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Plowshares into Swords: From Zionism to Israel
A critical history of Israel and the Arab–Israeli conflictEminent historian Arno J. Mayer traces the thinkers, leaders, and shifting geopolitical contexts that shaped the founding and development of the Israeli state. He recovers for posterity internal critics such as the philosopher Martin Buber, who argued for peaceful coexistence with the Palestinian Arabs. “A sense of limits is the better part of valour,” Mayer insists. Plowshares into Swords explores Israel’s indefinite deferral of the “Arab Question,” the strategic thinking behind the building of settlements and border walls, and the endurance of Palestinian resistance.
545 pages, Kindle Edition
First published June 9, 2008
18 people are currently reading
347 people want to read
About the author
Arno J. Mayer
16 books31 followersA specialist in modern Europe, diplomatic history, and the Holocaust, Arno Joseph Mayer was Dayton-Stockton Professor of History, Emeritus, at Princeton University. A self-proclaimed "left dissident Marxist", Mayer's major interests were in modernization theory and what he called "The Thirty Years' Crisis" between 1914 and 1945.
After fleeing the Nazi conquest of Europe in 1940, Mayer became a naturalized citizen of the United States and enlisted in the United States Army. During his time in the Army, he was trained at Camp Ritchie, Maryland and was recognized as one of the Ritchie Boys. He served as an intelligence officer and eventually became a morale officer for high-ranking German prisoners of war. He was discharged in 1946. He received his education at the City College of New York, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva and Yale University. He was professor at Wesleyan University (1952–53), Brandeis University (1954–58) and Harvard University (1958–61). He taught at Princeton University beginning in 1961.
After fleeing the Nazi conquest of Europe in 1940, Mayer became a naturalized citizen of the United States and enlisted in the United States Army. During his time in the Army, he was trained at Camp Ritchie, Maryland and was recognized as one of the Ritchie Boys. He served as an intelligence officer and eventually became a morale officer for high-ranking German prisoners of war. He was discharged in 1946. He received his education at the City College of New York, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva and Yale University. He was professor at Wesleyan University (1952–53), Brandeis University (1954–58) and Harvard University (1958–61). He taught at Princeton University beginning in 1961.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
October 25, 2023
Lots of great information in here. I think one thing that comes across as striking is how far right the Western powers have shifted. I mean, we have Joe Biden giving full cover for genocide, fully funding collective punishment, spreading lies that dehumanize Palestinians, and denying the mass death of Palestinians from (US-made) Israeli bombs. Reading what Ronald Reagan was saying during the 1980s and having seen what W. Bush's administration was saying, it's shocking (if unsurprising) how much of a rightward sprint has been done.
June 20, 2021
A study of the intransigence and apparent inhumanity of Zionists. Mayer demonstrates that Zionists have produced “facts on the ground” necessary for the justification of the policies they always already supported anyway. Makes a compelling argument that a binational, single state solution was historically possible. But is that much better? Mayer’s interest in this possibility leads to my only major complaint: the book is far, far too kind to liberal Zionists like Buber. Imo, Buber deserves treatment closer to what Barak got.
April 11, 2018
I picked this book up at a used bookstore, intrigued by the witty title being an inversion of Isaiah 2:4 "And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more".
As I started reading the Prolegomenon, I started to notice some value judgments of characters or events that I didn't share, as well as the omission of relevant information that may contradict the author's thesis. I decided to start sticking post-it notes into my book to mark passages I felt were objectionable. My intention was to mention some of the points I disagreed with in this review. Seeing more than 40 post-it notes hanging out of my book, I decided that I wouldn't waste my time in collating my arguments in order or by page number. I feel like I'd be wasting my time doing so.
In essence, my disagreement with this book stems from the author's decision to omit opposing viewpoints or facts in a variety of contexts. I was also disappointed to see several classic talking points being taken for granted, instead of evaluating their accuracy before using them. Let me give you a couple of examples of my problems with this book:
-Defending Ahmadinejad as merely agreeing with the statement that the "regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time", without reflecting on the financial support of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah who explicitly call for the destruction of Israel (and killing all Jews, as quoted from the Sahih Muslim Hadith) is highly objectionable. He insinuates that Israel falsely suggests Iran being a life-or-death threat to Israel, suggesting that Israel's army is far stronger than the Iranian forces. Unfortunately, Israel has to lose only one war or be hit by one atomic warhead to be wiped off the map. Therefore, I believe it is entirely acceptable to ring the alarm bells when the country with the 4th largest oil reserves claims to build nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes (what does Iran need nuclear energy for?) while being one of the largest state sponsors of terrorist activities.
-The issue of Palestinian refugees is a very saddening one. However, the author chooses to regurgitate the misleading talking point that by 2004, there were 7 million Palestinian refugees. If the author was knowledgeable enough to write a book of this scope, I am convinced that he should be aware of the contentious definition of refugees according to "UN Law". Taking for granted the fallacious UNRWA designation that all descendants of the 600-800 thousand refugees (some of them 4th or 5th generation descendants) of the War of Independence are also refugees is (in my opinion) intentionally confounding. A casual reader may not know that the definition of who constitutes a Palestinian refugee differs from the accepted definition of all other refugees worldwide. Are the descendants of the Sudeten-Germans who were forced to leave Czechoslovakia following WWII also refugees today? No. Confounding the plight of the Palestinian population under military occupation with the concept of refugees is intentionally misleading.
-Describing the reasons for why Palestinians fled Mandatory Palestine and later Israel, the author makes little attempt to make nuanced descriptions of the multitude of reasons. Instead of just quoting Ilan Pappé, the author could have referred to the eminent historian, and also member of the "New Historians" group, Benny Morris. He suggests that 200-300,000 people fled from April-June 1948, that is before the outbreak of war. I believe to remember him mentioning that several ten thousand members of the Palestinian elite (such as supporters of the Nashashibi faction) departed the country with their movable assets way before the outbreak of wide-spread hostilities because they didn't want to get caught up in a chaotic war. Also, Arab governments and distinct groups distributed propaganda, implying that the Palestinians should leave their homes and would be able to return shortly after the Arab countries would destroy any Zionist state. There is no denying that a significant proportion of the people who fled were expelled by the Haganah and later the IDF, for a variety of legitimate military and sadly also objectionable reasons. However, the author decided to not mention that (I believe to remember) the mayor of Haifa was appealing to the Arab residents to not flee the city but to remain in the city as equal citizens. That would not, of course, fit the author's narrative.
-The author implies that Ben Gurion, Weizmann, and the mainstream Labour political elite secretly condoned the actions of the extremist Stern Gang and Ezel. Surely Weizmann would not have tolerated material nor mortal damage to the British administration, being the most high-profile anglophile Zionist in the Yishuv. Further, the author does not mention the Altalena affair, a strong piece of evidence suggesting that Ben Gurion did not support, neither overtly nor covertly, these extremist groups. If he presented well-founded evidence suggesting an acceptance of their practices, I would have been open-minded to them.
-The author mentions as a sideline, that Clinton "unduly" blamed only Arafat for the failure of Camp David (p. 394), but otherwise keeps arguing that mainly Barak was not willing to compromise and asked unacceptable demands of Arafat and the Palestinian leadership. For the sake of perspective, I would have considered it necessary to repeat the actual allegations both Clinton and even Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia made. I'm not claiming that Arafat was the sole party to blame, but the author seems to support the polarized opposite argument. I'd encourage anyone reading this review to look up both statements.
-Although my knowledge about Arafat and his career is not as complete as my other knowledge regarding Israeli history, I believe the author was too lenient in describing the duplicitousness of Arafat. Arafat would preach love, peace and reconciliation in English, and on the same day call for armed resistance in Arabic. I'd suggest he reads "Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography" by Barry Rubin to read up on some of Arafat's contradictory public and private statements.
The historical timeline was generally accurate, but being aware of so many flaws and biased writing, I became sceptical of everything the author wrote. Thus, in the case of my experience reading this book, the author sabotaged himself. By noticing the often biased depiction of events and people, I caught myself instinctively rebutting many of the points he made. If the author was trying to convince me, a person fairly knowledgeable in this field, of his arguments, he miserably failed. I also believe that with this book the author will achieve further polarization of opinions, as laymen reading this may take all of the information for granted.
To conclude I need to point out that I did learn the occasional new fact, for example, that King Hussein of Jordan warned Golda Meir of the approaching Yom Kippur War. Also, in the Prolegomenon, the author seems to predict the Arab Spring and even the appearance of ISIS as a radical non-state actor.
To anyone reading this far, and to the author who may never read this review, I suggest reading the journal article "Exposure to Outgroup Members Criticizing Their Own Group Facilitates Intergroup Openness" by psychologists Tamar Saguy and Eran Halperin. They conducted research that demonstrates "Israeli Jews who were exposed to a Palestinian criticizing Palestinians were more open to the Palestinians’ perspective of the conflict, than those not exposed to the criticism." Disclaimer: here comes my subjective opinion. I believe that while Labour may not have a strong influence politically at the present time, there clearly still exists a plurality of opinions regarding the conflict within Israeli society. Today in Gaza, criticizing Hamas can get you imprisoned or killed. Supporting Israel as a Palestinian in the disputed territories can engender social exclusion or bodily harm from family, friends and even the authorities. Until a mainstream Palestinian or otherwise Arab political faction start to allow for a plurality of public opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the opinions on both sides will only become more polarized.
As I started reading the Prolegomenon, I started to notice some value judgments of characters or events that I didn't share, as well as the omission of relevant information that may contradict the author's thesis. I decided to start sticking post-it notes into my book to mark passages I felt were objectionable. My intention was to mention some of the points I disagreed with in this review. Seeing more than 40 post-it notes hanging out of my book, I decided that I wouldn't waste my time in collating my arguments in order or by page number. I feel like I'd be wasting my time doing so.
In essence, my disagreement with this book stems from the author's decision to omit opposing viewpoints or facts in a variety of contexts. I was also disappointed to see several classic talking points being taken for granted, instead of evaluating their accuracy before using them. Let me give you a couple of examples of my problems with this book:
-Defending Ahmadinejad as merely agreeing with the statement that the "regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time", without reflecting on the financial support of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah who explicitly call for the destruction of Israel (and killing all Jews, as quoted from the Sahih Muslim Hadith) is highly objectionable. He insinuates that Israel falsely suggests Iran being a life-or-death threat to Israel, suggesting that Israel's army is far stronger than the Iranian forces. Unfortunately, Israel has to lose only one war or be hit by one atomic warhead to be wiped off the map. Therefore, I believe it is entirely acceptable to ring the alarm bells when the country with the 4th largest oil reserves claims to build nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes (what does Iran need nuclear energy for?) while being one of the largest state sponsors of terrorist activities.
-The issue of Palestinian refugees is a very saddening one. However, the author chooses to regurgitate the misleading talking point that by 2004, there were 7 million Palestinian refugees. If the author was knowledgeable enough to write a book of this scope, I am convinced that he should be aware of the contentious definition of refugees according to "UN Law". Taking for granted the fallacious UNRWA designation that all descendants of the 600-800 thousand refugees (some of them 4th or 5th generation descendants) of the War of Independence are also refugees is (in my opinion) intentionally confounding. A casual reader may not know that the definition of who constitutes a Palestinian refugee differs from the accepted definition of all other refugees worldwide. Are the descendants of the Sudeten-Germans who were forced to leave Czechoslovakia following WWII also refugees today? No. Confounding the plight of the Palestinian population under military occupation with the concept of refugees is intentionally misleading.
-Describing the reasons for why Palestinians fled Mandatory Palestine and later Israel, the author makes little attempt to make nuanced descriptions of the multitude of reasons. Instead of just quoting Ilan Pappé, the author could have referred to the eminent historian, and also member of the "New Historians" group, Benny Morris. He suggests that 200-300,000 people fled from April-June 1948, that is before the outbreak of war. I believe to remember him mentioning that several ten thousand members of the Palestinian elite (such as supporters of the Nashashibi faction) departed the country with their movable assets way before the outbreak of wide-spread hostilities because they didn't want to get caught up in a chaotic war. Also, Arab governments and distinct groups distributed propaganda, implying that the Palestinians should leave their homes and would be able to return shortly after the Arab countries would destroy any Zionist state. There is no denying that a significant proportion of the people who fled were expelled by the Haganah and later the IDF, for a variety of legitimate military and sadly also objectionable reasons. However, the author decided to not mention that (I believe to remember) the mayor of Haifa was appealing to the Arab residents to not flee the city but to remain in the city as equal citizens. That would not, of course, fit the author's narrative.
-The author implies that Ben Gurion, Weizmann, and the mainstream Labour political elite secretly condoned the actions of the extremist Stern Gang and Ezel. Surely Weizmann would not have tolerated material nor mortal damage to the British administration, being the most high-profile anglophile Zionist in the Yishuv. Further, the author does not mention the Altalena affair, a strong piece of evidence suggesting that Ben Gurion did not support, neither overtly nor covertly, these extremist groups. If he presented well-founded evidence suggesting an acceptance of their practices, I would have been open-minded to them.
-The author mentions as a sideline, that Clinton "unduly" blamed only Arafat for the failure of Camp David (p. 394), but otherwise keeps arguing that mainly Barak was not willing to compromise and asked unacceptable demands of Arafat and the Palestinian leadership. For the sake of perspective, I would have considered it necessary to repeat the actual allegations both Clinton and even Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia made. I'm not claiming that Arafat was the sole party to blame, but the author seems to support the polarized opposite argument. I'd encourage anyone reading this review to look up both statements.
-Although my knowledge about Arafat and his career is not as complete as my other knowledge regarding Israeli history, I believe the author was too lenient in describing the duplicitousness of Arafat. Arafat would preach love, peace and reconciliation in English, and on the same day call for armed resistance in Arabic. I'd suggest he reads "Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography" by Barry Rubin to read up on some of Arafat's contradictory public and private statements.
The historical timeline was generally accurate, but being aware of so many flaws and biased writing, I became sceptical of everything the author wrote. Thus, in the case of my experience reading this book, the author sabotaged himself. By noticing the often biased depiction of events and people, I caught myself instinctively rebutting many of the points he made. If the author was trying to convince me, a person fairly knowledgeable in this field, of his arguments, he miserably failed. I also believe that with this book the author will achieve further polarization of opinions, as laymen reading this may take all of the information for granted.
To conclude I need to point out that I did learn the occasional new fact, for example, that King Hussein of Jordan warned Golda Meir of the approaching Yom Kippur War. Also, in the Prolegomenon, the author seems to predict the Arab Spring and even the appearance of ISIS as a radical non-state actor.
To anyone reading this far, and to the author who may never read this review, I suggest reading the journal article "Exposure to Outgroup Members Criticizing Their Own Group Facilitates Intergroup Openness" by psychologists Tamar Saguy and Eran Halperin. They conducted research that demonstrates "Israeli Jews who were exposed to a Palestinian criticizing Palestinians were more open to the Palestinians’ perspective of the conflict, than those not exposed to the criticism." Disclaimer: here comes my subjective opinion. I believe that while Labour may not have a strong influence politically at the present time, there clearly still exists a plurality of opinions regarding the conflict within Israeli society. Today in Gaza, criticizing Hamas can get you imprisoned or killed. Supporting Israel as a Palestinian in the disputed territories can engender social exclusion or bodily harm from family, friends and even the authorities. Until a mainstream Palestinian or otherwise Arab political faction start to allow for a plurality of public opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the opinions on both sides will only become more polarized.
February 24, 2024
Sobering chronicle. The story ends in early 2001. No progress since then.
January 7, 2015
I didn't finish this book, not because it wasn't interesting but because it was from the library and I didn't have enough time to read it at leisure. The parts I read were very interesting. Mayer is understanding of the Zionist cause in the early 20th century while recognising that from the beginning the Arab people living in what became Israel were not seen as legitimate citizens of the place they were living in. This colonial attitude tainted the otherwise impressive achievements of the early settlers. A defensive, militaristic ideology was dominant from the beginning of the settlements, and carried over into the foundation of the state. Mayer didn't gloss over Arab atrocities either, from the parts I read anyway, so the account felt balanced. I hadn't heard of advocates of the one-state solution like Martin Buber; he was an interesting figure. Shame that such a solution, or any satisfactory solution, seems pretty much impossible now. I hope to come back to this book in more detail when I have more time.
April 20, 2024
Strange book. It had moments of brilliance, and other times devolved into mere chronicle; reciting quotes, dates, and facts without any substantive interpretation. I would tell my history students off for writing like this in their essays. This book is also very (very) long. To justify that length on a well trodden subject, you would hope for a more original contribution.
Arno Mayer is fundamentally a historian of contingency, so naturally this book was at its best when discussing the lead up to Palestine’s partition in 1947. As he convincingly shows, up until the very last minute, binationalism was a real possibility. His description of the Oslo Accords, and the famous but bizarre energy of the Rabin-Arafat handshake (Arafat just happy to be there, Rabin conceding so little, so ungraciously) was equally poetic.
But really, after partition, the book gets progressively weaker, and the analysis less astute.
Arno Mayer is fundamentally a historian of contingency, so naturally this book was at its best when discussing the lead up to Palestine’s partition in 1947. As he convincingly shows, up until the very last minute, binationalism was a real possibility. His description of the Oslo Accords, and the famous but bizarre energy of the Rabin-Arafat handshake (Arafat just happy to be there, Rabin conceding so little, so ungraciously) was equally poetic.
But really, after partition, the book gets progressively weaker, and the analysis less astute.
October 1, 2021
Mayer's history of Zionism and Israel, starting at the beginning of modern Zionism and ending around the turn of the 20th century offers deep insight into the historical background and politics of Israel and the broader Middle East. It's a dense, detailed exploration of the origins of Zionism, the different factions that made up the movement, as well as the many many (many!) tragedies, most preventable, that brought us to this point. That said, it can be a bit of a slog, detailing the internal discussions, conferences, and power struggles. It's a serious history that offers significant insight, but it's not a "fun" read. All in all, worth it..
January 2, 2025
Super thorough read about Israeli history that talks about how we got to where we are today (spoiler alert: not a ton has changed). If you’re deterred from speaking on this topic by the “it’s complicated” messaging, reading this book will help you feel far more confident in speaking on this topic.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews