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Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 1
Wittgenstein finished part 1 of the Philosophical Investigations in the spring of 1945. From 1946 to 1949 he worked on the philosophy of psychology almost without interruption. The present two-volume work comprises many of his writings over this period. Some of the remarks contained here were culled for part 2 of the Investigations ; others were set aside and appear in the collection known as Zettel . The great majority, however, although of excellent quality, have hitherto remained unpublished.
This bilingual edition of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology presents the first English translation of an essential body of Wittegenstein's work. It elaborates Wittgenstein's views on psychological concepts such as expectation, sensation, knowing how to follow a rule, and knowledge of the sensations of other persons. It also shows strong emphasis on the "anthropological" aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. Philosophers, as well as anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists will welcome this important publication.
This bilingual edition of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology presents the first English translation of an essential body of Wittegenstein's work. It elaborates Wittgenstein's views on psychological concepts such as expectation, sensation, knowing how to follow a rule, and knowledge of the sensations of other persons. It also shows strong emphasis on the "anthropological" aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. Philosophers, as well as anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists will welcome this important publication.
422 pages, paper
First published November 15, 1980
About the author
Ludwig Wittgenstein
362 books3,013 followersLudwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (Ph.D., Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1929) was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
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October 23, 2022Man atrodo, kad šiuolaikinis neuromokslas būtų Wittgenstein'ui atsakęs bent į trečdalį jo klausimų.
Nelengvas ir laikui imlus skaitinys, nes greitai nesuskaitysi - sėdi ir nagrinėji minčių eksperimentus. Pagiriamasis žodis vertimui, nes, manau, kad vertėja tikrai turėjo pasistengti su žodžių žaismais ir prasmės išlaikymu, bei pratyboms vietoje įvado, kurios duoda paskanauti, kas laukia toliau. Pavyzdžiui, "8. Kaip skamba klausimas: kokia savaitės diena stora, kokia - plona? Kokią savybę tai nurodo?"
Iš pradžių stebinančiai žavi, kaip ir kokius aspektus autorius pastebi ir nagrinėja. Pavyzdžiui:
Jei kas netiki fėjomis, jam nereikia mokyti savo vaikų: "Fėjų nėra"; jis gali atsisakyti juos mokyti žodžio "fėja" reikšmės. Kokia proga jie turi sakyti: "Egzistuoja..." ar "Neegzistuoja..."? Tik sutikę manančius priešingai.
Bet idealistas vis dėlto mokys vaikus žodžio "krėslas", nes juk nori juos išmokyti kai ką padaryti, pvz., atnešti krėslą. Taigi kur skirsis tai, ką sako idealistiškai išauklėti vaikai, nuo to, ką sako realistiški? Ar skirtumas nebus tik kovos šūkių skirtumas? (p. 356)
Vėliau gi ima erzinti pasikartojimas, nes metodas lieka tas pats, keičiasi tik nagrinėjami aspektai. Iš vienos pusės galima skaityti "ak, tikrai - koks tai keistas reiškinys apie kurį nepagalvojam", iš kitos - galima skaityti ir kaip "okay, okay, jau girdėta iš ankstesnių puslapių, viskas yra wow, kad net pavargau".
Nesiryžtu vertinti žvaigždutėmis, nes neturiu pakankamai filosofijos žinių, kad įvertinčiau atitinkamame kontekste. O kaip paprastai mirtingajai ne filosofei, vietomis skaityti buvo sunkoka :)
Nelengvas ir laikui imlus skaitinys, nes greitai nesuskaitysi - sėdi ir nagrinėji minčių eksperimentus. Pagiriamasis žodis vertimui, nes, manau, kad vertėja tikrai turėjo pasistengti su žodžių žaismais ir prasmės išlaikymu, bei pratyboms vietoje įvado, kurios duoda paskanauti, kas laukia toliau. Pavyzdžiui, "8. Kaip skamba klausimas: kokia savaitės diena stora, kokia - plona? Kokią savybę tai nurodo?"
Iš pradžių stebinančiai žavi, kaip ir kokius aspektus autorius pastebi ir nagrinėja. Pavyzdžiui:
Jei kas netiki fėjomis, jam nereikia mokyti savo vaikų: "Fėjų nėra"; jis gali atsisakyti juos mokyti žodžio "fėja" reikšmės. Kokia proga jie turi sakyti: "Egzistuoja..." ar "Neegzistuoja..."? Tik sutikę manančius priešingai.
Bet idealistas vis dėlto mokys vaikus žodžio "krėslas", nes juk nori juos išmokyti kai ką padaryti, pvz., atnešti krėslą. Taigi kur skirsis tai, ką sako idealistiškai išauklėti vaikai, nuo to, ką sako realistiški? Ar skirtumas nebus tik kovos šūkių skirtumas? (p. 356)
Vėliau gi ima erzinti pasikartojimas, nes metodas lieka tas pats, keičiasi tik nagrinėjami aspektai. Iš vienos pusės galima skaityti "ak, tikrai - koks tai keistas reiškinys apie kurį nepagalvojam", iš kitos - galima skaityti ir kaip "okay, okay, jau girdėta iš ankstesnių puslapių, viskas yra wow, kad net pavargau".
Nesiryžtu vertinti žvaigždutėmis, nes neturiu pakankamai filosofijos žinių, kad įvertinčiau atitinkamame kontekste. O kaip paprastai mirtingajai ne filosofei, vietomis skaityti buvo sunkoka :)
January 30, 2021
He never disappoints. Every page is rich with at least one, often multiple, remarks that make you want to scratch your head, sit back, and think for a while. The stuff on aspect-seeing was my primary motivation for reading this, and it contains some of his best material on the nature of concepts (particularly psychological ones), and the comparative roles of science and philosophy in psychological investigations (as per usual, I think he is a bit too anti-science at times, but largely agree with his way of dividing up the conceptual space). He is talking about seeing, yet managing to say just as much, if not more, about meaning. The stuff on pains, sensations, and other minds contains his usual brilliant deconstruction of Cartesian dualisms and reified conceptions of "qualia." I do believe that many of his insights on the essential normativity of psychological vocab, his distinguishing between first-person/third-person language, and implicit understanding of the subpersonal/personal divide anticipate most of Dennett's central insights (which I take to be the best body of work that philosophy of mind has to offer in the last 50 years). Some of his thought experiments about qualia and sensations almost mirror Dennett exactly. Of course, there is still much here I feel like I don't grasp in full, and some remarks that went completely over my head. May a future me fare better!
August 26, 2021
A very phenomenal reading. Reading slowly. On the one hand, logical comparisons, psychological and logical insights are interesting. Thought tests are fascinating. On the other hand, very many repetitions that are a bit annoying. However, Wittgenstein himself emphasizes the need for repetition in order to understand the concepts, their use in cultures and their logic.
February 5, 2019
Wittgenstein's idiosyncratic philosophical writing style reach levels that I would define as a thin line between "mystical" and "insane" and that's one of the reason's why I enjoy the later Wittgenstein, he poses philosophical questions more often than attempting to solve/dissolve them.
Volumes one and two are mostly about Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind, however his philosophy of language does come up quite often to help elucidate his pondering of the mind.
I might add more to this with more time re-reading this volume.
Volumes one and two are mostly about Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind, however his philosophy of language does come up quite often to help elucidate his pondering of the mind.
I might add more to this with more time re-reading this volume.
October 14, 2024
WHAT WITTGENSTEIN WORKED ON AFTER THE “PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS”
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher whose books such as Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations are among the acknowledged “classics” of 20th century philosophy. Born into a wealthy family, he gave all of his inheritance away, served in the Austrian Army during World War I, taught schoolchildren in remote Austrian villages, but ultimately taught at Cambridge for many years.
The Tractatus was the only book he published during his lifetime, but his papers have been posthumously edited, and notes of lectures taken by his students have been transcribed, and have resulted in many published books, such as 'Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, & Religious Belief,' 'Philosophical Grammar,' 'Philosophical Remarks,' 'he Blue and Brown Books,' 'Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,' 'Remarks on Colour,' 'Zettel,' etc.
The companion volume to this is Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 2.
Wittgenstein worked on the philosophy of psychology from 1946-1949; a few of the remarks printed in this book were previously included in Volume 2 of the Philosophical Investigations, or in Zettel, but the vast majority were printed here for the first time.
He admits, “The basic evil of Russell’s logic, and also of mine in the Tractatus, is that what a proposition is is illustrated by a few commonplace examples, and then presupposed as understood in full generality.” (§38)
He observes, “The APPROPRIATE word. How do we find it? Describe this! In contrast to this: I find the right term for a curve, after I have made particular measurements of it… I see that the word is appropriate even before I know, and even when I never know, WHY it is appropriate.” (§72-73)
He comments: “‘But depression is surely a FEELING; you surely don’t want to say that you are depressed and don’t feel it? And where do you feel it?’ That depends on what you call ‘feeling it.’ If I direct my attention to my bodily feelings, I notice a very slight headache, a slight discomfort in the region of my stomach, perhaps a certain tiredness. But do I mean that, when I say I am severely depressed? And yet I say again: ‘I feel a burden weighing on my soul.’ ‘Well, I can’t express it any differently!’---But how remarkable that I say it that way and express it differently!” (§133)
He states, “MUCH can be said about a fine aesthetic difference---this is very important. That is to say, the first utterance is of course merely ‘THIS word fits, THIS one does not’ or the like; but then there may be discussion of all the widely ramified connexions made by each of these words. That is to say, it is NOT all over once that first judgment has been made; rather what it depends on is the FIELD of each word.” (§357)
He says, “The way you use the word ‘God’ shews, not WHOM you mean, but what you mean.” (§475)
He states, “ ‘One can’t describe the aroma of coffee.’ But couldn’t one imagine being able to do so? And WHAT does one have to imagine for this? If someone says: ‘One can’t describe the aroma,’ one may ask him: ‘What MEANS of description do you want to use? What ELEMENTS?’” (§553)
He wonders, “But isn’t there a connection between the grammatical ‘privacy’ of thoughts and the fact that we generally cannot guess the thoughts of someone else before he utters them? But there is such a thing as guessing thoughts in the sense that someone says to me: ‘I know what you have just thought’… and I have to admit that he has guessed my thoughts right. But in fact this happens very seldom. I often sit without talking for several minutes in my class, and thoughts go through my head; but surely none of my audience could guess what I have been thinking to myself. Yet it would also be possible that someone should guess them and write them down just as if I had uttered them out loud. And if he shewed me what he had written, I should have to say ‘Yes, I thought just that to myself.’ And here, e.g., this question would be undecidable: whether I am not making a mistake; whether I really thought that, or, influenced by his writing, I am firmly IMAGINING MYSELF to have thought precisely that. And the word ‘undecidable’ belongs to the description of the language-game.” (§568)
He suggests, “The way music speaks. Don’t forget that even though a poem is framed in the language of information, it is not employed in the language-game of information. Might not one imagine someone who had never known music, and who came to us and heard someone playing a reflective piece of Chopin, being convinced that this was a language and that people were merely keeping the sense secret from him? Verbal language contains a strong musical element. (A sigh, a modulation of tone for a question, for an announcement, for longing; all the countless GESTURES in the vocal cadences.)” (§888)
He asserts, “No supposition seems to me more than natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the SYSTEM continue further in the direction of the centre? Why should this order proceed, so to speak, out of chaos?” (§903)
He observes, “Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about metaphysics: that the difference between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear to it. A metaphysical operation is always in appearance a factual one, although the problem is a conceptual one.” (§949)
He contends, “Thinking in terms of physiological processes is extremely dangerous in connexion with the clarification of conceptual problems in psychology. Thinking in physiological hypotheses deludes us sometimes with false difficulties, sometimes with false solutions. The best prophylactic against this is the thought that I don’t know at all whether the humans I am acquainted with actually have a nervous system.” (§1063)
He argues, “‘Thinking is an enigmatic process, and we are a long way off from complete understanding of it.’ And now one starts experimenting. Evidently, without realizing WHAT it is that makes thinking enigmatic to us. The experimental method does SOMETHING; its failure to solve the problem is blamed on its still being in its beginnings. It is as if one were to try and determine what matter and spirit are by chemical experiments.” (§1093)
These ideas and hints and thoughts of Wittgenstein are, as always, thought-provoking and stimulating. These two books will be “must reading” for anyone studying the development of his later thought.
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher whose books such as Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations are among the acknowledged “classics” of 20th century philosophy. Born into a wealthy family, he gave all of his inheritance away, served in the Austrian Army during World War I, taught schoolchildren in remote Austrian villages, but ultimately taught at Cambridge for many years.
The Tractatus was the only book he published during his lifetime, but his papers have been posthumously edited, and notes of lectures taken by his students have been transcribed, and have resulted in many published books, such as 'Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, & Religious Belief,' 'Philosophical Grammar,' 'Philosophical Remarks,' 'he Blue and Brown Books,' 'Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,' 'Remarks on Colour,' 'Zettel,' etc.
The companion volume to this is Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 2.
Wittgenstein worked on the philosophy of psychology from 1946-1949; a few of the remarks printed in this book were previously included in Volume 2 of the Philosophical Investigations, or in Zettel, but the vast majority were printed here for the first time.
He admits, “The basic evil of Russell’s logic, and also of mine in the Tractatus, is that what a proposition is is illustrated by a few commonplace examples, and then presupposed as understood in full generality.” (§38)
He observes, “The APPROPRIATE word. How do we find it? Describe this! In contrast to this: I find the right term for a curve, after I have made particular measurements of it… I see that the word is appropriate even before I know, and even when I never know, WHY it is appropriate.” (§72-73)
He comments: “‘But depression is surely a FEELING; you surely don’t want to say that you are depressed and don’t feel it? And where do you feel it?’ That depends on what you call ‘feeling it.’ If I direct my attention to my bodily feelings, I notice a very slight headache, a slight discomfort in the region of my stomach, perhaps a certain tiredness. But do I mean that, when I say I am severely depressed? And yet I say again: ‘I feel a burden weighing on my soul.’ ‘Well, I can’t express it any differently!’---But how remarkable that I say it that way and express it differently!” (§133)
He states, “MUCH can be said about a fine aesthetic difference---this is very important. That is to say, the first utterance is of course merely ‘THIS word fits, THIS one does not’ or the like; but then there may be discussion of all the widely ramified connexions made by each of these words. That is to say, it is NOT all over once that first judgment has been made; rather what it depends on is the FIELD of each word.” (§357)
He says, “The way you use the word ‘God’ shews, not WHOM you mean, but what you mean.” (§475)
He states, “ ‘One can’t describe the aroma of coffee.’ But couldn’t one imagine being able to do so? And WHAT does one have to imagine for this? If someone says: ‘One can’t describe the aroma,’ one may ask him: ‘What MEANS of description do you want to use? What ELEMENTS?’” (§553)
He wonders, “But isn’t there a connection between the grammatical ‘privacy’ of thoughts and the fact that we generally cannot guess the thoughts of someone else before he utters them? But there is such a thing as guessing thoughts in the sense that someone says to me: ‘I know what you have just thought’… and I have to admit that he has guessed my thoughts right. But in fact this happens very seldom. I often sit without talking for several minutes in my class, and thoughts go through my head; but surely none of my audience could guess what I have been thinking to myself. Yet it would also be possible that someone should guess them and write them down just as if I had uttered them out loud. And if he shewed me what he had written, I should have to say ‘Yes, I thought just that to myself.’ And here, e.g., this question would be undecidable: whether I am not making a mistake; whether I really thought that, or, influenced by his writing, I am firmly IMAGINING MYSELF to have thought precisely that. And the word ‘undecidable’ belongs to the description of the language-game.” (§568)
He suggests, “The way music speaks. Don’t forget that even though a poem is framed in the language of information, it is not employed in the language-game of information. Might not one imagine someone who had never known music, and who came to us and heard someone playing a reflective piece of Chopin, being convinced that this was a language and that people were merely keeping the sense secret from him? Verbal language contains a strong musical element. (A sigh, a modulation of tone for a question, for an announcement, for longing; all the countless GESTURES in the vocal cadences.)” (§888)
He asserts, “No supposition seems to me more than natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the SYSTEM continue further in the direction of the centre? Why should this order proceed, so to speak, out of chaos?” (§903)
He observes, “Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about metaphysics: that the difference between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear to it. A metaphysical operation is always in appearance a factual one, although the problem is a conceptual one.” (§949)
He contends, “Thinking in terms of physiological processes is extremely dangerous in connexion with the clarification of conceptual problems in psychology. Thinking in physiological hypotheses deludes us sometimes with false difficulties, sometimes with false solutions. The best prophylactic against this is the thought that I don’t know at all whether the humans I am acquainted with actually have a nervous system.” (§1063)
He argues, “‘Thinking is an enigmatic process, and we are a long way off from complete understanding of it.’ And now one starts experimenting. Evidently, without realizing WHAT it is that makes thinking enigmatic to us. The experimental method does SOMETHING; its failure to solve the problem is blamed on its still being in its beginnings. It is as if one were to try and determine what matter and spirit are by chemical experiments.” (§1093)
These ideas and hints and thoughts of Wittgenstein are, as always, thought-provoking and stimulating. These two books will be “must reading” for anyone studying the development of his later thought.
April 10, 2024
(For the record, my copy is in fact the parallel text version, though I read the English, apart from occasionally looking to see what the German was out of curiosity. For example, at one point he's talking about Kohler's concepts of figure and ground, and on the next page he mentions some question of having a ground for a statement - I checked and sure enough the German used different words: Hintergrund and Grund respectively.)
Years ago I studied LW a bit, but nowadays I just read his stuff without any anchoring, so naturally half the time (at least!) I haven't the faintest idea where he's coming from or going. Even with this probably silly approach, his 'remarks' are often massively lucid and insightful and thought-provoking.
At the same time, it remains frustrating that he writes in that fragmentary way and rarely gives the reader much clue what he's driving at. And I think he could have done better in terms of explicitness and development - and should have, if that made sense.
In short, a mix of inspiring and annoying. But whatever the reservations, he can take you to mental places no-one else can, even a lazy reader like me. (That said, I'm not recommending this: lots of people can't stand LW and think he was a fake guru type. They're wrong, but don't take my word for it and then come complaining to me.)
Years ago I studied LW a bit, but nowadays I just read his stuff without any anchoring, so naturally half the time (at least!) I haven't the faintest idea where he's coming from or going. Even with this probably silly approach, his 'remarks' are often massively lucid and insightful and thought-provoking.
At the same time, it remains frustrating that he writes in that fragmentary way and rarely gives the reader much clue what he's driving at. And I think he could have done better in terms of explicitness and development - and should have, if that made sense.
In short, a mix of inspiring and annoying. But whatever the reservations, he can take you to mental places no-one else can, even a lazy reader like me. (That said, I'm not recommending this: lots of people can't stand LW and think he was a fake guru type. They're wrong, but don't take my word for it and then come complaining to me.)
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