In this, the first full-length study of the Directorate of Science and Technology, Jeffrey T. Richelson walks us down the corridors of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and through the four decades of science, scientists, and managers that produced the CIA we have today. He tells a story of amazing technological innovation in service of intelligence gathering, of bitter bureaucratic infighting, and sometimes, as in the case of its “mind-control” adventure, of stunning moral failure. Based on original interviews and extensive archival research, The Wizards of Langley turns a piercing lamp on many of the agency’s activities, many never before made public.
This interesting book answers so many questions I've had in the past based on my career flying KC-135Q model tankers refueling gas-guzzling SR-71s in far off places, shuttling U-2 crews and equipment, tanking RC-135s(all models and getting intercepted by MIGs), in my Predator/Reaper efforts and overall Intel support activities. Filled in all the machinations that impacted my work either directly and indirectly . . . great book for that purpose. Might be less interesting if you don't know that world.
Since the CIA was created soon after World War II, it has placed a big emphasis on technological intelligence gathering, in contrast to its Soviet counterpart KGB, which relied more on human spies. The agency did not design and build the famous U-2 and SR-71 spy planes (Lockheed did), but it gave the specifications for and operated them. An even faster successor aircraft was canceled because its hypersonic shockwave would be impossible to take photographs through. There were more feats of technological wizardry. The signal from a Soviet early warning radar reflected off of the Moon; a large radio telescope could receive the reflection and learn something about the radar. The CIA and the NRO launched and operated many spy satellites, including the school bus-sized KH-9 (it was unclear to me from the book, which agency played what role). From a station in Iranian mountains, the CIA intercepted the telemetry of Soviet missiles being tested at the Tyuratam and Sary Shagan missile ranges. The agency got a friendly Japanese company to ship a cargo container from Vladivostok to Europe; behind a false wall in the container there were cameras taking pictures of installations of military interest. The agency monitored radio telephone conversations between Soviet leaders, though most of what they overheard was gossip about Secretary General Brezhnev's health and the like.
What I found amazing is what meager results this massive and costly intelligence gathering had brought. American spooks may have learned the technical characteristics of Soviet fighters and ballistic missiles, but such events as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the rise of Gorbachev and his launch of the policy of Perestroika, Glasnost and New Thinking, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union took them entirely by surprise. Which proves to me that every satellite or hidden camera is only as smart as the officer operating it, and won't ever reveal anything that can possibly harm the officer's career.
I had to read this book for class, and actually enjoyed it a lot more than I thought I would! While not necessarily a book I would have picked out on my own, and one I definitely had to dedicate some time to just sit and read without distractions, I enjoyed it. It could be technical at times, but I found I was able to skim when necessary and not miss out on the main points.
I really wanted to like this book, but this is one of the few times I can only recommend a book to military historians or others VERY comfortable with lots of acronyms and jargon. Richelson somehow manages to make exciting material incredibly dry, so I was happy to be done with this one. Do not read unless you're heavily into military or technological history with lots of patience or a good ability to remember all the agency officials and departmental and project acronyms.
It's going pretty well now. I had set the book aside because of the inaccuracies contained in the very first paragraph, but have now picked it up again. It is an interesting read, I am just not sure how accurate it is from a historical perspective.
Imagine you are watching a show about housewives, now imagine instead of watching it, you are reading it, now imagine instead of housewives it’s mid level bureaucrats in the 60’s.
I picked this book up imagining I would be learning about all of the early interesting projects that CIA did to gain its reputation as a world leader in technology and intelligence. I was in for quite the surprise! Instead the author drones on about petty squabbles between people who do nothing then get fired a couple pages later, rinse wash and repeat for the whole book.
Do you want to learn about the U2 spy plane? Well it will talk about how the directors within the CIA fought over responsibility for rights to fly the U2, but not really focus on the tech and missions that made the U2 interesting. It will casually glance over the scientific and engineering details in a sentence or two to instead focus on how John Smith called Smith Johnson in a huff over how he visited with John Jansen to discuss how they needed more money for fax machines for the next 20 pages and all the petty squabbling nobody cares about.
I prefer to donate books if I know I am not going to read them again, but there have been less than a handful of books I have just throw away to save people from the mistake of reading them, and this is one of them.
«جفری ریچلسون» درباره سایت های نظامی CIA در ایران توضیح میدهد که مهمترین سایت های عملیاتی سیا در دوران جنگ سرد، در ایران واقع شده بود و به نام TACKSMAN I و TACKSMAN II شناخته می شد. سایت اول، سایت تله متری بود و در دهه ۱۹۵۰ میلادی ساخته شد و در قصری به نام بهشهر ایجاد شد که در جوار دریای خزر بود. هدف، جمع آوری اطلاعات سیگنال ها از Tyuratam شوروی بود که سیا معتقد بود که یکی از ابزارهای تست اصلی موشکی اتحاد جماهیر شوروری به شمار می رفت. دومین سایت نظامی تله متری سیا در ایران، در شمال شرقی ایران یعنی کپکان احداث شد که ۴۰ مایل از مشهد فاصله داشت. این سایت ۶۵۰ مایل از جنوب غرب سایت نظامی Tyruatam شوروی فاصله داشت. این دو سایت، کارهایی می توانستند انجام بدهند که هیچ سایت نظامی آمریکا در جهان برای رصد و پایش سیگنال های موشکی شوروی سابق، قادر به انجام نبودند. این دو سایت، مانیتور لحظه ای آخرین فعالیت های تست موشکی شوروی را در دستور کار داشتند و اطلاعات فوق محرمانه درباره ابعاد موشک و شرایط فعالیتش را استخراج می کردند. در واقع این دو سایت نظامی سیا، تسلط کامل بر برنامه ICBM شوروی سابق داشتند.
My main gripe with this book was its focus on the bureaucracy and organization of the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology. I was expecting it to be more focused on the details of the amazing technological feats (spy satellites, the A-12, other spooky stuff) that came out of the DS&T, but found that the majority of the book was about the politics within the CIA and between the CIA, NRO, and Air Force through its history. I finished the book because there are some really juicy nuggets of technological wonder sprinkled throughout the book. I found myself skimming large portions of it, however, when the author got bogged down in the minutiae of the DS&T org chart or the ongoing territorial squabbles with the NRO and USAF.
An oral history of CIA technical departments. Author’s analytical skills are impressive: compiling such a deep knowledge from OSINT is nearly impossible, but they did it.
I first read this book at the age of seven. It was in my father's workplace library. I was fascinated by the cover of the book and therefore decided to read it. I remembered a good part of the information that I read, but when my father asked me "tell me what you read so far", my anxiety and the feeling of being pressured, caused me to blank out. I was very sensitive as a child. My father did not acknowledge this.