Steiner's Nostalgia for the Absolute comes from a series of lectures given at the University of Toronto in 1974 with the intent of describing the ironic, perhaps even tragic situation in Western culture as it developed symptomatic post-theological mythologies. The term "mythology" is not accidental as Steiner wants to identify the quasi-religious traits found in decidedly modern ideological systems such as Marxism, Freudian Psychoanalysis, and the Structuralist Anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss. Steiner's contention is that each of these schools of thought, which have played an indisputably significant and irreversible role in the development of Western thought and culture since their inception, rely upon distinctly religious conceptions of the world, of humanity, of morality, and of the future. While not being identical with formal, organized religions -the writings of Marx, Freud, and Levi-Strauss all strive to attain the distinction of scientific reason - they nonetheless present modern "mythologies" that attempt to fill the void left from the collapse of traditional theological authorities, specifically the Christian churches in the wake of the Second World War. The void Steiner identifies is the absence of a totalizing framework that explains the purpose of humanity, the origin of "sin," the method of redemption from that sin, and the final goal or end-state of the human race, be it beatitude or damnation.
As a lecture, Steiner's presentation is not a study of these systems in any great depth. Marx, Freud, and Levi-Strauss are discussed separately with attention to the specific ways they adopt the rhetoric and concepts of the Christian religion they were trying to replace in order to restore a grand sense of meaning and purpose for themselves and their follows. Marxism, for example, asserts de fide the original sin of exploitation, the wounds of alienation, the redemptive nature of class conflict and revolution, the final political paradise in an apocalyptic "withering away" of the State. History has shown these doctrines of Marx to be promises as empty as any apocalyptic cult. Steiner also pays attention to how those who adopted these mythologies carried them forward as "orthodox" disciples or "heretical" reformers seeking to return to the "true" reading of their master. In this light, the internecine conflicts between Lenin and Luxemburg, Stalin and Trotsky, Freud and Jung resemble some of the most dramatic moments in Christian history where the stakes of doctrinal correctness and practical obedience to the establishment splintered churches and sparked religious wars. Between the textual evidence that Steiner brings forward as well as the historical accounts of how these modern mythologies played out, his argument that Marxism, for example, is a pseudo-scientific rationalist religion with its founding myths, its canonical texts, its magisterium, preachers, martyrs, and heretics, seems more than credible. The interesting question, however, is why these mythologies came about at all.
The central goal of Steiner's inquiry is to elaborate what he calls, "nostalgia for the absolute." Modern mythologies are fundamentally nostalgic, romanticized quests to recapture the feeling of certainty, security, and destiny that was once supplied by dogmatic Christianity. A mythology like Psychoanalysis is definitively anti-religious and anti-illusion in as much as it seeks to dispel the enchantment of theology built upon the idea of transcendent and absolute God who reveals himself and transforms the sinner, substituting theological explanations of original sin, the disobedience in Eden, for a psychoanalytic "original sin," patricide. The similarities cannot be missed. Freud has an Oedipus for Augustine's Adam, a therapist for the incarnate Logos. Psychoanalysis is thus one of many nostalgic mythologies poised over the abyss because its interpretation of civilization and the inner world of human experience cannot possibly be falsified or verified as "revelation."
It is important to note, with Steiner, that these mythologies are not anti-religious in the Enlightenment sense, as one finds in Voltaire. They are not an attack on religion. They are nostalgic quasi-religions that are only be possible in the dual collapse of the cultural authority of Christian theology and the Enlightenment narratives of progress based in the proliferation of rational, scientific research. Modernity, for Steiner, no longer accepts the phrase, "the truth will set you free," without question. In an age where technological progress and ferocious inhumanity are united in the cause of final solutions, where the old authority of the Church either fails to speak against or instead actively supports the atrocity, where theologians fall silent before the holocaust, what remains of truth and freedom?
In Steiner's account, by the end of the 20th century our modern mythologies are becoming just as culturally bankrupt as the religion they hoped to surpass. Since 1974 it would seem his analysis has been vindicated since neither the Marxist nor the theologian have succeeding in guiding the world according to their lights. Without recourse to formal Christianity or the nostalgic mythologies of the absolute that came in its wake, Western civilization is faced with a crisis which it is apparently unable to solve. Steiner's opinion is that desire for the absolute is the DNA of Western culture for some unknown reason. It cannot be exorcised, and nostalgics like Marx, Freud, and Levi-Strauss illustrate the inability of the West to surrender its drive for truth despite the abeyance of transcendent religion, a tragic flaw inherited from the Greeks. This drive for truth, for the absolute, nonetheless is doomed to undermine its own efforts since it is based in a mythical assumption that all truths are beneficial for human society, a presupposition that cannot be founded on anything but a kind of religious faith. Thus, even George Steiner tacitly admits some nostalgia into his analysis as he tries to explain the contemporary situation of the West in dramatological terms. The West is fated to explore and exploit, perhaps not on the local level but as a whole. Prometheus features large in nostalgic mythologies, but so does Hamlet. Steiner leaves us with the feeling that the Western mind is beautiful, sincere, and fatally tainted.
Ultimately, Steiner grants his audience a modicum of hope about the future of truth. Whether or not humanity has a future is a question he is much more hesitant to answer. His pessimism regarding humanity appears tinged with the very nostalgia he illustrates in the lectures. While essentially negative about the capabilities of Western civilization to heal its own wounds, he continues to wonder if the disappearance of humanity from the universe would be regrettable from a philosophical standpoint. Whatever might be the value of Steiner's post-theological hunch about the merit of humanity, his account of how we came to inhabit a post-theological world plagued with deep impulses of religious nostalgia is a valuable insight to our contemporary condition, whether one is a believer or not.