When a regime collapses, it leaves a lot of political detritus, men unwilling or unable to knuckle down, accept defeat and build again under new conditions. The collapse of the Nazi regime allowed no opportunities to wait (as old Soviet warriors might have) for more propitious times for its ideology.
First, the victors over the regime were absolute in their victory, occupiers, quite capable of setting the terms for recovery. Second, the old regime had committed awesomely brutal crimes that should have brooked no forgiveness. Third, the regime was not decadent like Sovietism but fanatic in its last days.
Orbach's 'Fugitives' is about those war criminals, fanatics, psychopaths, cynics and opportunists who had to deal with collapse and build new lives in confused circumstances, what they did, why they did it and what happened to them in the end.
He is not interested in the escape routes ('rat lines'), those who ended up in South America or those who buried themselves and hoped for nonentity within the German Democratic Republic. He has very little to say about those who chose to join the Soviet cause (simply for lack of sources).
He has had exceptional access to the archives of the German and Israeli intelligence services. Although these will have their own biases, this is sufficient to tell some remarkable stories that shine a new light on post-war espionage and the 'politics of the dark side'.
If a Nazi of some notoreity or prominence did not decide to go quiet and try to become a businessman or minor bureaucrat in the new German democracy, he would have four broad choices. He could hold on to the Nazi faith in the belief that he could play the allies off against each other.
He could choose the Soviet path (if he got past the initial risk of the firing squad) on the basis that the Soviets were the enemy of Jewish capitalism. Or he could join the Western cause (if his crimes were not too obvious and he was not too high-ranking) because it was the enemy of Jewish Bolshevism.
The fourth option was not to give a damn about ideology or politics (and perhaps never to have given a damn in the first place) and look to old contacts to earn some money through political means - as military or police adviser, as arms dealer or perhaps in what might amount to organised crime.
Orbach looks at all these options and how they played out amongst a surprisingly small group of people, mostly chancers and sociopaths, over the few decades following the Second World War in a story that is highly complicated but is well presented here.
The author is a professional historian. He does not allow himself to get over-excited by his subject matter. He is diligent. He has excellent and (I believe) reliable sources. He writes well and clearly. It may not be the whole story but the story is interesting enough.
The first section concentrates on the oft-told story of Reinhard Gehlen and the compromises entered into in order to create the Gehlen Org, the precursor of the BND (the German State Intelligence Service). It is a revisionist tale, shattering Gehlen's own carefully cultivated legend.
The truth is that Gehlen was a lucky opportunist, that American weakness when it comes to interagency co-operation rather than anything more malicious allowed his rather bungling organisation to continue as long as it did and that it became riddled with Soviet infiltration.
The Soviets come out of this as rather clever, exploiting the Nazi old boy network with Nazis of their own to create a scandal that was highly disruptive of German politics as the German Establishment tried to avoid exposure of the rum ex-Nazi, Hans Globke, Adenauer's Chief of Staff, to world gaze.
To be charitable, German democracy could not have secured itself without accepting the services of some who served under the previous regime and who had 'mains sales'. The chaos of collapse appears to have allowed the new system to avoid the worst of the Nazis only by taking the most weaselly.
The first part of the book leads into the second with its strong Middle East focus by telling the story of the Gehlen Org's attempt to build a Middle Eastern intelligence network using old regime sympathisers while West Germany simultaneously tried to build a positive relationship with Israel.
The second part of the book then deals largely with those ex-Nazis who embedded themselves in the world of Arab nationalism and took a more political view of things - that the war against the Jews was a war against Israel and the West.
Ex-Nazis turned up in Nasser's Egypt and in Syria as it went through regime change after regime change, touting themselves as military, police and interrogation advisers and introducing the techniques of the Gestapo to Nasserite and proto-Baathist officers.
The two main stories here are those of the vicious and murderous war criminal Alois Brunner who embedded himself in the Syrian security state and the Nazi arms trading operations such as OTRACO which ran guns, not always competently, to the Algerian rebels against French rule.
Brunner is another well known story except that, here, because of his access to Mossad files, Orbach can give us a fuller picture of his adventures. One is gratified (spoiler alert) that he ends up a victim of the Baathists who clearly despised him, eventually languishing in a cell no better than a Gestapo one.
What is more interesting are the insights into Israeli policy towards Nazi holocaust perpetrators. It is not quite what one may think. Although it was vital for Israel to trigger global awareness of the Holocaust, this was also a State with limited resources and other priorities.
The capture and trial (1961) of Eichmann, which, of course, led to a classic text, Arendt's 'Eichmann in Jerusalem' which spoke of the banality of evil, satisfied that primary aim. Judgements then had to be made on use of resources once that core end had been achieved.
Mengele (never captured) was never not going to be on the 'forever' list of Israel (with full justification) but other existential concerns of the nation pushed punishing war criminals to the back of the queue once the Eichmann Trial had had its effect.
The Eichmann kidnapping unnerved old Nazis. The myth of Israeli 'justice' by any means was sufficient to drive some into hiding but, after an attempt to assassinate Brunner (rather than attempt his kidnap for trial), he was ignored for two decades.
The FLN arms trading operation naturally brought into play the thoroughly murderous and ruthless French security services who conducted a campaign of car bombs against Neo-Nazi arms dealers, on German soil if necessary which was not good for Franco-German relations.
The arms dealers were not particularly adept at either field craft or business. Some of the 'deals' appear almost comically inept in retrospect. The French scored a nice own goal by harassing the second rate Nazis out of existence only to create space for far more efficient Soviet suppliers.
The strategic incompetence of security services seems to be a theme of this book. Gehlen and French intelligence are soon matched in the third and final part by the story of Israeli intelligence's poor analysis and diversion of resources into yet another murderous campaign.
In this case, it was triggered by panic over Nasser's hiring at enormous expense of West German rocket scientists (not necessarily Nazis) who were presumed to be building a missile capable of dropping a nuclear bomb on Israel.
The fear is understandable. Concern about nuclear weaponry led Israel into its own nuclear weapons programme and it has guided its foreign policy ever since. However, on this occasion, the evidence was there that these rocket scientists were second rate and there was no threat.
The 'justice' agenda was dropped but the scientists were assumed to be Nazis seeking a second holocaust (they were not Nazis, just hired hands). Israeli intelligence went down the rabbit hole and undertook a violent programme of assassination that destabilised Israeli-German relations.
In the end, Nasser's missile programme got nowhere for reasons that had little to do with Israel's efforts but simply because his team was not up to the job. The project was too expensive to be maintained.
Again, to be fair, Cairo in the late 1940s and 1950s, was a hotbed of pro-Nazi and anti-Jewish sentiment but we are now well into the early 1960s. Nazis were getting old and tired in any case, past any serious usefulness to local Arab regimes if ever they were very useful in the first place.
In the end, the West Germans and Israelis settled the matter far more intelligently by simply buying off the rocket scientists in 1964. The irony of it all is that the deal was partly enabled with intelligence acquired by Israel with the help of one of the most prominent Nazis of all - Otto Skorzeny.
Skorzeny, as a foot note, in this context is interesting because, untainted by war crimes yet the hero of European Neo-Nazis, he comes across here as a pragmatic opportunist hinting at the first emergence of Far Right admiration of Israel as a plucky national socialist State in its own right.
This might be puzzling but if there were Nazis committed to 'extermination', other Nazis were more inclined to forced emigration (like the forcing out of the Moriscoes of Spain) so the existence of Israel might not present such a problem. This has been a division within the Far Far Right ever since.
There was another brief burst of 'justice' attempts at creating an assassination programme directed at elderly Nazis under Begin in the late 1970s but it did not get very far. Brunner lost some fingers because of a letter bomb attempt on his life in 1980.
This book is a fairly detailed account of the history of post-war Nazi mercenaries yet it is readable. The overwhelming effect is one of despair at our species, not because of its crimes but because of its blundering ineptitude whether Nazi, the sponsors of Nazis or their enemies.
We are watching a criminal circus of surprisingly few people either 'busking' their way through life or engaging in extreme measures that would have been less necessary with a little forethought and closer attention to intelligence analysis.
The Nazis come across as losers in a struggle for survival that simply results in them doubling down on their earlier criminal or sociopathic behaviour. Their enemies come across as tending to panicked paranoia which perhaps marks out active service units today then as now.
History never repeats itself precisely but we are left with a suspicion that the shenanigans of excitable security apparats from Moscow to London, from Warsaw to Kiev, are likely to exhibit much the same tendencies nowadays as French, German and Israeli intelligence in the two post-war decades.
On the other hand, and more positively, it is equally probable that amateur banditti arising from regime collapse may be disruptive but have no serious means of changing history while, on the few occasions that the big boys of politics intrude into the game, problems can be resolved rationally.
An excellent historical work on a neglected part of post-war espionage, Orbach's use of his limited but important resources is exemplary. We can only hope that, one day, the Russian, Syrian and Egyptian Governments will give him access to their archives to fill out the story.