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The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations #1
The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume 1, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776–1865
The Creation of a Republican Empire traces American foreign relations from the colonial era to the end of the Civil War, paying particular attention not only to the diplomatic controversies of the era but also to the origins and development of American thought regarding international relations. The primary purpose of the book is to describe and explain, in the diplomatic context, the process by which the United States was born, transformed into a republican nation, and extended into a continental empire. Central to the story are the events surrounding the American Revolution, the constitutional Convention, the impact on the United States of the European wars touched off by the French Revolution, the Monroe Doctrine, the expansionism of the 1840s, and the ordeal of the Civil War.
272 pages, Paperback
First published September 24, 1993
About the author
Bradford Perkins
9 books2 followersBradford Perkins was an American historian known for his influential work on American diplomatic and foreign relations history. The son of historian Dexter Perkins, he taught at UCLA before joining the University of Michigan, where he spent most of his career and later became Professor Emeritus. A Guggenheim Fellow and Bancroft Prize recipient, he also served as president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and lectured internationally.
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December 5, 2014
The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865/ Bradford Perkins
This book is the first in a volume of four books the surveys the foreign relations of the United States from the birth of the nation to the modern day. The series is notable in that each author uses a very different theoretical perspective.
Perkins’s history of American foreign policy from 1776-1865 creates a portrait of a young nation (and at the outset a very weak one), its experience with an international system characterized by European monarchies and colonialism, and how from the interactions of interests, ideals, and experiences particularly American institutions and traditions formed.
Perkins’s book is different from the other three volumes in this series in that he is constantly juggling very different themes: the tension between interests and ideals; territorial expansion and commerce (material reward) as lubricant of the republican system; the very conservative vision of revolution Americans had; how the anarchical system conditions ideals fostered in domestic environment; the struggle for foreign policy between the president and congress; and isolation as a nexus of idealism and material interests.
The Prism
Perkins sets up a complex interplay between material interests, culture, and something he calls the “prism” that creates foreign policy (p. 15). The prism is not a framework where either interests or ideals dictate policy, but rather where there is constant mingling. Perkins establishes an overview of interconnected ideas that help form the national prism. Even before the revolution, Americans were developing a particular ideology that saw republicanism as the “hope and present of the future” (p. 11). This specifically American ideology also espoused the concept of individualism, both political and economic, and free markets—open doors were to be welcome (p. 13). America also looked favorably on revolution, in the beginning applauding the French revolution, but then turning away from its violent excesses. As Perkins writes, while Americans “welcomed antimonarchical risings” they also “recoiled when revolutions went beyond the purely political sphere to repression, Bonapartism, and deep social change” (p. 13).
Unlike other countries, Americans came from a long tradition of self-government and independence, so that they did not have to “exorcise political privileges of rank or transform the economic order to create conditions in which republicanism could thrive” (p. 13). This limited understanding of the relationship between republicanism, democracy, and revolution would persist until the present where simplistic notions of political evolution continue to color diplomatic perceptions—this especially about the US’s pro-democracy policies (even though there is a wealth of empirical information that demonstrates that nascent democracies are more prone to instability than autocratic forms of government).
The International System Conditions Early US Foreign Policy
In terms of the way international politics conditions national ideals, as Perkins writes, the negotiations between the US and Britain to settle the revolutionary war began as a meeting between innocence and guile, but the Americans soon learned what it took to survive (p. 46). This represents a fundamental strain of realism (maybe even structural realism) that runs throughout the book. The giant moat of the Atlantic Ocean--the stopping power of water (to borrow a term from Mearsheimer)--was one reason that Americans could afford to be naïve of European continental realism.
Another good example of the international system conditioning US policy would be the US alliance with France during the revolution, as well as the US choice to violate many of its agreements with France by negotiating a separate peace with England. US maneuvering won them favorable terms with Britain as it convinced the nation that the US would not become a satellite to France (p. 44). A neorealist would argue that the Americans did this because it was to their benefit and it was permissible in the international system. In addition, an important aspect of the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation was the US need for a more robust foreign policy. As many of the Federalist papers made clear, one of the fundamental roles of the constitution was to help improve the nation’s ability to “survive and prosper in a hostile world” (p. 71).
Economic Success as a Lubricant to Republican system.
Perkins also examines the way economic success and especially land-ownership was seen as necessary for a functioning republican system in America’s early history. Perkins looks at how territorial expansion and commerce were an important lubricant for political success during the early years of the republic, and how the thirst for commercial success underpinned fundamental doctrines of isolationism (the US benefited from the neutral status by trading with both sides in international conflicts [see p. 94 for American legislative battles and interpretation of international law]), manifest destiny, the Louisiana Purchase, and the war with Mexico.
But in following with Perkins’s theme of the prism, these commercial policies were always instituted in fundamentally American ways. Thus, individualism, open-doors, and territorial expansion were favored at the early expense of corporatism and empire—and there was a political recognition (the Jeffersonian tradition to use a term by Walter Russell Mead) that land-ownership would lead to a more equal and inclusive republic. In addition, the avarice of the US was at least to some degree always moderated by long-standing ideals. For example, after Polk’s acquisition of Mexican land there was universal agreement in the Senate that some money should be paid to Mexico, even if this sum was a token 15 million dollars (p. 195-196).
Evaluation of the Book
This book is a great read for any student of US foreign policy or even history buffs. However, if a reader had to choose between Walter Russell Mead’s Special Providence and any book in this series, I would suggest reading Mead’s book first.
My five star rating of this book is a judgement not only of this volume but of the value of the book series as a whole. Out of the four books, Perkins’s book is perhaps the most eclectic; thus, it is probably the least consistent but the most faithful to the messiness of the historical record. Thus, I think the book is a great example to foreign policy scholars on how to set up a loose framework that can capture lots of disparate but relevant details in a particular case. One will find in this book a historian who is not afraid to dabble in balance of power realism, geopolitics, issues of national identity, and even historical accident.
This book is the first in a volume of four books the surveys the foreign relations of the United States from the birth of the nation to the modern day. The series is notable in that each author uses a very different theoretical perspective.
Perkins’s history of American foreign policy from 1776-1865 creates a portrait of a young nation (and at the outset a very weak one), its experience with an international system characterized by European monarchies and colonialism, and how from the interactions of interests, ideals, and experiences particularly American institutions and traditions formed.
Perkins’s book is different from the other three volumes in this series in that he is constantly juggling very different themes: the tension between interests and ideals; territorial expansion and commerce (material reward) as lubricant of the republican system; the very conservative vision of revolution Americans had; how the anarchical system conditions ideals fostered in domestic environment; the struggle for foreign policy between the president and congress; and isolation as a nexus of idealism and material interests.
The Prism
Perkins sets up a complex interplay between material interests, culture, and something he calls the “prism” that creates foreign policy (p. 15). The prism is not a framework where either interests or ideals dictate policy, but rather where there is constant mingling. Perkins establishes an overview of interconnected ideas that help form the national prism. Even before the revolution, Americans were developing a particular ideology that saw republicanism as the “hope and present of the future” (p. 11). This specifically American ideology also espoused the concept of individualism, both political and economic, and free markets—open doors were to be welcome (p. 13). America also looked favorably on revolution, in the beginning applauding the French revolution, but then turning away from its violent excesses. As Perkins writes, while Americans “welcomed antimonarchical risings” they also “recoiled when revolutions went beyond the purely political sphere to repression, Bonapartism, and deep social change” (p. 13).
Unlike other countries, Americans came from a long tradition of self-government and independence, so that they did not have to “exorcise political privileges of rank or transform the economic order to create conditions in which republicanism could thrive” (p. 13). This limited understanding of the relationship between republicanism, democracy, and revolution would persist until the present where simplistic notions of political evolution continue to color diplomatic perceptions—this especially about the US’s pro-democracy policies (even though there is a wealth of empirical information that demonstrates that nascent democracies are more prone to instability than autocratic forms of government).
The International System Conditions Early US Foreign Policy
In terms of the way international politics conditions national ideals, as Perkins writes, the negotiations between the US and Britain to settle the revolutionary war began as a meeting between innocence and guile, but the Americans soon learned what it took to survive (p. 46). This represents a fundamental strain of realism (maybe even structural realism) that runs throughout the book. The giant moat of the Atlantic Ocean--the stopping power of water (to borrow a term from Mearsheimer)--was one reason that Americans could afford to be naïve of European continental realism.
Another good example of the international system conditioning US policy would be the US alliance with France during the revolution, as well as the US choice to violate many of its agreements with France by negotiating a separate peace with England. US maneuvering won them favorable terms with Britain as it convinced the nation that the US would not become a satellite to France (p. 44). A neorealist would argue that the Americans did this because it was to their benefit and it was permissible in the international system. In addition, an important aspect of the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation was the US need for a more robust foreign policy. As many of the Federalist papers made clear, one of the fundamental roles of the constitution was to help improve the nation’s ability to “survive and prosper in a hostile world” (p. 71).
Economic Success as a Lubricant to Republican system.
Perkins also examines the way economic success and especially land-ownership was seen as necessary for a functioning republican system in America’s early history. Perkins looks at how territorial expansion and commerce were an important lubricant for political success during the early years of the republic, and how the thirst for commercial success underpinned fundamental doctrines of isolationism (the US benefited from the neutral status by trading with both sides in international conflicts [see p. 94 for American legislative battles and interpretation of international law]), manifest destiny, the Louisiana Purchase, and the war with Mexico.
But in following with Perkins’s theme of the prism, these commercial policies were always instituted in fundamentally American ways. Thus, individualism, open-doors, and territorial expansion were favored at the early expense of corporatism and empire—and there was a political recognition (the Jeffersonian tradition to use a term by Walter Russell Mead) that land-ownership would lead to a more equal and inclusive republic. In addition, the avarice of the US was at least to some degree always moderated by long-standing ideals. For example, after Polk’s acquisition of Mexican land there was universal agreement in the Senate that some money should be paid to Mexico, even if this sum was a token 15 million dollars (p. 195-196).
Evaluation of the Book
This book is a great read for any student of US foreign policy or even history buffs. However, if a reader had to choose between Walter Russell Mead’s Special Providence and any book in this series, I would suggest reading Mead’s book first.
My five star rating of this book is a judgement not only of this volume but of the value of the book series as a whole. Out of the four books, Perkins’s book is perhaps the most eclectic; thus, it is probably the least consistent but the most faithful to the messiness of the historical record. Thus, I think the book is a great example to foreign policy scholars on how to set up a loose framework that can capture lots of disparate but relevant details in a particular case. One will find in this book a historian who is not afraid to dabble in balance of power realism, geopolitics, issues of national identity, and even historical accident.
November 17, 2012
Very good overview of the United States' first attempts at diplomacy. It was a fun little book, even though it was a text book for PSU.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews