I suppose it’s a bit timely that I am writing this review in wake of the disastrous scenes coming from the Americans' unfortunate, incompetently conducted, withdrawal from Afghanistan. Timely as one of the salient moral lessons of Paul Strathern’s work in this book is to caution the West in delving into situations it doesn’t remotely understand.
Napoleon in Egypt, by Paul Strathern, is a well written, if slower paced, chronicle of the young General Bonaparte’s vision of creating an Alexandrian type Eastern Empire. An Empire that the young Corsican envisioned would be a material, and spiritual, counterpoint to the commercial, mercantilist, technocratic Empires of Europe, and an especial counterpoint to his own nemesis the British. Far more than a work of military history, this is more of a cultural history than it is a study of the French operations and battles in Egypt and the Levant.
Despite, or because of, his fame and renown won in his brilliant campaign in Italy which helped end the War of the First Coalition, the Directory in Paris had grown wary and suspicious of the ambitious young General Napoleon Bonaparte. With boundless ambitions, and a penchant for irritating his political masters with constant grand strategic visions and ideas (not to mention the occasional advice given freely on political and cultural matters, despite never once being asked), General Bonaparte had become a bit of a burden in times of peace.
Seeking a means, any means, to get him off of their hands, the Directory jumped at the chance to send Napoleon, and a sizeable armed force, as far away from Paris as they were liable to throw him. Napoleon had delivered to the Directory his vision for a French conquest of Egypt, and the opening of a trade route through Suez (the idea for the Suez Canal was not native to the British, and significantly predated the actual construction of the Canal), which would strategically outflank British positions in India and the Far East. Seeing as how this was already a French strategic imperative, long predating the Revolution, just too expensive and logistically risky to undertake, the Directory, seeing their chance to be rid of Napoleon (possibly permanently), jumped at it.
As Strathern points out, however, Napoleon’s vision was not merely a strategic, economic, vision. Strathern details how Napoleon linked his expedition closely with the Institute of France (basically an intellectual think tank, though one which more akin to an ancient school of philosophy and esoterica than a modern, materialistic, think tank), and the brilliant Savants therein. Napoleon dreamed of an Empire of the East, akin to that of Alexander the Great. And like the great Maceonian, Napoleon envisioned an Empire that would be a model to the world. An Empire that would mould together the best ideals and virtues of both the East and the West, and be a template for a new, global, unification of humanity.
Not totally ignorant of what he was marching into, Napoleon instructed his Staff, chief subordinates, and his men, to be respectful of Islam, passed out copies of the Quran to be studied and even himself expressed the, albeit cynical, desire to convert to Islam in order to better lead a vast Eastern Army of global conquest (of course, he also mentioned rewriting the Quran for his own needs, and it should be mentioned that he eventually threw out this view, and upon contact with Eastern Orthodox Christians, began to take on a much more nuanced approach of what the East, and religion, really was). It should be mentioned, too, that Napoleon and the Institute had visions of discovering the truth of the ancient past.
Modern Egyptology is a byproduct of Napoleon’s ambitions, and he himself absolutely did have a hand in its creation. As Strathern shows in this book, Napoleon was far more than a one dimensional warlord or military genius. Napoleon was very much a restless genius, and despite being a soldier’s soldier, and a man’s man, was far more comfortable in the company of intellectuals, mystics, philosophers, artists, writers, even priests (Catholic, Orthodox, just not Protestants, as Napoleon very much found Protestantism to be a laughable religion), Imams and rabbis. This, of course, created tensions with his own Staff and command hierarchy, as some saw him as simply too strange, too odd of a bird, to be of any real use. As such, Napoleon entertained the more fringe ideas of some of the intellectuals of the time that Egypt was one of the pillars of an ancient, united, human empire, one that was mentioned in the tale of Atlantis and the ancient Greek philosophers.
Therefore, in Napoleon’s mind, the esoteric needs of the expedition were equally as important as were the strategic and military ones.
Strathern spends a considerable amount of time detailing Napoleon’s fascination with esoterica and the pursuits of the intellect, as it lays the foundation for the young General’s overall strategy for the entire campaign. Even the first stop, the seizure of the island of Malta, and the final overthrow of the Knights of Saint John as the rulers of the island, had considerable esoteric significance for the young Bonaparte. Malta, although strategically a necessity for the French Navy’s ability to logistically supply the expedition, and to keep open lines of communication with France, was also a means by which Napoleon could justify his endeavor as a quasi-Crusade in the name of a higher, enlightened, human Imperial ideal. (After his rapid takeover of the island despite brief resistance, Napoleon spent just as much time going through the Knight’s archives for esoteric information as he did organizing the logistics of the expedition's next steps).
From Malta, the French expedition sailed to Egypt.
Egypt was ruled by the Mamelukes, Georgian slaves, forcibly converted to Islam, who became fierce warriors, and who had taken over Egypt’s governance quite some time before. However, even the Mamelukes ruled at the behest of the blessing of Islam. Despite Murad Bey, the Mameluke ruler, being himself a rather debauched old man, the native Egyptians found the French to be repulsively hedonistic and degenerate.
And, in large part, this is the crux of Strathern’s work in this book.
The clash of civilizations, which had been ongoing since the dawn of Islam in the Seventh Century AD, would take a new turn with the advent of Napoleon’s invasion, and experiment with an Alexandrian Imperial vision. At first it seemed as though it would all be a foregone conclusion.
Alexandria was seized rapidly, and the French Fleet setup anchor there, and after establishing both a governing body and an esoteric exploratory body there, (the latter always an importance in Napoleon’s mind), the French made a rapid inland march towards Cairo, skirmishing with the Mamelukes, and local Bedouins, along the way. (A tragicomic side note, the alien nature of each civilization to each other was when a French patrol rescued several French who had been taken prisoner by the Bedouins in one of these numerous, small, skirmishes. The French men had been raped (yes, raped) by the Bedouins, and Napoleon himself did the men’s pride no favors by laughing hysterically and telling them it would serve as a good reminder to not stray from the main column...and then ordered the Bedouin skirmishers hunted down and exterminated, which they were).
As the French neared Cairo, their logistics being badly strained by the overland march, they faced the concentrating Mamelukes who offered battle at a place outside Giza, which is known to posterity as The Battle of the Pyramids. For all their martial grandeur, and glorious accoutrement, and genuine fierceness on the charge, the Mamelukes were no match for French discipline, training, tactics, and modern firepower. The French were formed up in massive open square formations, with artillery forming the corners of the squares. Each square was linked with the other to form interlocking fields of fire, and Mameluke attempts to ride around one square, meant they were blasted from all sides by the others. No French square broke, and the Mamelukes were cut to pieces. French cavalry, sheltering in the center of the massive squares, then rode out and finished the rout of the Mamelukes. At a stroke, much like with the Ancien Regime back home, the French Revolutionary soldiers had upended the ancient order within Egypt.
The Mamelukes, though not destroyed here, would never again hold chief political power in Egypt. Their mismatched defeat (the French would suffer barely 300 casualties while the Mamelukes would be massacred, losing between 10-20,000 men, sources vary) would upend everything on a truly regional basis. However, seizing Cairo would not bring the French the order that they sought.
Partly, this was because, technically, despite Mameluke control, Egypt was an Ottoman possession, and the Ottoman’s weren’t as of yet a part of the French Revolutionary conflict. As such, not only the French, but also the Russians and the British plied a considerable amount of diplomatic power to coerce the Ottoman’s to choose a side. It would be the British, as was typical in this period, who won out, and the Ottoman’s weren’t exactly too keen on the French traipsing around what they still considered their domain.
For his part, Napoleon went to work in Cairo with a will. He bent over backwards to ingratiate himself with the Muslim clerics, being initially slightly confused by the Greek Orthodox presence although he adapted rapidly, even placing several Orthodox clergy in the ranks of his Institute headquartered in Alexandria. However, despite all of his efforts, Napoleon simply failed to count on the rabid xenophobia of the native population, and how no matter what wonders of modern technology the French could offer, their own wretched social views (at least to Muslim eyes, especially vis a vis French attitudes towards women) ensured that, eventually, tensions would boil over.
This is where the book really slows down, Strathern isn’t a military historian, and clearly his interest is far more attuned towards social and cultural history. This is fairly interesting, and it certainly highlights the impossibility of Napoleon’s grand vision, (unless he was willing to slaughter all of the natives and go to the effort of migratory mass replacement...which he did, a couple of times, comment on in frustration), however, Strathern can, and does, belabor the point and the narrative in the middle third of the book really slows down.
There are some interesting bits in here, though. Napoleon’s quest for evidence of the ancient, global, human civilization does bear some fruit with the beginning of the excavation of the Sphinx, his own personal explorations into the Great Pyramid (J. Christopher Herold’s book on the same topic relates how Napoleon was very shaken by what he witnessed, and he wouldn’t discuss it with anyone, talk about tantalizing!), and the beginning of the attempt to unravel the Rosetta Stone, as well as studying what archival evidence the Orthodox and the Muslims had salvaged over the many generations.
It should also be pointed out that Strathern is highly condescending towards religious faith, especially Christianity, though he doesn’t let Islam off the hook, either. His constant and consistent sniping at religion, and his snide remarks vis a vis Orthodox clergy in particular, and Napoleon’s own curiosity towards religion and his discussions with Imams and Orthodox Priests, grows old very rapidly. To the point where it’s simply not professional and unbecoming of someone attempting to produce a work of historical veracity.
Despite this, he does a good job of highlighting how the French secularist views clashed so strongly with the Egyptians Islamic views, that an explosion was inevitable.
A great revolt broke out in Cairo, and spread to outlying communities when the Ottoman Porte made the call for Jihad against the Christians (never minding that the French weren’t themselves any longer Christian, despite Napoleon’s persistent religio curiosity and inquiries). However, this revolt didn’t turn out so well for the revoltees, who were brutally crushed, and most of the survivors who were captured were executed.
Possibly Napoleon’s strong reaction was either a form of common sense when faced with a hostile population, or it was frustration at the news that the British, under Horatio Nelson, had sailed their Royal Navy, after finally hunting down where the French Navy had gone off to, and blew it to smithereens in the Battle of the Nile. Now, stranded, with barely 30,000 men to control an unruly, alien, populace with alien ideals and values, as well as fearing an imminent Ottoman and possibly joint Ottoman/British/Russian drive against him, Napoleon began to act far more severely.
Fearing having to face an overwhelming Ottoman response, Napoleon gambled on invading Palestine, to force the Ottoman’s onto the defensive, and to further his quest for esoteric knowledge of ancient history. This is one of the more disappointing sections of the book. Strathern tends to breeze through the events in Palestine, though he does cover the siege of Acre well enough. Napoleon is defeated at Acre (though he does win an astonishing against the odds victory against a large Muslim force coming to take him in the rear at the Battle of Mount Tabor), and withdraws back into Egypt wherein he receives news that the Directory has recalled him back to France, and practically pleads with him to restore the military situation as the War of the Second Coalition has broken out.
Partly due to Napoleon’s Middle Eastern adventure, the outbreak of the Second Coalition catches the French off guard, and the initial offensives in the Rhineland, and in Northern Italy go splendidly for the Austrian and Russian forces, who sweep all before them. The end of Napoleon’s tale in Egypt is somewhat anticlimactic. Napoleon, ever the soul of pragmatism, realizes his dream of an Alexandrian Empire is doomed, and so he makes preparations to leave, albeit without informing everyone that he is doing so.
It is perhaps the only clear cut case of inexcusable cowardice in the man's life, and it condemns thousands of French to imprisonment, and not a few are murdered by vengeful Muslims before the British and the Russians can arrange for them to be exchanged. Napoleon’s flight from Egypt is eerily reminiscent of the sudden, poorly planned, American withdrawal from Afghanistan just a few days prior to writing this.
And that is probably why this book should stand as a necessary reading for anyone interested in getting involved in foreign affairs. This book is a warning, chocked full of them, in fact, against blindly jumping into an alien culture and assuming that you can change them with the force of progress. Perhaps Napoleon’s own quest for an ancient, objective, truth that he hoped to find in the material world, brought him into close enough contact with those of the spiritual world that he realized the futility of the nature of his quest. After all, his first act as First Consul (after a coup which launches against the Directory a very short time after returning to France) is to cease the Revolution’s persecution of Christians and to allow freedom for all religions within France.
This book is full of items of interest that force one to ponder what one has read, and it really is an engine for motivating deep thought. It is somewhat light on the military details, though Strathern does a decent enough job of covering them, and his writing style is not overly dry as to rob what is a truly epic event of it’s genuine grandeur and drama. One major criticism to level at the author is his delving into psychoanalysis of Napoleon.
Historical psychoanalysis was an academic fad in the late 90’s and has carried over to the current day though, thankfully, it seems to be waning. It is monumental intellectual hubris to attempt to psychoanalyze an historical figure who is a product of a different age, culture, and all the character that that entails in comparison to a modern evaluating them. It’s honestly silly when authors partake in it, and I found myself skipping those sections where Strathern attempts to pick apart Napoleon’s psyche.
Beyond that, however, this was a fascinating read, if overly dull in the long middle section, and it serves as a useful warning on why the West’s attempt to force modern, progressive ideals on the ancient East will never, ever, truly succeed.
Highly recommended.