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The Populist Delusion
The 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump unleashed a wave of populism not seen in America since the Nixon era, which carried him into the presidency. Seen widely as a vindication of the people over elites, his failure to bring about any meaningful change was then seen as an aberration, a departure from a natural state where the people are sovereign and their representatives govern by their consent. This is the populist delusion.
This book explodes that delusion. Beginning with the Italian elite school, Parvini shows the top-down and elite driven nature of politics by explicating one thinker per chapter: Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Schmitt, Jouvenel, Burnham, Francis, and Gottfried. The sobering picture that emerges is that the interests of the people have only ever been advanced by a tightly organized minority. Just as fire drives out fire, so an elite is only ever driven out by another elite.
The Populist Delusion is the remedy for a self-defeating folk politics that has done the people a great disservice.
This book explodes that delusion. Beginning with the Italian elite school, Parvini shows the top-down and elite driven nature of politics by explicating one thinker per chapter: Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Schmitt, Jouvenel, Burnham, Francis, and Gottfried. The sobering picture that emerges is that the interests of the people have only ever been advanced by a tightly organized minority. Just as fire drives out fire, so an elite is only ever driven out by another elite.
The Populist Delusion is the remedy for a self-defeating folk politics that has done the people a great disservice.
174 pages, Paperback
First published April 15, 2020
93 people are currently reading
1757 people want to read
About the author
Neema Parvini
10 books104 followersNeema Parvini is a British academic, writer, and YouTuber. He is currently a senior fellow at the Centre of Heterodox Studies at the University of Buckingham. He is best known for his work on Elite Theory, especially his critique of populism in The Populist Delusion (2022), but is also noted as a literary scholar of Shakespeare.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 91 reviews
May 21, 2022
You were just adorable shouting in formation with your little sign at the non-violent protest downtown.
The elites thought so too.
The elites thought so too.
April 6, 2023
First of all, it's a really good, short introduction to elite theory and an essential text for anyone interested in the topic. I have been reading and listening to a lot of what Neema Parvini has produced over the past 4 years and there is no question that he has helped popularise knowledge of the elitist political scientists amongst the modern dissident right. Knowledge of these political mechanisms are invaluable in understanding the social and economic trajectory of society for the past 100 years. While I admire Parvini's work in general, I'll try to be as objective as possible in reviewing this book...
The book is relatively short and gives a brief overview of political thinkers that have theorised on the elite-centric model of political science: Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Schmitt, Jouvenel, Burnham, Francis and Gottfried. Since the book is quite short, some sections will require the reader to do additional background reading to really understand the points being highlighted by Parvini. Thankfully, this book is abundant with references (including page numbers!). I certainly have more reading to do on these thinkers, and I'm sure I'll revisit Parvini's book to remind myself of what he was getting at.
However, one thing I dislike in books is the over-use of long quotations from other works. The original context of these quotations does not always shine through, and the change in writing style can often be quite jarring. I would much prefer a longer, more detailed description of each idea from the ground-up, even if this necessarily means some degree of paraphrasing. Is this an introductory text or a roadmap for people to extend their reading lists?
It is clear that this book is heavily inspired by Burnham's "The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom" (who unfortunately does a much better job at explaining why populism is a delusion). In that book, Burnham discusses Machiavelli, Mosca, Pareto and Michels and shows democracy for the pointless exercise that it is. What Parvini's book gives you is a recap and extension to include more philosophers (Schmitt, Jouvenel, Francis and Gottfried), and uses these to highlight several instances over the past decade where these theories have been proven. I would highly advise interested readers to dive into Burnham's Machiavellians once they've read Parvini's book.
The book is relatively short and gives a brief overview of political thinkers that have theorised on the elite-centric model of political science: Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Schmitt, Jouvenel, Burnham, Francis and Gottfried. Since the book is quite short, some sections will require the reader to do additional background reading to really understand the points being highlighted by Parvini. Thankfully, this book is abundant with references (including page numbers!). I certainly have more reading to do on these thinkers, and I'm sure I'll revisit Parvini's book to remind myself of what he was getting at.
However, one thing I dislike in books is the over-use of long quotations from other works. The original context of these quotations does not always shine through, and the change in writing style can often be quite jarring. I would much prefer a longer, more detailed description of each idea from the ground-up, even if this necessarily means some degree of paraphrasing. Is this an introductory text or a roadmap for people to extend their reading lists?
It is clear that this book is heavily inspired by Burnham's "The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom" (who unfortunately does a much better job at explaining why populism is a delusion). In that book, Burnham discusses Machiavelli, Mosca, Pareto and Michels and shows democracy for the pointless exercise that it is. What Parvini's book gives you is a recap and extension to include more philosophers (Schmitt, Jouvenel, Francis and Gottfried), and uses these to highlight several instances over the past decade where these theories have been proven. I would highly advise interested readers to dive into Burnham's Machiavellians once they've read Parvini's book.
August 25, 2022
I originally wrote a *very* long review of this book, but I have decided to replace it with this shorter one, primarily because I believe that it is not worth engaging with the material to the degree that I did. You see, this book is crypto-fascist. It pretends to “see the world as it is” and not how it “ought” to be. However, this book is not, at all, a neutral or objective critique of power. It is an agenda, and at some level a handbook, for taking power. It makes the following moves:
First, it poses as review of a set of thinkers who’ve written, in supposedly clear-eyed fashion, on the workings of power (notably, these thinkers skew decidedly right, one was even a Nazi sympathizer, but I digress…). However, in reality, which becomes clearer toward the latter half of the book, the review acts as a vehicle for the author’s political agenda. This facade obscures, and appears to lend intellectual credibility to, these views.
Second, the primary stance taken is that all forms of government are really just forms of justifying elite control and are therefore equally bad or good, depending on the elite that is in power (an extremely dubious claim; honestly, would you rather live in any working democracy, even, say, India, or in Saudi Arabia/North Korea/Russia/China?). The book mostly focuses on liberalism (and by extension actually-existing democracy), with communism and fascism mostly treated as minor also-mentions. This is a deceptive move that, because most readers will harbor pre-conceived bad vibes associated with communism and fascism, allows for a style of argument that places liberalism on an equally bad footing with other governmental forms even though no actual comparison is made (in fact, this type of lack, arguments by default, looms large throughout the book).
Third, liberalism is at first treated in the broad sense, but later, purposefully and progressively, this broad sense is wrapped up and confused with narrow sense liberalism as practiced by today’s ‘liberals’ (e.g. US Democratic Party). This does two things, it confounds the supposed general problems of liberalism with the views of current liberals, and hides sympathy for fascism under the guise of conservative values (which are here separated from broad sense liberalism, even though both liberal and conservative views today fall within broad sense liberalism).
Fourth, the author’s right-wing views exist here mostly as a negative space. The author only uses examples of what he views as the problems of leftist liberalism, and leaves rightist views untouched, in a purer non-formed state if you will. At first, this is simply annoying, but moving through the book the thinkers become more and more obviously rightist and the author uses these as launching points for his own agenda. The focus on multiculturalism (a sub-category of egalitarianism) is particularly egregious. The fight by racial and ethnic groups to be treated fairly by the system, after years of continued oppression, is described by as a cynical grab for power. And worse, that problems such as racism are not actually real (the “ghost of slavery”) but rather manufactured to serve this end. While racism is nowhere outright expressed it is heavily implied (e.g. people of “merit” are being fired to make way for “diversity”) and the hole where *things that are not said* gapes large.
Lastly, the author after making the previous moves to support the idea that what matters is which elites are in power, and to paint the current broad sense and narrow sense liberalism as corrupt and oppressive, essentially proposes that a new elite take over. One drawn from those disgruntled by the current system, particularly those of “merit” who have been cancelled for “speaking truth to power.” Essentially, the author dismisses democracy, maligns liberalism in all senses, and tip-toes toward calling for a revolution run by right-wing elites who hold racist and misogynistic views. In other words, makes a barely disguised call for fascism, with his friends in power.
First, it poses as review of a set of thinkers who’ve written, in supposedly clear-eyed fashion, on the workings of power (notably, these thinkers skew decidedly right, one was even a Nazi sympathizer, but I digress…). However, in reality, which becomes clearer toward the latter half of the book, the review acts as a vehicle for the author’s political agenda. This facade obscures, and appears to lend intellectual credibility to, these views.
Second, the primary stance taken is that all forms of government are really just forms of justifying elite control and are therefore equally bad or good, depending on the elite that is in power (an extremely dubious claim; honestly, would you rather live in any working democracy, even, say, India, or in Saudi Arabia/North Korea/Russia/China?). The book mostly focuses on liberalism (and by extension actually-existing democracy), with communism and fascism mostly treated as minor also-mentions. This is a deceptive move that, because most readers will harbor pre-conceived bad vibes associated with communism and fascism, allows for a style of argument that places liberalism on an equally bad footing with other governmental forms even though no actual comparison is made (in fact, this type of lack, arguments by default, looms large throughout the book).
Third, liberalism is at first treated in the broad sense, but later, purposefully and progressively, this broad sense is wrapped up and confused with narrow sense liberalism as practiced by today’s ‘liberals’ (e.g. US Democratic Party). This does two things, it confounds the supposed general problems of liberalism with the views of current liberals, and hides sympathy for fascism under the guise of conservative values (which are here separated from broad sense liberalism, even though both liberal and conservative views today fall within broad sense liberalism).
Fourth, the author’s right-wing views exist here mostly as a negative space. The author only uses examples of what he views as the problems of leftist liberalism, and leaves rightist views untouched, in a purer non-formed state if you will. At first, this is simply annoying, but moving through the book the thinkers become more and more obviously rightist and the author uses these as launching points for his own agenda. The focus on multiculturalism (a sub-category of egalitarianism) is particularly egregious. The fight by racial and ethnic groups to be treated fairly by the system, after years of continued oppression, is described by as a cynical grab for power. And worse, that problems such as racism are not actually real (the “ghost of slavery”) but rather manufactured to serve this end. While racism is nowhere outright expressed it is heavily implied (e.g. people of “merit” are being fired to make way for “diversity”) and the hole where *things that are not said* gapes large.
Lastly, the author after making the previous moves to support the idea that what matters is which elites are in power, and to paint the current broad sense and narrow sense liberalism as corrupt and oppressive, essentially proposes that a new elite take over. One drawn from those disgruntled by the current system, particularly those of “merit” who have been cancelled for “speaking truth to power.” Essentially, the author dismisses democracy, maligns liberalism in all senses, and tip-toes toward calling for a revolution run by right-wing elites who hold racist and misogynistic views. In other words, makes a barely disguised call for fascism, with his friends in power.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 3, 2022
This book is James Burnham's The Machiavellians with a software update for 2022. As such, it's a long overdue introduction to the "realist" or "elitist" school of politics where each chapter treats a thinker and their chief contribution to our understanding of power dynamics.
The Populist Delusion is, bar none, the best starters guide for students looking to dip into elite theory. He summarizes each thinker accurately and draws relevant distinctions between them. If a reader takes issue with Parvini's writing in the body of the book, they can rest assured their real beef is with the author he's referencing in a given chapter.
His introduction and conclusion are another story, but even there we find a trackable application- if you follow the premises introduced by each figure to their logical conclusions, you'll largely track with Parvini.
Don't be fooled by this book's short length and simple structure. This is a true, authoritative work of scholarship that wastes no space. If I had a complaint, it would be some parts could've done with a bit more beef and maybe more quoting from the referenced philosophers. Hopefully this sold well enough for there to be a larger second volume.
The Populist Delusion is, bar none, the best starters guide for students looking to dip into elite theory. He summarizes each thinker accurately and draws relevant distinctions between them. If a reader takes issue with Parvini's writing in the body of the book, they can rest assured their real beef is with the author he's referencing in a given chapter.
His introduction and conclusion are another story, but even there we find a trackable application- if you follow the premises introduced by each figure to their logical conclusions, you'll largely track with Parvini.
Don't be fooled by this book's short length and simple structure. This is a true, authoritative work of scholarship that wastes no space. If I had a complaint, it would be some parts could've done with a bit more beef and maybe more quoting from the referenced philosophers. Hopefully this sold well enough for there to be a larger second volume.
April 16, 2023
This book offers some great profiles on a series of thinkers crucial for understanding elite theory and the populist delusion. It is well researched and Parvini clearly knows what he's talking about. It is also useful that he relates the theory to recent developments, leaving little room for misunderstanding.
However, the reader should be prepared to read frequent extracts from the writers in question. This is not unexpected but it borders on the absurd here sometimes. Parvini's style also hurts him quite a bit since he seems to expect the reader has no patience or memory. Everytime Francis was brought up before his chapter, we would be reminded over the course of the next thirty words that he would get to him later. The Populist Delusion reads more like the mother of all 4chan effortposts than anything else. If you're fine with that, you'll get something out of it. I know I did.
However, the reader should be prepared to read frequent extracts from the writers in question. This is not unexpected but it borders on the absurd here sometimes. Parvini's style also hurts him quite a bit since he seems to expect the reader has no patience or memory. Everytime Francis was brought up before his chapter, we would be reminded over the course of the next thirty words that he would get to him later. The Populist Delusion reads more like the mother of all 4chan effortposts than anything else. If you're fine with that, you'll get something out of it. I know I did.
May 1, 2022
SUBSCRIBE TO ACADEMIC AGENT!!
February 27, 2025
A great primer on anti-liberal thinkers and elite theory. I found it incredibly useful as a guide, helping me identify specific areas and thinkers to explore further in my research. Parvini writes with the pedagogical clarity of a seasoned teacher, which I also found to be quite nice. (I don't watch Academic Agent, but I assume he is a teacher, maybe that's why).
Parvini concludes that popular action seeking radical change will inevitably fail. This is what he terms the “populist delusion.” I believe this conclusion is too hasty, as historical examples demonstrate that, under the right conditions, the populace can dismantle a regime without the guidance of a counter-elite, or even in the absence of one altogether.
Overall, though, I do highly recommend it if you're interested in counter-Enlightenment philosophy/political theory or, in general, unhappy with liberal democracy.
Parvini concludes that popular action seeking radical change will inevitably fail. This is what he terms the “populist delusion.” I believe this conclusion is too hasty, as historical examples demonstrate that, under the right conditions, the populace can dismantle a regime without the guidance of a counter-elite, or even in the absence of one altogether.
Overall, though, I do highly recommend it if you're interested in counter-Enlightenment philosophy/political theory or, in general, unhappy with liberal democracy.
May 31, 2022
A concise and well written book on political theory that serves both as a general introduction to elite theory and as a more specific criticism of the liberal-democratic system.
Despite its short length (166 pages including notes), this book packs in a great deal of information with a chapter each on Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, Carl Schmitt, Bertrand de Jouvenel, James Burnham, Samuel T Francis and Paul Gottfried.
Rather than spend much time on biographies and contextualising, Parvini focuses on the key ideas of each of these thinkers. Through Mosca he introduces the concept of the ruling class and the political formula, or ideology, that binds together the rulers and the ruled. Through Pareto (and Machiavelli) he discusses the metaphorical foxes (who rule by persuasion) and lions (who are more direct and rule by force); he also argues that reasoning and rationalisation comes after and is secondary to intuition, an idea that is refined and exploited by the ‘special class’ of public relations men such as Bernays and Lippmann, as discussed in the chapter on Samuel T Francis.
The chapters on Michels, Schmitt and de Jouvenel show how each developed the ideas of Mosca, Pareto and others to describe in detail the mechanisms by which they operate. Small numbers of organised elites come to dominate any organisation (Mosca). Sovereignty really lies with those who interpret the political formula, and all politics comes down to friend versus enemy (Schmitt). Power rests with the High making and appeal to the Low for liberation from the Middle and how the circulation of elites works in practice (de Jouvenel).
The chapter on James Burnham serves well as a summary of the ideas expressed in Burnham’s ‘The Managerial Revolution’, which accurately describes how the managerial class came to dominate the industrial world, usurping the previous entrepreneurial capitalist elite. This chapter also marks a change in style of the book, as the author turns from pure theory to begin to make his case for why the current system under which the western world lives is approaching an inflection point, with the current political formula (democracy and the rule of law) appearing tired and increasing numbers of people no longer having faith in the system.
The chapters on Francis and Gottfried bring the elite theory up to date, discussing how since the second world war and until the early 21st century the mass media and controllers of mass culture have unified the population of the western world by relentlessly demonising its rival political formulas. As the external enemies are conquered the power requires new enemies and so it turns to demonising internal enemies, creating a divided system with as many as a third of the population in the USA now seen as beyond the pale by the ruling class. Parvini discusses how de Jouvenel saw that the current system leads inevitably to an atomised society where individual bonds between men are broken and the only common bond is bondage to the state. One side effect of this atomisation, particularly in the age of the internet, has been that there is no longer a mass culture and hence one of the key levers of power no longer works as intended. The chapter on Gottfried describes how developments in psychology and psychiatry have been used to medicalize opposition to the current political formula, turning political disagreements into matters of ‘scientific’ enquiry. These developments are mirrored in other areas of study, with political questions increasingly being referred to experts.
The final chapter concludes with Parvini’s argument that democracy is and always has been a delusion and that bottom-up political change originating in the people is never possible without elite support. Parvini argues that circulation of elites is due and finishes with a list of possible points of failure in the system which will lead to an hour of decision when the current ruling elite will need to either concede to a new elite class or will need to maintain the current regime by force.
I recommend this thought-provoking book to anyone across the left-right political spectrum who is interested in how power operates. As the book itself makes clear, there is no thing as politics-free analysis and the author’s politics will not be to everyone’s taste, however, like many of the thinkers described in the book have shown, just because an idea is uncomfortable does not make it untrue.
Despite its short length (166 pages including notes), this book packs in a great deal of information with a chapter each on Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, Carl Schmitt, Bertrand de Jouvenel, James Burnham, Samuel T Francis and Paul Gottfried.
Rather than spend much time on biographies and contextualising, Parvini focuses on the key ideas of each of these thinkers. Through Mosca he introduces the concept of the ruling class and the political formula, or ideology, that binds together the rulers and the ruled. Through Pareto (and Machiavelli) he discusses the metaphorical foxes (who rule by persuasion) and lions (who are more direct and rule by force); he also argues that reasoning and rationalisation comes after and is secondary to intuition, an idea that is refined and exploited by the ‘special class’ of public relations men such as Bernays and Lippmann, as discussed in the chapter on Samuel T Francis.
The chapters on Michels, Schmitt and de Jouvenel show how each developed the ideas of Mosca, Pareto and others to describe in detail the mechanisms by which they operate. Small numbers of organised elites come to dominate any organisation (Mosca). Sovereignty really lies with those who interpret the political formula, and all politics comes down to friend versus enemy (Schmitt). Power rests with the High making and appeal to the Low for liberation from the Middle and how the circulation of elites works in practice (de Jouvenel).
The chapter on James Burnham serves well as a summary of the ideas expressed in Burnham’s ‘The Managerial Revolution’, which accurately describes how the managerial class came to dominate the industrial world, usurping the previous entrepreneurial capitalist elite. This chapter also marks a change in style of the book, as the author turns from pure theory to begin to make his case for why the current system under which the western world lives is approaching an inflection point, with the current political formula (democracy and the rule of law) appearing tired and increasing numbers of people no longer having faith in the system.
The chapters on Francis and Gottfried bring the elite theory up to date, discussing how since the second world war and until the early 21st century the mass media and controllers of mass culture have unified the population of the western world by relentlessly demonising its rival political formulas. As the external enemies are conquered the power requires new enemies and so it turns to demonising internal enemies, creating a divided system with as many as a third of the population in the USA now seen as beyond the pale by the ruling class. Parvini discusses how de Jouvenel saw that the current system leads inevitably to an atomised society where individual bonds between men are broken and the only common bond is bondage to the state. One side effect of this atomisation, particularly in the age of the internet, has been that there is no longer a mass culture and hence one of the key levers of power no longer works as intended. The chapter on Gottfried describes how developments in psychology and psychiatry have been used to medicalize opposition to the current political formula, turning political disagreements into matters of ‘scientific’ enquiry. These developments are mirrored in other areas of study, with political questions increasingly being referred to experts.
The final chapter concludes with Parvini’s argument that democracy is and always has been a delusion and that bottom-up political change originating in the people is never possible without elite support. Parvini argues that circulation of elites is due and finishes with a list of possible points of failure in the system which will lead to an hour of decision when the current ruling elite will need to either concede to a new elite class or will need to maintain the current regime by force.
I recommend this thought-provoking book to anyone across the left-right political spectrum who is interested in how power operates. As the book itself makes clear, there is no thing as politics-free analysis and the author’s politics will not be to everyone’s taste, however, like many of the thinkers described in the book have shown, just because an idea is uncomfortable does not make it untrue.
July 27, 2022
Decent overview of Italian Elite Theorists and certain others. However, the book seems to try to be something more than said overview and falls short. In addition, commentary on current events feels improper and unscholarly, getting (needlessly) ever more intense as the text progresses.
May 13, 2022
Very compact and articulate summary of main skeptics of liberal democracy of the last 100 years. Required reading for normie-cons who keep wondering why we're always on the retreat.
September 8, 2022
Flat out, one of the best books I've read this year so far. This is a great compilation of elite theory thinkers and a modern interpretation of the theories they devised in their own time. This book would serve as a phenomenal introduction to any one of those thinkers on their own to prepare you for what you're about to get into. And should get into. But more importantly, it serves as a cliff notes of what power is and how it is wielded.
Pete Quiñones does a reading with commentary of each chapter with different personalities, including the author, on YouTube if you'd like some more insights beyond what Neema provides in his latest must read.
Pete Quiñones does a reading with commentary of each chapter with different personalities, including the author, on YouTube if you'd like some more insights beyond what Neema provides in his latest must read.
August 22, 2022
Populism, as the code word for someone disliked by the establishment. Here, the parasitic class expresses its disapproval.
July 28, 2025
Through a survey of survey of various theorists, Parvini makes his case that politics is from the top down. Not only doesn’t demos rule, it never can never rule. An elite can only be replaced by another, or counter-elite. But where does the counter-elite come from? Before they come to power, how elite are they really?
September 5, 2022
What is populism? The snap answer is rule by the people. The more accurate answer is rule by an elite who strongly claim that they govern on behalf of the whole people. That claim is sometimes true and sometimes false, but as Neema Parvini’s The Populist Delusion, a compact summary of what is often called elite theory, pithily shows, it is always an elite who actually rules. Thus, the key question for a society’s flourishing is whether it is ruled by a virtuous elite, who rules for the common good, or by a rotten elite, as America is ruled by now. Embedded in this question is another question, however—how an elite can be removed and replaced. This latter question is the most important question in 2022 America.
Parvini is an expert on Shakespeare who has become a presence in the dissident Right, under the moniker Academic Agent. He has a YouTube channel, has appeared on Alex Kaschuta’s eclectic and always excellent podcast, and is someone to whom you should pay attention (perhaps through listening to the recent series of podcasts on this book by the insightful Peter Quiñones). Parvini defines the “populist delusion” as the belief “if conditions get bad enough, if the plebians become too disgruntled with their leaders, then the people will rise up and overthrow them.” He asserts that the reality is that “if people want change even at a time of popular and widespread resentment of the ruling class, they can only hope to achieve that change by becoming a tightly knit and organised minority themselves and, in effect, displacing the old ruling class.” There is, as we will discuss, some truth to this, but Parvini ignores that, as José Ortega y Gasset said, force follows public opinion, and he therefore considerably overstates the degree to which radical change must begin, rather than end, with an organized minority in charge.
Parvini ably summarizes and coheres the core thought of eight men (and in many ways this book, including Parvini’s incorrect belief that the desire for power is the only possible motive for nearly all human political action, is a sequel or update to James Burnham’s The Machiavellians, which analyzed three of the eight thinkers profiled here). Gaetano Mosca, the first modern political theorist to point out that every society always is ruled by an elite (usually one composed of two layers, what Parvini names the “governing elite” and the “non-governing elite”) and that all attempts to deny this end in disaster. Vilfredo Pareto, who offered a complex and highly original social analysis, showing that ruling class overthrow was not the result of competing ideologies, but of the inability of a calcified ruling class to absorb external talent. Robert Michels, who coined the Iron Law of Oligarchy, that every organization, not just every society, “becomes divided into a minority of directors and a majority of the directed” (something every person involved in an organization, or that horrible thing in business school and corporate work, a “team,” knows). Carl Schmitt, who piercingly analyzed sovereignty and legitimacy, and rejected the liberal delusion that democracy or parliamentarianism was in any way a more effective or more desirable system of government than ones which did not pretend the people ruled.
These four wrote before World War II, which birthed the world in which we live and changed, in many ways, the manifestation of elites in the West. The second set of four men Parvini profiles brings us up to the present. Bertrand de Jouvenal, theorist of power, who noted that democracy in practice was “the broadest highway to tyranny that has ever existed,” and described, in his “high-low-middle” mechanism, how the ruling high uses patronage handed out to the underclass low to drain power, and wealth, from the most populous group, the middle—and, not coincidentally, thereby destroys the intermediary institutions that are the bedrock of any successful society. James Burnham, who analyzed how modernity had introduced managers, who had absorbed the functions of both the governing and non-governing elite, a “fused political-economic apparatus.” (Parvini does not discuss what seems highly relevant to today, that Michels concluded that the necessary political end of all modern societies was Bonapartism, or that Schmitt concluded much the same in his The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, and Burnham largely agreed, in that he predicted a type of fractalized Bonapartism.) Samuel T. Francis, who updated Burnham’s thought to incorporate the explicit Left beliefs that had come to characterize the modern managerial elite, though he wrongly thought this largely cynical, a function rather than a set of core beliefs, and who called for a “revolution from the middle.” And, finally, Paul Gottfried (the only one of these men still alive), who identified the final stage of modern elite intentions, to change the people, who when they will not accept elite dictates are viewed as insane, through a twisted form of therapy, into a better people, willing to accept falsehood and unreality as truth and reality.
It’s all an excellent summary. But what does elite theory tell us about this moment? No sensible person can deny that every society is dominated by the powerful, and by definition, the powerful are a minority. In no real society can everyone, or even most people, be powerful, or equal in power. To all Western societies before the so-called Enlightenment, this was a feature, not a bug. Because power must reside in the few, a well-run society was seen not as extending power to all, but as ensuring that power was used generally for the good of the whole—“for the people,” rather than “by the people.” If correctly done, this means most citizens need not, and should not, trouble themselves about power or politics. Given human nature, the success of this project has been mixed from a historical perspective—but it has a far better track record than Enlightenment-based chimeras that claim to distribute power to everyone, most notably so-called liberal democracy. These not only fail to actually distribute power, but destroy any society, as we are seeing unfold before our eyes today in the West.
Parvini, however, goes farther and concludes that popular action that seeks radical change, whether the (fantastic and excellent) Electoral Justice Protest, the Yellow Vests in France, the Canadian truckers, or other such bottom-up movements emerging from those denied power and harshly oppressed, will necessarily fail. This is, as I noted, his “populist delusion.” I think he is too hasty in this conclusion, because it is easy to demonstrate that under the correct circumstances, the populace can destroy a regime without being led by a counter-elite, or even without the existence of a counter-elite. The people of the tyrannized countries of Eastern and Central Europe (tyrannized less, for the most part, than we are today) did it in 1989 (and not because they wanted blue jeans and rock music, but for much deeper principles, and all this is well discussed in Stephen Kotkin’s Uncivil Society). Sri Lankans did it recently (although I claim no special insight into the politics of that country, or how successful mass action ultimately was), and the unhinged reaction of the extremely punchable Justin Trudeau and his filthy henchmen clearly suggested they feared a similar result from the trucker protests. It only takes a little historical reflection to see that the often-held belief, which is also Parvini’s, that a counter-elite must originate and control such an uprising by the common people for it to be successful is false, the exception rather than the rule, and that this false belief is usually held mostly by eggheads and monomaniacs who incorrectly think that they would be part of such an elite, which could be nothing without them. Yes, it is sometimes true that a counter-elite first organizes, and only then replaces an existing elite; Vladimir Lenin is the best Western historical example. But if you change a few minor variables in 1917, the Russian ruling class is still overthrown, yet not replaced by the Bolsheviks, which suggests it is mere happenstance that Lenin spent decades preparing for the role that history ultimately granted to him.
Thus, it is no doubt true, as Parvini states, that “tight organizational ability and iron discipline” are necessary for a new elite to ultimately take control, but it is a confusion to suggest that those virtues must be operative for an existing regime, particularly an extremely fragile one such as ours, to meet its well-deserved end. Put another way, it is false, what Parvini claims, that “Change always takes concerted organization.” Seizing power with finality takes concerted organization, but the rapid upheaval that makes such seizure possible is driven by the release of boiling, chaotic internal forces, sometimes with future elites bobbing within them, like a cork on a stormy ocean. Once the slate is wiped clean, elite leaders necessarily emerge to take and exercise power (Burnham called this gaining “social weight”)—but the point is that, at least at first, they will likely rule as the populace desires, not as the former ruling class desires (though often enough members of that class throw on a fresh coat of paint and try to insert themselves into the new elite, if they are not first dealt with adequately). We must remember that this consummation has, historically, been accomplished by the masses, who in such times of change have the chthonic power, if they can stay the course in the face of ever-more-desperate attacks by the regime (such as “President” Biden’s bizarre and incompetent, hateful yet inevitable, speech the other day, a spectacular sign of regime fragility), to destroy a regime. Thereby the people hold a veto over when and how the new begins, even if they do not directly create the new elite, which emerges organically.
Although the end always comes, any elite can survive longer by taking shrewd (the word used by Pareto) actions, most of all by absorbing and coopting those outside the elite. Michels noted that his conclusions did not imply that oligarchs could do whatever they wanted without consequences. Quite the contrary—they had to be smart, and know both what the masses wanted, and if they themselves did not want what the masses wanted, what they could get away with. The relationship between elites and the governed is a complex relationship, not the caricature we have absorbed from the movies, which tend to posit either demagogues whipping up a stupid populace, or sinister men pulling the strings from behind the scenes. But even with shrewdness, the elite can only survive if those outside the elite do not become too hostile to the governing elite; I suspect we have long passed the point at which the American regime could recover. No matter, since our regime is the very opposite of shrewd, so we will never know if it could have retained its power by taking actions such as coopting those outside the elite.
Not everyone sees our regime as irredeemably incompetent. One can argue, for example, that our regime does coopt those outside the elite, bringing them into the professional-managerial elite, and despite elite-overproduction, managing to devote ever more stolen resources to ensuring these new entrants are able to live adequately well. After all, a majority of the talented young still aspire to join the PME, to go to a credentialing college which will indoctrinate them in regime loyalty and Left principles, and then to obtain a well-paid, or at least decently-paid and socially reasonably prestigious, job that marks them as part of the PME. Viewed from one angle, this process, successfully operated for decades by the Left, skims the cream of America’s young people, leaving few of the most talented to operate on the Right—and, not coincidentally, making it hard for a counter-elite to rise, even an inchoate one.
This is a problem for overthrowing the regime, but it’s a problem that is rapidly fixing itself, because whatever such cooption took place in the past, it is rapidly failing now. Our current elite deliberately and insanely selects as the beneficiary of money and honors anybody but those who have been the backbone of every successful Western elite ever—unfeminized heterosexual white men, whom the regime today instead aims to harm, and announces their aim through a megaphone. Yes, a few such men, though ever fewer, are admitted to the track leading to today’s elite, if they abase themselves adequately. But an ever-growing pool of such men exists completely outside the elite, and it is from these men that the new elite will be formed, after the chaos that will rise from below, sweeping everything before it.
If, as I claim, our current elite is foundering before our eyes, and will shortly be replaced, what does that imply an ambitious young man should do right now, at this moment? He cannot aim at joining the current elite, but there is no other elite yet taking applicants. It is yet aborning, and no action can offer a direct path to something that does not exist, meaning all choices must be based on gambles about the future. What such a man should do is a crucial question, and I discussed this in my recent article “My Advice to the Young”—though I said little about how a young man can become part of the future elite.
Now, it is true that I look, and walk, and talk, like an elite. Thus, as with the proverbial duck, am I not elite? And if that is true, what I am doing drawing a line between myself and today’s elite? Well, it’s not actually clear that I am part of today’s elite. If I wanted to be socially accepted by, say, Chicago high society (Indianapolis has no high society; while nobody likes to admit it, and as much as I love my state, this really is the provinces, even more so than other Midwestern states), that would not work out for me; I would be reviled, despite my notable good looks and undeniable charm. Still, I have many personal connections in various segments of America’s regime elite, because I came of age in a different time, when the regime was both less malicious and more competent. And my wealth necessarily creates around me a distortion field in some elite quarters, as well as insulates me from nearly all attacks by those who take offense at my beliefs, making such attacks stillborn, so far at least. If, in some future, I lead some segment of the Right as it ascends to full-spectrum dominance, or I become the local leader of a successful armed patronage network, then I will be fully elite, and that will be a good thing. I will celebrate by wearing only clothes shot through with gold thread. There is nothing wrong in the least with being elite; the problem is being a bad elite.
Aside from me, who will be elite in the new Right-dominated society, after the “circulation of elites,” when the Right has definitively wiped out the power and presence of the Left? The percentage of today’s elite who are Right is vanishingly low, and completely invisible. This is in part due to deliberate Left exclusion of those who fail loyalty tests, and also due to herd behavior, but one way or another, it is almost impossible to ascend or remain in the elite if one is Right. (The exception, or quasi-exception, is Right pundits, who have one foot in the elite, to the extent they can claim to be public intellectuals—but it is a very crippled, conditional form of elite status.) Obviously the Republican Party, which does contain some elites, is not Right; only a trivial number of prominent Republicans are other than handmaidens of the Left, and, sadly, many of those are simply charlatans and clowns with a tenuous grasp of reality, little charisma, and very desirous of attention to them as its own end, rather than as a tool. None of them would know what to do with power if they had it, and thus cannot be considered elite. Long ago and far away there was a Right that seemed to have power, exemplified by William F. Buckley and National Review. But it was all lies; we were betrayed, and it ended in tears for those who followed those supposed leaders (and Left-funded sinecures for the Judas sheep, such as Jonah Goldberg and David French, though the most guilty, such as Buckley himself, have mostly died). True, there exists the dissident Right, and it has many interesting voices, but it has no elite, for an elite must have power, and the dissident Right has none at all. It seeks power, but there is a long way from here to there, although that ground can, in the right circumstances, be covered fast as lightning. Thus, the answer to the question who will be elite is—we cannot know, for history twists and turns. We can only say it will be revealed to us.
What, then, should young men do on the Right to prepare to be part of the future elite? Some claim, as Scott Greer did in a recent somewhat-confused article, in which he seemed unable to determine at whom his thoughts were aimed, that the best path to joining the future elite is to continue treading the current path to joining the PME. To do this, you must go to college. He claims that without college, you can’t be qualified for a decent job, you’ll be poor, and you’ll always be irrelevant—by implication, even in future changed circumstances. Greer’s real, if hidden, objection is that he can’t imagine not being in the PME, even in the very junior and subordinated role he occupies there, and he doesn’t really believe the PME is going to disappear. He can’t imagine himself, so he can’t imagine anyone else, risking being forever excluded from the PME, so he counsels passivism and giving in to the sweet embrace of terminal inertia (he is not alone in this; it is the entire program of Curtis Yarvin, for example).
As I have recently analyzed . . . [review finishes as first comment].
Parvini is an expert on Shakespeare who has become a presence in the dissident Right, under the moniker Academic Agent. He has a YouTube channel, has appeared on Alex Kaschuta’s eclectic and always excellent podcast, and is someone to whom you should pay attention (perhaps through listening to the recent series of podcasts on this book by the insightful Peter Quiñones). Parvini defines the “populist delusion” as the belief “if conditions get bad enough, if the plebians become too disgruntled with their leaders, then the people will rise up and overthrow them.” He asserts that the reality is that “if people want change even at a time of popular and widespread resentment of the ruling class, they can only hope to achieve that change by becoming a tightly knit and organised minority themselves and, in effect, displacing the old ruling class.” There is, as we will discuss, some truth to this, but Parvini ignores that, as José Ortega y Gasset said, force follows public opinion, and he therefore considerably overstates the degree to which radical change must begin, rather than end, with an organized minority in charge.
Parvini ably summarizes and coheres the core thought of eight men (and in many ways this book, including Parvini’s incorrect belief that the desire for power is the only possible motive for nearly all human political action, is a sequel or update to James Burnham’s The Machiavellians, which analyzed three of the eight thinkers profiled here). Gaetano Mosca, the first modern political theorist to point out that every society always is ruled by an elite (usually one composed of two layers, what Parvini names the “governing elite” and the “non-governing elite”) and that all attempts to deny this end in disaster. Vilfredo Pareto, who offered a complex and highly original social analysis, showing that ruling class overthrow was not the result of competing ideologies, but of the inability of a calcified ruling class to absorb external talent. Robert Michels, who coined the Iron Law of Oligarchy, that every organization, not just every society, “becomes divided into a minority of directors and a majority of the directed” (something every person involved in an organization, or that horrible thing in business school and corporate work, a “team,” knows). Carl Schmitt, who piercingly analyzed sovereignty and legitimacy, and rejected the liberal delusion that democracy or parliamentarianism was in any way a more effective or more desirable system of government than ones which did not pretend the people ruled.
These four wrote before World War II, which birthed the world in which we live and changed, in many ways, the manifestation of elites in the West. The second set of four men Parvini profiles brings us up to the present. Bertrand de Jouvenal, theorist of power, who noted that democracy in practice was “the broadest highway to tyranny that has ever existed,” and described, in his “high-low-middle” mechanism, how the ruling high uses patronage handed out to the underclass low to drain power, and wealth, from the most populous group, the middle—and, not coincidentally, thereby destroys the intermediary institutions that are the bedrock of any successful society. James Burnham, who analyzed how modernity had introduced managers, who had absorbed the functions of both the governing and non-governing elite, a “fused political-economic apparatus.” (Parvini does not discuss what seems highly relevant to today, that Michels concluded that the necessary political end of all modern societies was Bonapartism, or that Schmitt concluded much the same in his The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, and Burnham largely agreed, in that he predicted a type of fractalized Bonapartism.) Samuel T. Francis, who updated Burnham’s thought to incorporate the explicit Left beliefs that had come to characterize the modern managerial elite, though he wrongly thought this largely cynical, a function rather than a set of core beliefs, and who called for a “revolution from the middle.” And, finally, Paul Gottfried (the only one of these men still alive), who identified the final stage of modern elite intentions, to change the people, who when they will not accept elite dictates are viewed as insane, through a twisted form of therapy, into a better people, willing to accept falsehood and unreality as truth and reality.
It’s all an excellent summary. But what does elite theory tell us about this moment? No sensible person can deny that every society is dominated by the powerful, and by definition, the powerful are a minority. In no real society can everyone, or even most people, be powerful, or equal in power. To all Western societies before the so-called Enlightenment, this was a feature, not a bug. Because power must reside in the few, a well-run society was seen not as extending power to all, but as ensuring that power was used generally for the good of the whole—“for the people,” rather than “by the people.” If correctly done, this means most citizens need not, and should not, trouble themselves about power or politics. Given human nature, the success of this project has been mixed from a historical perspective—but it has a far better track record than Enlightenment-based chimeras that claim to distribute power to everyone, most notably so-called liberal democracy. These not only fail to actually distribute power, but destroy any society, as we are seeing unfold before our eyes today in the West.
Parvini, however, goes farther and concludes that popular action that seeks radical change, whether the (fantastic and excellent) Electoral Justice Protest, the Yellow Vests in France, the Canadian truckers, or other such bottom-up movements emerging from those denied power and harshly oppressed, will necessarily fail. This is, as I noted, his “populist delusion.” I think he is too hasty in this conclusion, because it is easy to demonstrate that under the correct circumstances, the populace can destroy a regime without being led by a counter-elite, or even without the existence of a counter-elite. The people of the tyrannized countries of Eastern and Central Europe (tyrannized less, for the most part, than we are today) did it in 1989 (and not because they wanted blue jeans and rock music, but for much deeper principles, and all this is well discussed in Stephen Kotkin’s Uncivil Society). Sri Lankans did it recently (although I claim no special insight into the politics of that country, or how successful mass action ultimately was), and the unhinged reaction of the extremely punchable Justin Trudeau and his filthy henchmen clearly suggested they feared a similar result from the trucker protests. It only takes a little historical reflection to see that the often-held belief, which is also Parvini’s, that a counter-elite must originate and control such an uprising by the common people for it to be successful is false, the exception rather than the rule, and that this false belief is usually held mostly by eggheads and monomaniacs who incorrectly think that they would be part of such an elite, which could be nothing without them. Yes, it is sometimes true that a counter-elite first organizes, and only then replaces an existing elite; Vladimir Lenin is the best Western historical example. But if you change a few minor variables in 1917, the Russian ruling class is still overthrown, yet not replaced by the Bolsheviks, which suggests it is mere happenstance that Lenin spent decades preparing for the role that history ultimately granted to him.
Thus, it is no doubt true, as Parvini states, that “tight organizational ability and iron discipline” are necessary for a new elite to ultimately take control, but it is a confusion to suggest that those virtues must be operative for an existing regime, particularly an extremely fragile one such as ours, to meet its well-deserved end. Put another way, it is false, what Parvini claims, that “Change always takes concerted organization.” Seizing power with finality takes concerted organization, but the rapid upheaval that makes such seizure possible is driven by the release of boiling, chaotic internal forces, sometimes with future elites bobbing within them, like a cork on a stormy ocean. Once the slate is wiped clean, elite leaders necessarily emerge to take and exercise power (Burnham called this gaining “social weight”)—but the point is that, at least at first, they will likely rule as the populace desires, not as the former ruling class desires (though often enough members of that class throw on a fresh coat of paint and try to insert themselves into the new elite, if they are not first dealt with adequately). We must remember that this consummation has, historically, been accomplished by the masses, who in such times of change have the chthonic power, if they can stay the course in the face of ever-more-desperate attacks by the regime (such as “President” Biden’s bizarre and incompetent, hateful yet inevitable, speech the other day, a spectacular sign of regime fragility), to destroy a regime. Thereby the people hold a veto over when and how the new begins, even if they do not directly create the new elite, which emerges organically.
Although the end always comes, any elite can survive longer by taking shrewd (the word used by Pareto) actions, most of all by absorbing and coopting those outside the elite. Michels noted that his conclusions did not imply that oligarchs could do whatever they wanted without consequences. Quite the contrary—they had to be smart, and know both what the masses wanted, and if they themselves did not want what the masses wanted, what they could get away with. The relationship between elites and the governed is a complex relationship, not the caricature we have absorbed from the movies, which tend to posit either demagogues whipping up a stupid populace, or sinister men pulling the strings from behind the scenes. But even with shrewdness, the elite can only survive if those outside the elite do not become too hostile to the governing elite; I suspect we have long passed the point at which the American regime could recover. No matter, since our regime is the very opposite of shrewd, so we will never know if it could have retained its power by taking actions such as coopting those outside the elite.
Not everyone sees our regime as irredeemably incompetent. One can argue, for example, that our regime does coopt those outside the elite, bringing them into the professional-managerial elite, and despite elite-overproduction, managing to devote ever more stolen resources to ensuring these new entrants are able to live adequately well. After all, a majority of the talented young still aspire to join the PME, to go to a credentialing college which will indoctrinate them in regime loyalty and Left principles, and then to obtain a well-paid, or at least decently-paid and socially reasonably prestigious, job that marks them as part of the PME. Viewed from one angle, this process, successfully operated for decades by the Left, skims the cream of America’s young people, leaving few of the most talented to operate on the Right—and, not coincidentally, making it hard for a counter-elite to rise, even an inchoate one.
This is a problem for overthrowing the regime, but it’s a problem that is rapidly fixing itself, because whatever such cooption took place in the past, it is rapidly failing now. Our current elite deliberately and insanely selects as the beneficiary of money and honors anybody but those who have been the backbone of every successful Western elite ever—unfeminized heterosexual white men, whom the regime today instead aims to harm, and announces their aim through a megaphone. Yes, a few such men, though ever fewer, are admitted to the track leading to today’s elite, if they abase themselves adequately. But an ever-growing pool of such men exists completely outside the elite, and it is from these men that the new elite will be formed, after the chaos that will rise from below, sweeping everything before it.
If, as I claim, our current elite is foundering before our eyes, and will shortly be replaced, what does that imply an ambitious young man should do right now, at this moment? He cannot aim at joining the current elite, but there is no other elite yet taking applicants. It is yet aborning, and no action can offer a direct path to something that does not exist, meaning all choices must be based on gambles about the future. What such a man should do is a crucial question, and I discussed this in my recent article “My Advice to the Young”—though I said little about how a young man can become part of the future elite.
Now, it is true that I look, and walk, and talk, like an elite. Thus, as with the proverbial duck, am I not elite? And if that is true, what I am doing drawing a line between myself and today’s elite? Well, it’s not actually clear that I am part of today’s elite. If I wanted to be socially accepted by, say, Chicago high society (Indianapolis has no high society; while nobody likes to admit it, and as much as I love my state, this really is the provinces, even more so than other Midwestern states), that would not work out for me; I would be reviled, despite my notable good looks and undeniable charm. Still, I have many personal connections in various segments of America’s regime elite, because I came of age in a different time, when the regime was both less malicious and more competent. And my wealth necessarily creates around me a distortion field in some elite quarters, as well as insulates me from nearly all attacks by those who take offense at my beliefs, making such attacks stillborn, so far at least. If, in some future, I lead some segment of the Right as it ascends to full-spectrum dominance, or I become the local leader of a successful armed patronage network, then I will be fully elite, and that will be a good thing. I will celebrate by wearing only clothes shot through with gold thread. There is nothing wrong in the least with being elite; the problem is being a bad elite.
Aside from me, who will be elite in the new Right-dominated society, after the “circulation of elites,” when the Right has definitively wiped out the power and presence of the Left? The percentage of today’s elite who are Right is vanishingly low, and completely invisible. This is in part due to deliberate Left exclusion of those who fail loyalty tests, and also due to herd behavior, but one way or another, it is almost impossible to ascend or remain in the elite if one is Right. (The exception, or quasi-exception, is Right pundits, who have one foot in the elite, to the extent they can claim to be public intellectuals—but it is a very crippled, conditional form of elite status.) Obviously the Republican Party, which does contain some elites, is not Right; only a trivial number of prominent Republicans are other than handmaidens of the Left, and, sadly, many of those are simply charlatans and clowns with a tenuous grasp of reality, little charisma, and very desirous of attention to them as its own end, rather than as a tool. None of them would know what to do with power if they had it, and thus cannot be considered elite. Long ago and far away there was a Right that seemed to have power, exemplified by William F. Buckley and National Review. But it was all lies; we were betrayed, and it ended in tears for those who followed those supposed leaders (and Left-funded sinecures for the Judas sheep, such as Jonah Goldberg and David French, though the most guilty, such as Buckley himself, have mostly died). True, there exists the dissident Right, and it has many interesting voices, but it has no elite, for an elite must have power, and the dissident Right has none at all. It seeks power, but there is a long way from here to there, although that ground can, in the right circumstances, be covered fast as lightning. Thus, the answer to the question who will be elite is—we cannot know, for history twists and turns. We can only say it will be revealed to us.
What, then, should young men do on the Right to prepare to be part of the future elite? Some claim, as Scott Greer did in a recent somewhat-confused article, in which he seemed unable to determine at whom his thoughts were aimed, that the best path to joining the future elite is to continue treading the current path to joining the PME. To do this, you must go to college. He claims that without college, you can’t be qualified for a decent job, you’ll be poor, and you’ll always be irrelevant—by implication, even in future changed circumstances. Greer’s real, if hidden, objection is that he can’t imagine not being in the PME, even in the very junior and subordinated role he occupies there, and he doesn’t really believe the PME is going to disappear. He can’t imagine himself, so he can’t imagine anyone else, risking being forever excluded from the PME, so he counsels passivism and giving in to the sweet embrace of terminal inertia (he is not alone in this; it is the entire program of Curtis Yarvin, for example).
As I have recently analyzed . . . [review finishes as first comment].
June 23, 2022
So Basically it's a book that tries to cloak nihilistic hatred in intellectualism, I believe some of the points in this book were even adopted by Stalin. But it stands as an important illustration as to why we mustn't censor speech. People need to see that history will repeat itself if we don't engage and neutralize hollow, hateful, and useless ideologies. Otherwise people are liable to think this is new synthesis and a new idea to try. Like you get the idea they're trying to support a strong man dictator ship because at least there would be order and that is a sh*t argument.
and to be double fair, the "dissident right" (sure bud) are at least willing to think out and submit their ideas for scrutiny, the left is not.
That said, it IS a GOOD and PRACTICAL analysis of power dynamics, I just don't agree with the conclusions that it's trying to push in through the back door. On particular idea I've walked away from this book with is that government systems rooted in permanence are doomed to fail because human nature and nature in general is cyclical and unique to it's point in time and typically people want ORGANIZATION but conflate that for GOVERNMENT which is a minority of people trying to exert control over others typically through the threat of violence.
and to be double fair, the "dissident right" (sure bud) are at least willing to think out and submit their ideas for scrutiny, the left is not.
That said, it IS a GOOD and PRACTICAL analysis of power dynamics, I just don't agree with the conclusions that it's trying to push in through the back door. On particular idea I've walked away from this book with is that government systems rooted in permanence are doomed to fail because human nature and nature in general is cyclical and unique to it's point in time and typically people want ORGANIZATION but conflate that for GOVERNMENT which is a minority of people trying to exert control over others typically through the threat of violence.
June 18, 2022
Absolutely incredible book.
This is far and away the most potent and succinct summary of elitism I've ever encountered. It manages to perfectly explain the points of the authors while very powerfully showing examples from the modern world.
This is an extremely dissident right book and holds certain soicitally unpopular opinions as self evident and this bent will ruin any interest in it at all for some people, but I implore you to read this with an open mind even if you have a hint of interest in elitism.
This is far and away the most potent and succinct summary of elitism I've ever encountered. It manages to perfectly explain the points of the authors while very powerfully showing examples from the modern world.
This is an extremely dissident right book and holds certain soicitally unpopular opinions as self evident and this bent will ruin any interest in it at all for some people, but I implore you to read this with an open mind even if you have a hint of interest in elitism.
June 17, 2022
If you're wondering why our liberal democracies seem to be failing and it doesn't appear to make any difference who is elected, this book does a brilliant job of explaining why. This book should be required reading for anyone who just wants to know what on earth is going on.
November 14, 2022
Interesting short book/pamphlet on how things may actually work
December 27, 2024
The Populist Delusion (Imperium Press, 2022) är skriven av författaren och Youtube-profilen Neema Parvini, även känd under namnet Academic Agent. I den här boken påvisar Parvini, på ett övertygande sätt, hur politik och makt verkligen fungerar samt hur falsk den demokratiska myten är.
En central poäng är att den organiserade minoriteten (eliten) alltid härskar över den oorganiserade massan oavsett vilket politisk formel eller ideologi som används.
I syfte att underbygga olika aspekter av sin tes tar Parvini hjälp av ett antal mycket intressanta författare. Dessa är; Geatano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Rober Michels, Carl Schmitt, James Burnham, Samuel T Francis och Paul Gottfried. Vi vill understryka att samtliga dessa författares egna verk är mycket läsvärda och informativa. Förutom bokens inledande kapitel behandlas de nämna författarna var sitt kapitel där några av deras viktigaste idéer sammanfattas innan boken avslutas med en kort konklusion.
Boken är på många sätt en uppdaterad version av James Burnhams bok The Machiavellians från 1942. The Populist Delusion är dock, trots att den behandlar flera författare än Burnham gör i sin bok, mer koncis och informativ eftersom Parvini är väldigt duktig på att sammanfatta och tydliggöra idéer på ett lättförståeligt och effektivt sätt. Utöver denna förmåga är författaren även bra på att understryka sina poänger genom att exemplifiera med hjälp av referenser till moderna politiska händelser.
The Populist Delusion är en väldokumenterad och mästerlig sammanfattning av några av de förra århundrades viktigaste politiska tänkare och vi rekommenderar denna bok till alla som börjar se sprickorna i den demokratiska myten och är intresserade av hur politik och makt verkligen fungerar. Vi ger författaren själv det sista ordet:
“The thesis of this book has been that democracy is and always has been an illusion, in which the true functioning of power where an organised minority elite rule over an disorganised mass is obscured through a lie that 'the people are sovereign'. I have called this 'the populist delusion' because of the number of other lies that this central lie conceals, chiefly the myth of the bottom-up power or 'people power' and the entirely inaccurate view of history this lie creates. There is never a substitute for the tightly organised minority. This fact, Mosca´s law, is the key lesson of the Italian elite theorists: Geatano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels. I Believe that the outbreak of populism in Europe and America that started in 2015 was significantly stymied due to a view of power and the functioning of Western systems that was wholly wrong, which is to say that the people who made up those populist movements believed re-articulations of a false political formula that they were taught in their civics or history classes at school. The myth of social change being a 'bottom-up' phenomenon pervades our culture and thinking. It is the essential fiction of 1960s counterculture and the worldview of the baby boomers.”
s.143
En central poäng är att den organiserade minoriteten (eliten) alltid härskar över den oorganiserade massan oavsett vilket politisk formel eller ideologi som används.
I syfte att underbygga olika aspekter av sin tes tar Parvini hjälp av ett antal mycket intressanta författare. Dessa är; Geatano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Rober Michels, Carl Schmitt, James Burnham, Samuel T Francis och Paul Gottfried. Vi vill understryka att samtliga dessa författares egna verk är mycket läsvärda och informativa. Förutom bokens inledande kapitel behandlas de nämna författarna var sitt kapitel där några av deras viktigaste idéer sammanfattas innan boken avslutas med en kort konklusion.
Boken är på många sätt en uppdaterad version av James Burnhams bok The Machiavellians från 1942. The Populist Delusion är dock, trots att den behandlar flera författare än Burnham gör i sin bok, mer koncis och informativ eftersom Parvini är väldigt duktig på att sammanfatta och tydliggöra idéer på ett lättförståeligt och effektivt sätt. Utöver denna förmåga är författaren även bra på att understryka sina poänger genom att exemplifiera med hjälp av referenser till moderna politiska händelser.
The Populist Delusion är en väldokumenterad och mästerlig sammanfattning av några av de förra århundrades viktigaste politiska tänkare och vi rekommenderar denna bok till alla som börjar se sprickorna i den demokratiska myten och är intresserade av hur politik och makt verkligen fungerar. Vi ger författaren själv det sista ordet:
“The thesis of this book has been that democracy is and always has been an illusion, in which the true functioning of power where an organised minority elite rule over an disorganised mass is obscured through a lie that 'the people are sovereign'. I have called this 'the populist delusion' because of the number of other lies that this central lie conceals, chiefly the myth of the bottom-up power or 'people power' and the entirely inaccurate view of history this lie creates. There is never a substitute for the tightly organised minority. This fact, Mosca´s law, is the key lesson of the Italian elite theorists: Geatano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels. I Believe that the outbreak of populism in Europe and America that started in 2015 was significantly stymied due to a view of power and the functioning of Western systems that was wholly wrong, which is to say that the people who made up those populist movements believed re-articulations of a false political formula that they were taught in their civics or history classes at school. The myth of social change being a 'bottom-up' phenomenon pervades our culture and thinking. It is the essential fiction of 1960s counterculture and the worldview of the baby boomers.”
s.143
June 9, 2022
A brisk, terse condensation of the half-dozen or so political theorists whose ideas are so clarifying about the current era, whose theories provide a complete toolkit for how power operates, in all places, at all times, and at all scales. The terseness is part of the message: theorising is over, application begins. I really thought of a modern tool system: one body with a half dozen interchangable heads, in a hard case.
The last few years, the populist moment of 2016, the coof etc, have given us public sluggards the empirical proof. I myself feel an awful idiot that it took such blatant, shameless, and incompetent action by elites, on the local and the global scale, to finally blow away all my illusions that there's anything but the most basic motivations at work: possession, power, prestige, control; kinship, tribe, friends and enemies; fear and greed.
We learn where to look and who to dismiss when it comes to challenger groups. How this works is another matter, when all transcendent ideas have just been theoretically debunked as veils for power, and have in practice been systematically degraded for many generations in those very people that would make up a capable challenger class.
Is he missing something? The circulation of elites as theorised has been a local sort of affair, a family matter. Maybe the clash of civilisations puts a spanner in that. Our elites are bureaucrats that crave problems to manage and skim profit from. Mass immigration provides this. In the post-consumption world we are entering, disfunction and resentment are the raw materials for the bureaucracy's activity. The disfunctional are their periphery allies, and at the same time their raw material. This seems an untenable situation. It can continue only so long as there is tax or credit inflow to match the disfunction inflow, or until real force is needed to keep control. It seems likely this periphery will at that point be easily swept up by another elite, which will sideswipe both the incumbent and their natural local challenger.
The successful challenger elite will therefore need to be emphatically illiberal. Is the West incubating such a group, such a sentiment or such an aesthetic, in numbers?
The last few years, the populist moment of 2016, the coof etc, have given us public sluggards the empirical proof. I myself feel an awful idiot that it took such blatant, shameless, and incompetent action by elites, on the local and the global scale, to finally blow away all my illusions that there's anything but the most basic motivations at work: possession, power, prestige, control; kinship, tribe, friends and enemies; fear and greed.
We learn where to look and who to dismiss when it comes to challenger groups. How this works is another matter, when all transcendent ideas have just been theoretically debunked as veils for power, and have in practice been systematically degraded for many generations in those very people that would make up a capable challenger class.
Is he missing something? The circulation of elites as theorised has been a local sort of affair, a family matter. Maybe the clash of civilisations puts a spanner in that. Our elites are bureaucrats that crave problems to manage and skim profit from. Mass immigration provides this. In the post-consumption world we are entering, disfunction and resentment are the raw materials for the bureaucracy's activity. The disfunctional are their periphery allies, and at the same time their raw material. This seems an untenable situation. It can continue only so long as there is tax or credit inflow to match the disfunction inflow, or until real force is needed to keep control. It seems likely this periphery will at that point be easily swept up by another elite, which will sideswipe both the incumbent and their natural local challenger.
The successful challenger elite will therefore need to be emphatically illiberal. Is the West incubating such a group, such a sentiment or such an aesthetic, in numbers?
June 30, 2022
Ever wonder why populist political movements in the US or in Western Europe seem to fail? Parvini offers up some answers. Our world's understanding of democracy is full of myth-making about the separation of the economy, society, and culture from our politics. In the end, an elite political class of government, business, and public relations managers is able to hold onto control of the key flashpoints of Western political systems. And while an election or populist movement might remove certain political figures or managers, the necessity for a managerial elite remains. In today's modern world the knowledge, the intellectual pedigree, and the relationships "necessary" to run the world are a fairly exclusive system. This makes it challenging for new figures and new ideas to enter into the mainstream. Using a thorough review of Italian, German, and American political thinkers, Parvini makes a case for why a class of "elites" makes populism a delusion/myth of liberalism.
While I think Parvini's thesis and argument is fairly strong, I think his argument is weak in giving more practical, rather than philosophical examples of how his theory works. More specificity would have helped make the work accessible.
While I think Parvini's thesis and argument is fairly strong, I think his argument is weak in giving more practical, rather than philosophical examples of how his theory works. More specificity would have helped make the work accessible.
May 18, 2022
A brisk summary the nature of power according to the elite theorists and their latter day followers. AA highlights one thinker per chapter.
Loved it. Theories are well outlined and the author provides numerous examples of these ideas materialising in the last few years.
Theories like the Mosca’s law, the High-low mechanism or the iron law of oligarchy aren’t overly complex and upon reading are obvious. However, these are very ‘dangerous ideas’ and there’s no chance an educational institution would highlight them. Instead students have sermons delivered to them on the holiness of liberal democracy and the demons who dare oppose it.
AA has added to his already legendary legacy with this book. Summarising these thinkers is a great service and on a personal note has crystallised the worldview I’ve developed over the past few years.
4.5/5
Loved it. Theories are well outlined and the author provides numerous examples of these ideas materialising in the last few years.
Theories like the Mosca’s law, the High-low mechanism or the iron law of oligarchy aren’t overly complex and upon reading are obvious. However, these are very ‘dangerous ideas’ and there’s no chance an educational institution would highlight them. Instead students have sermons delivered to them on the holiness of liberal democracy and the demons who dare oppose it.
AA has added to his already legendary legacy with this book. Summarising these thinkers is a great service and on a personal note has crystallised the worldview I’ve developed over the past few years.
4.5/5
June 3, 2022
Great introduction to some important right wing thinkers in the past 150ish years. Each chapter is a brief, dense introduction to an important thinker's most important ideas. Many chapters have analogies drawn from current politics to illustrate various points. Very manageable. Parvini's other books have a similar utility--they get you introduced to what's out there to aid you in your own reading.
November 24, 2022
A real eye-opener - for any centrally-based political thinker who has been watching in horror as the societal madness and loss of rationality has unfolded over the past decade (particularly in America) and wondered "what the hell is going on?" A little convoluted in its explanatory style and presumes a fair amount of knowledge of political science on the part of the reader, so you may have to do some of your own research (references provided). Overall, absolutely worth the exploration.
October 1, 2022
Very good book. Having read some of the thinkers that AA mentions, this is a very accessible distillation of their ideas. I am recommending this book to close friends and family who are interested in politics
December 31, 2023
Well written summary of Italian Elite Theory and it's successors, used to explain why ideas of populism and "the public getting fed up" aren't necessarily going to lead to change.
February 3, 2023
A fascinating read.
May 1, 2023
A mudt-read. Fantastic and essential analysis of the relationships and power dynamics between the governing and the governed.
March 8, 2026
Watch my review on YouTube here - Dune and the Populist Delusion: Revolutions Don’t Liberate (Elite Theory Explained) - https://www.youtube.com/live/P4io7I6N...
April 13, 2025
A great introduction to Elite Theory by Mr. Parvini.
Parvini, through the examination of different thinkers, argues that the majority of movements (e.g. revolution, civil rights, feminism etc) throughout history have either been led by an organised minority of elites or funded by elites.
He argues that an organised minority will always defeat or overcome an unorganised mass, and provides evidence to support this argument.
Parvini also compares liberal democracy to authoritarianism . Again, using different thinkers, Parvini argues that the two seemingly opposite states of power may have more similarities than differences.
Above are just two of the major questions Parvini explores in his book.
Do read it as, if nothing else, it will give you a different perspective on politics.
Parvini, through the examination of different thinkers, argues that the majority of movements (e.g. revolution, civil rights, feminism etc) throughout history have either been led by an organised minority of elites or funded by elites.
He argues that an organised minority will always defeat or overcome an unorganised mass, and provides evidence to support this argument.
Parvini also compares liberal democracy to authoritarianism . Again, using different thinkers, Parvini argues that the two seemingly opposite states of power may have more similarities than differences.
Above are just two of the major questions Parvini explores in his book.
Do read it as, if nothing else, it will give you a different perspective on politics.
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