Morality

by Bernard Williams

Bernard Williams's remarkable essay on morality confronts the problems of writing moral philosophy, and offers a stimulating alternative to more systematic accounts that seem nevertheless to have left all the important issues somewhere off the page. Williams explains, analyzes and distinguishes a number of key positions, from the purely amoral to notions of subjective or relative morality, testing their coherence before going on to explore the nature of "goodness" in relation to responsibilities and choice, roles, standards, and human nature.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Politics, Academic

120 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1972

About the author

Sir Bernard Arthur Owen Williams was an English moral philosopher. His publications include Problems of the Self (1973), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), Shame and Necessity (1993), and Truth and Truthfulness (2002). He was knighted in 1999.
As Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and Deutsch Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, Williams became known for his efforts to reorient the study of moral philosophy to psychology, history, and in particular to the Greeks. Described by Colin McGinn as an "analytical philosopher with the soul of a general humanist," he was sceptical about attempts to create a foundation for moral philosophy. Martha Nussbaum wrote that he demanded of philosophy that it "come to terms with, and contain, the difficulty and complexity of human life."
Williams was a strong supporter of women in academia; according to Nussbaum, he was "as close to being a feminist as a powerful man of his generation could be." He was also famously sharp in conversation. Gilbert Ryle, one of Williams's mentors at Oxford, said that he "understands what you're going to say better than you understand it yourself, and sees all the possible objections to it, and all the possible answers to all the possible objections, before you've got to the end of your own sentence."

Reviews

[Greg · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is on the Goodreads list of "1000 Books Every Christian Should Read (Besides the Bible)". I don't know if it's addition to the only 618 books that have so far made it on to the list is meant to be serious, or is one of the obvious blasphemers having snuck in and added it. I hope it's serious, that some Christian saw this book, picked it up, read the chapter about God and morality, and swallowed the argument that if one believes in God, and can logically make sense of some kind of ethical system out of the whole concept, and one lives their life only in order to please this god and not be punished in the afterlife than one may be acting like a good person (or not), but one is not acting morally.

Thus Christians are not moral if they only rely on religion to guide their ethical practices.

I don't know if I actually agree with all of William's conclusions, but he does a nice job of setting up the weaknesses of competing systems of morality, and added a couple of more logical tools to my mental toolbox for seeing through bullshit.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good short book on morality. The last chapter on utilitarianism was for me the most interesting. The four outlooks of utilitarianism include first it is non- transcendental, and makes no appeal outside human life, in particular disregarding religious considerations. Second, its basic good happiness is minimally problematic as everyone wants to be happy. Thirdly, moral issues theoretically can be determined by empirical calculations. Lastly, utilitarianism provides a common currency of moral thought. However, different cultures and societies may differ on what they consider happiness resulting in conflict. The problem with utilitarianism is that morality is more than just happiness.

[Eva · Rating 4 out of 5]

my brain just exploded

[Rick Wayne · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent undergraduate-level introduction to moral thought for two reasons.

First, it is short. At 97 pages, this book can be covered in less than a day.

Second, although some of Williams' own views are discussed, this essay is a lucid, easy to read survey of the major modes of ethical thinking - from amoralist to utilitarian.

If you want to know more about moral philosophy but are not sure where to begin, try here.

(But please note, this is a scholarly essay by one of the greatest minds in 20th Century philosophy. I can't help but think some of the negative reviews were due to folks expecting it would be the History Channel version.)

[Tylor Lovins · Rating 5 out of 5]

Bernard Williams's brief introduction of morality is easily my favorite on the subject. He's a wise and articulate guide, considering briefly but with measurable depth the issues with thinking about morality in general, contemporary conventional moralizing fallacies, and the potential goals of moral reasoning. When theories of morality generalize, he reminds us of the tremendous breadth and variegated nature of human experience. When theories become too reductive, he steps back and looks skillfully at problems of coherence and consistency. His motto at the introduction guides his thinking in general: that one should, through and through, be more concerned with moral phenomena themselves instead of strictly theorizing.

The average chapter length is about ten pages long. This work has got much to say about the contemporary scene, despite being decades old. The newcomer to moral philosophy will find his first few chapters of particular interest, in his devastating critiques of subjectivism and relativism. Those familiar with the field will find his criticisms of utilitarianism enlightening. Recommended for everyone interested in reading about moral philosophy.

[Rachael · Rating 3 out of 5]

When opening this second hand book I found that there were bright red pen marks (underlines) from pages 3 to 25, then replaced by use of a violent black biro for pages 26 to 37, then after that the remaining pages appeared unscathed. I figured it would probably be a challenge for my humble pencil lines to be noticed among the marks made by the previous owner but never mind. As usual I'll try my best not to pay attention to the lines and put more emphasis on previously highlighted text, but instead try to see which points jump out at me personally. But it is sometimes interesting to see what caught the eye and was deemed important by another reader...

Anyway this was a nice short essay that I read this morning in the warmth of the conservatory. Williams made good points throughout without massively presenting his own theory on anything, but it was enjoyable to read.

I was also amused by his frequent use of the word 'absurd' (used mainly to describe relativism).

[Robb Seaton · Rating 2 out of 5]

This was drier than I thought it was going to be.

In the intro, Williams remarks that the book is a tortuous tour of the moral landscape -- his own peculiar making. This is, I think, supposed to be endearing: an idiosyncratic genius condensing a complicated subject.

But it's just an excuse. The book is a mess. It reads as if Williams sat down and had it all out in one go.

The chapter on good isn't good and his conception and subsequent take down of utilitarianism in the last chapter struck me as not so compelling. Really, when was the last time you met a Bentham-style, hedonistic utilitarian? (Hint: never.) And the whole bit about utilitarianism being too convenient... !

The prose is pretty good, though.

[George Dean · Rating 2 out of 5]

Read this as part of my ongoing material collection for my end of degree dissertation about morality and children’s literature. I was promised an “introduction to morality” but this book is more “an introduction to an introduction to morality”, because a lot of the points discussed here aren’t actually the foundations of moral thought, but sort of thought experiments. The only chapters I found remotely useful were the first and last ones, as they’re the only ones that define actual facets of morality, instead of a loose collection of ideas. Not sure if maybe my topic of interest was too niche for this to be useful, or if it’s just not that good as a moral instructive text.

[Ralph Palm · Rating 1 out of 5]

The title is an outright lie: this book is in no way an introduction to anything. It's a fix-up of random essays on technical topics. The preface is a well-written promise that the book fails to deliver: writing on moral philosophy that is isn't boring. ('Boring' is the author's term, not mine.) The quality of the writing at the beginning just serves to make the rest even more disappointing.

[Sudeys · Rating 4 out of 5]

The writer acknowledges that not all the important topics concerning ethics are treated in his book. The book is not a textbook either and in fact, he does not claim he knows how to write an ethics book. The book is written anyway and he has a way of writing.

First of all, the claim of an amoralist is treated first since the questions asked by those are probably the most fundamental ones. If we agree with an amoralist, no point in going further in this book and also ethics is no concern for us. The way of attacking the amoralist claims is demonstrating the inconsistency in their claims and their way of living.

And then claims of a subjectivist are discussed. According to Williams, if we happen to understand their claims correctly, the claims are either wrong or right but unharmful to the fundamentals of ethics. If a subjectivist claims that every culture has different moral standpoints and each of them are right and therefore, we should respect each of them, then they put themselves in a moral domain, which is inconsistent. If we neglect what they suggest but take the first claim seriously, then they cannot live according to their moral standpoints since the conflicts are the natural result of different moral standpoints. If they aim to look at the all standpoints from a reference frame other than people, then they are mistaken since it is just an illusion.

There are other topics discussed later in this book such as fact-value distinction, goodness, and utilitarianism. He thinks we have good reasons not to readily conclude that fact and value are not linked. He claims that good is not an adjective that can be thought of independently, but it is an integral part of “good X” statement. Without “X”, “good” loses its meaning. And finally, he discusses utilitarianism briefly, and he believes it is inconsistent. He also thinks that a utilitarianist not only acts to maximize the good but also to prevent the bad things from happening by doing the not-the-worst things.

Overall, it was a good book but I will not attempt to define what the “good” here actually means since it involves criteria attached to the book indicating a moral standpoint which opens a way to discuss ethical issues, which, I think, would make this review “uglier”.

[Andrew · Rating 3 out of 5]

‘Morality: an Introduction to Ethics’ is not an introduction. It is a critical survey of the field of moral philosophy (as it existed in the Sixties) that none but a philosophy student or unusually sophisticated general reader could hope to gain from reading.

Williams’s verbose and stilted prose overloads the brain. Like in German, the meaning of his sentences is often delayed until you have reached the end, which is exacerbated by his copious parentheticals and qualifying remarks. Williams is the type of person to say, ‘This raises two questions (though of course there may be others)’ - which is pedantic and distracts the reader from the main point. Here is an extract from a page chosen at random:

‘Nor - though this is more contestable - is it clear that ‘well-being’ in this connection can be identified with happiness. Certainly if we think (as the English language, as it now is, rather encourages us to think) that contentment is a sufficient, though not a necessary, condition of happiness, it will not do for the present purpose; we must be able to recognise as moral views (though cynics will think them mistaken) outlooks which deplore contentment, if secured at too low a level of consciousness and activity.’

On its own, that example is not terribly remarkable, but after pages and pages of the stuff - each sub-clause introducing further uncertainty to difficult philosophy - it becomes exhausting. It’s sometimes said that philosophy is difficult to read because there is no other way to introduce radically novel ideas. But the ideas in this book could have been made far more accessible without compromising them one bit.

The difficulty is not simply the fault of the language. There is also an air of disregard for anyone who is not already familiar with the ideas discussed. Complicated theories are frequently introduced in the same sentence that they are dismissed - often disdainfully, e.g. as being ‘absurd’ or ‘idiotic’. There is no obvious structure to the book, and certainly no attempt to help the reader by summarising. It simply meanders through various topics, ending abruptly.

All that said, Williams is a celebrated philosopher, and there is no doubt that once you have extracted his meaning, the ideas are very deep.

[Matilda Rose · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bernard Williams' introduction to moral philosophy examines a number of key theories, including subjectivism, relativism and utilitarianism.

The first chapter is particularly interesting and focuses on the amoralist. Williams argues that a person who "acts for other people", even if only when inclined to do so, is "capable of thinking in terms of others' interests" and that this is enough to render him if not 'moral', certainly on his way to being so. Williams then claims that a person who is never inclined to help others is simply a psychopath whom appalls us - is this always the case? Certain literary figures such as the protagonist of A Clockwork Orange spring to mind as Williams' theory suggests all readers ought to be appalled by him (he has committed atrocious and brutal crimes and does not care for others in the slightest, although he does find great pleasure in listening to Beethoven).

Another fascinating chapter approached what issues the existence of God could pose for morality. Williams argues that one's motives for following the morality of God are either moral or are not; if they are moral there is no need for the addition of God to the equation, and if they are not then they cannot correspond to morality at all. I think it's interesting to consider this in light of Aristotle's skill analogy for the acquiring of moral virtues. Aristotle claimed that as with acquiring a new skill, to acquire a virtue one must practice by following an exemplar (in this case a moral exemplar) before one comes to a fully developed sensitivity towards recognising the appropriate actions to be taken in different situations. Similarly, perhaps being compelled to act morally out of a fear of hell, say, acts as a means of 'practice', culminating in thinking for oneself and acting out of a sense of morality.

[Ed Fernyhough · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not exactly an introduction since it dives into very technical language immediately, but it is nevertheless a good primer for people who are already versed in some moral philosophy to understand its broad currents from the 1960s and 70s. He is critical of the excessive abstraction and technicality of analytic moral philosophy which was then contemporary, divorced as he thought it was from real-world examples. This habit has unfortunately continued into the 2020s despite Williams's criticism. Williams does distinguish between metaethics and normative ethics but treats them in conjunction, presenting major problems with moral relativism and moral subjectivisim, as well as utilitarianism. It's a decent book which helped connect some of the earlier metaethics done by Moore and Ayer in the earlier 20th century with later currents of ethical thought - in particular it contains an influential indictment of moral relativism that would influence Martha Nussbaum's opposition to moral relativism in the disputes between feminists and multiculturalists in the 1990s. It doesn't carry any major ideas since it is mainly a book for clarification and refutation. Overall it's a useful response to some key issues of his day, but if you want to understand debates about the ontology of morality there are better places to look than this book, it serving now really only as a historical curiosity.

[Błażej · Rating 4 out of 5]

As far as essayesque introduction to ethics goes, this book is a fine read. It discusses major milestones in thinking about ethics, and presents a handful of critiques to each. The critiques themselves are not polished or equal in quality by any means, but it's not what this book is about. It states in the introduction that its purpose is to sketch a context for thinking about ethics, and to sketch it in style. And it delivers on this promise.

[Adam Pittman · Rating 3 out of 5]

An excellent book as a critique of modern moral philosophy, which is truly an untenable mess. I wouldn't recommend using as a positive basis for your own thought. Anscombe would be good for that. But this best demonstrates the foolishness of trying to speak of morals without a concept of Divine law and theology to support it; without, the best you can do is ethics.

[Molly Sinderbrand · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not a good introduction to ethics, though I regularly teach parts of it. A good framing for ethics. Delightfully Humean. It is a bright spot in 20th century ethics, and reveals just how bad most of 20th century ethics was.

[Ross Jensen · Rating 5 out of 5]

After half a century, this little book is still the best dialectical introduction to moral philosophy available in English. Williams is so perceptive and so articulate that even seasoned philosophers will benefit from revisiting this gem of a text.

[Atlrs · Rating 3 out of 5]

Did not finish. Boring.

[Luke · Rating 3 out of 5]

probably the best introduction to moral philosophy one could read, if a bit thin on the ground.

[Ciortea Octavian · Rating 5 out of 5]

De fapt e o introducere în etică și metaetică. Ingenios!

[Let · Rating 4 out of 5]

Primeira metade é ótima, segunda me perdi em vários momentos. Admito que preciso ler novamente quando a minha bagagem de leituras filosóficas aumentar.

[Isaac Lambert · Rating 4 out of 5]

interesting arguments here if you you take the time to grok them- especially against utilitarianism

[Thomas Kerleroux · Rating 4 out of 5]

brillant as always

[Rebecca · Rating 3 out of 5]

read chapter on Utilitarianism blz 82-98 for the Chemical Engineering course Ethics & Risk

[Chapmar · Rating 4 out of 5]

What is morality?

The main puzzle I was interested in figuring out was whether there is anything like morality at all. Why are moral positions something more than personal opinions or “attitudes”, as Williams calls them? I try to summarize in my own words. What makes certain opinions moral is that they are normative, intersubjective. They are not simply attitudes that we are ready to admit to be merely personal, like preferences in matters of food. Rather, they demand universality, making relativist statements logically inconsistent as they reside in a “mid-air position” that they purportedly banish (e.g., “who am I to say that this custom is immoral? Each culture has its own set of values.”). Curiously, it is in the attempt to banish such mid-air position that the relativist reveals its existence. But is this contrast – banishing a mid-air position while comfortably sitting in it – really a contradiction? I was reminded of one of Husserl’s arguments against logical psychologism (in the Logical Investigations): that truth cannot be relative because if someone else believed truth to not be relative, one would be forced to shut the other down, proving her point. With truth, the argument is inescapable, because one cannot renounce logic and non-contradition as those are necessary for making an argument in the first place. Instead, a subjectivist could deny the mid-air position not because its “wrong” – ascribing a moral quality to it or from it deriving unwarranted conclusions, and thus contradicting herself – but because she believes it does not exist. Making a metaphysical claim about morality does not require of one to “be” in morality or to “use” morality. Granted this possibility, what a subjectivist must do, then, is to refrain from normative claims, or from drawing any moral conclusions about the lack of morality. In short, she must become an amoralist – if not in practice, at least in theory. Therefore, there is no logical argument that can argue someone out of this position: the existence of morality must simply be acknowledged. Acknowledging it does not mean believing in a "shared" mid-air position, a place like our would but made out of moral facts so solid that, like science, one could ultimately falsify rival moral theories. What’s the nature of this mid-air position, then? Williams writes: “If subjectivism, however, defused, is true, things are with morality not quite as they seemed; but the fraud, we might say, justifies at most resentment rather than panic. We shall not however lose sight of the idea of constraints on moral thought, the limitations on the creation of values.” I take the passage to mean that one might resent the loss of a moral landscape only if “landscape” was taken literally, that is, a place of moral facts, where morality can proceed like science. However, even if this place turns out to be illusory, “panic” should not ensue as this doesn’t imply that moral statements are meaningless. Why? While moral thought does not mirror the world and so its truths are not determined by the world as scientific facts are, it nonetheless _feels_ as if they mirror something, and this _feels as if_ is sufficient for morality to work, because morality is not about objective truth, but about (some specific kind of) feelings. So, these feelings can still operate with rules (they can be consistent or inconsistent) and this is not only by virtue of logic, but of the content of moral thought (that is, the fact that it does not simply express a personal preference, an attitude, but has ambitions of universality). In this sense one might say: moral reasoning is a qualitatively distinct type of personal preference which, by virtue of its normative character, makes morality subject to logic, which grants it the leverage of reasoning. So, the normative ambition of one’s beliefs must be acknowledged first (and cannot be “deduced”), and then it’s perfectly fine not to have a literal moral landscape: if my moral claim is unfalsifiable and unprovable, it does in no way make it wrong, unlikely to be true or not permissible.

[M · Rating 3 out of 5]

While I may try to finish this, I will probably have forgotten most of it by then. I may just be lazy, but I really am not following very well. The main gist of the argument is quite simple, and Williams has some very strong views which is very apparent ("... relativism, the anthropologist's heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy." p34). I think my main problem is that I'm still not sure what his definition of morality is, and therefore all his arguments about why something, such as a belief, shows a particular moral view don't really make sense. Of course, I may have just missed this, but am at the moment far too lazy to look for it.

[Calum · Rating 2 out of 5]

I will just copypaste my personal summary of the book below, made as I read through for easier recall. As a summary of moral concepts, it is frustratingly dense but thankfully short. Williams spends a lot of time saying little, yet manages to condense a good deal of moral philosophy into this book. Nevertheless, a taxing read. 2/5 based on the Goodreads guidelines of "it's ok".

Please feel free to point out if I misunderstood Williams - very likely -.-



coming soon

[Stephen · Rating 3 out of 5]

The critique of utilitarianism, along with his writings elsewhere is daunting. His discussion of amoralism is thin and psychologically uninteresting. Solid discussion of relativism. Not a good intro text at all though.

[Jerry Wall]

Sketch of morality with special emphasis on Utilitarinism with which the author does not hold.
Relativism and subjectivism discussed. God pronounces preexisting morality in which no need for
God. God pronouncements are moral by what standard.

[Neelroop · Rating 3 out of 5]

I thought it was a bit tough to read as an introduction to the subject, but it really does teach a lot.