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Cassell History of Warfare
The Second World War in the East
Until its loss in World War II, Japan had not known failure in centuries of warfare. This record of the conflict goes beyond mere description to illuminate why Japan instigated a conflict with the only nation--the United States--capable of defeating her, as well as the crucial shifts in the nature of naval power and strategy that occurred during the fighting. Set off on the road to war, analyzing the effects of the first world conflict; Japan's policies in China; the first victories, as Japan surges through Asia; the great battles of Midway and Guadacanal; and the final defeat, with the devastating launch of the first nuclear weapons. 224 pages, 70 color illus., 80 b/w illus., 7 3/4 x 10 3/8.
224 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1999
About the author
H.P. Willmott
42 books17 followersHedley Paul "Ned" Willmott was a widely published military historian, author, former Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and a fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He earned B.A. and M.A. degrees in modern history and politics from Liverpool University and a Ph.D. from the University of London in 1991.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
February 6, 2026
Encompassing the events of the Second World War in East Asia and the Pacific in little more than 200 pages is no small challenge. To do so, an author must describe campaigns and battles that took place in a theater that ranged from inland China to the Hawai’ian Islands, and the Aleutians to Australia, involving combat in jungles, on the oceans, and in the air. If any consideration of the causes of the war is included, the author has to expand their focus further still, to include events as far afield as Meiji-era industrialization, the Russo-Japanese War, and interwar naval disarmament efforts. To attempt all this in a book that is supplied liberally with maps and photographs on practically every page seems almost masochistic.
Writing a concise book about an event this monumental in scope inevitably requires the author to make some difficult choices. H. P. Willmott’s solution to the problem is to lean on his strengths by adopting a broad strategic focus in his narrative. Readers picking up this book desiring gripping narratives of Dauntless dive bombers sweeping down on Japanese aircraft carriers, or of Japanese troops charging British defenses at Kohima will be disappointed. What they will read instead is an acute analysis of the motivations of the major powers in the prewar era, the strategies they adopted to fulfill them, and the flaws that determined their outcome.
Some of these flaws originated decades before the conflict exposed their fallacies. Foremost among them was the Japanese doctrine of Kantai Kessen, or the “decisive battle.” Drawing upon the writings of the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, it envisioned the achievement of victory by a single, climatic clash between the Japanese and American battle fleets in the western Pacific. Enshrined in the Japanese naval imagination by their victory over the Russian fleet in the battle of Tsushima in 1905, it shaped the formation of the Japanese fleet in a number of ways. Willmott subjects it to withering criticism, condemning it as “a doctrine of battle that masqueraded as a plan of campaign, and the plan of campaign was a substitute for strategy.” Because of this, the Japanese neglected important considerations that proved fatal to their hopes, most notably the maritime requirements of trade and shipping, and the weaknesses of the perimeter defense expected to weaken the American fleet prior to the decisive battle.
These flaws were no obstacle to the heady initial success enjoyed by the Japanese in the Pacific in the months following their attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet this success became increasingly undeniable as the war went on. Willmott dismisses the idea that any one battle was “decisive” or the “turning point” of the conflict, arguing that Japan’s flawed approach to the war – one in which a nation of limited industrial capacity attacked another that possessed far superior resources – ensured their defeat. This is a more debatable point, as it discounts the possibility that “black swan” events might not alter the course of the war as they did in France in 1940. Absent those, however, the weight of the Anglo-American effort proved irresistible over time. Increasingly Japan’s material limitations constrained their ability to respond effectively to the unrelenting assaults on their maritime resources, cutting the Japanese economy off from the resources it expanded the war in 1941 to acquire. By 1944, the certainty of Japan’s defeat was undeniable to most of its leaders, yet it took the devastation of the Home Islands and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war for them to accept surrender.
At the end of his book, Willmott states that “there are few things more difficult to explain than inevitable defeat.” While modest about his own achievements in it, his book nevertheless succeeds in providing just such an explanation. It would be easy to criticize the author for what was left out in the process, as the text captures just one aspect of an enormous, multifaceted conflict that involved tens, even hundreds of millions of people. Yet no work on the scale of this one could possibly hope to do so, and Willmott’s choices bring the arc of the war in the region into crystal clarity. Especially for its overview of the factors that led to the war and an understanding of why Japan’s efforts to achieve victory in it were doomed from the start, his book is well worth reading.
Writing a concise book about an event this monumental in scope inevitably requires the author to make some difficult choices. H. P. Willmott’s solution to the problem is to lean on his strengths by adopting a broad strategic focus in his narrative. Readers picking up this book desiring gripping narratives of Dauntless dive bombers sweeping down on Japanese aircraft carriers, or of Japanese troops charging British defenses at Kohima will be disappointed. What they will read instead is an acute analysis of the motivations of the major powers in the prewar era, the strategies they adopted to fulfill them, and the flaws that determined their outcome.
Some of these flaws originated decades before the conflict exposed their fallacies. Foremost among them was the Japanese doctrine of Kantai Kessen, or the “decisive battle.” Drawing upon the writings of the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, it envisioned the achievement of victory by a single, climatic clash between the Japanese and American battle fleets in the western Pacific. Enshrined in the Japanese naval imagination by their victory over the Russian fleet in the battle of Tsushima in 1905, it shaped the formation of the Japanese fleet in a number of ways. Willmott subjects it to withering criticism, condemning it as “a doctrine of battle that masqueraded as a plan of campaign, and the plan of campaign was a substitute for strategy.” Because of this, the Japanese neglected important considerations that proved fatal to their hopes, most notably the maritime requirements of trade and shipping, and the weaknesses of the perimeter defense expected to weaken the American fleet prior to the decisive battle.
These flaws were no obstacle to the heady initial success enjoyed by the Japanese in the Pacific in the months following their attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet this success became increasingly undeniable as the war went on. Willmott dismisses the idea that any one battle was “decisive” or the “turning point” of the conflict, arguing that Japan’s flawed approach to the war – one in which a nation of limited industrial capacity attacked another that possessed far superior resources – ensured their defeat. This is a more debatable point, as it discounts the possibility that “black swan” events might not alter the course of the war as they did in France in 1940. Absent those, however, the weight of the Anglo-American effort proved irresistible over time. Increasingly Japan’s material limitations constrained their ability to respond effectively to the unrelenting assaults on their maritime resources, cutting the Japanese economy off from the resources it expanded the war in 1941 to acquire. By 1944, the certainty of Japan’s defeat was undeniable to most of its leaders, yet it took the devastation of the Home Islands and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war for them to accept surrender.
At the end of his book, Willmott states that “there are few things more difficult to explain than inevitable defeat.” While modest about his own achievements in it, his book nevertheless succeeds in providing just such an explanation. It would be easy to criticize the author for what was left out in the process, as the text captures just one aspect of an enormous, multifaceted conflict that involved tens, even hundreds of millions of people. Yet no work on the scale of this one could possibly hope to do so, and Willmott’s choices bring the arc of the war in the region into crystal clarity. Especially for its overview of the factors that led to the war and an understanding of why Japan’s efforts to achieve victory in it were doomed from the start, his book is well worth reading.
November 12, 2020
This book looks at the Second World War in the Far East and takes quite an unusual approach. As the author says at several stagess, he is trying to explain what happened rather than describe what happened. As a result this book does not contain detailed narratives of some of the key events of the conflict such as Pearl Harbour, Guadalcanal or Midway. Also we certainly do not get descriptions of the experience of the fighting men on the ground, on the sea or in the air. Rather we get a view of the overall strategy. In particular this book looks at the strategic thinking (or lack of it) of the Japanese military. Like many books on this subject it makes plain that Japanese defeat was almost inevitable from the moment Pearl Harbour was attacked. It does explain that the Japanese hoped for a 'great battle' that would make the Allies sue for peace. It also highlights the flaws in this plan. It points out that the Americans lost relatively few men. Indeed, one assertion in the book suprised me: 'In any week of her war with Germany between June 1941 and May 1945, the Soviet Union lost more dead than the total American fatalities in the Pacific War.' Can this possibly be true?
June 14, 2021
As is so often the case, if you need one book on a topic, and Willmott is there, grab it.
June 2, 2015
Trying to be insightful but IMO shows no novel perspectives on the defeat of Japan in the Pacific War. The charts and maps are great, but the writing is difficult to read from time to time when the author trying to pack too many thought into a convoluted long sentence.
August 10, 2015
Verständliche und reich bebilderte Darstellung des Pazifikriegs. Als Mititärhistoriker legt der Autor seinen Schwerpunkt auf die militärischen Aktionen beider Seiten.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews