The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon

by Michael S. Sherry

How did the United States become committed to the warplane as an instrument of national policy? What forces influenced America's decision to rely on indiscriminate destruction to implement its will? This book is the first in-depth history of the rise of American strategic bombing. With impressive sweep and vigor, Michael S. Sherry explores the aspirations and illusions that led Americans to embrace air power before World War II, the ideas, techniques, and organizations that guided air attacks during the war, and the devastating effects of American and British "conventional" bombing. His book is a major contribution to American military, intellectual, and political history.

Sherry investigates the growing appeal of air power in America from the turn of the century to the end of World War II. he demonstrates that the airplane became at the same time the embodiment of the fantasy of flight, a celebration of American technical genius and might, and a promise of escape from the protracted destruction suffered by land armies. Then, because what America thought about air power is only half the story, Sherry reconstructs in compelling detail what bombing actually did, focusing on the campaign of firebombing against Japanese cities during World War II that preceded the atomic bomb and rivaled it in destructive fury. Sherry explores why Americans employed against Japan the techniques of city bombing they had usually resisted in Europe and, in the process, examines the insidious role of racism in American policy. He shows how the bureaucratization of this war, by which the bombing campaign against Japan was directed from offices in Washington D.C., affected the decision process, And he assesses the roles and personalities of such controversial policymakers as Roosevelt, LeMay, Arnold, and Truman.

Sherry's book traces the origins of a dangerous illusion in American thought about bombing and mass destruction: that the bombing of cities would be so horrific that nations would not dare let it occur, or long tolerate it if restraint broke down. This illusion, says Sherry, persists today and it has sanctioned the growth of nuclear arsenal, crippled efforts to contain the nuclear buildup, and immensely deepened the modern nuclear peril.

Genres: Military History, History, American History, Nonfiction, World War II

478 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1987

About the author

Michael S. Sherry is Richard W. Leopold Professor of History emeritus at Northwestern University, where he taught from 1976 until his retirement in 2020. A graduate of Washington University, Sherry earned his PhD at Yale University.

Reviews

[Frank Stein · Rating 3 out of 5]

What a frustrating book! This 1988 Bancroft Prize-winning work on the history of American strategic bombing in World War II seemingly has a lot going for it. For one, the book finally brought both the cultural and intellectual history of air power into the history of strategic bombing. It discusses theorists like Guilio Douhet, the Italian air theorist who as early as 1920 in "The Command of the Air," argued that bombers could end major wars quickly by breaking the "will of the people." Likewise, the author deals with novels like H.G. Wells' "The War in the Air" (1908) and "The World Set Free" (1914), which both envisioned a world war in the air against major cities. Sherry describes how increasingly in the 1920s and 1930s, soi disant "prophets" of air war drew ever more elaborate fantasies about the overwhelming power of bombers and the end of ground warfare. Even more interesting, Sherry shows how in the United States in the late 1930s FDR could advocate building up an extensive strategic air force despite isolationist sentiment in Congress because bombers were seen as a defensive weapon that could protect the oceans around the U.S. from attack (even Lindbergh was for them when he fought all other armaments). The power of the U.S. Air Force in World War II thus emerges from this era.

Sherry's main thesis, though, is that the prophets of air war convinced major powers that strategic bombing could be decisive against other populations, and once these countries had assembled massive bomber forces based on these theories, in the US mainly B-17s and B-29s, increasing evidence that a people's morale or economy were not subject to immediate collapse was ignored by the urge to keep such forces occupied. While Britain's Arthur Harris focused on the night-bombing of German cities from the beginning, America's commanders like Ira Eaker, Carl Spaatz, and Haywood Hansell thought precision strikes on key industries would cripple Germany and Japan. As the major targets were eliminated, however, new commanders like Curtis LeMay gradually slipped into indiscriminate bombing of urban populations. Sherry makes a good case that the influence of the Air Force in the postwar world was at the forefront of many of these commander's minds, and the "demonstration" of its power was a large part of their planning.

Still, Sherry seems constitutionally incapable of telling a straight narrative, and veers and weaves and bobs around every fact and anecdote until its impossible for the reader to know what's important and what's extraneous, or to assemble a clear story of the whole. Almost as annoying, Sherry rarely gives a quote or a fact without editoralizing on it, usually unsupported by any evidence. Overall, Sherry is at pains to show that all strategic bombing was a useless diversion, and every indication to the contrary elicits pages of factless speculation. Of course, the debate about the efficacy of the bombing campaigns has been going on since they began, and is a legitimate and worthwhile debate to have. Furthermore, even if the efficacy of such bombing is conceded, the moral quandary of terrorizing innocent civilians remains, but Sherry seems incapable of severing the two. Whatever is immoral must therefore be militarily unneccessary in Sherry's eyes. If only it were so easy! In the end, Sherry also has to admit that the air war caused Japan's surrender, and therefore is confronted with the uncomfortable truth that it seemed accomplished something, and something very significant at that.

So for all the fun stories and background, I beg someone to find a better book about strategic bombing out there, then tell me about it. This one whetted by curiosity but certainly didn't satisfy it.

[Vheissu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Melissa is entirely correct in her estimation of Sherry's book. It is, indeed, a "bible," in that it is exhaustive but also in a way hopeful. Sherry seems not to believe that we are predestined for nuclear annihilation and I for one hope he is correct. The mythology surrounding the bomb and ballistic missile defenses are problematical and the contingencies and uncertainties concerning strategic bombing generally and thermonuclear warfare in particular are incalculable. The U.S. Air Force today possesses weapons of unprecedented precision, making "area bombing" unnecessary, and yet still deploys weapons "...such as Fougasse, the M202A1 Flash, white phosphorous, thermobaric, and other incendiary agents..." (GlobalSecurity.Org). Until Americans demand the abandonment of such weapons, any hope of reducing or eliminating thermonuclear weapons will likely be ephemeral.

I suppose the growing tensions in the Middle East concerning Iran's "peaceful nuclear power program" will resolve some of the uncertainties about the future of nuclear proliferation. Either the world will learn to live with a nuclear-capable Iran or the powers in the region will risk mutually assured destruction. I, for one, hope for the best and fear the worst.

Thank you, Melissa, for bringing this important work to my attention.

******************

Here's a precious moment from the history of American aviation:

"A confrontation [by chief of staff Douglas MacArthur] with President Franklin Roosevelt on the [Air Corps] budget issue left [MacArthur] so upset that he threatened (not for the last time) to resign and so ill that he vomited on the White House lawn." (p. 49)

Good times.

"The bomber always gets through" was a common assumption in the years immediately following World War I. The assumption was misstated. It should have stated, "the ICBM always gets through." It is interesting to speculate whether if the British and Germans actually had "bombers that could get through" as well as a survivable second strike bomber capability, would they have deterred each other from attacking each other in the first place, much as the United States and Soviet Union deterred each other in the 1960s and 1970s?

A silly question but an interesting thought.

[Nate Huston · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is another book I would have liked to have more time on. While the author is definitely biased and a significant number of his propositions seem to be more theory than supported argument, the questions he asks are essential to anyone interested in the profession of arms.

Sherry's book reads like a cross between Jervis and Biddle, with a heavy dose of pacifism thrown in for good measure. His ideas regarding self-deception and delusion are intriguing, if not well supported by the historical record. With that said, it is appealing to view America's ability to conduct massive raids on "civilian morale" as a product of an increasingly distant perception of exactly what our machines and weapons were doing. Whether or not these considerations changed our calculus (I believe they did not - we believed we faced an existential threat), it is important to consider their possible effects on leadership and national psyche.

[Chris · Rating 5 out of 5]

I wrote a whole essay criticizing this book, but still it should be read. However, if one reads it alone you will probably come away wildly misinformed about many issues. Its tendency to simplistic moralizing is a serious defect complex moralizing requires trade offs and counter-factuals, these are not investigated.

[Trav · Rating 3 out of 5]

If Walzer's and Biddle's books were to have a love-child, this would be it. Sherry focuses on the ethics and morality of the American approach to bombing in the Second World War. In particular, he focuses heavily on the racial aspects of American policies towards Japan.

The thesis appears to be, American bombing policy was not guided by any clear conception of what the desired ends were for the bombing. The focus was on the means of destruction, not the reason for destruction. Sperry tracks the development of air power theory, specifically bombing theory, and highlights how the flaws in US air strategy were not examined with progress made on assumptions.

An interesting book that provides food for thought. Most useful read in conjunction with other books on the subject, rather than as a stand-alone to understand air power in the Second World War.

[Horza]

Read parts of this as part of my studies. Military history isn't my field but I am definitely going to re-read in full down the line. Sherry skillfully weaves together air power theory, with institutional and operational histories with a skeptical eye for the interplay of rationales and expediency.

[Michael- Berry · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very well researched and scholarly piece of history with some interesting viewpoints. I just didn't enjoy reading it. I wanted to but never did.