Spinoza avait raison: Joie et tristesse, le cerveau des émotions

by Antonio R. Damasio

Descartes a instauré la grande coupure entre le corps et l’esprit. à la même époque, Spinoza, les a réunis et, surtout, a su voir dans les émotions le fondement même de la survie et de la culture humaines. D’où ce voyage accompli par un scientifique pionnier afin de redécouvrir le génie visionnaire de l’Éthique. Car c’est Spinoza qui préfigure le mieux ce que doit être pour Antonio R. Damasio la neurobiologie moderne de l’émotion, du sentiment et du comportement social. Elle fournit aussi les concepts et les perspectives nécessaires au progrès de notre connaissance de nous-mêmes.

« Un exercice intellectuel brillant, mais aussi une méditation sur la recherche du bonheur et d’une vie meilleure. Une tentative unique en son genre pour examiner en termes philosophiques les connaissances neurobiologiques les plus à la pointe. » Jean-Pierre Changeux.

Antonio R. Damasio est professeur et directeur du département de neurologie de l’Université de l’Iowa. Il est également professeur adjoint au Salk Institute de La Jolla. Il a déjà publié L’Erreur de Descartes, La Raison des émotions et Le Sentiment même de soi. Corps, émotions, conscience.

Genres: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Neuroscience, Nonfiction, History, Brain

370 pages, Paperback

First published October 1, 2001

Reviews

[Stephen · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is, by turns, interesting and frustrating. Damasio knows his stuff when it comes to the details of neuroscience (which is to be expected because this is his field) and the details he supplies are fascinating. However, he overreaches himself when he tries to fit all these separate details into his one-size-fits-all model of how emotions and feelings interact together in a living brain; everything becomes ‘evidence’ for his overarching theory. Just because we have the one word ‘feelings’ does not necessarily mean that joy, sorrow, envy, hate, happiness and the like all work the same way or have the same origins. Also he is often unclear as to whether the processes he describes are operating at a conscious or unconscious level. Then at one point in the book he almost implies that cells themselves are conscious. When it comes to evolution he again takes things too far with the equivalent of ‘just so’ stories to describe how emotions and feelings arose.

The parallel thread in the book concerns the seventeenth century Dutch philosopher Spinoza. Many interesting and fascinating details of his life and work are presented, but Damasio again tries to shoehorn these ideas into his own overblown model of brain function. Spinoza’s thoughts are fascinating but of course he knew nothing of neurobiology, his ideas need to be understood in relation to his own time, in context with the philosophers that came before him and those writing alongside him.

Overall, the book’s language is also rather dense and too flowery. On the whole, if you have time to spare, you will find some interesting facts here, both about how the brain works and about Spinoza. However, be prepared to wade through pages of overblown pet theories that the evidence just doesn’t support. You may well find the same information more clearly presented elsewhere.

[Jon Stout · Rating 4 out of 5]

Inspired by Descartes' Error, and interested in a neurologist's interest in philosophers, I sought out Looking for Spinoza. It rewarded me in several ways, first by extending my understanding of how emotions as a biological concept are continuous with feelings as a conscious, mental phenomenon, and second by providing a guided, personal investigation into the life of Bento-Baruch-Benedict Spinoza.

Damasio has a lot to say about emotions and the structure of the brain, some of it exhaustingly detailed. But the key area for me was in matching what I might introspectively think and feel, with Damasio's experimentally substantiated knowledge of the routes through the neural pathways that electrical and chemical signals follow.

One example would lie in Damasio's distinction between emotions and feelings, which I had previously taken to be roughly synonomous. Damasio says that emotions are instinctual reactions that all animals have as a way of coping with environmental stimuli. They are not necessarily conscious. But feelings, according to Damasio, are our conscious perceptions of our bodily states as we are having emotions. Thus a worm can react with alarm, but we conscious beings feel our bodies change when we are alarmed, and we can be alerted to consider why we are alarmed and what we want to do about it.

The less theoretical and more personally appealing part of the book is Damasio's personal quest to trace out the life of Spinoza, whose philosophy, Damasio believes, anticipates many of his own findings and conclusions. I love Damasio's drive to fit his scientific work into a philosophical overview, which is both theoretical and personal.

Damasio is originally Portuguese, and I can't help feeling that he is driven in part by a sense of kinship with a man who might have shared some of his cultural experiences, albeit separated by centuries. Much of the research on Spinoza is in Portuguese, showing some intensive effort. Spinoza was a Portuguese Jew whose family fled the inquisition for a relatively tolerant Holland.

There Spinoza participated in the Jewish community, but eventually was alienated from it, because he had attained views of his own, characteristic of the Enlightenment. Thus he moved from the Portuguese "Bento" to the Hebrew "Baruch" to the Latin "Benedictus" (all meaning "blessed", like "Barack" from Swahili and Arabic, I can't help adding).

Spinoza's odyssey is inspiring, as is Damasio's obvious admiration of it, and his own efforts to model his own life as a scientist on a comparable philosophical framework. As I get older (smile), I love it when science and philosophy get personal.

[Dragos C Butuzea · Rating 4 out of 5]

pe lângă alte osho, mosho şi alte cărţi de pseudo-ştiinţă, iniţiere şi de auto-cunoaştere de care vai! pute piaţa de carte, rareori găseşti cărţi de popularizare a ştiinţei aparţinând unor oameni de ştiinţă. oameni de ştiinţă onorabili, cu diplome şi catedre universitare - adevărat, nedeţinători de Adevăruri supreme, ci de mici concluzii de bun-simţ, obţinute pe baza unor cercetări laborioase de ani de zile.

să nu mă credeţi ştiinţofil şi filozofob, însă aşa m-am săturat de autori ageamii, că nu mai ştiu ce să fac. mi-aduc mereu aminte de tânărul eliade fascinat de marii iniţiaţi ai lui schuré, şi de stupoarea sa când a aflat că respectivul e doar un poet amărât.

în primul rând, cartea e scrisă bine, în 2 părţi - una ştiinţifică şi una de filozofie a ştiinţei (povestea lui baruch spinoza, filozoful obscur în viaţă, celebru după moarte, autorul eticii şi a tratatului teologico-politic). autorul îl aminteşte pe spinoza pentru că găseşte în scrierile filozofului afirmări ale concluziilor sale (de exemplu, în propoziţia 17 din partea a 4 din etica găseşte imperativul autoconservării).

teoria lui damasio desparte emoţiile de sentimente. el afirmă didactic că emoţiile apar primele, în urma stimulilor (apţi emoţional) care urmăresc să păstreze echilibrul homeostatic al organismului. aceste emoţii sunt apoi "executate" de anumite zone cerebrale (hipotalamusul, prozencefalul bazal, anumiţi muşchi din trunchiul cerebral) prin eliminarea unor molecule care modifică starea organismului (destinderea muşchilor feţei - dezgust, contracţia muşchilor feţei - frică etc.).

ei bine, toate aceste modificări alcătuiesc mai departe o hartă neurală care ajunge la alte zone cerebrale (insula), responsabilă, mai departe, de sentimente: echilibrul organismului, de exemplu, produce harta plăcerii. cu alte cuvinte, starea internă a organismului contribuie la sentimentele umane. evident că la sentimente mai contribuie şi alte elemente - tiparele mentale, imaginile.
mai departe, starea internă a organismului (semnalizată de emoţii) poate fi susţinută artificial (prin droguri) sau patologic (prin medicamente).

sentimentele sunt manifestări mentale ale echilibrului şi armoniei, ale dizarmoniei şi conflictului. (p.134)

urmează apoi ipoteza markerului somatic ce spune că în raţionamente / luare decizii, intervine întotdeauna semnalul emoţional de "bun sau rău", ce întăreşte sau goneşte decizia. el spune că intuiţia reprezintă contribuţia biologicului în raţionament.

în alt capitol, antonio damasio explică rolul emoţiilor sociale (simpatia, recunoştinţa, ruşinea, invidia etc.) în crearea civilizaţiei, a eticii şi religiei. e interesantă această abordare nouă - "biologică" - a eticii.

deşi perspectiva cărţii e una exclusiv biologică, se cuvine să salutăm excursul etic al autorului, referitor la o viaţă plină de bucurie pe care trebuie s-o trăim cu ceilalţi oameni în acord cu evitarea suferinţei şi cu îmbunătăţirea regulilor sociale.

definiţia conştiinţei (apropo de poliţist, adjectiv):
conştiinţa = procesul prin care o minte e impregnată de un referent pe care îl numim eu şi află despre propria ei existenţă şi despre existenţa obiectelor din jur. (p.175)

ştiaţi că viermele are 302 neuroni, albina, 95 000 iar omul are câteva miliarde?

http://chestiilivresti.blogspot.ro/

[Melinda Olivas · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found the book “Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain” by Antonio Damasio an interesting look at the relationship between emotions, feelings, and the brain. I enjoyed reading about Damasio’s almost obsession-like fascination with the philosopher Spinoza. Damasio found Spinoza’s beliefs about feelings, passions, and emotions influential and relevant to his work as a neurologist. I also enjoyed that Damasio included a bit of philosophical flavor throughout the whole of this book.
As a current doctoral student in clinical psychology, I found Damasio’s unique perspective on emotions and feelings interesting, though debatable. I read the book with an open mind yet could not help but think of my clients as their difficulties with feelings, affect, and emotion regulation are relevant to the topic. Damasio believes that emotions are a person’s external or observable expressions of feelings, and that feelings are the hidden, in-the-mind, non-observable experiences. He believes that emotions come before feelings which implies ideas such as one making a facial expression that typically implies “happiness”, then their internal state will also be happy. I find this idea hard to grasp because of the simplicity it suggests regarding emotion regulation. If being “happy” was this easy there would be little need for therapists or clinicians in general. On the other hand, some psychotherapy orientations, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, lend themselves to the idea that one’s internal experience of feelings are inter-dependent on one’s behaviors and thoughts. If one agrees with Damasio’s perspective, it would be interesting to see how a depressed client is affected by “pretending” to be happy.
A section that I also enjoyed reading and find applicable to my work as a clinician is that of joy and sorrow. Although Damasio breaks down these two feelings into neurological processes, he does talk about how a person’s choices are influenced by their past experience of the joy or sorrow feeling that they associate it with. Damasio wrote, “A gut feeling can suggest that you refrain from a choice that, in the past, has led to negative consequences, and it can do so ahead of your own regular reasoning telling you precisely the same ‘do not’ ” (147). Many clients seek therapy for problems they have related to attachment or interpersonal skills. These problems can be explained and understood in light of Damasio’s belief because they have dealt with similar situations and had negative consequences in their past. For example, if a person has been hurt as a result of an unfaithful partner and finds they can no longer trust people, it is their “gut feeling” that reminds them not to make the same bad choice and they find themselves alone and uhappy. Damasio suggests that this “gut feeling” or “hunches…steer our behavior in the proper direction” (150). Psychotherapy is a very beneficial and helpful resource for exploring, processing, and challenging the negative “gut feelings”.
I found this book to be interesting, applicable to clinical psychology, and, for the most part, easy to read. I liked his style of writing, was entertained with his fascination with Spinoza, and inspired by his passion for neuroscience.

[Randal Samstag · Rating 1 out of 5]

For a devastating critique of this book see: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/boo....

Quoted from the review, by philosopher of mind, Colin McGinn:

"I have two things to say about this theory: it is unoriginal, and it is false. As anyone even remotely familiar with this topic is aware, what Damasio presents here is known as the ''James-Lange'' theory of emotion, after the two psychologists, William James and Carl G. Lange, who thought of it independently in the 1880's. Not once does Damasio refer to it by this name, and he makes only very cursory reference to James's version of the theory. He generally writes as if he were advancing a startling discovery, mere hints of which, with the benefit of hindsight, can be extracted from Spinoza and James. In fact, the theory is a standard chestnut of psychology textbooks, a staple of old-style behaviorist psychology, with its emphasis on outer behavior at the expense of inner feeling.

The errors of the theory are chiefly those of exaggeration. While it is a truism that whistling a happy tune can improve your mood so that external actions can initiate a change of emotional state, it by no means follows that feelings play no causal role in the production of behavior. And it is quite clear that an emotion can shape the course of a person's actions over time, as when someone stays in bed all day because he feels depressed. We do often cry because we are sad -- even though the crying can work to augment the feeling. There is causal interplay between feelings and their bodily expression, rather than a one-way dependence. The fact, cited by Damasio, that a bodily fear response can precede a conscious feeling of fear does not show that once the feeling is present it has no causal control over behavior -- and it clearly does, as with fleeing and hiding.

What about the idea that an emotion is a bodily perception? Suppose I am delighted that my son has become a doctor. I may have various sensations in my body that express this emotion -- say, lightness in my limbs and a warm feeling in my viscera. But the object of my delight is not my body; it is my son's success. My bodily sensations are directed to my body and my emotion is directed to my son. Therefore my emotion cannot be identical to my bodily sensations -- for the two have different objects. This refutes the James-Lange theory.

As Wittgenstein remarks in his classic discussion of this theory, the horribleness of my grief when someone I love dies cannot be explained as the horribleness of the sensations I feel in my body. It results, rather, from the horribleness of what my grief is about; my bodily sensations may not be particularly horrible in themselves. Nor do we try to assuage someone's grief by attending to her bodily sensations; instead we talk about what she is grieving over. The James-Lange theory fails because it ignores what philosophers call the intentionality of emotion -- that is, what emotions are about, their representational content, which are generally things outside the body. The theory tries to reduce an emotion to its sensory bodily symptoms, but these symptoms have the wrong kind of intentionality: the state of the body, not the state of the external world."

I would never take this guy (Damasio) seriously.

[Divya Palevski · Rating 3 out of 5]

I liked this book but found some parts weary to read. When Damasio writes about the neurology of the feeling brain , it is easy to assemble the author's love for his subject. However, found his sentence structuring elaborately wounded ( I had to read some sentences twice) and repetitive.
But that being said, his monolistic view of mind/ brain and body and his reverence towards Baruch Spinoza is admirable. I believe in Monolism and the idea of feelings variably related to the homeostasis of the body makes great sense.

[Gianfranco Ruffini · Rating 2 out of 5]

it./troppo difficile per ora interrotto 190/766

[Charles Daney · Rating 3 out of 5]

The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio writes pleasant, elegant prose. Unfortunately, aside from that, this book, first published in 2003, is somewhat of a disappointment. The main concern of his scientific career has been to understand the mechanisms underlying "emotions" and "feelings". He has given good accounts of this subject in two previous books: Descartes' Error (1994) and The Feeling of What Happens (1999). What is good about Damasio's writing, especially in the earlier books, is that he doesn't do much dumbing down of the material, by avoiding technical terms, to appeal to the "general reader", as too many "science writers" do.

The book reviewed here, however, doesn't cover the subject in as much depth as the previous books, and in particular it doesn't very well illuminate the distinction - which the author insists upon - between "emotion" and "feeling". It appears that Damasio wanted to write on what interested him about Spinoza, but didn't have enough to fill a whole book. So the first five chapters (about 3/4 of the total text) are devoted mostly to the neuropsychological issues, while the final two chapters are on Spinoza, and are connected only tenuously with the rest of the book.

Damasio has championed the idea that human consciousness and other psychological phenomena - emotions and feelings especially - aren't rooted primarily in the brain, but instead are shaped by physiological processes going on throughout the whole body. This may be surprising to some, but it's not an especially radical idea. It makes good evolutionary sense. An animal's main evolutionary objective is to be good at survival and reproduction. Emotions (at least in animals with more than a rudimentary nervous system) exist to motivate an individual to seek things that favor survival and reproduction (shelter, food, sex), and to avoid threatening things (excessive heat or cold, predators, reproductive rivals). They seem to form a bridge between the sensory and motor systems. In animals with a developed cerebral cortex, like humans, emotions work partly through cognition.

Note that the words "emotion" and "motivation" share the same linguistic root: the Indo-European MEUh-. Emotions, whether conscious or not, are what motivates animal behavior. Emotions in general and feelings in particular allow humans to make critical decisions quickly, when the situation requires that. It seems unlikely that inhabitants of the planet Vulcan, like Mr. Spock of Star Trek, could have successfully evolved without the help of emotions. (Though perhaps they became able to suppress them at a later stage.)

I wish Damasio had been clearer in this book about his distinction between emotions and feelings. Are things like "fear", "pleasure", "shame", etc. emotions or feelings? Most people, I think, might use either term for them. But for Damasio, it seems, an emotion is represented in the brain only in certain specific regions, and may or may not appear in consciousness. For instance, a person (who is capable of consciousness) may have a "je ne sais quoi" sensation of fear on encountering an animal or object or situation with which the individual has had a negative experience in the past, even if that has been forgotten. The person will still avoid the particular stimulus without giving much thought as to why. A feeling, on the other hand, enters consciousness and additionally involves parts of the brain related to deliberate behavior. ("I like (or don't like) this whatever and want to remain (or not remain) exposed to it.") Naturally, if an animal doesn't have "consciousness" in the human sense - a worm, say - the animal can still be said to have "emotions" if it is motivated to approach or avoid certain things, for its own benefit. At any rate, that's how I interpret Damasio's thesis, and if I've misinterpreted it, a lack of clarity may be the reason.

As far as the two chapters on Spinoza are concerned, they may be the most interesting part of the book in spite of their brevity. He lived from 1632 to 1677, entirely in Holland. This was mostly before what historians consider the "Age of Enlightenment", which flowered in the 18th century. Spinoza, however, is generally considered one of its earliest avatars. He was born into a moderately prosperous Jewish family, but eventually renounced both his material and religious heritage. Temperamentally he was reclusive, yet congenial with others in his limited social sphere. He came to reject both Judaism and Christianity, evidently for both philosophical reasons (of which see below) as well as revulsion at the irrationality and cruelty of both religious traditions. Fortunately for Spinoza, he lived in Holland, which at the time featured the least intolerant variety of Christianity. Nevertheless, his main philosophical work, the Ethics, was published only posthumously - and was almost immediately banned by both secular and religious (Jewish, Catholic, and Calvinist) authorities because of its "heretical" philosophy. Later leading philosophers of the Enlightenment (e. g. Locke, Hume, Leibniz, and Kant) apparently studied the Ethics - but were fearful of acknowledging its influence on them. At least Spinoza managed to escape the fates of other "heretics" like Giordano Bruno and Galileo.

If you're interested in much discussion of Spinoza's philosophy, the present book is disappointing on this too, for at least three reasons. First, Damasio alludes in passing only to a few places in Spinoza's writing that deal with the psychology of emotions and feelings. Although he suggests that Spinoza foreshadowed current research findings, Spinoza's musings on these issues, however prescient, can't be much more than lucky guesses about what neuroscience now knows. Second, Damasio is wise not to deal at length with Spinoza's take on philosophical questions like "free will" and the "mind-body" problem. That's because the occupation of philosophers is to argue endlessly about issues that can only be satisfactorily resolved by scientific investigation. Third, Spinoza's opinions on religion aren't crystal clear. It's true that Spinoza was perhaps the most noteworthy Western philosopher of the preceding 1500 or so years to flatly reject dogma of the polluted swamp of traditional religion. However, arguments (among philosophers who care about such things) are still going on as to whether Spinoza's opinions actually represented atheism, agnosticism, "panentheism", or "pantheism" (which has generally been attributed to Spinoza).

[Mariana Ferreira · Rating 4 out of 5]

Damásio é para mim um materialista espiritual. À semelhança de tantos cientistas, a compreensão física e química dos fenómenos humanos não lhes retira beleza ou sacralidade. Difere, no entanto, da maioria na questão da aceitação da ignorância – muito não se sabe ainda. Por exemplo, o mecanismo especifico, as reacções infinitesimais, que transformam meros padrões neurais em verdadeiras imagens mentais. Como é que o corpo afecta a mente ( ex: Drogas, álcool, efeito da temperatura...) é mais passível de ser seguido pela neuro-biologia do que a reacção contrária: a mente afectar o corpo e também assim poder criar "falsos mapas"- como as reacções psicossomáticas ou a vitalidade súbita suscitada pela esperança e pela "força de vontade" ( o que quer que isto signifique em termos abstratos, tem o seu correspondente efeito fisiológico). A compreensão da interdependência deve fazer jus a um transcender do dualismo cartesiano (falar de mente e corpo, continua, no entanto, a ser um aparato heurístico e mesmo que se trate de uma só substância é difícil despregar de tal divisão. Mesmo Damásio fala que os sentimentos são a linguagem do "espírito" a respeito da homeostasia do corpo, dos estados do corpo) que se prova reducionista e falso à luz dos novos dados da ciência. Os mecanismos, permanecem, no entanto, semi obscuros. Mas tal, não faz resvalar para um agnosticismo sem chão: Damásio é ainda um positivista - considera estas questões dentro do escopo técnico, uma vez que radica toda a sua teoria na neurobiologia aplicada e associada a outras ciências sociais e exatas para a compreensão alargada e complexa dos comportamentos sociais, da imaginação, criatividade, os sentimentos, a razão, a poesia, a esperança, o desespero mais fundo ou o sonho mais metafísico de resposta.

Admirador de Espinosa (de um modo que poderia dizer poético) é, no entanto, crítico deste no que toca a uma resposta satisfatória para o alcance da felicidade (tida como a forma mais elevada de ser, contrariamente à tristeza, emoção tida como baixa e descendente). Se é certo que o estoicismo e o domínio das paixões mediante a razão e a construção da virtude é de salutar em Espinosa, tal disciplina continua a ser um trabalho essencialmente hermético, de um sábio na sua torre de marfim. Assim, contra um hermetismo contemplativo ou a tranquilidade passiva de um Espinosa “soalheiro”, Damásio, (à semelhança de Albert Camus), apresenta a acção no mundo como ponto-chave para essa filosofia. A luta, o combate de Sísifo a despeito da miséria e da morte, a construção ativa e benévola depois de uma aceitação bem lúcida do sofrimento humano, da condição humana. Afinal, não temos (subjetivamente pensando) de seguir os planos de indiferença e crueldade da natureza mas sim contribuir para o bem-estar cada vez maior – mediante a educação, a tecnologia, as instituições sociais, etc.

Quanto à ideia de Deus…Damásio acredita, (não surpreendentemente), que a experiência espiritual por excelência é explicada por uma harmonia ímpar do corpo e da mente. Constitui o equilíbrio mais perfeito, a exponenciação do " Conatus" (ou preservação de si), a celebração efusiva da vida. Pela primeira vez, li uma concepção espiritual que assenta a espiritualidade na animalidade e não despreza o corpo nem as emoções basais na construção mais complexa e elevada de sentimentos de união, paz, transcendência etc. Não deixar espaço para um lacuna fora do escopo material poderá fazer de Damásio um materialista/ reducionista, mas não acho o seu tom, de forma alguma, aparentado com o ateísmo arrogante, cru e afrontado, de um Richard Dawkins, por exemplo. Pelo contrário, acho humildade e elegância nas palavras de Damásio ( um dos factos que mais me surpreendeu juntamente com toda a sua pesquisa e experiência) , e uma busca sincera pelo conhecimento, sem grandes ganâncias ou julgamentos de valor.

Para mim, a concepção de Damásio a respeito da espiritualidade é também corpórea e misturada com a narrativa da vida:
"Deus" - Cabe-me no peito agitado pela incompreensão. Porque o Amor é fundo. Desce e sobe até ao céu. Deus é a aceitação. O eterno “sim” que não se anula com a tragédia passada, presente ou futura. Porque deus é a vida espezinhada que no entanto é e se levanta – todos os dias. Por mais um dia. Porque deus está nas pequenas histórias. Nas pequenas memórias. Nos pequenos gestos e glórias. Porque deus é aquele abraço, aquele beijo, aquele sol, aquele amar. Deus é a epifania de que isto chega quando isto está em harmonia. Connosco e com os que amamos. Epifania não circunscrita pela linguagem. É todo esse filme dentro de nós- agridoce. Deus é a mais humana paz e o mais puro amor. Essa paz apesar de. Essa confusão de lágrimas que são duas coisas ao mesmo tempo. Por ter sido e por termos acontecido. Deus é humano. Deus está dentro de nós. Em forma de riso e choro, chamamento, abandono. Deus é a única coisa que nos absolve – o Amor. Seja ele um mapeamento neural que se transforma numa sinestesia de imagens mentais, “um mistério sem rosto”, para mim, a espiritualidade assenta realmente na forma mais perfeita de estar vivo. Como Damásio descreve. É a consciência de si imersa em graça. O corpo é fundamental para o entendimento de tudo quanto é humano porque nos contacta com o mundo e com o olhar e afeta até a nossa linguagem e metáforas. A mente perde o seu trono por instantes. Ao mesmo tempo que se abarca.

[Elizabeth · Rating 4 out of 5]

In Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain Antonio Damasio uses neurological and physiological markers to delineate the process of emotions and feelings. Then, he further integrates these scientific findings with social studies. This in and of itself was quite impressive and perhaps demonstrates the fields (e.g., what individuals call the soft sciences and hard sciences) coming together and taking a different integrative perspective of how mental health can be conceptualized.

Of particular interest to me was when Damasio indicated that problems in the environment prompt self-preserving behavior. This perspective is very much in line with behaviorist thinking. However, on a more psychodynamic note, it makes me think about how personality becomes engrained, especially in the case of individuals with personality disorders. It makes me think about how crucial early relationships with significant others are. For example, an individual with antisocial personality disorder lacks empathy for others, because the individual more than likely experienced abuse, neglect, modeling of antisocial behavior in early relationships with significant others, and/or had a parent with an inability to set healthy boundaries (e.g., overindulgent parent). Conceptualizing psychopathology from the perspective that most behavior is aimed at self-preservation helps me conceptualize clients that may be difficult to work with from a different, perhaps more empathic, perspective. Additionally, conceptualizing all behavior as self-preserving behavior also makes one aware of the behaviors that our client’s pull from us and how therapy can serve as a problem or change in the environment that may prompt our clients to change their behaviors.

Also of clinical relevance was Damasio’s conceptualization that feelings serve as information about internal states of what is happening within the individual. This reminds me of client’s that wish that uncomfortable feelings would dissipate and go through quite a number of measures to ignore, avoid, and not feel unwanted feelings. The amount of energy that they expend in that process at times is significant. In the avoidance of unwanted feelings sometimes more emotional damage emanates rather than in accepting feelings as indicators that something in going on within. Perhaps, offering a metaphor of an unpleasant feeling being akin to a physical marker of pain (e.g., a person cutting their finger and blood the pain resulting from the experience) would help our clients come to accept some of their unpleasant feelings. The conceptualizing of the emotional healing process within the framework of a physical injury may also help our clients more holistically integrate and accept their feelings.

Overall, the book was full of food for thought. It was filled with clinical relevance and is worthy of keeping on a shelf as a book that could be re-visited for varying purposes (e.g., a clearer understanding of how neurology and psychopathology emanate in different cases, in helping conceptualizing certain clients, and so forth).

[Ana Marinho · Rating 3 out of 5]

António Damásio é uma figura que admiro imenso e cujos livros nunca me desiludiram - ensina-me imenso, troca conceitos complicados por miúdos, simplifica e explica. Nesta obra, o autor explora a ligação entre as emoções, a neurociência e as ideias de Espinosa. Foi, como sempre, um livro muito interessante e enriquecedor, mas com o qual tive dificuldade em me conectar ou desfrutar da leitura. Talvez a altura em que o li não tenha sido o melhor, pelo excesso de cansaço e a falta de concentração. Será um livro a reler no futuro.

[cole · Rating 1 out of 5]

If you buy the Enlightenment belief that scientific truth can be obtained and man made better for it, then take my review with a grain of salt. If you are convinced of the fact that using the terms "bad" and "human nature" in the same sentence is pretty acceptable, you won't like this too much.

Damasio's science seems interesting enough and does pose some engaging questions. However, there are far too many condescending logical leaps for me to stomach. The low point came with the rather absurd statement that placing self-preservation and it's biological mechanisms at the center of human ethical systems was in no way problematic, as if that hadn't been the ostensible justification for a horde of repugnant choices, national efforts and reform programs throughout history. This was far too much Nietzsche in sheeps clothing and far too little virtue.

As a classmate noted, the parts about Spinoza are interesting.

[Michael · Rating 2 out of 5]

Looking for Spinoza is essentially two books wishing it could be one. The first half covers the neurobiology of emotional life. Damasio lays out an interesting overview for a lay reader of how the brain operates as a self regulatory system, connecting this self-regulation to emotions and feelings. The second half is essentially a slim biography of Spinoza. Unfortunately, for a man whose major life events consisted of excommunication, writing philosophy and grinding lenses until he died, there isn't much that Damasio could add to our knowledge of Spinoza. Damasio clearly wants to do more with Spinoza's philosophy and Neurobiology, he just does not have the command of the philosophy to pull it off.

[Mauro · Rating 4 out of 5]

Un viaggio affascinante attraverso la neurobiologia dei processi emozionali, guidati con grazia da un profondo conoscitore della materia, affascinato dal pensiero di Spinoza, al quale attribuisce il merito di aver per primo intuito l'indissolubile unità di mente e corpo. Lettura avvincente per chi ama la scienza e la filosofia (come se poi fossero due cose differenti!).

[Freddie Berg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Never thought I would understand Spinoza. Never thought I would understand feelings. Never thought I would understand the psychophysiology and chemistry of the brain. Made me even more grateful to doctors and healers of all stripes and plaids.

[Freddie Berg · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent explication of many issues. Initially skipped a few sections on the complexity of neural electricity. Re-read other portions over several years, and still pick it up from time to time. Offered it to several friends. On my all time favorites shelf.

[Aljoša Toplak · Rating 4 out of 5]

Damasio je v prejšnji knjigi kritiziral Descartesovo stališče, da je racionalno mišljenje ločeno od čustvovanja, da je duh neutelešen in da sta telo dve različni substanci. Zato v tej knjigi najde filozofski zgled v Spinozi, po katerem sta duh in telo vzporedna in medsebojno usklajena procesa, ki na vsakem križišču posnemata drug drugega kot dve plati iste medalje. Kot nevrobiolog pa se osredotoči predvsem na vlogo čustev v racionalnem mišljenju.

V knjigi predstavi načelo ugnezdenja, po katerem so preproste uravnalne reakcije (ki zagotavljajo homoestazo) kot so imunski sistem in uravnave metabolizma, vgrajene kot komponente bolj dovršenih uravnalnih reakcij, kot so težnje, čustva in občutki. Ta gradbeni načrt se razteza vse do vrha seznama, kjer npr. vidimo kako so kompleksna družbena čustva, kot je prezir, ugnezdena na prvinah osnovnih čustev, kot je gnus.

Na vrhu tega načrta najdemo razločevanje med čustvmi in občutki – izraz »čustvo« pogosto uporabljamo tako, da označuje oboje: čustvo in njegovo zavestno izkustvo, »občutek«, Damasio pa predlaga, da naj to dvoje razločujemo.

Občutki so zaznave, ki so osnovane predvsem na "možganskih zemljevidih telesa", torej gre za zaznavo določenega telesnega stanja (interocepcija), kot tudi zaznavo določenega spremljevalnega duševnega stanja (introspekcija). Da pa lahko ima organizem občutke, mora po Damasiu zadostiti štirim pogojem; (1) organizem potrebuje sredstvo, da telo upodobi v svoji notranjosti (živčni sistem), (2) živčni sistem mora biti zmožen kartografirati telesne strukture in živčne vzorce preoblikovati v duševne, (3) organizem mora biti seznanjen z vsebino občutka, torej potrebuje zavest in (4) še preden lahko možgani kartografirajo telesna stanja, ki vzbudijo občutke, morajo biti sposobni, da ta posebna telesna stanja izdelajo. Ti pogoji pa že nakazujejo evolucijski razlog občutkov (občutenje torej ni pasivni proces), ki prevzamejo vlogo duševnih senzorjev, ki nadzirajo notranjost organizma, očividci ki motrijo potek življenja. Verjetno so nastali kot stranski produkt vpletenosti možganov v urejanje življenja, saj nam to obsežno kartografiranje omogoča, da določene funkcije upočasnimo, zaustavimo ali zaženemo in na ta način vnesemo utrezne popravke v upravljanje našega življenja. Dalje pa nam občutki pomagajo reševati nestandardne probleme, pri katerih sodelujejo ustvarjalnost, presoja in odločanje.

[Jorge Ortiz · Rating 5 out of 5]

I didn't know the author before, but now I admire him.
Antonio Damasio is not just a scientist, he is also a humanist; he is a philosopher. He understands the deep of what he talks about and never claims to have the truth (as others claim) of difficult issues
such as feelings, consciousness, moral values,...

As the tittle suggests, the author talks about how emotions work, from a neurobiological perspective, and admires the evolutionary process that had to take place in order to reach a point of complexity able to host those feelings. He let you see how emotions are the key component of humanity, the main thing which makes us do something, instead of nothing.
A scientist of today would stop there, and limit himself, but he goes further. He speculates about a moral system based on those feelings, a moral system which should optimize survival and well-being of humanity. That's when he talks about Spinoza, interpreting his philosophy and ethic with the scientific knowledge of today, realising the level of truth that Spinoza reached thanks to his life, culture, family, friends, introspection, intelligence,...

Full of biography and references, this is a masterpiece, not just because the truth it holds, but because the humility and bravery with which the author tackle difficult problems with the knowledge of today, in order to motivate the search of tomorrow.

[Dennis Littrell · Rating 5 out of 5]

Humanism from a neurobiologist

Part of this is a celebration of the 17th century Rationalist philosopher Baruch Spinosa whose world view is very much in concert with that of Antonio Damasio. Spinosa's demolition of Descartes' mind/body duality is the thread that Damasio takes up and weaves into this graceful and agreeable narrative. Furthermore, it is Spinosa's recognition that we are part of, and contained within, nature and not materially different from nature (another of Descartes' errors) that attracts Damasio's admiration for Spinosa.

Leaving aside this framing device I want to concentrate on Damasio's argument about the nature of humans based on his experience as a neurobiologist, which is really the core of this book.

Damasio recognizes that feelings, like consciousness itself, are perceptions, not states of mind. What is being perceived is the state of the body itself, and what is doing the perceiving is the brain. In this understanding--and I think it is a felicitous one--the brain operates as a sixth sense, something like the so-called third eye of the Hindus. It is not, of course, a supernatural sixth sense, but a sense organ in addition to the other five whose job it is to perceive the homeostasis of the organism, a sense organ that looks within instead of without. Instead of the sensation of color or sound, the sixth sense perceives emotions.

Of course the Van Allen Distinguished Professor of Neurology at the University of Iowa Medical Center does not use such a term as "sixth sense" nor would he allude to the third eye of the Hindus. He is a neurologist, a scientist and (despite his demurral) a philosopher. I mention these other ways of "knowing" in an attempt to provide a larger context for Damasio's argument.

This argument is not original with Damasio (and I don't think he would claim it is). In one sense it is derivative from the growing understanding that consciousness itself, a kind of meta-awareness, is actually a perception. Damasio's "feelings" are part of this consciousness.

A further part of Damasio's argument is that emotions are prior to feelings. First there is an emotionally competent stimulus (ECS). Then there is an "appraisal" of that stimulus which results in appropriate and automatic emotion, followed by feelings based on a perception of the emotion and the external situation. This is on-going, and we usually don't notice it. In extreme cases, such as danger, our feelings are more pronounced. In Damasio's scheme, an ECS might be a grizzly bear come upon suddenly while hiking. The "appraisal" would be the recognition that this is a bear, that it is big and it is potentially dangerous. The "emotion" would be all the systemic glandular, chemical and muscular responses in preparation for the flight or fight response. The "feeling" itself would be what we call fear.

Damasio attempts to explain the experience of feelings in anticipation of "naysayers" who contend that such things are eternal mysteries. He makes a distinction between what, say, a Boeing 777 with all its sensing devices might "feel" and how humans feel. The crux of Damasio's distinction is the enormously greater complexity of the biological organism. But this argument, beginning on page 126, is not satisfactory because it does not explain the subjective experience of pain, which is what the "naysayers" are really talking about.

What I think Damasio should say is that we can never know what the Boeing 777 is feeling (or if it is "feeling") since feelings are subjective experiences. They can only be recognized in ourselves (if we have them) and identified with in the report of others. It is the same as trying to explain what the color red looks like to a blind person or how strawberries taste to someone who has never tasted one. Analogies and comparisons may be drawn, but there is no way that I can ever be sure that I feel what you feel or that the subjective nature of any sensuous experience between one entity and another is the same.

In the fourth chapter, "Ever Since Feelings," Damasio attempts to account for how feelings arose in an evolutionary sense. He believes they help complex organisms solve complex problems. (p. 177) "Body-state maps" work automatically for most organisms, but, Damasio argues, with emotions made conscious through the experience of feeling, humans are able to achieve not only a "concern for the individual self" but with "sufficient integration of the now, the past, and the anticipated future" a more effective game plan for survival and well-being. (p. 178) Feelings signal the conscious mind to become involved and this has proven adaptive.

What I think is profound about this argument is how naturally it would have arisen from the evolutionary experience. Before humans and other sophisticated animals arose, most creatures probably made little or no distinction between themselves and their environment. Their responses were mostly automatic and they had no sense of self. Along comes this great leap forward called consciousness and it works because it makes us more effective at protecting ourselves. It also makes us more fearful of death, of course, which is part of the human predicament.

Despite some difficulties, I am very much impressed with Damasio's effort, and I think that his approach from neuroscience and biological evolution, and through the use of scientific experiment, is eons ahead of the old schools in psychology which attempted to understand human beings based on arbitrary models such as psychoanalytic theory or on limited approaches such as behaviorism. But it must be realized (as I'm sure Damasio does) that we are at a tentative stage of understanding. Some even say that we will never be able to completely understand how our brain works. Some even cite Russell's paradox and Godel's proof about the limitations of self-referential systems (the brain/body is such a system) and deny that it is even theoretically possible for us to completely understand ourselves. Maybe only our artifacts, our computers will be able to understand us.

--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”

[Juan Medina · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Para algunos, la solución de Spinoza es un medio superior de conferir significado a la vida… Su ruta es a través del uso de la razón y del sentimiento. La razón nos permite ver el camino, mientras que el sentimiento es el que hace cumplir nuestra determinación de ver. Lo que encuentro atractivo en la solución de Spinoza es el reconocimiento de las ventajas de la alegría y el rechazo de la aflicción y el miedo, junto con la determinación de buscar el primero y de obliterar estos últimos. Spinoza afirma la vida y transforma la emoción y el sentimiento en los medios para nutrirla, una hermosa mezcla de sabiduría y de previsión científica. En su camino hacia el horizonte de la vida, le corresponde al individuo vivir de tal manera que se pueda conseguir con frecuencia la perfección de la alegría, con lo que se logra que valga la pena vivir la vida." AD

[Emanuela · Rating 5 out of 5]

Emozioni e sentimenti sono fondamentali per il mantenimento dell'omeostasi, ovvero l'equilibrio fisiologico degli organismi che ha come scopo primario la sopravvivenza e il funzionamento efficace ed efficiente dei processi biologici e fisiologici.
Di questa necessità si era accorto Spinoza già nel XVII secolo formulando di conseguenza le sue teorie, spesso in contrasto con il suo quasi contemporaneo Cartesio che aveva invece una visione dualistica dell'essere.
Quello che i due dimostrano, Damásio e Spinoza, uno con la scienza l'altro con la filosofia, è una visione monistica dell'essere non più distinta in cui lo "spirito" è separato dal materiale corporeo, ma dove i processi, complessi e non sempre chiaramente dimostrabili, coinvolgono l'intero essere, determinando variazioni più o meno importanti dell'omeostasi.

Nella seconda parte del libro l'autore ripercorre la biografia di Spinoza funzionale alla valorizzazione della coerenza tra il suo pensiero e la sua vita. A volte sottolineando anche le criticità di pensiero, non sempre chiarissimo negli intenti. Ma quelle che sono state le sue intuizioni cominciano ad avere anche un riscontro oggettivo attraverso la scienza.

Forse il miglior testo che ho letto sul problema mente-corpo.

[Joshua · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was both not enough of and way more than I expected. I enjoyed the physiological discourse for which I picked up the book, and appreciated the philosophical overtones that were brought out in the latter parts.

[Samin K · Rating 4 out of 5]

کتابی به نسبت ساده با مفاهیمی ثقیل از نوروآناتومی احساسات و شرح و بسط در ابتدا ، و بازگشت تاریخی به اسپینوزا و شرح اخلاقیات و آرا وی به طور مختصر. این کتاب کاملا علمی و مبتنی بر شواهد بوده و راه را برای مطالعه بیشتر در حوزه ذهن و جسم و بازگشتی به اخلاقیات اسپینوزا باز میکند

[Margedev · Rating 5 out of 5]

Que dire à part que c’est UNE FUCKING RÉVOLUTION de pensée et de comment cerner le monde
En bref : Le corps et l’esprit sont intimement liées et on arrive aujourd’hui, grâce aux neurosciences, à prouver le génie de Spinoza
Un gros doigt d’honneur au libre-arbitre et au libéralisme (quand on veut on peut et on (individu) décide de tout = faux ) oui c’est mon interprétation personnelle
Une réflexion en profondeur sur la spiritualité et qu’est ce que l’être humain, au fond ? SURVIVRE ET RESSENTIR
Tu peux coupler ça avec l’arrivée de l’IA et comment exister dans ce monde de brutasse.
J’ai mis 3 mois a le lire car c’est niveau difficile, mais purée quelle claque. Bravo, merci, vive la science et vive spinoz

[Juan Manuel Charry Urueña · Rating 5 out of 5]

Spinosa, a diferencia de Descartes, consideraba que cuerpo y alma tenían la misma sustancia. Este es el punto de partida de Damasio para explicar las emociones y sentimientos a partir de la neurobiología. Algunas de las cosas que dice el libro: El amor no es otra cosa que un estado placentero, alegría, acompañado por la idea de una causa externa (Spinoza). La mente humana es la idea del cuerpo humano. Tendemos a creer que lo oculto es el origen de lo que se expresa. El sentimiento es lo que realmente cuenta. Los seres humanos poseen varios miles de millones de neuronas y varios billones de conexiones. Todos los seres vivos tratan de preservarse sin conocer conscientemente del empeño. El contenido esencial de los sentimientos es la cartografía de un estado corporal determinado. Los sentimientos son percepciones. Los sentimientos pueden ser alterados por sustancias químicas. ¡Que intrigante resulta que los sentimientos atestigüen el estado de la vida de nuestro interior más profundo! Una de las principales características de la conducta humana es pensar en términos de futuro. La integridad de la emoción y el sentimiento es necesaria para el comportamiento social humano normal. La historia de nuestra civilización es, hasta cierto punto, la historia de un esfuerzo persuasivo por extender los mejores "sentimientos morales" a círculos cada vez más amplios de la humanidad. Los contratos sociales y políticos son extensiones del mandato biológico personal. La ejecución de respuestas tanto automáticas como deliberadas requiere imágenes. La mente existe para el cuerpo, está dedicada a contar la historia de los múltiples acontecimientos del cuerpo. Sin imágenes mentales, el organismo no sería capaz de ejecutar de manera oportuna la integración. La mente emerge de la cooperación de muchas regiones cerebrales. Spinoza nació en la época de las preguntas. Nunca poseyó una casa y nunca ocupó más que un dormitorio y un estudio. Spinoza tiende a convertirse cada vez más en filósofo de los hombres de ciencia. Spinoza no leía inglés. Conciencia y memoria ... originan el drama humano. Los intentos de salvación humana se refieren a una acomodación a una muerte presagiada o al dolor físico y a la angustia mental. La intuición es el medio más refinado de conseguir el saber. La perfección de la alegría.

[João Teixeira · Rating 3 out of 5]

Qual o objectivo de Damásio ao escrever este livro? A resposta é dada logo nas primeiras páginas: somos compostos por uma mente (à qual corresponde o sentimento) e um corpo (ao qual corresponde a emoção). Compreender o todo que compõe o ser humano (abrindo horizontes para uma nova visão do mesmo) é o que Damásio propõe.

Este é um livro científico. António Damásio apresenta-nos nestas páginas a neurobiologia do sentimento, pelo que o que vamos encontrar nestas páginas são as explicações científico-fisiológicas das emoções e dos sentimentos. E é um pouco estranho quando reflectimos sobre os factos que nos são dados a conhecer nestas páginas, como por exemplo, o facto de uma lesão no cérebro poder inibir emoções como a simpatia ou a culpa.

O livro está escrito numa linguagem acessível e que, por isso (mas não só), se lê bastante bem. Não obstante, julgo que exige do leitor alguns conhecimentos de fisiologia do sistema nervoso (mas nada de grave, pois o próprio livro inclui um glossário a que podemos sempre recorrer, se alguma dúvida houver). Damásio consegue cativar. E é engraçado ver que sustenta as suas opiniões não apenas com experiências científicas concretas, mas também, por exemplo, com citações de Shakespeare, o que não deixa de ser curioso.

Para além disto tudo, posso acrescentar que foi interessante conhecer um pouco melhor o filósofo Benedictus Espinosa, de que já ouvira falar, mas que não conhecia propriamente.

[Ari Landa · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not an easy book to go through. Can get a bit too technical and sciencey, also the writing isn't as fluid as others (Perhaps there's a lot of "feelings of ideas" in the writing style which clouds the sentence syntax:)). That said it's a very smart book that explains a lot and also invites a lot of questions regarding the implications of feelings on the cognitive brain. For example, if the brain is built up from emotions to feelings to rational logic, and just as feelings are a more complicated expression of emotions, would we then say that rational logic is just a more complex expression of feelings? Is all knowledge "feeling based?" I think Spinoza would say emphatically yes. But what does that mean for us humans? For example, should we forget about arguing politics and just focus on the underlying "feeling of the idea" we're arguing about? If two academics differ in their theories do they also have a differing underlying "feel" of their worlds? Is there any idea in our world that exists outside our feeling brain? Do feelings, or the idea of the feeling (or the feeling of the idea) guide our philosophical perspectives or intellectual discoveries? I would have liked to see a bit more speculation at the end of the book regarding possible implications of this idea. Nonetheless, a difficult but worthwhile read.

[Frank Strada · Rating 3 out of 5]

Much of Damasio's book is about brain anatomy. Too much detail (I skimmed most of this section), but his point is well taken: that Spinoza, who lived in the 17th century, had it right regarding human feeling and emotion, despite his lack of knowledge about neural systems.

Baruch Spinoza is known for his book Ethics and his Treatise on Politics and Religion, which had to be published under a pseudonym in once case and posthumously in the other. He advocated separation of church and state and democracy (long before Jefferson), both radical ideas in his time. But perhaps he was most reviled for his religious beliefs. He wrote about the primacy of reason in finding truth and used reasoned arguments to show that there is no supernatural god; that god is nature.

Damasio's focus is on Spinoza's writings on feelings and emotions, and what it is to live a virtuous life and to understand God. His views got him banished from the Jewish community in Amsterdam when he was just 24 years old forcing him to live the remainder of his life in a sort of exile in Holland.

I would recommend this book if you're interested in how the European Enlightenment influenced how we think today. Spinoza was perhaps the spark that led to the ideas put forward by the likes of Voltaire, Diderot, Jefferson and Franklin.

[Martijn ter Haar · Rating 5 out of 5]

Een zware bevalling, maar wel wel zeer de moeite. Goed, diepgaand boek over de neurologie van emoties en de daaruit volgende morele en ethische consequenties. Gevoel is een reflectie van de staat van het lichaam, emoties zijn complexen van gevoelens, het rationeel denken er over. De aanvankelijke richting dus lichaam -> geest en niet andersom. Daaruit kan je dit soort pop-pyschologie distilleren, maar dat doet Damasio gelukkig niet. Nauwelijks MRI scans in dit boek, maar veel Spinoza. Die had namelijk alles al min of meer correct uitgedacht en daar zijn Ethica op gebaseerd.

[Fanymoon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Increíble investigación que te lleva a conocerte mejor a ti mismo y a las personas que te rodean.

Una forma de descubrir qué somos y cuál es nuestro papel en nuestra vida diaria.