This book is quite striking--both in its claims and its tone. Lakoff, a champion of progressive values, is under the impression that the conservative model of thought has completely dominated American culture for the past 35 years (at the time of publishing in 2008). Conservatives, he believes, expertly harness the power of narrative, symbols, and stories to quite literally change the brains of American citizens. Conservatives prove more effective than liberals in their persuasion power because they do not share an “enlightenment” view of the reason which understands rationality to be ultimately universal, literal, and cognitive. Instead, conservative talk heads provoke the imagination with crafted metaphors ("nation as a family"), narrative frames ("terrorists as villains"), psychological framing ("Avoid a nanny state"), political symbolism ("American exceptionalism"), and many more subtle language games for imprinting a conservative frame. The damage, Lakoff fears, undermines the crucial value underpinning American Democracy--empathy. He hopes to convince his liberal compatriots to follow him in a New Enlightenment view of the brain, one which acknowledges the power of unconscious reasoning, the intermingling of emotion, and the power of imagination. His resources promise a guide for how to better frame progressive values in the public square.
An impression a reader gets from Lakoff’s urgency is that conservatives are dominating all aspects of American life—media, politics, entertainment, and academics. But are conservatives really winning the culture war? This sentiment does not seem to be shared by even the most nominal conservative even if asked from the perspective of 2008! Here it is probably wise to drastically expand the lexical range of Lakoff’s view of conservatism. For him, the winner of a culture war is not calculated by counting how many Rs or Ds control the senate and house but is fundamentally connected to the use of language. By-and-large Lakoff argues that the American citizenry uses metaphorical structures in their political talk which is most associated with conservativism. Regardless of this expansive definition, he still believes conservatives have mostly achieved cultural and political control. For example, he states, “conservatives have an easier time constructing effective slogans and message. In addition to having a better message machine and more radio and TV stations, they got the public first, instilling their worldview and their deep framing over thirty-five years.” (239) This dramatic historical analysis appears extremely narrow and disconnected from the felt experience of many. Still, Lakoff is very brilliant and his study on metaphors is eye-opening. Thus, he is worth considering. Lakoff does well to highlight the prevalence of metaphorical/symbolic thinking but his empiricist metaphysics leaves many questions unanswered and makes his moral claims less convincing.
It could be said that metaphors are a way of linking physical/primal experiences with the imagination. The concept of "imagination" proves difficult to explain empirically but Lakoff believes its contours can at least be mapped. Similar, perhaps, to draping a sheet over an object--the content of the object underneath disappears from sight but you can at least determine its shape. Similarly, the use of language, brain activity, and neuroscience serves as an observable phenomenon for understanding the unconscious (or the “self” underneath the physical phenomena). But Lakoff's crucial miscalculation is to mistake the mapping for the thing itself. His emphasis on metaphors may explain how the imagination gets used in everyday life but offers no real explanation for what the imagination is and its qualities. Looking at brain activity alone cannot provide answers to what makes a "self" a "self."
If this critique is warranted, then Lakoff loosely follows in the epistemological quandaries of Kant. Like Kant, problems arise regarding individual consciousness and selfhood. If the “self” is situated in the physical world, then it too must obey the blind and determined laws of nature. On the other hand, if the “self” is immaterial and transcends these physical forces then it fundamentally loses its ability to perceive and act within the world. Ironically, Lakoff falls in a similar trap as the Old Enlightenment. He somewhat notices this problem at the end of chapter 13 when he admits the difficulty in explaining the substance of “personality” from the perspective of neuroscience alone. Thus, everything in the world can be explained comfortably within his system except the "self" itself.
Lakoff's moral urgency also seems woefully unfounded due to his near epistemological relativism. He uses strong language condemning the conservative program and presents his political philosophy as more Democratic. "Democracy" he cries, "is too important to leave the shaping of the brains of Americans to authoritarians." (120). The basic and obvious assumption here is that his conception of a Democratic nation is "good." But I am not sure what his tools and resources are for evaluating why this "good" is superior to other visions of the good. What makes progressivism a better "worldview" than conservatism? He makes lots of moral claims--sometimes subtly with his chosen language--but I just do not discern how he derived these moral claims beyond just decrying that views are either democratic or anti-democratic.
One can get the impression that a view is “right” if it can be shown to produce activity in a certain portion of the brain. A worldview or pattern of thought which happens to fire more neurons in the correct portions of the frontal cortex can be measured as more morally substantive (or visa versa). Studying the brain can equally signal the existence of moral deficiencies. For example, “Conservatives show less ability to respond to complex and potentially conflicting situations as measured by the [anterior cingulated cortex] response.” (198) Consequently, the morality of Lakoff’s political philosophy seems to hinge on whether someone possesses enough mirror neuron circuitry to be deemed sufficiently “empathetic” and “cooperative.” Empathy is of more moral worth, Lakoff believes, because it proved to be an evolutionary advantage (“because cooperators do better than hermits or misanthropes”) and thus is a more “natural” state than compared to the disposition of competitiveness.
Making what is deemed “natural” or “evolutionarily advantageous” the calculous for virtue creates horrendous moral ambiguities—it is merely Old-Enlightenment pragmatism under a Darwinian garb. The scaffolding of this kind of morality is built firmly in the air. Evil, for this kind of pragmatic liberal, has no substance but would be defined by privation of evolutionary benefits. Human behavior is explained primarily through empirical analysis and as author Lewis Mumford would starkly remind us: “For this kind of liberal, the most heinous fact about a war is not the evil intentions and purposes that one or both sides may disclose: it is mainly the needless waste of material, the unbearable amount of human suffering, the premature deaths.” And in the face of such tragedy, it is a sufficient theodicy for Lakoff to remind the sufferer that the cruelties of the gulags were ultimately due to a deficiency of brain activity in the mind of a totalitarian. This explanation also conveniently ignores that fact that scientific pragmatists could easily justify their own use of brutal eugenics in the first place using evolutionary language.
Whenever Lakoff does try to explain moral behaviors he ends up making some bizarre assumptions. For example, he admits he once struggled to explain how political conservatism could end up advocating for so many seemingly unrelated topics. For example, what does abortion have to do with gun rights? What does the free market have to do with traditional family values? What do proposals about lowing taxes have to do with the war on terror? When explained in isolation, these claims can sometimes even appear contradictory! His solution is to believe that an overarching metaphorical structure supersedes over all of these issues. He further theorizes that the mind of a conservative is situated under the metaphorical sub-structure of a "strict family." Like a strict father, the government must protect the family against threats. Like a strict father, vested authorities must be obeyed. Like a strict father, discipline and responsibility are rewarded. And because things like sexual promiscuity disappoint a strict father, so sex must be regulated in a culture. And because a strict father necessary assumes strong gender-specific responsibilities in the home, so LGBT rights must be limited due to their effect of flattening gender roles. The list goes on and Lakoff is convinced this metaphorical structure explains the conservative web of behaviors . (True progressives, by the way, use the “family as nurturing” metaphor where empathy is the supreme virtue.)
A superimposing metaphor does not eradicate political contradictions in policy, Lakoff readily admits. Any instance of dissonance is mostly caused by a lack of reflection. This lack of reflection explains why people can so readily vote against their own best interests or adopt a more moderate position. In the end, Lakoff’s psychological explanations seem entirely farfetched. For example, which is easier to believe and prove at face value (1) someone is against abortion because their brain structure is so severely altered due to using a repeated metaphorical sub-structure in which the powers-to-be are imagined as a "strict father" and he alone is to determine whether his wife gives birth so any extramarital behaviors must be punished (See page 78-79). Or (2) someone is against abortion because their moral conviction about life beginning at conception naturally leads them to have empathy for the unborn. Lakoff's near-Freudian psychoanalysis of human behaviors is at least creative. While Lakoff is free to have empathy for ecological environments, those who share a concern over the unborn are considered victims of faulty brain structure and need reprogramming. I suppose it is only the enlightened like Lakoff who determine who or what should be recipients of empathy.
Lakoff's view that progressivism and conservativism can be distinguished not through undergirding principles but with metaphors also makes him oblivious to some crucial biconceptualism of his own. For example, he makes comments in passing that "changes [regarding metaphorical structures] will be hard to reverse. It is easier to dismantle a civil service built over a century than to put one together." (90). Later he encourages his liberal friends to take the long-view of history: "It also takes patience. Change does not come overnight." (116). Sentiments like this guide his progressive program. He understands, according to his own system, that changing brains is more important than bursts of political power or temporary revolution. And I am sure the giant of modern conservatism Roger Scruton would readily agree with him out of principle, for it was him who noted, "Conservatism starts from a sentiment that all mature people can readily share: the sentiment that good things are easily destroyed, but not easily created." At least this aspect of Lakoff’s politics appeared rather conservative in principle.
Being someone who literally wrote the book on metaphors, I am sure Lakoff chose his words carefully when describing his relationship to conservatism. In this book, he goes to great lengths to warn his readers that slight language changes can plunge oneself into a web of predetermined metaphorical structures. A recent political example would be Bush's “war” on terrorism in the Middle East. In chapter 6 he writes: "'War on terror' means war without end. It was used by the Bush administration as a ploy to get virtually unlimited war powers--and further domestic influence...because the mention of "terror" activates a fear response, and fear activates a conservative worldview." Later he observes how this language can conveniently squelch alternative opinions since "being against war as a response was to be unpatriotic" (we should note a similar phenomenon occurring with the term “progressive” since to challenge its values would mean being labelled anti-progress). Two lines down Lakoff then states: "The war metaphor put progressives on the defensive." The word “defensive” sticks out vividly! It is as if this episode of American history was yet another instance of the ongoing culture “war” between conservatives and progressives. Lakoff would go on for several pages detailing how the Bush’s administration’s "war" against the enemies of American democracy justified morally reprehensible political policy in the Middle East due to it's carefully chosen language alone. Lakoff's solution is to summon others to "war" against the conservatives (who coincidently also threaten democracy). But as Lakoff is careful to show, even the metaphor of “war” can be easily weaponized for political gain. This incongruity is especially obvious. Maybe Lakoff should take Lakoff's warnings more seriously.
Throughout this book, Lakoff presents a method for how to continue the trajectory of progress and lead the way to a “New Enlightenment” which takes into account new scientific discoveries about mankind and incorporate them into American Democracy in a reflective manner. This anthropology—unlike the old way—reflects intensely on the unconscious forces which precede Rationality itself. If symbolism, imagination, emotion, metaphor, and narrative represent the scaffolding of thoughts then they become powerful tools for aligning the imaginations of citizens. Indeed, Lakoff credits the vicious left-right schism of modern-day as a conflict of imaginations rather than principles; metaphors rather than facts. But Lakoff’s new enlightenment project, though it shares in its predecessor’s optimism for society, ironically denigrates man in the process. Indeed, his orotundity reveals a strain of pragmatism backed by extreme empiricism and thus replaces any semblance of truth, goodness, and beauty with the ebb-and-flow of an evolutionary calculus. Lakoff feels satisfied in communicating the moral superiority of his position by simply showing its supposed evolutionary advantages. But if there is one lesson Lakoff wished to tell throughout it is that the world of political action must transcend the rational man: it must be as large as the human imagination itself. Unfortunately, his analysis fails to reach this height. His scientific investigation is tainted with bombast while his attempt at metaphorical reconstruction adopts the very structures he wishes to eliminate. In the end, the political mind of Lakoff seems immutable and his capacity for empathy for those who disagree leaves a lot to be desired.