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Moral Relativism
'A book on moral relativism by someone with a steely understanding of social reality. Only Steven Lukes could write it' - Richard Sennett, author of "The Craftsman". In the current age of mass immigration, religious extremism and international terrorism issues of global morality are more pertinent than ever. But many people who are naturally-inclined to believe in universal 'human rights' also have a fear of ethnocentric arrogance. This conflict is central to the highly-charged debate about moral relativism. One may be repulsed by female circumcision, but is such opposition merely a form of moral imperialism? In this book, Steven Lukes examines what people believe and why. Is there any common ground, or is it simply a matter of 'us' and 'them'? For instance, do East Asian values inherently challenge those held in the West? Lukes' incisive polemic cuts to the heart of the matter by focusing on the best arguments from both sides. He strips back conjecture to leave us with the key issues before laying bare the shocking requirements that moral relativism makes of its true advocates. This is philosophy at its exciting best and most relevant.
256 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2008
31 people are currently reading
302 people want to read
About the author
Steven Lukes
37 books41 followersSteven Michael Lukes is a political and social theorist. Currently he is a professor of politics and sociology at New York University. He was formerly a professor at the University of Siena, the European University Institute (Florence) and the London School of Economics.
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
June 21, 2011
Although he is very aware (and succinctly delineates) the issues of “cognitive relativism” that underpin cultural, moral, and social relativism, the refreshing part of Steven Lukes’ Moral Relativism is that he applies a sociological, as well as philosophical, perspective to the issues. Without surrendering the truth in relativism, he also recognizes the need for some kind of objective standard in ethics. Where can that objective standard be found? Lukes’ answer seems to be in justification. Is one able to “justify” one’s moral decision beyond one’s immediate social institution or network?
To avoid oversimplifying, please note that Lukes begins very carefully by establishing the perspective of “cognitive relativism” which has defined the post-modern world since Nietszche’s “There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing.” (p. 2) His approach uses an understanding of morality understood in a descriptive sense (p. 25) and we would expect that from a sociologist. “Indeed, theoretically, even if much or all of human morality turned out to be shared in common, there would still be the potentiality of diversity emerging, and that shared morality would, in the moral relativist view, be relative to all currently existing societies.” (pp. 27-8)
Yet, just as one thinks that Lukes is going to be “all in” for moral relativism as the ideal, he goes on to cite the source of moral authority being social and notes that anthropologists tried to insinuate that the ethical response to these social strictures was through an ethic of tolerance (p. 39). Then, he tears down that idea by pointing out that “Nationalism” (a force that divides humanity and arguably, instigates wars) is, by definition, intolerant. And cultural relativism is essentially a moral version of “Nationalism.”
I particularly enjoyed his references to the work of Tzvetan Todorov in On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism and Exoticism in French Thought. Todorov stated, “An entirely consistent relativist may demand that all foreigners go home, so they can live surrounded by their own values.” (p. 40) Naturally, this doesn’t have to be true merely of nationalists, but it can refer to specific religious persuasions, sexual preference groups, or cultural affinity groups, as well.
One senses that the argument is about to shift toward the consideration of objective moral values when Lukes cites the work of Eliot Turiel (The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention and The Culture of Morality: Social Development, Context and Conflict). Turiel’s research shows that children can distinguish and react differently to moral norms (don’t lie) and conventional norms (don’t belch) and can clearly distinguish between rules concerning bodily harm, theft, and truth (particularly, promise-breaking), on the one hand and rules concerning appropriate dress, etiquette, or social protocol on the other (p. 45).
There is a clever illustration from a moral relativist named Jonathan Haidt where compares morality to a rider on the back of an elephant. “We give far too much importance to the rider—conscious thought.” (p. 48) Is that rider merely an “adviser” to the elephant (social convention and cultural norms) or an “advocate” trying to persuade others of the elephant’s point of view? From my perspective, conscious thought needs to exert some effort in trying to “guide” the elephant rather than merely yelling for everyone else to get out of the way because he can’t control social momentum. But that may just be me!
When Lukes is at his best is when he advocates for a high level of abstraction (basic moral principles) versus low-level diversity (p. 53). In this way, he recognizes both the reality of cultural-social differences and the likely existence of certain universals. He argues that the similarities cannot be explained via the language theory of morals (ie. Chomsky suggested that we begin with a universal language capacity and this is developed in the local culture, so there could be a universal moral capacity to be developed in local culture), suggesting the linguistic differences can be resolved pragmatically, but moral dilemmas accelerate into problematic interactions (pp. 58-59). One either communicates or one doesn’t, but the signal to noise ratio in morality can be infinite. Hence, Lukes gravitates toward Norwegian social theorist, Jon Elster, with regard to moral, quasi-moral, social, and legal norms. Moral norms would be equivalent to the Kantian categorical imperatives, quasi-moral norms are more conditional (giving the example of reciprocity), social norms are tied to “convention” and involve being observed and feeling shame, and legal norms are enforced via threat of or implementation of punishment (p. 63).
Following that taxonomy, it is possible to understand what is important to the basic nature of humanity and what is “optional” within cultural differences. The danger, as Lukes warns his readers, is falling victim to the “projection error” of explaining other cultural practices in the light of our understanding instead of their own (p. 70). One illustration is particularly vivid with regard to understanding different practices. As the wise, spiritual men in the Dinka tribe (of the Southern Sudan) are close to the end of their lives, these “spearmasters” are placed in a hole prepared just for them and covered with cattle dung until they suffocate. We project the idea of euthanasia or assisted suicide upon the activity. Within the culture, this is a sacrifice to ensure that the vital force of the tribe is passed on to the tribe, that the cattle eco-system remains healthy, and that the tribe does not diminish. It is not so much about the dying spearmaster as about the tribe’s life. (p. 75)
In the same way, a lot of people don’t understand the American South’s long traditions of feuding, fanatical gun possession, and fighting. Recognition that all three of these traditions are vital parts of a “culture of honor” (compare with the Mediterranean cultures where dueling, weapon possession, and fighting at the drop of an insult are normal) and that they are most likely to occur where: 1) the individual perceives himself/herself at economic risk from her/his neighbors and 2) the state is perceived as weak or non-existent with regard to protecting the individual’s property. (p. 87) With the projection error, we lament both culture’s tendency toward violence without realizing that its purpose is to reduce the possibility of becoming victims to a crime against person or possession.
Before reaching his conclusions, Lukes discusses “value pluralism” as the belief that human goals are varied and that many of them are incommensurable (p. 98). Hence, it is impossible from the value pluralist’s perspective to find a moral calculus that can put all of these goals into perspective. Such is the perspective of Ann Swidler who advocates culture as not consisting of a unified system but as a “tool kit” of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views (p. 115). So, how do these fit together? To be sure, values “…are what we care about.” (p. 122) Yet, how do we apply them in a pluralistic world?
One clue may be “justifiability” as the key to moral motivation. The very process of deliberation may help create consensus (p. 136). He cites some evidence that retribution tied to proportionality may be a universal idea of morality (p. 139). If so, this fits nicely with a lot of Aristotle and allows one to come full circle.
Finally, Lukes distinguishes morality as “applying anywhere and everywhere and directing attention to the duties and obligations I have to other human beings, viewed from the standpoint of justice” (p. 145). He defines ethics as to the values and ideals that inhere in one or another specific way of life (pp. 145-6). In other words, morality (tied specifically to issues of justice) is global, ethics (tied to behavior in a community or culture) is local. So, how does one get from the second idea (ethics) which so closely ties to Aristotle’s view of ethics as “ethos” (habit) to an objective perspective of moral value? To start the discussion, Lukes appeals to Martha Nussbaum’s ten central human capabilities which form a “threshold” for human values: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, relation to other species, play, and control over one’s environment (p. 147). When the local “ethic” is such as to keep any of its participants from the opportunity to reach a minimal threshold in any of these ten basic capabilities, it is time to advocate for justice on the basis of morality. If this sounds an awful lot like the rhetoric from advocates for international human rights, that’s because Nussbaum’s work has influenced such efforts.
Nussbaum recognized that there would be local interpretations of these ten behaviors/capabilities (she didn’t call them rights as do other advocates), but she believed she could build an overlapping consensus between peoples with otherwise differing perspectives on the dignity of human life. By focusing on the thresholds of these capabilities, Lukes suggests that we may be able to find consensus on actions that are universally wrong as opposed to determining what is universally right (p. 154).
In closing, Lukes admits that it tends to be the same cultural imperialists who are leading the human rights movement, but observes that the exercise of considering human rights in terms of universal, objective, moral capacity doesn’t have to be imperialistic (cultural or otherwise). Instead, modern humanity simply needs to realize that throwing up one’s hands in the face of relativism is not an answer, but finding the absolutes by focusing on those actions that pull victims beneath the threshold may well be the beginnings of a series of answers (p. 159). Hence, Luke is able to appeal to both a Kantian and Aristotelian perspective in spite of the evidence of relativism and the desire for pluralism in our era.
By way of confession, I originally started reading this book looking for someone who staunchly advocated moral relativisim as a means of setting up a “straw man” when discussing this ethical approach in my ethics class. I finished the book with a firm appreciation for what Lukes is trying to accomplish. It is a quick and stimulating book to read and should be a reading in more ethics courses. I rate it highly because it seems like Lukes accomplished what he set out to accomplish.
To avoid oversimplifying, please note that Lukes begins very carefully by establishing the perspective of “cognitive relativism” which has defined the post-modern world since Nietszche’s “There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing.” (p. 2) His approach uses an understanding of morality understood in a descriptive sense (p. 25) and we would expect that from a sociologist. “Indeed, theoretically, even if much or all of human morality turned out to be shared in common, there would still be the potentiality of diversity emerging, and that shared morality would, in the moral relativist view, be relative to all currently existing societies.” (pp. 27-8)
Yet, just as one thinks that Lukes is going to be “all in” for moral relativism as the ideal, he goes on to cite the source of moral authority being social and notes that anthropologists tried to insinuate that the ethical response to these social strictures was through an ethic of tolerance (p. 39). Then, he tears down that idea by pointing out that “Nationalism” (a force that divides humanity and arguably, instigates wars) is, by definition, intolerant. And cultural relativism is essentially a moral version of “Nationalism.”
I particularly enjoyed his references to the work of Tzvetan Todorov in On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism and Exoticism in French Thought. Todorov stated, “An entirely consistent relativist may demand that all foreigners go home, so they can live surrounded by their own values.” (p. 40) Naturally, this doesn’t have to be true merely of nationalists, but it can refer to specific religious persuasions, sexual preference groups, or cultural affinity groups, as well.
One senses that the argument is about to shift toward the consideration of objective moral values when Lukes cites the work of Eliot Turiel (The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention and The Culture of Morality: Social Development, Context and Conflict). Turiel’s research shows that children can distinguish and react differently to moral norms (don’t lie) and conventional norms (don’t belch) and can clearly distinguish between rules concerning bodily harm, theft, and truth (particularly, promise-breaking), on the one hand and rules concerning appropriate dress, etiquette, or social protocol on the other (p. 45).
There is a clever illustration from a moral relativist named Jonathan Haidt where compares morality to a rider on the back of an elephant. “We give far too much importance to the rider—conscious thought.” (p. 48) Is that rider merely an “adviser” to the elephant (social convention and cultural norms) or an “advocate” trying to persuade others of the elephant’s point of view? From my perspective, conscious thought needs to exert some effort in trying to “guide” the elephant rather than merely yelling for everyone else to get out of the way because he can’t control social momentum. But that may just be me!
When Lukes is at his best is when he advocates for a high level of abstraction (basic moral principles) versus low-level diversity (p. 53). In this way, he recognizes both the reality of cultural-social differences and the likely existence of certain universals. He argues that the similarities cannot be explained via the language theory of morals (ie. Chomsky suggested that we begin with a universal language capacity and this is developed in the local culture, so there could be a universal moral capacity to be developed in local culture), suggesting the linguistic differences can be resolved pragmatically, but moral dilemmas accelerate into problematic interactions (pp. 58-59). One either communicates or one doesn’t, but the signal to noise ratio in morality can be infinite. Hence, Lukes gravitates toward Norwegian social theorist, Jon Elster, with regard to moral, quasi-moral, social, and legal norms. Moral norms would be equivalent to the Kantian categorical imperatives, quasi-moral norms are more conditional (giving the example of reciprocity), social norms are tied to “convention” and involve being observed and feeling shame, and legal norms are enforced via threat of or implementation of punishment (p. 63).
Following that taxonomy, it is possible to understand what is important to the basic nature of humanity and what is “optional” within cultural differences. The danger, as Lukes warns his readers, is falling victim to the “projection error” of explaining other cultural practices in the light of our understanding instead of their own (p. 70). One illustration is particularly vivid with regard to understanding different practices. As the wise, spiritual men in the Dinka tribe (of the Southern Sudan) are close to the end of their lives, these “spearmasters” are placed in a hole prepared just for them and covered with cattle dung until they suffocate. We project the idea of euthanasia or assisted suicide upon the activity. Within the culture, this is a sacrifice to ensure that the vital force of the tribe is passed on to the tribe, that the cattle eco-system remains healthy, and that the tribe does not diminish. It is not so much about the dying spearmaster as about the tribe’s life. (p. 75)
In the same way, a lot of people don’t understand the American South’s long traditions of feuding, fanatical gun possession, and fighting. Recognition that all three of these traditions are vital parts of a “culture of honor” (compare with the Mediterranean cultures where dueling, weapon possession, and fighting at the drop of an insult are normal) and that they are most likely to occur where: 1) the individual perceives himself/herself at economic risk from her/his neighbors and 2) the state is perceived as weak or non-existent with regard to protecting the individual’s property. (p. 87) With the projection error, we lament both culture’s tendency toward violence without realizing that its purpose is to reduce the possibility of becoming victims to a crime against person or possession.
Before reaching his conclusions, Lukes discusses “value pluralism” as the belief that human goals are varied and that many of them are incommensurable (p. 98). Hence, it is impossible from the value pluralist’s perspective to find a moral calculus that can put all of these goals into perspective. Such is the perspective of Ann Swidler who advocates culture as not consisting of a unified system but as a “tool kit” of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views (p. 115). So, how do these fit together? To be sure, values “…are what we care about.” (p. 122) Yet, how do we apply them in a pluralistic world?
One clue may be “justifiability” as the key to moral motivation. The very process of deliberation may help create consensus (p. 136). He cites some evidence that retribution tied to proportionality may be a universal idea of morality (p. 139). If so, this fits nicely with a lot of Aristotle and allows one to come full circle.
Finally, Lukes distinguishes morality as “applying anywhere and everywhere and directing attention to the duties and obligations I have to other human beings, viewed from the standpoint of justice” (p. 145). He defines ethics as to the values and ideals that inhere in one or another specific way of life (pp. 145-6). In other words, morality (tied specifically to issues of justice) is global, ethics (tied to behavior in a community or culture) is local. So, how does one get from the second idea (ethics) which so closely ties to Aristotle’s view of ethics as “ethos” (habit) to an objective perspective of moral value? To start the discussion, Lukes appeals to Martha Nussbaum’s ten central human capabilities which form a “threshold” for human values: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, relation to other species, play, and control over one’s environment (p. 147). When the local “ethic” is such as to keep any of its participants from the opportunity to reach a minimal threshold in any of these ten basic capabilities, it is time to advocate for justice on the basis of morality. If this sounds an awful lot like the rhetoric from advocates for international human rights, that’s because Nussbaum’s work has influenced such efforts.
Nussbaum recognized that there would be local interpretations of these ten behaviors/capabilities (she didn’t call them rights as do other advocates), but she believed she could build an overlapping consensus between peoples with otherwise differing perspectives on the dignity of human life. By focusing on the thresholds of these capabilities, Lukes suggests that we may be able to find consensus on actions that are universally wrong as opposed to determining what is universally right (p. 154).
In closing, Lukes admits that it tends to be the same cultural imperialists who are leading the human rights movement, but observes that the exercise of considering human rights in terms of universal, objective, moral capacity doesn’t have to be imperialistic (cultural or otherwise). Instead, modern humanity simply needs to realize that throwing up one’s hands in the face of relativism is not an answer, but finding the absolutes by focusing on those actions that pull victims beneath the threshold may well be the beginnings of a series of answers (p. 159). Hence, Luke is able to appeal to both a Kantian and Aristotelian perspective in spite of the evidence of relativism and the desire for pluralism in our era.
By way of confession, I originally started reading this book looking for someone who staunchly advocated moral relativisim as a means of setting up a “straw man” when discussing this ethical approach in my ethics class. I finished the book with a firm appreciation for what Lukes is trying to accomplish. It is a quick and stimulating book to read and should be a reading in more ethics courses. I rate it highly because it seems like Lukes accomplished what he set out to accomplish.
Read
August 13, 2009The book centers around two conflicting intuitions: 1) there are universal principles of right and wrong; and 2) who are we to judge other cultures? One chapter explores the notion of what a "culture" is and comes to the conclusion that it eludes an easy definition. The final chapter of the book concludes that the second question is not a good question. Activists within societies challenge cultural institutions of their own societies such as female genital mutilation and wife-beating, and it is those in power who benefit from the institutions who invoke the concept of protecting "culture". The author suggests two approaches for making moral judgments: 1) the "Kantian" question of whether all participants affected by a custom would agree that it is positive and justified, and 2) the "Aristotelian" question of whether the custom drags any of the participants below a threshold of human capabilities. The author concludes that wife-beating, for example, does not meet either of these two criteria.
This book left me with some hope that there is a way to avoid cultural moral relativism without falling into the trap of moral imperialism and ethnocentrism.
This book left me with some hope that there is a way to avoid cultural moral relativism without falling into the trap of moral imperialism and ethnocentrism.
March 4, 2010
I was disappointed by Steven Lukes Moral Relativism. I had expected an interesting treatise on the philosophical aspects of moral relativism, but instead the book is grounded more in sociology and anthropology, which, by personal taste, I find less engaging.
Lukes makes some interesting points about moral relativism. He asserts that there are two kinds of moral relativism. First is the concept that there are many moral systems instead of a single universal one; Amazonian tribal peoples have a different moral system than suburban Californians. Moral relativism also encompasses the belief that no moral system should be more privileged than another and that the morality of a particular behavior depends on the context. It is this idea that agitates people.
Lukes' discussion of moral relativism made clear to me that moral disputes can be a disagreement over the fundamental facts of the matter in question, rather than a disagreement about a particular moral precept. The prohibition of murder is an example of a fairly universal moral precept. But, how does this relate to the death penalty? I am against the death penalty because I think it is murder, the intentional killing of another human being. I live in the state of Texas where many people are pro death penalty. Does that mean they don't believe murder is immoral? Of course not. We disagree not about a prohibition against murder, but about whether execution of a convicted felon is murder. It seems that many disputes about morality are like this, more about definitions than about actual morality.
Read
October 15, 2016I'm declining to rate because I'm not well-versed in this topic to determine how well and how impartially the author had presented his argument. But it was a clear and concise argument, with sufficient background to aid the reader's understanding.
September 2, 2009
I'm still puzzling over how I feel about this quote from the book "Swidler cites as one example the small role played in young women's career plans and family choices by values and plans as opposed to their immediate situations: "a first job which works out, or a boyfriend who does not.""
The entire book was colored for me by the women's issues it brought up. There was an amazing focus on women, their sexual rights, status, discipline, right to mutilate [women:] that I just did not anticipate reading on picking up this book. I'd been thinking that murder, Death Panels for the elderly, sexual politics, abortion, manners, education, those were moral standards in question.
Are morals relative to circumstances, times and customs? Is there a single moral standard that is best practice? If so, why are there so many variations? I did appreciate that practices were spelled out as to why the custom originated, but was just taken aback on the focus on women. Possibly because I'm a woman from the USA I found it really odd that any of it was in question as a possible viable moral alternative.
Mind you, it's not the focus of the book or even most of the focus. I was just surprised to see it at all. Moral bias, anyone?
The entire book was colored for me by the women's issues it brought up. There was an amazing focus on women, their sexual rights, status, discipline, right to mutilate [women:] that I just did not anticipate reading on picking up this book. I'd been thinking that murder, Death Panels for the elderly, sexual politics, abortion, manners, education, those were moral standards in question.
Are morals relative to circumstances, times and customs? Is there a single moral standard that is best practice? If so, why are there so many variations? I did appreciate that practices were spelled out as to why the custom originated, but was just taken aback on the focus on women. Possibly because I'm a woman from the USA I found it really odd that any of it was in question as a possible viable moral alternative.
Mind you, it's not the focus of the book or even most of the focus. I was just surprised to see it at all. Moral bias, anyone?
December 4, 2012
Moral Relativism is a topic that has been coming up more and more in my life as I find myself at odds with those around me on the true nature of morality. Moral Relativism can mean so many different things though. I only know that I believe morality to be a construct of the human mind, and therefore fluid and subjective.
I was hoping to get more enlightenment on the Philosophy of Moral Relativism with this book. Unfortunately it was more of a Sociological book about the clashes of morality when cultures meet. This, of course, is another facet of Moral Relativity, and one that in itself can still be quite interesting, even if it's not what I was hoping for when I picked this book up. Unfortunately this book was nothing more than a collection of quotes from better minds, stitched together in a nearly unreadable rambling manner.
I will keep looking into Moral Relativism as a concept to better understand my views, or perhaps help change them, but this book offered no real insight for me.
I was hoping to get more enlightenment on the Philosophy of Moral Relativism with this book. Unfortunately it was more of a Sociological book about the clashes of morality when cultures meet. This, of course, is another facet of Moral Relativity, and one that in itself can still be quite interesting, even if it's not what I was hoping for when I picked this book up. Unfortunately this book was nothing more than a collection of quotes from better minds, stitched together in a nearly unreadable rambling manner.
I will keep looking into Moral Relativism as a concept to better understand my views, or perhaps help change them, but this book offered no real insight for me.
December 10, 2012
This book is slim and "sweet" about Moral Relativism.
It goes through the history and development, starting with Montaigne, explaining why the idea gained currency recently, especially in Anthropology, and then pokes some holes.
At some point he says Moral Relativism is a non-sequitur, after he has spent 159 pages defining it.
Relativism is an antidote to Absolutism, but not a perfect solution...
A quote he uses which was memorable by Robert Frost explains the problem rather well: "a liberal is a man too broad-minded to take his own side in a quarrel." Lukes points out that ultimately Moral Relativism goes further, it prompts us to defend arguments we disagree with, or claim we agree with nothing at all.
Lukes points out that this is a problem if we are trying to get somewhere, towards some sort of consensus of morality, and additionally, bars the idea of finding codes that we agree on mutually as humans.
It goes through the history and development, starting with Montaigne, explaining why the idea gained currency recently, especially in Anthropology, and then pokes some holes.
At some point he says Moral Relativism is a non-sequitur, after he has spent 159 pages defining it.
Relativism is an antidote to Absolutism, but not a perfect solution...
A quote he uses which was memorable by Robert Frost explains the problem rather well: "a liberal is a man too broad-minded to take his own side in a quarrel." Lukes points out that ultimately Moral Relativism goes further, it prompts us to defend arguments we disagree with, or claim we agree with nothing at all.
Lukes points out that this is a problem if we are trying to get somewhere, towards some sort of consensus of morality, and additionally, bars the idea of finding codes that we agree on mutually as humans.
March 28, 2012
Does anyone know what this guy is talking about? Are any of these sentence structures legal? You know, I'm taking a philosophy class in school and I totally love it, which is why this book caught my eye. I wanted to read about this topic and educate myself outside of class, but I just can't do it with this book. I got through the preface and the first couple pages of the first chapter, and to be honest, it just seems like he highlighted each word, clicked the 'Synonyms' button, and chose the last word on the list.
If you're gonna write a book on a subtopic like this, the least you could do is make it understandable. For what other reason would you want to publish a book like this than to educate people who don't know about it?
Gonna try and get through at least the first chapter. Wish me luck.
If you're gonna write a book on a subtopic like this, the least you could do is make it understandable. For what other reason would you want to publish a book like this than to educate people who don't know about it?
Gonna try and get through at least the first chapter. Wish me luck.
November 27, 2013
A fascinating and complex subject, thoroughly covered. Alas, the author ruins most of the reading experience with his insistance on structuring the whole book on quotations from other writers. No page without quotes, sometimes up to a dozen per page, resulting in a dull staccato text which is more tiring than enlightening.
June 29, 2008
Not as intriguing as I first thought.
April 30, 2021
On the whole it's clear and concise, a straightforward read which focuses more on the C.19th/20th anthropological and political roots of cultural -> moral relativism, rather than the philosophical development of moral relativism in metaethics and the intellectual contexts that contributed to the establishment of the division between continental and analytic philosophy, where the ontology of morality became disputed. Although Lukes recognises that Nietzsche can be understood as making contributions to the establishment of moral relativism in Western philosophy through his perspectivism and his attack on conventional Christian morality (he begins the book by quoting Nietzsche's perspectivism hence to gesture towards his importance in the historical development of moral relativism), he makes little more of the crossover between proliferating faithlessness and the growth of empiricism in European philosophy from the 17th century (we see this through Hobbes > Hume > Logical Positivism (Moore; Russell; Ayer; and more recently Simon Blackburn).
Furthermore I do not feel that Lukes makes enough clear argumentation to clarify the distinction there is between value pluralism and moral relativism, which probably leaves readers with more questions than answers. Not entirely a bad thing, but although he (to put it crudely) asserts that cultural & moral diversity is not a justification for accepting moral relativism, he does not provide a clear epistemology that helps us ground judgements that forms of moral & cultural diversity can be coherently adjudicated as non-relatively detrimental, that is to say, as a human-being in a general sense, rather than as a member of a culture possessing contingent moral standards. The issue at stake for Lukes is whether it is possible to establish common, cross-cultural comprehension of particular actions and concepts that people agree are morally wrong, undesirable, or deserving of disapproval - such as abuse. The issue for Lukes is that between different cultures, people cannot necessarily agree on what constitutes a particular transgression of a definition of a moral wrong such as abuse. For Lukes, the problem is that what may be judged as abusive in one culture may not be seen as abusive in another. Lukes wants to argue that nevertheless, evidence suggests that even if people cannot always agree on whether a specific contentious case meets the given criteria for transgressing a particular action considered morally wrong, an overriding concept of moral wrongdoing (or behaviour considered absolutely reprehensible) is cross-culturally persistent.
However, Lukes does not clearly establish whether or not certain actions can be perceived separately from culture, which hinders him from defining whether it is possible to arrive at definitions of actions & concepts that people agree are morally reprehensible in ways that cut across cultural divisions. A sensible way to approach this is to ground it in an empiricism that derives moral imperatives from facts of experience: for example, we know from the sensory experience of the hardness of our knuckles in relation to the soft tissue and cartilage on our faces that getting smacked in the face hurts, so we draw the moral conclusion that it's best not to do it to people - somewhat facile examples such as these provide us with empirical reasons to formulate & accept particular moral doctrines. But Lukes doesn't attempt to explain the possible roots of moral behaviour & how moral standards can be justified in terms like these; he leaves the question open. Where Lukes does not adequately distinguish between value pluralism and moral relativism hinges on his failure to recognise that yes, there are many possible, morally acceptable ways of life, but also that there are ways of life non-relatively worse than others. He thus fails to provide grounds for adjudicating between morally acceptable and reprehensible forms of cultural diversity.
Lukes states early on in the book that he himself rejects moral relativism. He explains what moral relativism is cogently enough, though his historical sketch is of limited scope. However, in his failure to provide grounds for determining between morally acceptable and morally reprehensible forms of conduct and cultural diversity, he fails to establish the basis on which he rejects it. Although there is interesting material in this book not found in many others that touch on relativism, such as the idea's connections with anthropological methodology, it's hard to see it as a total success, given his failure to meet some of his own stated objectives. Basically, I just don't think Lukes goes deep enough into this issue to reach persuasive conclusions.
Furthermore I do not feel that Lukes makes enough clear argumentation to clarify the distinction there is between value pluralism and moral relativism, which probably leaves readers with more questions than answers. Not entirely a bad thing, but although he (to put it crudely) asserts that cultural & moral diversity is not a justification for accepting moral relativism, he does not provide a clear epistemology that helps us ground judgements that forms of moral & cultural diversity can be coherently adjudicated as non-relatively detrimental, that is to say, as a human-being in a general sense, rather than as a member of a culture possessing contingent moral standards. The issue at stake for Lukes is whether it is possible to establish common, cross-cultural comprehension of particular actions and concepts that people agree are morally wrong, undesirable, or deserving of disapproval - such as abuse. The issue for Lukes is that between different cultures, people cannot necessarily agree on what constitutes a particular transgression of a definition of a moral wrong such as abuse. For Lukes, the problem is that what may be judged as abusive in one culture may not be seen as abusive in another. Lukes wants to argue that nevertheless, evidence suggests that even if people cannot always agree on whether a specific contentious case meets the given criteria for transgressing a particular action considered morally wrong, an overriding concept of moral wrongdoing (or behaviour considered absolutely reprehensible) is cross-culturally persistent.
However, Lukes does not clearly establish whether or not certain actions can be perceived separately from culture, which hinders him from defining whether it is possible to arrive at definitions of actions & concepts that people agree are morally reprehensible in ways that cut across cultural divisions. A sensible way to approach this is to ground it in an empiricism that derives moral imperatives from facts of experience: for example, we know from the sensory experience of the hardness of our knuckles in relation to the soft tissue and cartilage on our faces that getting smacked in the face hurts, so we draw the moral conclusion that it's best not to do it to people - somewhat facile examples such as these provide us with empirical reasons to formulate & accept particular moral doctrines. But Lukes doesn't attempt to explain the possible roots of moral behaviour & how moral standards can be justified in terms like these; he leaves the question open. Where Lukes does not adequately distinguish between value pluralism and moral relativism hinges on his failure to recognise that yes, there are many possible, morally acceptable ways of life, but also that there are ways of life non-relatively worse than others. He thus fails to provide grounds for adjudicating between morally acceptable and reprehensible forms of cultural diversity.
Lukes states early on in the book that he himself rejects moral relativism. He explains what moral relativism is cogently enough, though his historical sketch is of limited scope. However, in his failure to provide grounds for determining between morally acceptable and morally reprehensible forms of conduct and cultural diversity, he fails to establish the basis on which he rejects it. Although there is interesting material in this book not found in many others that touch on relativism, such as the idea's connections with anthropological methodology, it's hard to see it as a total success, given his failure to meet some of his own stated objectives. Basically, I just don't think Lukes goes deep enough into this issue to reach persuasive conclusions.
April 18, 2019
What makes the current post metaphysical moment so destabilising for moral relativist? Is it the advent of media, news or just a highlighting of the differences within the world and its practices that makes us seem as banner holders for liberty, freedom, cultural dissension (depending on where you are from)? Or is it they were unceremoniously called out for having differing adaptations to how people are treated and treat others in their socially prescribed space and hence a sort of moral and ethical imperialism? Steven Lukes argues cogently that ethnographic histories, interpretations and perhaps just a little circumstantial foreground could allow for moral relativity. However, he goes to lengths to explain that there are many persuasive sides to wanting to give others their subsequent cultural, religious, political space of actions. But we do live in a world where consensus of living a flourishing life that's replete with conditions of individual liberty, sustenance and discourses of what promotes and higher satisfying individual self and community is not a paradox. It can be achieved and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a democratic framework which can be debated and adopted globally to foster humanity.
May 4, 2022
A carefully reasoned book on a difficult subject. Lukes draws fairly easily and accessibly on a range of interesting and relevant disciplines - philosophy, anthropology, sociology and psychology.
Also useful for its efforts at trying to clearly define difficult social concepts - such as norms, values and morals.
There are not easy answers to questions of moral relativism, but Lukes conclusions seem reasonable, if a little unsurprising. In short, we should acknowledge some level of cultural pluralism while still engaging in some level of moral judgement and critique of culturally and morally diverse practices. From Kant, the test is whether something is justifiable to all affected. From Aristotle, the test is whether something maintains some minimum acceptable thresholds for protecting central human 'capabilities' associated with human rights and flourishing.
Seems simple, yet arguably many immoral practices remain and persist across our cultures...Strong relativistic positions do not help us to challenge them and establish 'overlapping consensus' across cultures (John Rawls).
Also useful for its efforts at trying to clearly define difficult social concepts - such as norms, values and morals.
There are not easy answers to questions of moral relativism, but Lukes conclusions seem reasonable, if a little unsurprising. In short, we should acknowledge some level of cultural pluralism while still engaging in some level of moral judgement and critique of culturally and morally diverse practices. From Kant, the test is whether something is justifiable to all affected. From Aristotle, the test is whether something maintains some minimum acceptable thresholds for protecting central human 'capabilities' associated with human rights and flourishing.
Seems simple, yet arguably many immoral practices remain and persist across our cultures...Strong relativistic positions do not help us to challenge them and establish 'overlapping consensus' across cultures (John Rawls).
June 11, 2023
"Moral relativism disturbs and attracts, and it disturbs because it attracts." (p. 151) This is a good discussion of the many sides of the complex issue of moral relativism and its cousin values diversity. It's a good book for anyone who cares about these things.
December 11, 2017
This was a good introduction to the topic and issues concerning moral relativism.
August 19, 2013
Lukes' Moral Relativism offers the best and most thoughtful introduction to the subject that I have come across. If nothing else, the opening chapters provide the background and history that illustrates the appeal of moral relativism to, particularly, anthropologists. Those reading the very short book will definitely leave with a challenged view of the seriousness and strength of relativism as a philosophical position, and understand the way that the position makes its way into postmodern literature.
There are a few problems with the book; the first is that while Lukes offers some tangential thoughts on relativism at the end of the book, it doesn't really answer many of the substantive objections raised by modern anti-relativists. You can see, if you take the time, how Lukes' version of the position might dodge some of the typical objections, but Lukes himself doesn't make that clear, and so there's definitely something lacking as far as argumentative flavor. The fact that Lukes chooses to emphasize adequate description of a morally important act (e.g. abortion, suicide, patricide) in a cultural context gives him a strong line against philosophical theorists who neglect the problems of translation in talking about inter-cultural ethics.
There's also something lacking as far as systematic description; Lukes spends a lot of time giving examples that are important to the primary source literature on moral relativism, documents discussing rituals performed outside of Europe, as seen by Anglo anthropologists. These examples are important, but they start to feel redundant and they don't always generalize together clearly along the axis that Lukes is trying to describe. There's a lot to be said for good editing, and Lukes' book is so short that though the material could have been edited down, he would likely have had to add some longer theoretical sections in order to maintain the 170ish page length. (I have a serious bias, though, as I really enjoy the theoretical sections.)
On the whole, it is an engaging and important work, made much better by the fact that it is accessible to beginners, clearly written as a short introduction to the subject and the position. For those who want to talk about the subject in a reasonable, thoughtful way (instead of to just vent about it in the way Popes tend to) then this introduction is a good place to start. It didn't move me towards accepting the position of relativism in any important way, but it did leave me with a much improved understanding of the underlying arguments.
There are a few problems with the book; the first is that while Lukes offers some tangential thoughts on relativism at the end of the book, it doesn't really answer many of the substantive objections raised by modern anti-relativists. You can see, if you take the time, how Lukes' version of the position might dodge some of the typical objections, but Lukes himself doesn't make that clear, and so there's definitely something lacking as far as argumentative flavor. The fact that Lukes chooses to emphasize adequate description of a morally important act (e.g. abortion, suicide, patricide) in a cultural context gives him a strong line against philosophical theorists who neglect the problems of translation in talking about inter-cultural ethics.
There's also something lacking as far as systematic description; Lukes spends a lot of time giving examples that are important to the primary source literature on moral relativism, documents discussing rituals performed outside of Europe, as seen by Anglo anthropologists. These examples are important, but they start to feel redundant and they don't always generalize together clearly along the axis that Lukes is trying to describe. There's a lot to be said for good editing, and Lukes' book is so short that though the material could have been edited down, he would likely have had to add some longer theoretical sections in order to maintain the 170ish page length. (I have a serious bias, though, as I really enjoy the theoretical sections.)
On the whole, it is an engaging and important work, made much better by the fact that it is accessible to beginners, clearly written as a short introduction to the subject and the position. For those who want to talk about the subject in a reasonable, thoughtful way (instead of to just vent about it in the way Popes tend to) then this introduction is a good place to start. It didn't move me towards accepting the position of relativism in any important way, but it did leave me with a much improved understanding of the underlying arguments.
December 15, 2014
I never had must interest in ethics, and so I figured that this small version would be a nice look at the state of contemporary ethics - which I would say it succeeds at, however superficially some of the content is gone over. For me though, true ethics starts with Kant and ends with Nietzsche. It is for this very reason that I have never taken much interest in it. Ethics today is more an issue of politics than it is one of "living the good life," and I feel that this shows through with the content that is presented (which in all fairness he does cover a large base). I personally hold politics in little regard, and so this book, though only about 150 pages, became a bore to me. Nevertheless it is not without it's merit. It gives plenty to mull over and is a great reference source for further readings.
December 13, 2008
I come across more and more of my students who think that morals are "just personal". I had one person tell me she thought murder was wrong, but she didn't think she could impose that view on anyone else. I asked her what she would think if i murdered her parents. She replied, "I would think that was awful, but I don't think I could force you to think it was". This book is a good antidote to those kinds of views but takes seriously the idea that there is value pluralism.
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June 27, 2011This is admittedly a pretty high-altitude examination of the subject, so someone seeking a more sophisticated treatment from a particular disciplinary perspective (e.g., philosophy, anthropology, moral psychology) should look elsewhere. Yet if one wants a philosophically astute and sociologically informed discussion that raises plenty of interesting questions to be pursued in greater depth, I would definitely recommend this.
September 7, 2010
What begins as an analytic assessment of moral relativism begins to develop into a diatribe that questions the value of pluralism, univeralism amongst other social theories without fully defining, supporting or opposing moral relativism. Only its conclusion can really be seen as focusing specifically on the subject.
January 1, 2021
This book was quite repetitive in its message. Moral Relativism does differ among person to person and among groups of people and culture. The examples used to explain the concepts were varied and numerous. It was a bit of a tough read and felt more like a dictionary of related terms.
November 18, 2009
Tied a bunch of big ideas together in a very helpful way for me...
June 30, 2013
A decent book but there are far better treatments of this topic elsewhere.
May 22, 2015
This is a solid, succinct little book about how we can all get along and improve our treatment of humanity in general.
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