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Atoms and Ashes: A Global History of Nuclear Disasters
A chilling account of more than half a century of nuclear catastrophes, by the author of the “definitive” (Economist) Cold War history, Nuclear Folly.
Almost 145,000 Americans fled their homes in and around Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in late March 1979, hoping to save themselves from an invisible enemy: radiation. The reactor at the nearby Three Mile Island nuclear power plant had gone into partial meltdown, and scientists feared an explosion that could spread radiation throughout the eastern United States. Thankfully, the explosion never took place—but the accident left deep scars in the American psyche, all but ending the nation’s love affair with nuclear power.
In Atoms and Ashes, Serhii Plokhy recounts the dramatic history of Three Mile Island and five more accidents that that have dogged the nuclear industry in its military and civil incarnations: the disastrous fallout caused by the testing of the hydrogen bomb in the Bikini Atoll in 1954; the Kyshtym nuclear disaster in the USSR, which polluted a good part of the Urals; the Windscale fire, the worst nuclear accident in the UK’s history; back to the USSR with Chernobyl, the result of a flawed reactor design leading to the exodus of 350,000 people; and, most recently, Fukushima in Japan, triggered by an earthquake and a tsunami, a disaster on a par with Chernobyl and whose clean-up will not take place in our lifetime.
Through the stories of these six terrifying incidents, Plokhy explores the risks of nuclear power, both for military and peaceful purposes, while offering a vivid account of how individuals and governments make decisions under extraordinary circumstances. Today, there are 440 nuclear reactors operating throughout the world, with nuclear power providing 10 percent of global electricity. Yet as the world seeks to reduce carbon emissions to combat climate change, the question arises: Just how safe is nuclear energy?
Almost 145,000 Americans fled their homes in and around Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in late March 1979, hoping to save themselves from an invisible enemy: radiation. The reactor at the nearby Three Mile Island nuclear power plant had gone into partial meltdown, and scientists feared an explosion that could spread radiation throughout the eastern United States. Thankfully, the explosion never took place—but the accident left deep scars in the American psyche, all but ending the nation’s love affair with nuclear power.
In Atoms and Ashes, Serhii Plokhy recounts the dramatic history of Three Mile Island and five more accidents that that have dogged the nuclear industry in its military and civil incarnations: the disastrous fallout caused by the testing of the hydrogen bomb in the Bikini Atoll in 1954; the Kyshtym nuclear disaster in the USSR, which polluted a good part of the Urals; the Windscale fire, the worst nuclear accident in the UK’s history; back to the USSR with Chernobyl, the result of a flawed reactor design leading to the exodus of 350,000 people; and, most recently, Fukushima in Japan, triggered by an earthquake and a tsunami, a disaster on a par with Chernobyl and whose clean-up will not take place in our lifetime.
Through the stories of these six terrifying incidents, Plokhy explores the risks of nuclear power, both for military and peaceful purposes, while offering a vivid account of how individuals and governments make decisions under extraordinary circumstances. Today, there are 440 nuclear reactors operating throughout the world, with nuclear power providing 10 percent of global electricity. Yet as the world seeks to reduce carbon emissions to combat climate change, the question arises: Just how safe is nuclear energy?
345 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2022
282 people are currently reading
5615 people want to read
About the author
Serhii Plokhy
44 books900 followersSerhii Plokhy is a Ukrainian and American historian. Plokhy is currently the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History and Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, where he was also named Walter Channing Cabot Fellow in 2013. A leading authority on Eastern Europe, he has lived and taught in Ukraine, Canada, and the United States. He has published extensively in English, Ukrainian, and Russian. For three successive years (2002-2005) his books won first prize of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies.
For his Ukrainian-language profile, please see: Сергій Плохій
For his Ukrainian-language profile, please see: Сергій Плохій
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 176 reviews
October 30, 2022
Oh dear, now we are in a pickle.
Technician at Windscale Piles, 1957
A collection of six short chapters on various nuclear disasters, starting with the Castle Bravo test in 1954 and continuing to the Fukushima incident in 2011. The stories are told well, and Plokhy's use of Russian-language sources contributes to the narrative in studies about Kyshtym and Chernobyl.
Plokhy asserts that the risk of dramatic accidents will ultimately impact their later use and cleaner energy more generally, but I have to admit as a layman I'm not entirely convinced - I see these incidents as the result of novel weapons tests, rushed construction, or regulatory capture. But accidents tend to linger in the public memory, and the slow consequences of the alternatives are just like the parable of boiling frogs.
Technician at Windscale Piles, 1957
A collection of six short chapters on various nuclear disasters, starting with the Castle Bravo test in 1954 and continuing to the Fukushima incident in 2011. The stories are told well, and Plokhy's use of Russian-language sources contributes to the narrative in studies about Kyshtym and Chernobyl.
Plokhy asserts that the risk of dramatic accidents will ultimately impact their later use and cleaner energy more generally, but I have to admit as a layman I'm not entirely convinced - I see these incidents as the result of novel weapons tests, rushed construction, or regulatory capture. But accidents tend to linger in the public memory, and the slow consequences of the alternatives are just like the parable of boiling frogs.
March 1, 2025
Terrifying - a debt of gratitude is owed to the individuals who managed to make these nuclear disasters stop where they did, but they serve as an an ominous warning to those who see nuclear power as the answer to the global energy crisis. And in our uncertain present, the threat of such power being fought over in war zones is chilling. Plokhy as always manages to make the technical details understandable without over simplifying, and conveys the human drama and tension with skill.
June 3, 2022
Quick Take: Nuclear power is terrifying and deadly as proven by the disasters that have occurred throughout history.
I’m going to file this book under “things I wish I never learned.” Atoms and Ashes by Serhii Plokhy is a historical accounting of nuclear accidents. I was disturbed hearing how destructive nuclear power and fallout actually is. Many of the caretakers of nuclear energy in the accidents cared more about covering up the accident than warning the residents who would be affected.
1. Castle Bravo (US) - thermonuclear weapon tests - US military leaders ignored weather readings that would indicate the test would not go as planned. Several surrounding islands were radiated and residents had lifelong health problems due to exposure. A Japanese fishing boat was radiated leading to the death of one sailor and health problems for the rest including all the fish.
2. Kyshtym (Russia) - Plutonium-Processing Plant - Scientists dumped radioactive waste that thousands of people used as drinking water and a food resource. Eventually a nuclear waste system was devised but exploded in 1957 radiating everyone in the vicinity.
3. Windscale (England)- Nuclear Reactors - operators made a mistake which caused a fire in the core. It took hours to get the fire under control during which radiation spewed out of cooling towers into the air.
4. 3 Mile Island (US) - Nuclear Power Plant - calamity of errors so ridiculous It would be funny if it wasn’t so terrifying leads to a near core meltdown at power the plant.
5. Chernobyl (Ukraine) - Nuclear Power Plant - Lack of safety culture and untrained staff leads to core meltdown and death of at least 30 people.
6. Fukushima (Japan) - Nuclear Power Plant - Tsunami disables the cooling power supply and causes core melt down.
To me, this book shows that science and scientific research is its own type of power and should not be given into the hands of just anyone. Especially when working with such possibly harmful substances, the highest ethical standard should be required.
I would have liked to have had an early chapter about the basics of nuclear energy and the development of nuclear power. While I know bits and pieces, I knew little enough that when the book started, I felt like I missed something or started in the middle of the book instead of the beginning. I also agree with other reviews that it doesn’t make sense that so many different measurement types were used for measuring radiation. It made reading radiation numbers basically meaningless.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the history of nuclear power.
Rating: 4/5
Genre: Non-Fiction/History
I’m going to file this book under “things I wish I never learned.” Atoms and Ashes by Serhii Plokhy is a historical accounting of nuclear accidents. I was disturbed hearing how destructive nuclear power and fallout actually is. Many of the caretakers of nuclear energy in the accidents cared more about covering up the accident than warning the residents who would be affected.
1. Castle Bravo (US) - thermonuclear weapon tests - US military leaders ignored weather readings that would indicate the test would not go as planned. Several surrounding islands were radiated and residents had lifelong health problems due to exposure. A Japanese fishing boat was radiated leading to the death of one sailor and health problems for the rest including all the fish.
2. Kyshtym (Russia) - Plutonium-Processing Plant - Scientists dumped radioactive waste that thousands of people used as drinking water and a food resource. Eventually a nuclear waste system was devised but exploded in 1957 radiating everyone in the vicinity.
3. Windscale (England)- Nuclear Reactors - operators made a mistake which caused a fire in the core. It took hours to get the fire under control during which radiation spewed out of cooling towers into the air.
4. 3 Mile Island (US) - Nuclear Power Plant - calamity of errors so ridiculous It would be funny if it wasn’t so terrifying leads to a near core meltdown at power the plant.
5. Chernobyl (Ukraine) - Nuclear Power Plant - Lack of safety culture and untrained staff leads to core meltdown and death of at least 30 people.
6. Fukushima (Japan) - Nuclear Power Plant - Tsunami disables the cooling power supply and causes core melt down.
To me, this book shows that science and scientific research is its own type of power and should not be given into the hands of just anyone. Especially when working with such possibly harmful substances, the highest ethical standard should be required.
I would have liked to have had an early chapter about the basics of nuclear energy and the development of nuclear power. While I know bits and pieces, I knew little enough that when the book started, I felt like I missed something or started in the middle of the book instead of the beginning. I also agree with other reviews that it doesn’t make sense that so many different measurement types were used for measuring radiation. It made reading radiation numbers basically meaningless.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the history of nuclear power.
Rating: 4/5
Genre: Non-Fiction/History
August 30, 2022
Recent newspaper headlines and reports on cable news have pointed to the threat of a nuclear disaster in the war in Ukraine. It appears that the Russians have seized the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe. They have forced Ukrainians to operate the massive complex and have turned it into a military base to fire missiles at enemy positions. The Russians know full well that using the plant as a “shield” would preclude the Ukrainian army from firing its own missiles at the plant or even trying to retake it. Western powers have requested that the International Atomic Energy Commission investigate, and finally after obfuscating for days the Kremlin has agreed to let inspectors into the plant today. As the situation evolves it has placed Ukraine, Europe, and even Russia in a precarious position if a nuclear accident occurs.
In this environment Serhii Plokhy, the author of numerous historical works including THE GATES OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF UKRAINE, LOST KINGDOM: THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE AND THE MAKING OF THE RUSSIAN NATION and THE LAST EMPIRE: THE FINAL DAYS OF THE SOVIET UNION has authored a timely narrative in his latest work, ATOMS AND ASHES: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF NUCLEAR DISASTERS.
Plokhy, the Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University examines the dramatic history of Three Mile Island, the Chernobyl disaster, and most recently the Fukushima catastrophe in addition to three others. In so doing Plokhy has provided careful and informative details of each event discussed zeroing in on the planning of nuclear tests and building of nuclear reactors, their implementation, the disasters that evolved, and concludes with a telling analysis of who was responsible. Today a debate exists over the utility of solar and wind technology. As this debate rages, Plokhy takes a fresh look at the history of nuclear accidents trying to understand why they have occurred, how impactful they were, and what we can learn from each event.
Plokhy states from the outset that he “examines not only the actions and omissions of those directly involved, but also the ideologies, politics, and cultures that contributed to the disasters.” After each disaster, a commission was created to examine what occurred and what steps could be taken to prevent future accidents. The problem is that these accidents keep happening and Plokhy tries to lay out the process and offers suggestions to maintain safety for all of humanity.
One of the strengths of Plokhy’s remarkable narrative is explaining the scientific information associated with nuclear testing, the quest to build hydrogen bombs, the development of nuclear power programs, and the catastrophes involved in a clear and concise manner that allows the laymen the ability to understand what normally very complex information is. The author begins his presentation with a discussion of American nuclear testing in the South Pacific at the Bikini Atoll in March 1954. Plokhy points out that nuclear testing in the 1950s was very dangerous no matter what governments said. Scientists had little control over the power of explosions, the direction of wind at various levels of the atmosphere, and which direction fallout might travel. The events of March 1954 involving “Operation Castle Bravo” were no exception particularly once American officials realized that their testing had gone awry there were no contingency plans for evacuations and the weather forecast relied upon was incorrect, despite these “warnings” they continued with further testing even though the first did not go as planned. Of course, the American Atomic Energy Commission investigated and tried to reassure everyone there was nothing to worry about, a common theme in all incidents. Further, secrecy and the need to keep as much information from the public and adversaries in the dark as to what occurred also dominates each incident. In Castle Brava, many islanders felt they were “guinea pigs” for human radiation experiments and the American response was to throw money at them to deal with medical, social, and economic issues that beset survivors. Problems that emerged included the possibility of future cancers, irradiated food sources, and retarding the growth of children.
Nuclear events in the Soviet Union seem to dominate Plokhy’s narrative. First, the Kyshtym accidents, and the meltdown at Chernobyl. In both cases even though the events are 42 years apart the same Soviet scientists had tremendous impact. Nikolai Dollezhal developed a model of a graphite-moderated and water cooled reactor first used in Hanford, WA in 1944. However, Dollezhal along with his colleagues changed the design of the reactor, impacting the future of the Soviet nuclear program and later nuclear industry which became a contributing factor to the Chernobyl disaster. Plokhy takes the reader inside the Maiak nuclear complex and the repeated accidents between 1950 and 1955. He carefully explains what went wrong and the mistakes those in charge made as an explosion at the complex created what one witness described as a “radioactive northern lights.” The key here and Chernobyl in March and April 1986 were nuclear reactor design issues and who would be “blamed” for what transpired in both instances.
“Blame” was the game that was part of the Soviet managerial culture which kicked in immediately in both cases. Scapegoats were needed as upper management knew how to play the game and escape responsibility. Interestingly Yefim Slavsky, the former chief engineer at the complex will reappear at Chernobyl over 40 years later. Secrecy dominated at Maiak as Lavrenti Beria, in charge of developing a hydrogen bomb to match that of the United States pressured the Soviet scientific community to deliver a nuclear device. In 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev took his time in dealing with the reactor meltdown looking for scapegoats which of course centered on operators and engineers at the site. The Cold War dominated 1986 as it had in 1954 and Gorbachev and his cohorts kept information from his domestic audience and the international community which were desperate for information as evidence of radiation began to permeate the atmosphere across Europe. Authorities saw no reason to publicize what occurred as “radiation was harmful but invisible,” and one could pretend nothing happened – of course until an explosion occurred as in Chernobyl; which blew off the protective cover over one of the reactors.
Anglo-American relations play an interesting role in at least one nuclear accident. British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan desperately sought to maintain the United Kingdom as a major power. Since the passage in Congress of MacMahon Act in 1946 the United States was no longer allowed to share nuclear secrets with the British, therefore London had to go it alone in developing a hydrogen bomb to show the US that they were worthy of cooperating on nuclear issues. In 1957, fresh from the disaster of the Suez War and the collapse of the Eden government, MacMillan pressured British nuclear scientists to develop and test a hydrogen bomb. At first, the bomb appeared to have had a successful test at Winscale, the US Congress rescinded the MacMahon Act, and MacMillan seemed to have implemented a successful strategy. However, when it appeared that one of the reactors caught fire and was leaking radiation, MacMillan kept it quiet as possible so as not to endanger nuclear cooperation with Washington. As in Kyshtym, Chernobyl, Bikinii Atoll, radiation levels in food and milk made it difficult to keep the accident from the public. Plokhy correctly reminds us that Cold War pressure on the US and United Kingdom dominated the period as on October 4, 1957, the Russians successfully launched Sputnik causing fears of a nuclear armed missile with a warhead reigning down on them.
The US had its own disaster on March 27, 1979 ,with the accident at Three Mile Island in central Pennsylvania. The event which saw a meltdown of a nuclear reactor was difficult to accept by American leaders, because of all the safeguards built into the system. As in all cases contradictory information dominated. In this case Metropolitan-Eddison who owned the complex, Lt. Governor William Scranton III, the point man for Governor Richard Thornburg, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could not agree on what had occurred and how dangerous the situation was. I remember standing outside my house in Northern Virginia testing which way the wind was blowing once the accident went public. The final report heavily influenced by Navy Captain Ronald Eytchison who was the only member of the investigating committee with extensive nuclear knowledge blamed the accident on human error, not simple equipment failure. The problem was that a reactor at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Plant suffered an event in September 1977 that manifested the same problem that triggered the melt down at Three Mile Island meltdown in March 1979. Eytchison states “the dynamite was that no manager or operator of the similar reactor at the Three Mile Island Plant had ever been informed about the Davis Besse accident.”
The last and most recent major accident that Plokhy discusses occurred on March 11, 2011, when the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant was hit with a 9.1 Richter scale earthquake followed by a level three Tsunami which flowed over all retaining walls flooding the plant. As in all cases Plohky’s research is impeccable presenting the background of the Japanese nuclear industry, what went wrong, and what should have been learned from the accident. In 2002 safety violations at the plant were falsified and TEPCO who owned and operated the plant would not institute the overall seismic safety measures for the entire complex. The Japanese always build their nuclear facilities near water sources to save money in the cooling process. With Fukushima located in Okuma, Japan on the Pacific Ocean, it was a disaster that was waiting to happen.
The Fukushima disasters present two aspects which Plokhy points out that are interesting. First, is the major difference between Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan who invested himself in the crisis to a degree unprecedented for any leader under similar circumstances. Eisenhower, MacMillan, Gorbachev, and to a lesser extent Carter all passed responsibility to others focusing more on withholding information and the domestic and international ramifications over what to do next. Second, is the comparison between Chernobyl and Fukushima. “Despite different levels of meltdown of reactor cores, no Chernobyl-type explosion of a reactor occurred at Fukushima-the result of the superior design of BWR reactors over RMBK type and the self-sacrifice of Japanese crews who worked overtime for days and weeks to supply water to the reactors.” Further, fewer people died and were irradiated causing deaths years later at the Japanese site than Chernobyl. Mortality at Fukushima rests around 10,000, while at Chernobyl the number reaches close to 50,000. The refugee issue is also different. Fukushima produced around 150,000 displacements, the Russian site 500,000. An ancillary result from these catastrophes has been the decline in support of the nuclear industry spurred on by anti-nuclear protests in Japan, the United States, and Germany in particular. However, the geo-political world, i.e., Russian invasion of Ukraine has called a halt somewhat in nuclear plant shutdowns because of the need for fossil fuels. In Germany and Japan, we have seen a reversal and nuclear plants that went offline since 1986 and 2011 are now going back online.
In the end I agree with Jennifer Szalai who writes in her May 18, 2022, New York Times book review that ATOMS AND ASHES shows how the nuclear industry requires vast amounts of trust in the establishment — in scientific experts, government officials and corporate figures, a number of whom didn’t exactly acquit themselves well in the dismal examples recounted here. Part of this has to do with the real limits of knowledge; for all the confident pronouncements and safety guarantees, the awesome power of nuclear energy doesn’t always behave in ways that are predicted. Not to mention that the effects of radiation exposure can vary wildly.” “The existing nuclear industry is an open-ended liability, Plokhy writes. With catastrophic climate change bearing down on us, nuclear power has been promoted by some as an obvious solution, but this sobering history urges us to look hard at that bargain for what it is.”
In this environment Serhii Plokhy, the author of numerous historical works including THE GATES OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF UKRAINE, LOST KINGDOM: THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE AND THE MAKING OF THE RUSSIAN NATION and THE LAST EMPIRE: THE FINAL DAYS OF THE SOVIET UNION has authored a timely narrative in his latest work, ATOMS AND ASHES: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF NUCLEAR DISASTERS.
Plokhy, the Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University examines the dramatic history of Three Mile Island, the Chernobyl disaster, and most recently the Fukushima catastrophe in addition to three others. In so doing Plokhy has provided careful and informative details of each event discussed zeroing in on the planning of nuclear tests and building of nuclear reactors, their implementation, the disasters that evolved, and concludes with a telling analysis of who was responsible. Today a debate exists over the utility of solar and wind technology. As this debate rages, Plokhy takes a fresh look at the history of nuclear accidents trying to understand why they have occurred, how impactful they were, and what we can learn from each event.
Plokhy states from the outset that he “examines not only the actions and omissions of those directly involved, but also the ideologies, politics, and cultures that contributed to the disasters.” After each disaster, a commission was created to examine what occurred and what steps could be taken to prevent future accidents. The problem is that these accidents keep happening and Plokhy tries to lay out the process and offers suggestions to maintain safety for all of humanity.
One of the strengths of Plokhy’s remarkable narrative is explaining the scientific information associated with nuclear testing, the quest to build hydrogen bombs, the development of nuclear power programs, and the catastrophes involved in a clear and concise manner that allows the laymen the ability to understand what normally very complex information is. The author begins his presentation with a discussion of American nuclear testing in the South Pacific at the Bikini Atoll in March 1954. Plokhy points out that nuclear testing in the 1950s was very dangerous no matter what governments said. Scientists had little control over the power of explosions, the direction of wind at various levels of the atmosphere, and which direction fallout might travel. The events of March 1954 involving “Operation Castle Bravo” were no exception particularly once American officials realized that their testing had gone awry there were no contingency plans for evacuations and the weather forecast relied upon was incorrect, despite these “warnings” they continued with further testing even though the first did not go as planned. Of course, the American Atomic Energy Commission investigated and tried to reassure everyone there was nothing to worry about, a common theme in all incidents. Further, secrecy and the need to keep as much information from the public and adversaries in the dark as to what occurred also dominates each incident. In Castle Brava, many islanders felt they were “guinea pigs” for human radiation experiments and the American response was to throw money at them to deal with medical, social, and economic issues that beset survivors. Problems that emerged included the possibility of future cancers, irradiated food sources, and retarding the growth of children.
Nuclear events in the Soviet Union seem to dominate Plokhy’s narrative. First, the Kyshtym accidents, and the meltdown at Chernobyl. In both cases even though the events are 42 years apart the same Soviet scientists had tremendous impact. Nikolai Dollezhal developed a model of a graphite-moderated and water cooled reactor first used in Hanford, WA in 1944. However, Dollezhal along with his colleagues changed the design of the reactor, impacting the future of the Soviet nuclear program and later nuclear industry which became a contributing factor to the Chernobyl disaster. Plokhy takes the reader inside the Maiak nuclear complex and the repeated accidents between 1950 and 1955. He carefully explains what went wrong and the mistakes those in charge made as an explosion at the complex created what one witness described as a “radioactive northern lights.” The key here and Chernobyl in March and April 1986 were nuclear reactor design issues and who would be “blamed” for what transpired in both instances.
“Blame” was the game that was part of the Soviet managerial culture which kicked in immediately in both cases. Scapegoats were needed as upper management knew how to play the game and escape responsibility. Interestingly Yefim Slavsky, the former chief engineer at the complex will reappear at Chernobyl over 40 years later. Secrecy dominated at Maiak as Lavrenti Beria, in charge of developing a hydrogen bomb to match that of the United States pressured the Soviet scientific community to deliver a nuclear device. In 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev took his time in dealing with the reactor meltdown looking for scapegoats which of course centered on operators and engineers at the site. The Cold War dominated 1986 as it had in 1954 and Gorbachev and his cohorts kept information from his domestic audience and the international community which were desperate for information as evidence of radiation began to permeate the atmosphere across Europe. Authorities saw no reason to publicize what occurred as “radiation was harmful but invisible,” and one could pretend nothing happened – of course until an explosion occurred as in Chernobyl; which blew off the protective cover over one of the reactors.
Anglo-American relations play an interesting role in at least one nuclear accident. British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan desperately sought to maintain the United Kingdom as a major power. Since the passage in Congress of MacMahon Act in 1946 the United States was no longer allowed to share nuclear secrets with the British, therefore London had to go it alone in developing a hydrogen bomb to show the US that they were worthy of cooperating on nuclear issues. In 1957, fresh from the disaster of the Suez War and the collapse of the Eden government, MacMillan pressured British nuclear scientists to develop and test a hydrogen bomb. At first, the bomb appeared to have had a successful test at Winscale, the US Congress rescinded the MacMahon Act, and MacMillan seemed to have implemented a successful strategy. However, when it appeared that one of the reactors caught fire and was leaking radiation, MacMillan kept it quiet as possible so as not to endanger nuclear cooperation with Washington. As in Kyshtym, Chernobyl, Bikinii Atoll, radiation levels in food and milk made it difficult to keep the accident from the public. Plokhy correctly reminds us that Cold War pressure on the US and United Kingdom dominated the period as on October 4, 1957, the Russians successfully launched Sputnik causing fears of a nuclear armed missile with a warhead reigning down on them.
The US had its own disaster on March 27, 1979 ,with the accident at Three Mile Island in central Pennsylvania. The event which saw a meltdown of a nuclear reactor was difficult to accept by American leaders, because of all the safeguards built into the system. As in all cases contradictory information dominated. In this case Metropolitan-Eddison who owned the complex, Lt. Governor William Scranton III, the point man for Governor Richard Thornburg, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could not agree on what had occurred and how dangerous the situation was. I remember standing outside my house in Northern Virginia testing which way the wind was blowing once the accident went public. The final report heavily influenced by Navy Captain Ronald Eytchison who was the only member of the investigating committee with extensive nuclear knowledge blamed the accident on human error, not simple equipment failure. The problem was that a reactor at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Plant suffered an event in September 1977 that manifested the same problem that triggered the melt down at Three Mile Island meltdown in March 1979. Eytchison states “the dynamite was that no manager or operator of the similar reactor at the Three Mile Island Plant had ever been informed about the Davis Besse accident.”
The last and most recent major accident that Plokhy discusses occurred on March 11, 2011, when the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant was hit with a 9.1 Richter scale earthquake followed by a level three Tsunami which flowed over all retaining walls flooding the plant. As in all cases Plohky’s research is impeccable presenting the background of the Japanese nuclear industry, what went wrong, and what should have been learned from the accident. In 2002 safety violations at the plant were falsified and TEPCO who owned and operated the plant would not institute the overall seismic safety measures for the entire complex. The Japanese always build their nuclear facilities near water sources to save money in the cooling process. With Fukushima located in Okuma, Japan on the Pacific Ocean, it was a disaster that was waiting to happen.
The Fukushima disasters present two aspects which Plokhy points out that are interesting. First, is the major difference between Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan who invested himself in the crisis to a degree unprecedented for any leader under similar circumstances. Eisenhower, MacMillan, Gorbachev, and to a lesser extent Carter all passed responsibility to others focusing more on withholding information and the domestic and international ramifications over what to do next. Second, is the comparison between Chernobyl and Fukushima. “Despite different levels of meltdown of reactor cores, no Chernobyl-type explosion of a reactor occurred at Fukushima-the result of the superior design of BWR reactors over RMBK type and the self-sacrifice of Japanese crews who worked overtime for days and weeks to supply water to the reactors.” Further, fewer people died and were irradiated causing deaths years later at the Japanese site than Chernobyl. Mortality at Fukushima rests around 10,000, while at Chernobyl the number reaches close to 50,000. The refugee issue is also different. Fukushima produced around 150,000 displacements, the Russian site 500,000. An ancillary result from these catastrophes has been the decline in support of the nuclear industry spurred on by anti-nuclear protests in Japan, the United States, and Germany in particular. However, the geo-political world, i.e., Russian invasion of Ukraine has called a halt somewhat in nuclear plant shutdowns because of the need for fossil fuels. In Germany and Japan, we have seen a reversal and nuclear plants that went offline since 1986 and 2011 are now going back online.
In the end I agree with Jennifer Szalai who writes in her May 18, 2022, New York Times book review that ATOMS AND ASHES shows how the nuclear industry requires vast amounts of trust in the establishment — in scientific experts, government officials and corporate figures, a number of whom didn’t exactly acquit themselves well in the dismal examples recounted here. Part of this has to do with the real limits of knowledge; for all the confident pronouncements and safety guarantees, the awesome power of nuclear energy doesn’t always behave in ways that are predicted. Not to mention that the effects of radiation exposure can vary wildly.” “The existing nuclear industry is an open-ended liability, Plokhy writes. With catastrophic climate change bearing down on us, nuclear power has been promoted by some as an obvious solution, but this sobering history urges us to look hard at that bargain for what it is.”
September 2, 2022
In How to Avoid a Climate Disaster: The Solutions We Have and the Breakthroughs We Need, Bill Gates suggested the use of nuclear energy as one of the alternative sources of energy to reach net-zero. However, Serhii Plokhy’s latest book made me question the wisdom of utilising nuclear energy to generate civilian electricity requirements amidst the possibilities of nuclear accidents. The statistics of nuclear accidents do not sound promising. Between 1952 and 2009, there have been around 99 (military and civilian) recorded nuclear power plant accidents, a few of which are highlighted in this book. This book is as engaging as Mr Plokhy’s previous nuclear-related book Nuclear Folly: A New History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, yet this one focuses more on documenting the sequences of events as well as on how both the governments and nuclear establishments alike mitigated the nuclear accidents, mostly related to nuclear power plants, namely: Castle Bravo (the US, 1954), Kyshtym (former USSR – now Russia, 1957), Windscale (England, 1957), Three Mile Island (the US, 1979), Chernobyl (former USSR – now Ukraine, 1986), and Fukushima Daichii (Japan, 2011).
Compared to Mr Plokhy’s previous book, this one is more technical with less emphasis on the political dimensions of the crisis. Honestly, I got sleepy in some parts as the technical aspects being discussed are too exhaustive. But after reading the afterwords and deriving from my experience dealing with nuclear regulatory bodies, I gather that it remains a challenge to this day to align the policies of the scientists at the nuclear regulatory bodies with the political tracks of the government. When dealing with a crisis such as a nuclear accident, oftentimes the crisis would involve not only the country where the accident took place but also neighbouring countries as well. Governments often responded to the crisis by coverup or downplaying the issue in face of international prestige and protecting national interests, or in the case of the Three Mile Island accident, the media played a role in stirring fear among the public. The scientists do not know how to communicate effectively to the public, whereas the politicians oftentimes do not understand the gravity of the crisis and ask the scientists to do the impossible, except for Jimmy Carter when dealing with the Three Mile Island accident as he had extensive technical nuclear experience.
The premise is quite straightforward. There are two questions asked by Mr Plokhy through his retelling. The first question would be to ask us to rethink the sustainability and the impact of relying on nuclear energy to fulfil our energy demands. There are many alternative options to fossil fuels, but the main challenge remains the economics of scale to adopt them by larger masses, i.e., to make them economically viable. The development of nuclear energy is mostly handled by governmental institutions as the proponents, with limited involvement of private companies, making safety compliance – in theory – easier to regulate and the costs are mostly borne by taxpayer money. 178 states already concluded the safeguard agreements by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as of today. Yet it didn’t rule out nuclear accidents. In most cases, nuclear accidents were blamed on human errors (personnel’s negligence of safety requirements) or bad designs of the reactors (such was the case of the RBMK reactor model built in the former USSR). However, there were various factors at play contributing to nuclear accidents. There is no single magic wand to rule out nuclear accidents.
Human errors often are the result of external pressures, such as the pressure to build a hydrogen bomb during the Castle Bravo incident, or the expectations to fulfil the electricity demand in the case of Chernobyl accident. Whereas, the different types of nuclear reactors and the high stake of national interests also resulted in the delay in mitigating the crisis, which means coordinated international responses are unlikely to happen. The Chernobyl accident, for example, only got its publication by the Soviet authorities after the Swedish authorities noticed an abnormal amount of radiation in their territories and reported the case to the IAEA. The national interests at stake by the Soviet government, both to maintain prestige as a nuclear superpower in Cold War rivalries and to assure the control of information over their citizens, resulted in bad press handlings and late actions on the government establishments to form coordinated responses. Yet many developments also took place following nuclear accidents, such as the requirement to only perform nuclear tests underground as opposed to the atmospheric test to prevent radiation fallout after the accident of Castle Bravo, as well as the adoption in 1986 of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident following the Chernobyl accident.
Due to the international nature of most nuclear accidents, I agree with Mr Plokhy’s assessment that most politicians and diplomats should be aware of the gravity of the issue and there should be coordinated responses from both nuclear regulatory bodies and the political tracks of government authorities. Despite the implementation of various safeguards, there are still risks that could trigger nuclear accidents outside of the technical dimensions, i.e. political, economic, and social pressures. Nuclear energy is often associated with danger since its first implementation was to bomb the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, and it’s true that nuclear energy is dangerous. But now we also have the pressing issue of climate change which has been forcing us to find alternative energy sources to replace fossil fuels, which is also true. If I have to say a thing that I don’t like about this book, it put too much emphasis on retelling the accidents rather than providing analysis on how the accidents could be relevant to the present circumstances. The afterword, despite its short length, is actually more interesting and insightful rather than the retelling of the six nuclear accidents.
Reviewed from an electronic advance reading copy provided by the publisher through NetGalley.
Compared to Mr Plokhy’s previous book, this one is more technical with less emphasis on the political dimensions of the crisis. Honestly, I got sleepy in some parts as the technical aspects being discussed are too exhaustive. But after reading the afterwords and deriving from my experience dealing with nuclear regulatory bodies, I gather that it remains a challenge to this day to align the policies of the scientists at the nuclear regulatory bodies with the political tracks of the government. When dealing with a crisis such as a nuclear accident, oftentimes the crisis would involve not only the country where the accident took place but also neighbouring countries as well. Governments often responded to the crisis by coverup or downplaying the issue in face of international prestige and protecting national interests, or in the case of the Three Mile Island accident, the media played a role in stirring fear among the public. The scientists do not know how to communicate effectively to the public, whereas the politicians oftentimes do not understand the gravity of the crisis and ask the scientists to do the impossible, except for Jimmy Carter when dealing with the Three Mile Island accident as he had extensive technical nuclear experience.
The premise is quite straightforward. There are two questions asked by Mr Plokhy through his retelling. The first question would be to ask us to rethink the sustainability and the impact of relying on nuclear energy to fulfil our energy demands. There are many alternative options to fossil fuels, but the main challenge remains the economics of scale to adopt them by larger masses, i.e., to make them economically viable. The development of nuclear energy is mostly handled by governmental institutions as the proponents, with limited involvement of private companies, making safety compliance – in theory – easier to regulate and the costs are mostly borne by taxpayer money. 178 states already concluded the safeguard agreements by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as of today. Yet it didn’t rule out nuclear accidents. In most cases, nuclear accidents were blamed on human errors (personnel’s negligence of safety requirements) or bad designs of the reactors (such was the case of the RBMK reactor model built in the former USSR). However, there were various factors at play contributing to nuclear accidents. There is no single magic wand to rule out nuclear accidents.
Human errors often are the result of external pressures, such as the pressure to build a hydrogen bomb during the Castle Bravo incident, or the expectations to fulfil the electricity demand in the case of Chernobyl accident. Whereas, the different types of nuclear reactors and the high stake of national interests also resulted in the delay in mitigating the crisis, which means coordinated international responses are unlikely to happen. The Chernobyl accident, for example, only got its publication by the Soviet authorities after the Swedish authorities noticed an abnormal amount of radiation in their territories and reported the case to the IAEA. The national interests at stake by the Soviet government, both to maintain prestige as a nuclear superpower in Cold War rivalries and to assure the control of information over their citizens, resulted in bad press handlings and late actions on the government establishments to form coordinated responses. Yet many developments also took place following nuclear accidents, such as the requirement to only perform nuclear tests underground as opposed to the atmospheric test to prevent radiation fallout after the accident of Castle Bravo, as well as the adoption in 1986 of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident following the Chernobyl accident.
Due to the international nature of most nuclear accidents, I agree with Mr Plokhy’s assessment that most politicians and diplomats should be aware of the gravity of the issue and there should be coordinated responses from both nuclear regulatory bodies and the political tracks of government authorities. Despite the implementation of various safeguards, there are still risks that could trigger nuclear accidents outside of the technical dimensions, i.e. political, economic, and social pressures. Nuclear energy is often associated with danger since its first implementation was to bomb the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, and it’s true that nuclear energy is dangerous. But now we also have the pressing issue of climate change which has been forcing us to find alternative energy sources to replace fossil fuels, which is also true. If I have to say a thing that I don’t like about this book, it put too much emphasis on retelling the accidents rather than providing analysis on how the accidents could be relevant to the present circumstances. The afterword, despite its short length, is actually more interesting and insightful rather than the retelling of the six nuclear accidents.
Reviewed from an electronic advance reading copy provided by the publisher through NetGalley.
June 9, 2022
Well, I didn't really think much of this book, it reads more like a term paper than any kind of compelling narrative. I don't think it's particularly well written. The (mostly) well-known examples of these disasters all pretty much follow a similar path:
1. Pressure from governments or business competitiveness lead to shortcuts in design, safety features, training etc;
2. A problem occurs that either should have been anticipated or was anticipated but due to poor training, design, shoddy materials, or human error, is not appropriately dealt with;
3. Businesses and (especially) governments are desperate to conceal the causes and (especially) severity of the crises;
Stir, mix, and repeat.
I think this might have been a better book had the author not treated each accident in its own chapter and instead done a more macro look at the problems with nuclear power and delved into the particulars of each incident together, comparing, for example, design flaws or construction short cuts together.
I also think the fact that many of these disasters have had their own books (in the cases of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, many different books) written leaves one with the feeling that "Atoms and Ashes" is almost a Cliff's Notes version, and it leaves the reader unmoved. It is mostly too dry. For example, not that long ago I read "Midnight in Chernobyl" which was an unbelievable work or research and an edge-of-your-seat thriller as well as an absolutely gripping polemic. THAT book was terrifying. This book, despite the author's best intentions, was yawn-inducing.
1. Pressure from governments or business competitiveness lead to shortcuts in design, safety features, training etc;
2. A problem occurs that either should have been anticipated or was anticipated but due to poor training, design, shoddy materials, or human error, is not appropriately dealt with;
3. Businesses and (especially) governments are desperate to conceal the causes and (especially) severity of the crises;
Stir, mix, and repeat.
I think this might have been a better book had the author not treated each accident in its own chapter and instead done a more macro look at the problems with nuclear power and delved into the particulars of each incident together, comparing, for example, design flaws or construction short cuts together.
I also think the fact that many of these disasters have had their own books (in the cases of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, many different books) written leaves one with the feeling that "Atoms and Ashes" is almost a Cliff's Notes version, and it leaves the reader unmoved. It is mostly too dry. For example, not that long ago I read "Midnight in Chernobyl" which was an unbelievable work or research and an edge-of-your-seat thriller as well as an absolutely gripping polemic. THAT book was terrifying. This book, despite the author's best intentions, was yawn-inducing.
July 13, 2022
I have been interested in nuclear energy my whole life (nerd alerts). I could not put this down and read it in 3 days. It covers the five worst nuclear accidents in history Bikini Atoll, Wingdale , Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima. Since humans are involved, and we make many mistakes, I no longer think that nuclear power now is a safe option. The technology may improve over time, but is it not safe enough today. I have placed this book on my honorable mention list.
April 14, 2024
Джерело підвищеної небезпеки в руках людей, які ще не володіють усіма знаннями Всесвіту, але впевнені, що вони знають усе.
Криза довіри.
Брак інформації.
Людський фактор та фактор однієї людини, які стають вирішальними.
Різна поведінка людей, які приймають рішення, в залежності від національної культури та політичного режиму.
І багато-багато інших деталей, які складаються в мозаїку при виникненні надзвичайних ситуацій.
Грунтовна, цікава, актуальна.
У мене перед очима весь час стояла ЗАЕС.
#451deepreading
June 18, 2022
A dry and monotonous retelling of famous nuclear accidents. The book would have been better with fewer details and more analysis. Also, I gather that the author is marshaling these cases as evidence in his argument against nuclear power, but is it fair to focus on the few times nuclear power went wrong? How many oil tankers have ever spilled? Not to mention …climate change? Nuclear power is still one of the best out of the bad options available.
March 9, 2024
Це не художні замальовки про ядерні аварії, а відповідь на запитання як реагують прості і не прості люди на них. Як влада себе веде, наскільки швидко огранізовують евакуацію, як реагують ЗМІ і як після цього відчуває себе галузь.
Так, написано трохи суховато, але для такої тематики саме воно. Мені, особисто, вистачило, бо пару разів була потреба відставити книжку і піти подихати.
Так, написано трохи суховато, але для такої тематики саме воно. Мені, особисто, вистачило, бо пару разів була потреба відставити книжку і піти подихати.
April 4, 2023
Diagrams! For the love of God, man, put in some diagrams the next time you try to describe a nuclear reactor going supercritical
March 7, 2025
3.5 Stars!
“With the construction of nuclear plants taking as long as ten years, and returns on investment realised incrementally over decades, it is difficult if not impossible to develop nuclear energy without government subsidies and guarantees. That was true back in the 1950s and remains true today.”
We learn that on May 21, 1946 37 year old Al Graves and the physicists Louis Slotin became the very first victims of a nuclear accident in history, Graves was standing next to Slotin during an experiment at a lab in Los Alamos, when Slotin’s hand slipped whilst holding a screwdriver allowing two plutonium hemispheres to join for a split second, “lighting up the laboratory with a bright blue glare and releasing enough radiation to kill anyone in sight.” Slotin died a few days later in May 30 of acute radiation poisoning, and Graves developed a fever and vomiting and lost half of his hair after being exposed to around 390 roentgens – but was never actual told this, and instead they assured him he only took around 200 roentgens.
Plokhy starts off his list of nuclear calamities with the Americans doing the Castle Bravo test at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands 1954. We learn that the Americans never thought to evacuate the population until days after the detonation?...which of course by that time the damage had very much been done. Because they had so greatly underestimated the power and impact of the device they had detonated, they had destroyed their own barracks and so had nowhere to put their own men until the next tests?...
We also see that apparently the highly-sophisticated US military aerial surveillance technology failed to pick up on the presence of the now notorious, “Lucky Dragon” shipping vessel before and after the detonation. And of course after the Americans had been caught and challenged about their criminality they did what they do best, deny, lie and attack.
Bungling incompetence, delusional hubris and profound ignorance are rarely ingredients which end well, add to this a conscious disregard for the many civilians who would have to suffer as a result of their experiments and explosions. But of course this didn’t stop the Americans suffering more issues when their arrogance, greed, ignorance and incompetence led to Three Mile Island in 1979 and this time on American soil.
“We are operating almost totally in the blind. His information is ambiguous, mine is non-existent, and I do not know, it’s like a couple of blind men staggering around making decisions.”
So said one American functionary in a rare moment of total honesty as the fallout of Three Mile Event disaster began emerge.
Of course that’s just the Americans, the British, the Russians and the Japanese all had their own various run ins and disasters usually all stemming from the same fundamental issues. Unprepared, inadequate and in spite of the arrogance and the self-delusion they are found to be totally out of their depth. It’s often difficult to tell what’s worse, human error or human hubris?...
We see that although many of these leaders and governments may use different languages and have different cultures, it reminds you they all share the similar depressingly predictable traits, profound aversion to honesty and transparency as well as habitually favouring cost cutting measures, prioritising money over human lives with the inevitable consequences playing out down the line. Ultimately this book proves beyond any reasonable doubt that the long-term health, environmental and financial costs are almost immeasurable as the true nature of radiation fallout is simply too difficult to measure accurately.
Having read quite a few of Plokhy’s books, I’d say that I was a fan, but I find that he tends to just slightly overwrite and this gives his books a really flabby and bloated feel, his work would really benefit from a bolder and better editor to give his work that sharpness and clarity that it never quite reaches for any sustained period of time.
October 31, 2024
Як людині, яка до прочитання цієї книги мала дуже поверхневі знання про історію ядерних катастроф, для мене відкрилось багато нового і склалась загальна картинка про те, як країни взаємодіють у сфері безпеки атомної енергетики (готуйтесь читати про традиційну «стурбованість»).
Дуже круто бачити такі роботи не просто українською, а створені українським автором.
Треба бути готовими, що більшість сторінок присвячені швидше хроніці подій і політичному середовищу, ніж фізиці процесів. Інколи мені було аж занадто багато імен і сторонніх відступів, а подекуди стиль написання здавався надто сухим, як для наукпопу, через що 4/5.
Дуже круто бачити такі роботи не просто українською, а створені українським автором.
Треба бути готовими, що більшість сторінок присвячені швидше хроніці подій і політичному середовищу, ніж фізиці процесів. Інколи мені було аж занадто багато імен і сторонніх відступів, а подекуди стиль написання здавався надто сухим, як для наукпопу, через що 4/5.
February 15, 2024
Masterful history telling. My wife can't wait to read it next; she is not only a fan of history but also tales of disaster. Knowledgeable presentation of some of the world's worst nuclear disasters. One Greek word seems to perfectly sum up each case and that is hubris. Human error and arrogance triumph again and again.
May 31, 2022
A challenging story on the accident risks of nuclear power. The chapter on Chernobyl was perhaps the weakest, as I have read better accounts, but the other chapters were strong, especially the brief Fukushima summary.
> the main source of contamination was the radiation control point itself. Radioactive particles washed off dirty vehicles stayed on the spot, and, as people walked from dirty buses to clean ones, they picked up radioactive dust and carried it into the buses and their apartments.
> Britain’s first atomic establishment became known as the brainiest town in the country. If one counts people with degrees, it turned into one of Britain’s most educated places. And they had smart children, too—the grades in local schools were higher than anywhere else. One former pupil recalled that they could not get a physics teacher in their school because the quality of the homework was so high that regular teachers of physics were afraid to take the job
> Frustrated, Yoshida, who knew that a delay in pumping seawater into the reactor might cause a second, much more damaging explosion, decided to ignore both the prime minister and TEPCO. “I continued with the pumping of seawater based on the judgment that the most important thing was to … prevent the spread of the accident,” recalled Yoshida later. He called in one of his managers and told him: “I am going to direct you to stop the seawater injection, but do not stop it.” He then gave a loud order in front of the cameras of the telecommunication system linking him with TEPCO headquarters to stop the pumping. Despite that formal order, the pumping continued.
> “When I heard about the evacuation request, I was feeling that I had to stake my political life on resolving the situation,” recalled [Prime Minister Naoto] Kan later. “That made me feel the request was totally out of line.” Kan’s aides shared his sentiment. “We must ask TEPCO to hold the fort, even if they have to put together a suicide squad,” said one of them. TEPCO officials denied that they had ever suggested complete evacuation of the site. Instead, they had allegedly considered the evacuation only of nonessential personnel. The videoconference footage that TEPCO was later forced to release suggested otherwise, supporting Kan’s understanding that the company was prepared to abandon the station altogether.
> the main source of contamination was the radiation control point itself. Radioactive particles washed off dirty vehicles stayed on the spot, and, as people walked from dirty buses to clean ones, they picked up radioactive dust and carried it into the buses and their apartments.
> Britain’s first atomic establishment became known as the brainiest town in the country. If one counts people with degrees, it turned into one of Britain’s most educated places. And they had smart children, too—the grades in local schools were higher than anywhere else. One former pupil recalled that they could not get a physics teacher in their school because the quality of the homework was so high that regular teachers of physics were afraid to take the job
> Frustrated, Yoshida, who knew that a delay in pumping seawater into the reactor might cause a second, much more damaging explosion, decided to ignore both the prime minister and TEPCO. “I continued with the pumping of seawater based on the judgment that the most important thing was to … prevent the spread of the accident,” recalled Yoshida later. He called in one of his managers and told him: “I am going to direct you to stop the seawater injection, but do not stop it.” He then gave a loud order in front of the cameras of the telecommunication system linking him with TEPCO headquarters to stop the pumping. Despite that formal order, the pumping continued.
> “When I heard about the evacuation request, I was feeling that I had to stake my political life on resolving the situation,” recalled [Prime Minister Naoto] Kan later. “That made me feel the request was totally out of line.” Kan’s aides shared his sentiment. “We must ask TEPCO to hold the fort, even if they have to put together a suicide squad,” said one of them. TEPCO officials denied that they had ever suggested complete evacuation of the site. Instead, they had allegedly considered the evacuation only of nonessential personnel. The videoconference footage that TEPCO was later forced to release suggested otherwise, supporting Kan’s understanding that the company was prepared to abandon the station altogether.
January 29, 2022
Simultaneously riveting and chilling, Atoms and Ashes is a retelling of six major nuclear disasters, beginning with atomic bombs and then transitioning to reactors, developed both for peaceful purposes and for building bombs. It is both startling and bleak how much risk we took with so little understanding of the physics behind nuclear energy. This is an essential read for anyone who cares about the future of energy on the planet (which should be all of us).
One thing that could have improved the presentation would have been to standardize the units used for describing radiation dose and radioactivity. This would have also allowed a brief description of the biological effects of radiation as a function of dose, which is now well-known, but of course was not when most of these disasters occurred. This would help the reader understand the biological impact of each event and see better how they relate in scale to each other.
Thank you to Serhii Plokhy, W. W. Norton Company, and Edelweiss for access to this free e-arc in exchange for an honest review.
One thing that could have improved the presentation would have been to standardize the units used for describing radiation dose and radioactivity. This would have also allowed a brief description of the biological effects of radiation as a function of dose, which is now well-known, but of course was not when most of these disasters occurred. This would help the reader understand the biological impact of each event and see better how they relate in scale to each other.
Thank you to Serhii Plokhy, W. W. Norton Company, and Edelweiss for access to this free e-arc in exchange for an honest review.
July 9, 2023
Interesting summaries of the separate incidents, but it read more as six disjointed stories than one cohesive narrative. Hence, the argument felt weak - yes, nuclear accidents are possible, but so are accidents with other energy sources (Deepwater Horizon? Exxon Valdez?), and previous accidents certainly do not make us "likely to see another before 2036". I felt Command and Control was a far better written approach to nuclear accidents, even if of a slightly different variety.
June 19, 2022
Plokhy's approach to history is one that is focused on understanding the mistakes that were made and this is a topic to which that approach couldn't be more perfect. There were many places where I felt that the details of physics and engineering could have been just a bit clearer, but as a record of the institutional and human factors that played out in these disasters this was superb
July 17, 2022
Extremely dry. I made it through the first two disasters then DNF. Midnight In Chernobyl and Command and Control are much better told.
October 5, 2023
Borrowed from the library.
Quite a book good written in an interesting manner. I have a couple of minor issues, though. In the foreword, the author explains how over time different standards of measuring radioactivity have changed, which makes it difficult to make direct comparisons. Different standards are also used based on the purpose of the measurement. Do you want to measure general radiation, do you want to measure the impact on the human body? And he pretty much leaves it at that and uses whatever was in use at the time of the various accidents. I think, the layman would be better served if one standard was used and everything converted to that. With modern computers, it has to be quite an easy thing.
Distances in the book are not handled in a consistent manner. Some places it is most km with miles in parenthesis behind. In others, it is the reverse. And I believe in one chapter, it flipped between the two. Please, choose one way and stick with it.
Also, in the Fukushima chapter, there are problems with the timeline. If you take it as written, it jumps around a lot. However, I think at least one error has been overlooked, so there are perhaps more. For example on page 245 evacuating the population is being discussed. At 7:45 pm a press conference is started. At 8:50 pm, the local government ordered an evacuation within 2 km of the nuclear plant. At 9:00 **am** the central government starts a meeting. Then "At 9:23 p.m., less than half an hour after the meeting began,...." So, the meeting held by the central government must have started at 9:00 pm. There are some other points talking about when things happened (in particular when Prime Minister Kan decided to visit the plant) that don't really make sense, just the one I mention above is blatant. I hope there aren't other mistakes that have been missed by proofreaders/the editors.
Also, the maps are not great. In the first chapter, it would have been better if more of these islands/atolls were on the map. There simply isn't enough detail there. Also, in general the name places are often obscured by the shading showing how much radiation fell where. The worst example is the map for the chapter "A Very English Fire". It is impossible to read one place name altogether. From consulting another map, I believe it must be Millom. You can see the "Mi", but not the rest. You can't even see the whole name of the main location, Seascale.
Despite these niggles, I recommend the book if you want to know more about the largest nuclear accidents around the world. Oh, the author chose to accept the claim that the US Navy's testing at Bikini Atoll irradiating the indigenous population was an accident, not something more sinister.
Quite a book good written in an interesting manner. I have a couple of minor issues, though. In the foreword, the author explains how over time different standards of measuring radioactivity have changed, which makes it difficult to make direct comparisons. Different standards are also used based on the purpose of the measurement. Do you want to measure general radiation, do you want to measure the impact on the human body? And he pretty much leaves it at that and uses whatever was in use at the time of the various accidents. I think, the layman would be better served if one standard was used and everything converted to that. With modern computers, it has to be quite an easy thing.
Distances in the book are not handled in a consistent manner. Some places it is most km with miles in parenthesis behind. In others, it is the reverse. And I believe in one chapter, it flipped between the two. Please, choose one way and stick with it.
Also, in the Fukushima chapter, there are problems with the timeline. If you take it as written, it jumps around a lot. However, I think at least one error has been overlooked, so there are perhaps more. For example on page 245 evacuating the population is being discussed. At 7:45 pm a press conference is started. At 8:50 pm, the local government ordered an evacuation within 2 km of the nuclear plant. At 9:00 **am** the central government starts a meeting. Then "At 9:23 p.m., less than half an hour after the meeting began,...." So, the meeting held by the central government must have started at 9:00 pm. There are some other points talking about when things happened (in particular when Prime Minister Kan decided to visit the plant) that don't really make sense, just the one I mention above is blatant. I hope there aren't other mistakes that have been missed by proofreaders/the editors.
Also, the maps are not great. In the first chapter, it would have been better if more of these islands/atolls were on the map. There simply isn't enough detail there. Also, in general the name places are often obscured by the shading showing how much radiation fell where. The worst example is the map for the chapter "A Very English Fire". It is impossible to read one place name altogether. From consulting another map, I believe it must be Millom. You can see the "Mi", but not the rest. You can't even see the whole name of the main location, Seascale.
Despite these niggles, I recommend the book if you want to know more about the largest nuclear accidents around the world. Oh, the author chose to accept the claim that the US Navy's testing at Bikini Atoll irradiating the indigenous population was an accident, not something more sinister.
July 1, 2022
Serhii Plokhny’s definitive account of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, Chernobyl- history of a nuclear catastrophe - left the reader questioning just how uniquely Soviet the response to the accident was. Now we have an in-dept answer as he examines 5 other accidents plus Chernobyl itself in terms of their historical context, causes and aftermaths. This is the story of 6 accidents divided into 3 ‘atoms for war’ stories - those of Bikini Atoll, Kyshtym and Windscale in the 50’s, and 3 ‘atoms for peace’ stories of 3 mile island, Chernobyl & Fukushima. What all have in common is the ‘Soviet’ predisposition for secrecy, denial, cover up, lack of transparency and finally the blame game when things go wrong in the nuclear realm, regardless if the setting is the US, the UK, Japan or the Soviet Union. The other things all 6 incidents have in common is the confused, panicky & erratic decision making on the ground, the tendency to look to blame individuals rather than design , management or political culture or processes; a deficient safety & training culture and above all the placement of production quotas, drive for results and thirst for energy above safety.
At a time when we are yet again confronted by an energy crisis combined with the urgent challenges to address climate change, it is tempting to once again turn to nuclear power. Plokhny’s work serves a timely reminder from history that when things go wrong with this technology, it has the potential to make vast swathes of our planet permanently uninhabitable for human life for thousands of years. This is to say nothing of the vast destructive potential of the atom when used for making war, a step we have also moved closer to on the doomsday clock.Dry and technical that Plokhny’s subject may be, this contains essential warnings to be heeded regarding man’s potential for his genius to turn to his destruction. Just as Prometheus gave the gift of fire to humanity, so the Gods punished and cursed him for his transgressions.
At a time when we are yet again confronted by an energy crisis combined with the urgent challenges to address climate change, it is tempting to once again turn to nuclear power. Plokhny’s work serves a timely reminder from history that when things go wrong with this technology, it has the potential to make vast swathes of our planet permanently uninhabitable for human life for thousands of years. This is to say nothing of the vast destructive potential of the atom when used for making war, a step we have also moved closer to on the doomsday clock.Dry and technical that Plokhny’s subject may be, this contains essential warnings to be heeded regarding man’s potential for his genius to turn to his destruction. Just as Prometheus gave the gift of fire to humanity, so the Gods punished and cursed him for his transgressions.
January 17, 2023
(2.5 rounded up because I still found this useful even if I have some bones to pick)
The parts I quite liked are the range of events covered, the historical context provided on each event, the sources, and the near chronological listing of happenings in each disaster. This book is a good informational source even if it isn't one I would consider a primary or definitive source. (I do love his sources though. Granted I'm a sucker for any kind of decent bibliography but still...) I did learn quite a bit as well on things such as the nuclear race starting with Germany, which makes sense in retrospect but my brain always connected it with Russia, and especially about the Kyshtym incident which I had never heard of before.
Now the things I wasn't as big of a fan of...
The MATH and NUMBERS in here are not my specialty, but even I know when introducing a topic your audience may not be familiar with to make sure the units match. Now, the numbers he provides may be direct from the sources Plokhy is citing, but still - it makes grasping the scale of the individual disasters quite tricky when I can't get a decent grasp of the numbers. Prepare to do lots of unit conversions to try and grasp scale to compare these incidents. It was hard to truly identify the difference in impact between disasters from the numbers alone as they were not consistent. (Many thanks to those who know numbers better than me and confirmed that this was actually an issue and not just me being unable to comprehend the numbers.) The structured, patterned language makes for a bit of a dull read at times even when the information is interesting too.
Overall - informational and relevant to those interested in the topic but nowhere near comprehensive, and I would do further research to get context on some of his blanket statements (for example, Shippingport has been decommissioned as have several other commercial plants).
The parts I quite liked are the range of events covered, the historical context provided on each event, the sources, and the near chronological listing of happenings in each disaster. This book is a good informational source even if it isn't one I would consider a primary or definitive source. (I do love his sources though. Granted I'm a sucker for any kind of decent bibliography but still...) I did learn quite a bit as well on things such as the nuclear race starting with Germany, which makes sense in retrospect but my brain always connected it with Russia, and especially about the Kyshtym incident which I had never heard of before.
Now the things I wasn't as big of a fan of...
The MATH and NUMBERS in here are not my specialty, but even I know when introducing a topic your audience may not be familiar with to make sure the units match. Now, the numbers he provides may be direct from the sources Plokhy is citing, but still - it makes grasping the scale of the individual disasters quite tricky when I can't get a decent grasp of the numbers. Prepare to do lots of unit conversions to try and grasp scale to compare these incidents. It was hard to truly identify the difference in impact between disasters from the numbers alone as they were not consistent. (Many thanks to those who know numbers better than me and confirmed that this was actually an issue and not just me being unable to comprehend the numbers.) The structured, patterned language makes for a bit of a dull read at times even when the information is interesting too.
Overall - informational and relevant to those interested in the topic but nowhere near comprehensive, and I would do further research to get context on some of his blanket statements (for example, Shippingport has been decommissioned as have several other commercial plants).
June 19, 2023
Many countries are challenged by the need to accommodate every increasing energy needs while also de-carbonising. In most instances this will mean there are more than a few advocates for nuclear energy. In Australia this has been personified by 16 year old William Shackel, born more than 10 years after Chernobyl and probably still eating Clag™ when Fukushima happened. Which brings to mind the variously attributed quote, "Those who do not learn history are doomed to repeat it."
Plokhy covers that history in considerable detail while not loosing sight of the humanity of all the various people directly and indirectly involved in the six case studies he explores. In each and every instance there have been shortcuts taken, subsequent cover-ups, and enormous financial, environmental and health sacrifices faced by future generations.
Little is likely to change any time soon.
Atoms and Ashes makes evident yet again that if nuclear energy is the answer then you're asking the wrong question.
Though perhaps beyond scope this is just another tome that doesn't capture the damage caused by British nuclear testing at Emu Plains and Maralinga, nor French testing at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. The people impacted by these "experiments" have been silent witnesses to a poisonous legacy.
Plokhy covers that history in considerable detail while not loosing sight of the humanity of all the various people directly and indirectly involved in the six case studies he explores. In each and every instance there have been shortcuts taken, subsequent cover-ups, and enormous financial, environmental and health sacrifices faced by future generations.
Little is likely to change any time soon.
Atoms and Ashes makes evident yet again that if nuclear energy is the answer then you're asking the wrong question.
Though perhaps beyond scope this is just another tome that doesn't capture the damage caused by British nuclear testing at Emu Plains and Maralinga, nor French testing at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. The people impacted by these "experiments" have been silent witnesses to a poisonous legacy.
March 24, 2025
4.5,
This was super interesting! The majority of this book is going through the histories and circumstances surrounding different nuclear disasters, and that part was very compelling, especially towards the second half when it starts making comparisons between the events. The last chapter or so of the book is dedicated to the authors conclusions and the future of nuclear energy, and while some of that was kind of surface level compared with the rest of the book I still 100% love when nonfiction authors actually say what they want the readers to get from a book.
This book is very academic in tone, which works for what it is but does make it difficult to stay engaged for all of it.
This is a small thing, probably made worse from reading this in one day, but this book can be somewhat repetitive in it's various explanations for the disasters. I think it said "hydrogen gas when mixed with oxygen is explosive" or its equivalent like 10 times at least.
overall good, good book!
This was super interesting! The majority of this book is going through the histories and circumstances surrounding different nuclear disasters, and that part was very compelling, especially towards the second half when it starts making comparisons between the events. The last chapter or so of the book is dedicated to the authors conclusions and the future of nuclear energy, and while some of that was kind of surface level compared with the rest of the book I still 100% love when nonfiction authors actually say what they want the readers to get from a book.
This book is very academic in tone, which works for what it is but does make it difficult to stay engaged for all of it.
This is a small thing, probably made worse from reading this in one day, but this book can be somewhat repetitive in it's various explanations for the disasters. I think it said "hydrogen gas when mixed with oxygen is explosive" or its equivalent like 10 times at least.
overall good, good book!
November 22, 2023
I'm not an engineer or scientist, but decided to read Atoms and Ashes from a review, mostly because I have worked in nuclear facilities and hubby was a nuclear engineer. I must say the book was over my head with the science, engineering, acronyms, etc. It does make some interesting comparisons of accidents in different places (i.e., US vs USSR) and shows the arrogance of some people in the early days of the industry, willing to try anything to advance their purpose.
Hubby has extensive experience in the nuclear industry, including as project manager after the accident at TMI, charged with turning the accident into a lesson for the industry. He thought the book read like an AI search of documents.
Hubby has extensive experience in the nuclear industry, including as project manager after the accident at TMI, charged with turning the accident into a lesson for the industry. He thought the book read like an AI search of documents.
January 14, 2024
slayed, i sort of skipped ten pages from the last chapter and just read the afterword tho. overall i think its a really insightful analysis and changed my perspective alot. historical thriller for sure, had me scared for my life. also damn governments #dontcareabouttheirpeople??? read this book if u want, it talks about the russo-ukrain war too which shocked me and im still in shock about this world but i think u should read this bye
June 7, 2024
I found this a far more plausible, and valuable read, than Annie Jacobsen’s alarmist ‘Nuclear War.’
Remarkable how close and how often we have come to a complete nuclear catastrophe in the past 70 years. And only avoided a worse outcome through luck, fortune, and human perseverance.
The prospect of a complete nuclear meltdown in the next 50 years feels like a closer possibility after reading this.
Remarkable how close and how often we have come to a complete nuclear catastrophe in the past 70 years. And only avoided a worse outcome through luck, fortune, and human perseverance.
The prospect of a complete nuclear meltdown in the next 50 years feels like a closer possibility after reading this.
September 11, 2022
A good compendium of al the major nuclear disasters of the world so far. The reporting of the Kyshtym/Mayak and Windscale disasters were particularly well done, and gave me plenty of new information. The rest were ... less so, seemed to be more akin to wikipedia-ish overviews. Also requires another editing pass, lots of information (and sometimes sentence fragments) kept being repeated.
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