how Nasser helped to inspire other Arab leaders to imitate and institute their own form of nationalist government as best as they could, incompetence., corruption and other loyalties withstanding. Despite the world of that time being clumsily divided into two apparent ideological camps, the Middle East was a tapestry of shades that never satisfied Moscow. Primakov details how often Arab leaders embraced Moscow and the East Bloc only once they had been scorned, betrayed and misused by the West thus leading them to seek support or aid from the Soviet Union. No doubt convenient for both parties.
Even though this book is written from an Arab and Russian perspective it does not attack Israel or the West with any serious fixation. This is likely also due to the period when the book was written and is in some way self-serving. Primakov points out the faults and flaws found within the relationship of the USSR and its Arab friends. As well as the clumsiness and arrogance of both during moments of crisis and peace, where wiser alternatives could have been sought. It suggests that the Israelis were often over confident and aggressively arrogant, the PLO and its leadership are granted a far too kind praise at times. And the American’s always leading the dance that the Russians are struggling to keep up with, much of Soviet foreign policy was a reaction.
The most interesting aspects of the book are from the conflict among the Russians themselves, the uncertainty of Soviet policy abroad is touched upon often in the book. It shows that those in the Kremlin were not in control and could at best respond to events that their allies or others initiated. Though the Soviet Union seemed strong it was struggling to maintain control from within itself, let alone across the globe. Because of these hints from the inside can inspire ones interest from the decayed reality of the Soviet Union, Andrew Cockburn’s “The Threat” would be a complimentary read to help dispel the depiction of the Soviet Empire as the malicious pariah as it was considered.
The book ‘feels’ as though It provides a balanced depiction of events. Though that is the seduction of the writing style of Primakov and what he has no doubt omitted from his book. The book should be considered as a Pro Russian read, that does not mean it is an antithesis of the West either. It just attempts to inject balance into an imbalanced narrative of a certain period. The book was written around 2005 and came at a time when Russian-Western relations were less than chilled. The Bush regime and its war in Iraq are discussed towards the end and the projections Primakov make are with historical retrospect wrong.
With the above in mind I would advise anyone interested in contemporary history or Middle Eastern politics to read this book. It most certainly provides a balance to many trendier books which seem to emerge after each event that befalls the Middle East or that seek to praise the major power that fights to master the region. It is not perfect and should not be read as a one stop read, perhaps Robert Fisk’s “The Great War for Civilisation” written around the same time is a far better book. But this is something that can be read as a compliment to more generic (ie Pro West) books.


78 %

[Gordan Karlic]

Must get me some more of this.
And what this is you might ask?
Russian view on the world.
In this case, their relationship with several Araps states in the Middle East.
You learn a lot, because it gives you a perspective you didn't have, and you learn a lot of new information because Russians had different intel then Western powers.
I knew the Middle East is complicated even before this book, but the complicated situation feels even more complicated when you see just how many choices, players and options every single player has in the Great game called politics.
Loved it from the start to the finish, great stuff, I just swallowed this book.
Deserving rate 5.

[Ali Ziraoui]

بعد الضرب صفحا عن حديث الكاتب عن الشرق الأوسط قبل منعطف الربيع العربي أثارني تناوله لهذا المنعطف وهي رئيس الزرراء الروسي الأسبق و وزوزير خارجيتها و مير مخابراتها حيث بين الصبغة المفاجأة عن جميع المحللين و صناع القرار اللذين يزعمون إلمامهم و سيطرتهم تباعا على الأوضاع
كما بين طبيعة هذا التحول باعتباره عفويا يهدف لغصلاحات ديمقراطية و مطالب إنسانية من حرية و عدالة و كرامة بما لا يمكّن أي طرف من اتهامه بتلك التهم الجاهزة المتمحورة حول التطرف
و في الأخير تحفظ عن التنبؤ بمستقبله علما أنه ألف قبل الربيع العربي في طبعته الأولى أما طبعته الأخيرة فقد سبقت الالتفاف على الربيع العربي المصري بواسطة الانقلاب السيسوي و لعل موجة ثالثة ستعدل الأوضاع في دول الربيع العربي و تنقل الأوضاع في دول التي تنتظر دورها على غرار دول الخليج ستسبق الطبعة الموالية من هذا الكتاب الهام

[Wathiq Mohammed]

موسوعة تاريخية وسياسية مهمة لإحداث الشرق الأوسط في نصف القرن الأخير

[Simon Wood]

RUSSIA AND THE ARABS

Yevgeny Primakov started out as a journalist for the Soviet News Agency combining the job with a variety of roles for the Soviet equivalent of the Foreign Office. He rose to become head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service then Foreign Minister as well as a stab at being Prime Minister of Russia. His book (written in 2005/6 and only recently translated) on the relationship between Russia, in its Soviet and post-Soviet guises, and the Arab States of the Middle East was one that I found distinctly under whelming.

Anyone who has read a reasonable amount of post WW2 Middle East history will find nothing in the way of revelations or in fact anything greatly surprising. Those parts of the book that relate to Primakov's personal experiences in the Middle East, which president of the Nixon centre Dimitri K. Simes describes in the back cover blurb as reading "like a Spy Thriller" are decidedly run of the mill. The only parts of the book that were new for this reader were the elements that covered debates back in the Soviet Union and the nature of those is hardly unexpected.

One thing is clear from the book, that the Soviet government - certainly outside Eastern Europe - was a conservative power, endlessly and timidly reactive and unlikely to ever seriously rock the boat for a good cause. Their influence on the Communist parties and radicals of the Middle East can be likened to the role of a rod of graphite in a nuclear reactor. This is not to say that Primakov is a fool or unpleasant in any way, indeed much of the Soviet approach to the issues of the Middle East which he was continuously involved in was a good deal more constructive than that of the United States. His quite reasonable view on the stalled Middle East peace processes is that the blame primarily, but not entirely, lies with Israel and its super-power patron. The only thing strange about such an assessment is that some people do find it strange.

Primakov's readings of many Arab figures could come from the pen of any number of standard issue western diplomats, especially his generally hagiographic account of King Hussein of Jordan though he does cheekily hint that the Kings policy was essentially to prevent his own goose from being cooked. The Israelis, unsurprisingly, are effortlessly arrogant with the odd exception of Netenyahu. With Arafat he is too kind about his competence, but his reading of the peace process of the 1990's and the 2nd Intifada is more reasonable than one would expect from our Western diplomat, though the optimism he displays with regard to Bush's road map from the vantage point of 4 or so years ago has to be regarded as grotesquely misplaced.

For anyone nursing delusions about the endless machinations of the Soviets "Evil Empire" at one end of the spectrum, or about it being a radical socialist influence in the 3rd world at the other end, might be well advised to have a read of this book. For anyone else with a knowledge of the region they will get a competent history of the era with a Russian slant. I was left wondering, giving the enthusiastic blurb on the back of the book from the likes of Henry Kissinger, Madeline Albright and Brent Scowcroft, whether there is not some sort of "International Freemasonry of Top Diplomats" who at the tweak of a trouser leg will not close ranks and scribble a favourable few sentences for one of their own?

Borrow from the library by all means, but I wouldn't advise shelling out for it (A Russophile friend lent me his copy). If you're interested in finding out about post WW2 Middle East diplomacy you would better off consulting Avi Shlaims monumental synthesis "The Iron Wall" which concentrates on the interaction between Israel and the Arabs, but also covers the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Mehmet Koç]

A great book on the relations of the USSR/Russia with the Middle East nations (mainly Muslim Arabs, but also Jews, Christians and Kurds)by Primakov, former Russian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (also one of the best Russian experts on the region). Primakov explains the tumultuous history of the region since the end of the WWII mainly based on his own memories as a "Pravda correspondent". Primakov had personally met, as officially instructed by the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party, with nearly all then Middle Eastern leaders such as Nasser, Sadat, Mobarak, Begin, Peres, Dayan, Meir, Jumblatt, Saddam, Barzani, Assad, King Hussein... as a "correspondent". Soviet leadership's diplomatic practices to convey critical messages to the leaders as sending a correspondent-expert instead of diplomats was also interesting for me.

After finishing the book, readers easily conclude that the Russians have far better understood and evaluated the Middle East and the Arab world rather than the Americans...

[Rhesa]

Just bought this book, from the first 2 chapters I read, it seems that the author [an accomplished & senior chief strategist of former Soviet Union foreign intelligence department:] tries to portray Russia as innocent party in the Arab-West affairs. He said that the involvement of Russia with Middle East countries, especially Egypt during Nasser's reign was because USA, UK & France failed him, then Egypt turned to Russia. This book is not a systematic historical work, it is more of a personal note from the author of Russia's engagement with the Middle east for the last 40 years as well as his social commentary regarding major events in modern Middle East history. It provides a Russian view of a little bit of everything and therefore stimulates curiosity, bit expensive though [Rp.390,000:].

[Jacob Aitken]

Yevgeny Primakov, formerly head of Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, and former Prime Minister of Russia, has written his own memoirs. The book reflects 30 years of diplomatic service from one of the world’s most respected statesman. Always serene and mature in his analysis, Primakov has correctly diagnosed the problems in Middle Eastern and American diplomatic policies..
Many neo-conservatives and American patriots think that the Soviet Union simply desired to export (and force down) its own version of socialist revolution upon unwilling countries. While this was true in Eastern and Central Europe, nothing of the sort happened in the Middle East, at least not for the long term. The United States and the Soviet Union found the post-World War II Middle East rife with young nationalist movements. At first the Middle Eastern governments were committed to a form of Arab socialism. However, this form of Arab socialism had little in common with the socialism of the USSR, and while some Communist parties in the Middle East held tenaciously to power, the Arab mindset was not given to international socialism. Therefore, and this is a key point Primakov makes, the USSR did not force Communism onto the Middle East. Primakov writes, “The Soviet Union understood that it was impossible to bring about sociopolitical change in another country via an imported revolution. It had to happen from within, when the time was ripe” (92).

The United States’ original objective was to draw the Arab nations into an anti-Moscow alliance. This meant allying itself with radical Arab groups (the fateful foreshadowing should not be missed). In any case, neither the Soviet Union nor Soviet America was able to accomplish its primary goal.

It would be simplistic to say that the USSR threw all of its support behind Arab states and America supported Israel. True, the USSR had good relations with most Arab states and Tel Aviv called the shots on American foreign policy. But Moscow let Arab states know they could not act with impunity and keep expecting Russian military expertise and arms shipments (Sadaam Hussein never learned this lesson).

Nevertheless, both the USA and the USSR did act accordingly to one objective: prevent the Middle East from flaring up, with the larger geographic instability ensuing. Moscow (and less often America) would take a hard line with her allies if they threatened Middle Eastern peace. This is political realism.

Many will fault Primakov’s narrative at this point. Primakov tells the story that the USSR did all that it could to foster Middle Eastern peace while Israel did all it could to hinder it. Perhaps he is myopic on this point, but Israel’s actions have been coming under more scrutiny. Primakov has a very revealing chapter documenting Israel’s illegal nuclear arms ambitions.

There are also moving chapters giving insight into the lives of Yasser Arafat and others.


Criticisms of the Book

Many will probably fault Primakov of stacking the deck. The Soviet Union’s Middle Eastern policy can do no wrong while the US keeps bungling it. While the latter is certainly true, many in the West will blanche at this rosy picture of the USSR. While perhaps flawed on some points, Primakov does highlight an important issue: for twenty years Americans have been cheering themselves as the sacred guardians of the free world and anyone who questions that narrative is a liberal, communist, hates the troops, or an Islamomeanie. The dialectical irony is Americans have done the same thing with ideology that the Soviets did. In fact, it’s worse. Trotsky was rejected on this point. The D.C. Establishment has surpassed even Stalin on this point! There is a reason that neo-conservatives are said to be the heirs of Trotksy: Trotksy wanted to import revolution to all countries, whether they were ready for it or not (with the subsequent goal of destroying national boundaries and traditional cultures); neo-conservatives want to spread neocon ideology to all countries (e.g., globalism, the dominance of Western corporations and markets, “democracy,” relativising traditional society). The dialectic has come full-circle. The D.C. Regime is the new Soviet Union.

Primakov has a provocative, if at times flawed chapter on Islam. Careful thinking is required here, and I think Primakov rushed his thinking. Primakov identifies Samuel Huntingdon’s thesis (to which the current reviewer subscribes) positing an ultimate clash between Western civilization and Islamic civilization. At this point, instead of engaging Huntingdon’s thesis, Primakov ridicules those provincial people who think all Arabs are Muslims are terrorists. Presumably, these people think that the coming clash should be an armed clash and the sooner the better. But is this what Huntingdon really believes? Even more, is Primakov’s own views of Islam that different?
Perhaps Huntingdon can be faulted with an ambiguous use of the term “clash.” More importantly, why did Huntingdon posit there would be a clash? He said this because Islam’s values are inherently at odds with the post-Christian West’s secular values. Ironically, Primakov, too, identifies democracy as incompatible with Islam (or consistent Judaism or Christianity). Indeed, this is the key to Primakov’s critique of the US importing Western democracy on Iraq!

Conclusion

The book is an interesting glimpse inside the life of a key player for peace in a troubled area. The book is written in a memoir-like style and occasionally suffers from those defects. But that also makes it the readable and interesting book that it is. Primakov tells a story that is different from the Official Narrative of the Ministry of Truth.

[Çağatay Boz]

Yevgeny Primakov, that name speaks for itself.

Unbiased piece of work from an author who has actually been on the field during the events which are in the book. Not to despise the other academic works from various authors but I'm deeply into that sort of style. Just like Gates' From the Shadows, you know you are reading personal experiences which made the history as we know it.

This book nearly covers everything that has been related to Middle East, ranging from the start of the Cold War and today, Soviet Union and Russia. If you're into Middle East, it is a must-read for you since a book that's not very American-centric is highly rare and that is not one of them.

[Michael Lundgren]

I blazed through this one for class, it's a good book and a must if you want to understand Russia's relations with the Middle East. Yevgeny Primakov was the former head of National Intelligence and no one knew the players better or interacted with them more than he did in the Middle East.

[Karl]

Very insightful book as to the Soviet Union and Russia's Middle Eastern policy. A must read for any geopolitical enthusiast.

[Pieter]

Most interesting book on one of the most crucial areas from a geopolitical point of view. Many US and European authors have written the 20th century the Middle East story from a Western point of view. But is helpful to understand Russian's opinion too. Who better than a foreign minister like Mr Primakov to do the job?

Apparently, Soviet Union never believed Arab communism strong enough to cause a revolution. Therefore, it supported Arab nationalist regimes like Egypt, Syria and Iraq. This was a reaction to the support US and Great Britain gave to the old-time Arab monarchies. A few decades later, US decided to support islam fundamentalism to counterattack Arab secular regimes. Islamic State and Al-Qaida are living proof of US its failed foreign policy in the Middle East.

It was enlightening to read how the Russians were involved during the Suez War, the Six Days War, the peace talks between Israel and Egypt and which countries (France, US) helped Israel on the nuclear bomb. A must-read!

[Rob Prince]

During the years of the USSR, I tried to follow Soviet Middle Eastern policy. Always found Primakov a cut or three above the others. Now he's writing memoirs...Controlled, critical writing as in the past with new insights; Not surprisingly,he is quite critical of certain aspects of Soviet Middle Eastern policy...(which was, on the whole - minus the Afghanistan debacle - much more principled than U.S. policy)

Many pearls here - how the U.S. mistook Arab Nationalism for Communism (they always got that one wrong)... a very decent mostly supportive but critical evaluation of Nasser (especially the conditions leading up to the 1967 War)

Much more.

[Anders Widebrant]

This is not the book to read if you're looking for an in-depth well-sourced analysis of the relationship between Russia and the Middle East, but Primakov's historical account as seen with Russian eyes is very interesting, in particular providing a lot of texture from someone who really was in the room negotiating with the defining leaders in the region. The book is also full of excellent dishy asides about unacknowledged or botched intelligence operations.

[Kevin Kizer]

Great, informative read on the situation in the Middle East by one of the prime players on the Russian side. Quite enlightening. I'm always a bit skeptical of "history from one side" but Primakov comes across as relatively objective.

[Richard R]

Honest Perspective

The author did his best to explain the critical issues facing the Arab region. The book she'd light on a great many of the problems that the United States policy has had on our world.

[Roderigo]

Interesting viewpoint on how the Russian's saw the Arab states. worth a read if Interested in the region's politics and history. Heads up, it's written by an high ranking ex Soviet comrade, and needs to be viewed In that light.

[Dan]

A very interesting take on politics in the Middle East over the past 50-60 years. I just wish it had talked more about Russia.