In some senses this book is a testimony to how much more aware and sophisticated Americans are about politics since this was written in 1989. It aims at savvy readers but feels the need to tell them what "inside the Beltway" means, and that "in the loop" means to be aware.
At it's best the books offers insightful looks by a long-time Washington correspondent on Washington power-players that have since been forgotten, such as the Democratic millionaire Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum, who was said to embody "porcupine politics" who used his generally ornery behavior to win fights on special giveaways (Senator Ed Muskie was said to be a master of this too, never leaving negotiating rooms, smoking terrible cigars in small rooms, and thus winning conference committees). One could add some of the anonymous staffers who shaped history, sch as Stephen Bell, the budget committee chief of staff who revived the idea of "reconciliation" to push Reagan's budget plan. Or it describes dramas that have faded with time, such as Rockwell International's attempt to override Carter's decision in 1977 against B-1 production, which nearly won in Congress (it won over such doves as California Senator Alan Cranston since the prime contractor was based in his state and got revived by Reagan). Or issues that have faded with time, such as the power of the franking privilege, which hit almost 1 billion pieces of mail and $100 million in costs in 1984, more than double what it was in 1980. Some subjects have increased in interest with time. In 1981 when Strom Thurmond became head of the Senate Judiciary, Joe Biden went to him with a draft crime bill and asked him to become its main sponsor and then hammered out final details until late one night before the final Senate vote. It mentions that Thurmond speaks with Biden with the affection of a father for his son. Chris Matthews, then just a Tip O'Neil staffer, is a prominent and often funny explainer ("The problem with Washington is it's all an input town... You can't measure outputs." He was not talking about government programs but about the need to appear busy.)
At it's most tedious it either rehashes political bromides (explaining how power depends on access to the powerful) or recounts the innumerable power plays inside the Reagan administration, that are often discussed elsewhere chronologically, but here are discussed as examples of such bromides (SecDef Caspar Weinberger had long been under SecState George Schultz, during the Nixon's OMB and later at Betchel, and they both worked for access to the President, surprisingly often for the diplomatic Schultz to push for force as a means of diplomacy.) It's overlong, but will remain an important look at the Reagan years, if not an impressive work of political theorizing or investigation.