Unconscious Sexism, Unnoticed Cruelty
This is a tone poem, a mood piece, which is what excuses the otherwise irresponsible quotation from the Sunday Telegraph on the back cover: “The Graham Greene of Uruguay.”
(This formula, “The X of Y,” needs to be banished from criticism and history, both because it means the country Y is ranked behind the country of author X, and because it drains the interest from the new author by explaining her work in terms of someone else. I could say that the Uruguayan painter Juan Manuel Blanes (1830-1901) is “the Ingres of Uruguay,” but that would only make his Retrato de Doña Carlota Ferreira—a canonical starting point of Uruguayan modernism—into a comic object.)
A Brief Life is about a man whose companion is dying, and his attempts to escape that tragedy by creating and imagining different lives for himself. The parallel between the main character’s attempts and Onetti’s own is very close, and so the novel is modernist in the sense that it is clear Onetti himself doesn’t want to think about real tragedy, unless it is delivered as a question of imagination. There are issues in Onetti to do with the narrator's and author's sexism and limited empathy. Normally they would not present an problem for me: I don't expect morality from fiction; I don't expect fiction to make me better, or make the world better, or tell the truth about anything in particular (as de Botton does); I haven't avoided Celine (the anti-Semite), Sade, Stokoe (his novel "Cows," which I won't describe here), or even Schreber (the psychotic patient of Freud's). But I won't be reading more Onetti, and I wrote this to puzzle out the reasons.
Onetti’s women are unpleasantly imagined. He pictures them coming and going, perfuming, dressing, undressing, smoking, tapping their varnished nails, and dreaming of seducing men. Even though there are passages of some psychological insight and others with some introspective force, mainly women just recline, sit, pace, pose, and smoke (and so do men, although they aren’t observed, and they aren’t imagined thinking of themselves being observed). I found that way of thinking repulsive, exactly (and only) because I understand Onetti's narrator expects us to see it as poetic, melancholic, resigned, wise, and adult.
The book has one or two pages in which the narrator suddenly dives into a deeper stoicism, and those are interesting passages because they are not integrated into the book’s perfumy pallor. This happens first on p. 44:
“Bills to be paid and the unforgettable certainty that nowhere in this world is there a woman, a friend, a house, a book, not even a vice, that can make me happy.… I never did anything and presumably I will die. I have, naturally, a certain impersonal remorse; but it hasn’t kept me from being content.”
An so forth: these passages are like unmelted glaciers in the narrative. It would have been a more interesting book—perhaps more dangerous—if there had been more of them.
Another thing: there are moments of tremendous cruelty in this book, which are, I think, partly unnoticed by Onetti's narrator and by the implied author. On pp. 56-7 the narrator has his principal character dream of murdering his dying wife. He seems not to notice how quickly he allows himself to observe, and dismiss, the wife’s attempts to repress awareness of her illness. He doesn't see how cruelty and self-absorption limit his empathy.
What is wrong with unnoticed sexism or cruelty? Since this subject is so entangled in notions of relativist literary criticism, let me set out some positions point by point. (I thank Aarnaud Rommens for helping me clarify this list.)
Like most readers I don't conflate fiction with fact. But I also do not read novels to learn anything about the facts of the world, and I think most readers do. All the interest in regional and national literatures, in postcolonial literatures, in writing about gender and identity, is predicated on the idea that you might learn something about the world by reading fiction. Fiction isn't history or sociology, so it doesn't matter if the book is an accurate record of its milieu. I don't read for information, as Steve Mitchelmore says. It's the main reason I am not interested in Zadie Smith, who tells readers about new sorts of social formations, classes, and identities in London. So I'm especially unlikely, I think, to dislike a novel because it isn't informing me reliably about the world.
I also may be on a far end of the spectrum when it comes to hoping literature can make me more reflective, more sensitive, more thoughtful, or even a better person. Fiction isn't self-help or self-improvement. That is Alain de Botton's belief, and in a different way James Wood's. I don't find myself optimized in any sensible way by the novels I've read. I'm drawn to labyrinthine sensibilities from Montaigne to Pessoa and Proust, but I'd be hard-pressed to make the sorts of claims de Botton makes about their capacity to meliorate my psyche or otherwise make me better, whatever in the world that might mean.
It follows that it's potentially unobjectionable if an author has views or information that are false or objectionable in real life. (I shouldn't object if Onetti's narrator, or the implied author, has reductive ideas about women.) Why, then, put Onetti in a different category than, say, Celine? Here are three possibilities.
1. The appearance of control.
One reason to judge an author like Onetti negatively may be that what matters in fiction is what is compelling, persuasive, well represented. There is an uncontrolled contrast in Onetti between the narrator's display of what he considers psychological insights, and the narrator's or author's obliviousness on other points. It's the lack of control of that contrast that produces the deficit in persuasion, because it undermines my confidence that his imagination, as he presents it in the text, is his own possession.
On the other hand, I recognize that many great novels are partially unpersuasive and largely out of control or even incoherent (for example Flann O'Brien, or Stephen Dixon's "Frog"), so I can see that this isn't a sufficient answer.
2. A lack of self-awareness.
There is a problem, in Onetti's work, in the narrator's self-awareness. It's a disappointment when an author posits self-awareness as a value, but lacks it in ways that she would clearly not be happy with if they were pointed out. The author's blindnesses are not the sort that postmodern authors and readers like to agree are potentially interesting values. Poststructuralist readers love to find gaps, blindnesses, and inbuilt contradictions in texts, which can come to be seen as crucial for interesting literature. But there is a taste involved: postmodern literary critics have preferences for certain kinds of problems with self-awareness. Onetti's may not be among them.
3. Inadequacy of imagination.
There are ways that readers become aware of the sufficiency, the adequacy, of the writer's imagination. Onetti's world seems insufficiently imagined according to his own criteria of thoughtfulness. That kind of contradiction appears as a lapse: Sade and Celine, etc., don't have that particular problem.
These last two might be ways I'd like to go if I were to pursue this issue. But it's a genuinely difficult, perhaps insoluble problem, if it's asked from within the general frame of postmodern literary criticism. On the one hand, all fiction, especially fiction that shows blindnesses, can be of interest, so there is no sense to asking, as a modernist or realist would, about ethical or moral values. On the other hand, readers have preferences. There is a difference between Onetti's book and some of the other books I've mentioned, and it has to do, somehow, with the narrators' beliefs.