Entertaining read, but -the "fall of the USSR" was more complex than Schweizer's neo-con thesis allows. No doubt the actions presented here did play their part. But sabotage and covert warfare were endemic in Soviet-Western relations from 1917, alternating with periods of detente. To grant Schweizer's thesis, as some reviewers have uncritically done, only raises new questions, such as:
Was the Soviet "collapse" thus due to sabotage, wrecking, spies and agents and not its "failed system?" For those leaping to answer "both", why should the early 80s have been any different in themselves? No national economy, no matter how successful (like West Germany) could have withstood a determined US onslaught on all fronts. Playing upon Soviet weaknesses, as Schweizer suggests, only begs these questions. Thus was Stalin "right" after all, that the Soviet economy was victim to a well-orchestrated enemy conspiracy of "wreckers," and not any systemic shortcomings of central planning? In fact, the USSR had already hit an industrial impasse, as in the American rust belt. "New thinking" was uppermost in leading Party minds long before Reagan ever took office the first time; a crisis prolonged on ice by Brezhnev's refusal to die. This might explain perestroika leaders' readiness to blame their own system , agreeing with their neo-con US adversaries, for its self-destruction. One exception was Yegor Ligachev, who in his memoirs credits the fear of old apparatchiks for new technology and new thinking - rather than the institutions themselves - in causing the USSR's lag. This has to be as great a factor as Reagan's covert sabotage program.
Ultimately, Reagan's personal relationship with Gorby was equally decisive as Casey's capers in changing the Soviet course. In fact Gorby was hated by the hard core neo-cons precisely because his extended hand to the West thwarted their trope of all-conquering Evil Empire (as he intended it to do). Schweizer inadvertently exposes this image as a complete deceit: DI Casey's private assessments constantly reiterated the "weakness", "stagnation", and "vulnerability" of the Soviet economy, while publicly magnifying its threat and ramping up "the strategic necessity" of Star Wars systems.
Schweizer also downplays the blowback from said victory, such as the rise of militant Islam following the Afghan jihad. Writing in the mid-90s he couldn't know of 9/11, of course, but the beards and green banners were already fluttering in the ill winds. And if hi-tech sabotage was so instrumental in the Soviet collapse, might it have also been responsible for Chernobyl, rather than lax maintenance security? Another, albeit covert Hiroshima to end a global conflict and "save lives". . . .
He also writes of "a stake driven silently through the heart of the Soviet economy" in 1985, by allowing the Saudis to turn on the oil spigot. Schweizer nicely avoids the fact that this also spiked US domestic production, as well as costing the USSR hard currency revenue. Whole regions of the US were devastated that have never truly recovered, no matter how many inland casinos have sprung up afterward. Let's not go into the general devastation wrought by supply-side "Reaganomics" at home, except to say that what worked for the goose can cook the gander.
And in showing the CIA connections flowing to Solidarity, Czech, and other Soviet-bloc dissidents, he unwittingly confirms the KGB contention that democracy and human rights movements were merely enemy fifth columns "deserving" repression. Imagine the reaction if it were proved M. L. King's movement was really KGB-subsidized all the time - wait! That's what Reaganites believed already. But at least Walesa and Havel did survive, to lead their nations and write their memoirs. Ultimately, it was Yeltsin (think of him as Reagan's legacy in Moscow, Bill Casey's posthumous "inside man") who gave the coup de grace to the first Ronald Reagan Freedom Award winner. Might this have been Reagan's intent all along, conning Gorby into neglecting his back as "Brutus" Boris drew near? Schweizer does not ask such questions; he came only to bury Ceasar, not to praise him.